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Abstract 
This Thesis investigates the recent regulatory reforms applied to the credit ratings industry in 
Europe and the US. It analyses the impact on credit rating agencies (CRAs) and financial 
markets. The prior literature on CRA regulation is focused on the US markets and is limited to 
investigations of competition between CRAs. The impact of recently implemented regulations 
for CRAs in Europe has received very little academic attention and presents a highly topical 
research avenue. This Thesis makes several novel contributions to the literature, including (i) 
critical perspectives on the new regulation, especially in the EU; (ii) the impact of the 
solicitation status of sovereign ratings upon bank ratings; and (iii) whether European Securities 
Markets Authority (ESMA) rating identifiers affect the quality of ratings. Several 
methodologies are applied to enhance the robustness of the findings, including ordered probit 
analyses, fixed effects models, covariate matching (CVM) and propensity score matching 
(PSM). An extensive sample of rating actions by the largest CRAs (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P) 
during 2006 to 2014 is utilised. 
The critical review of the EU’s CRA regulation sheds light on several shortcomings and raises 
a need for reassessment. Some assumptions presented by the European Commission (EC) lack 
underlying evidence and are subjective in nature. Disclosures by CRAs have been inconsistent, 
which may reflect ambiguity in the regulations. Compliance with new regulation has affected 
the CRAs’ operating costs, which confirms earlier fears expressed by CRAs. Additional 
evidence is presented relating to CRAs’ business models. The second empirical chapter 
identifies that changes to the solicitation status of sovereigns induced by new disclosure rules 
have an adverse effect on banks domiciled in these countries. This has policy implications for 
regulators and banks since the ceiling effect identified in the study can lead to higher costs and 
harm the intermediaries. In the final empirical chapter, ESMA’s requirement for rating 
identifiers is questioned since it does not have any discernible impact on the quality of ratings 
reported by CRAs. This finding is of interest to policymakers, market participants and 
academics since the quality of ratings is linked to banking regulation and affects financial 
stability.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have played an important role in global financial markets in 
recent decades. They enabled international investments by providing clear and coherent 
assessments of creditworthiness for investors who would not be able to perform such exercises 
on their own (i.e. due to costs and time). CRAs provide investors with an independent opinion 
regarding the creditworthiness of debt issuers or issues and thereby facilitate a reduction in 
information asymmetry between investors and issuers (S&P, 2014). This ultimately results in 
lower costs of capital (Löffler 2004; Duff and Einig, 2009a). Moreover, the importance of 
ratings to users stems from the fact that entities seeking funding from debt markets are required 
to obtain credit assessment (Langohr and Langohr, 2010).  
According to Boot et al. (2006), three key and beneficial functions performed by CRAs are: 
information production, monitoring and certification. To a large extent, ratings facilitate the 
standardisation of securities via their straightforward linear rating scale (Alcubilla and Del 
Pozo, 2012). 
Ratings are useful in highlighting vulnerabilities in the financial system and identifying which 
institutions are affected by it (BIS, 2011). Therefore, ratings are important to various users such 
as corporations (including banks) and sovereigns. Creditors and trading counterparties use 
them to define the risk element of a party with whom they enter agreements. Sovereign ratings 
are central to other countries when setting conditions for international arrangements and 
determine the cost of borrowing. They are also essential to institutions operating in these 
countries as the creditworthiness of the country translates into support available to them in case 
of deteriorating economic conditions. Moreover, banks use ratings to assess the risk-weighted 
assets for regulatory requirements (BIS, 2011). 
CRAs’ techniques for corporate and sovereign ratings have performed reasonably well over a 
long period of time (Bank of England (BOE), 2011). Conversely, structured finance products 
require more than reducing information asymmetry between the debt issuers and the investors. 
They need quality credit assessment for investors who were not qualified. However, during the 
period leading up to the US sub-prime crisis, the CRAs were not able to adequately assess the 
probability of default of structured products in comparison to their strengths in traditional debt 
instruments. 
2 
 
Recent financial crises repeatedly drew the attention of regulators, academics and market 
participants to the activity of CRAs. They were blamed for an inability to foresee the Asian 
crisis in 1997 and were criticised at the beginning of the 21st century for failures to foresee the 
collapse of large corporates both in Europe and the US (e.g. Enron, Parmalat, Worldcom) (e.g. 
see Bolton et al., 2012). 
The US subprime crisis in 2007 raised serious questions about the role played by CRAs in 
modern financial markets and about their influence on global economic stability (Alcubilla and 
Del Pozo, 2012). In this respect, numerous commentators aimed to highlight the deficiencies 
of the CRA industry during the crisis. The most substantial flaws were found with the ratings 
of structured finance products (e.g. Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 2008; Stiglitz, 2008; 
Mathis et al., 2009). These investigations identified weaknesses relating to the business model 
and internal procedures of CRAs as a whole; and triggered demand for new CRA regulation. 
The determination of regulators to reform the credit rating industry stemmed not only from the 
sub-prime crisis originated in the US but also from the events which severely affected Europe 
during the debt crisis. Contrary to the previous accusations, of being too slow and lenient when 
releasing ratings, the CRAs were criticised for being too strict when suddenly issuing a series 
of sovereign downgrades in Europe (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). 
After the sovereign crisis struck Greece and Ireland, the European Commission (EC) instigated 
measures to implement EU CRA regulation. The CRAs’ European downgrades contributed to 
disruption of the stability of developed markets and placed the CRAs in the spotlight. The EC 
decided to transform the shape of the CRA business (Dalton, 2011). 
Until 2010, CRA regulation in Europe was minimal and relied on self-regulation (BOE, 2011). 
Before the crisis the EC relied on existing directives (e.g. the Capital Requirements Directive) 
and self-regulation applied by CRAs under the IOSCO Code and accountable to the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) (EC, 2006). 
According to the EC (2013), the main flaws of the CRA system could be grouped into three 
categories: issues relating to integrity, reliability and lack of transparency. Firstly, the CRAs’ 
business model leads to some conflicts of interest. The issuer-pays model implies that the debt 
issuer is the same party that remunerates the CRA for its rating services. The CRA faces a 
dilemma where it seeks to rate the issuer with the highest accuracy while ensuring the service 
is satisfactory for the client who brings revenue to the CRA (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). This 
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need to attract and retain customers triggers the phenomenon known as ratings shopping during 
the crisis (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). The potential issuers make enquires at several CRAs 
for a preliminary rating assessment and employ the CRA which assigned them with the highest 
rating. In essence it leads to pressures on CRAs to release inflated and more favourable ratings. 
Secondly, the crisis revealed an inability of CRAs to reflect precisely, and in a timely manner, 
the creditworthiness of structured finance products in the face of deteriorating economic 
conditions. This issue is closely linked to the deficiencies in methodologies and assumptions 
which did not hold in reality and underestimated the risk of a global crisis (Coval et al., 2009). 
The effect was amplified further by the overreliance by market participants who instead of 
using ratings as partial credit appraisal relied on them entirely (EC, 2010). This dependence 
resulted in the cliff-effect situation with its cascading and disastrous effect upon debtors known 
as the ‘death spiral’ (Manso, 2013).  
Thirdly, lack of transparency in CRAs’ rating processes is one of the major points condemned 
by politicians and market participants who urged new regulation (ESMA, 2011a). Before the 
crisis, rating criteria and model assumptions were not disclosed to the market (ESMA, 2011a). 
Moreover, the limitations of ratings were not explained and there was no comparable 
information on each CRA’s performance. The rating methodologies of CRAs were considered 
to be a ‘black box’ (Sy, 2009). This opacity created difficulty for investors to judge the quality 
of ratings and to comprehend the rating process (Duan and Laere, 2012).  
There are also views that a lack of competition and the oligopolistic CRA industry accentuate 
the problems mentioned above. ESME (2008)1 claim that the dominance of three players 
reduces the quality and integrity of ratings. Additionally, Fennel and Medvedev (2011) suggest 
that the current system is beneficial for the CRAs rather than for other stakeholders.  
Moreover, the fact that ratings are strongly hard-wired into securities regulations does not make 
it easy for market participants to ignore them (BOE, 2011). According to Partnoy (2002), the 
numerous references to ratings in securities and banking regulation make CRAs more 
important than they would otherwise be. 
After recognising numerous flaws of the system, steps have been taken by international 
authorities to improve the legislation and promote competition in the CRA business. Recent 
regulatory developments are based on a micro-prudential perspective and aim to reinstate the 
                                                 
1. European Securities Markets Expert Group.  
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confidence of investors and improve financial stability (ECB, 2012). The ECB stresses that the 
main actions deal with reducing problems such as conflict of interest, spillover effects, 
developing a stronger rating market with improved quality of ratings and ensuring investors 
are protected. Further, the new EU regulation aims to strengthen the independence of CRAs 
while increasing soundness of rating procedures and methodologies with the overall aim of 
improving ratings quality (EC, 2011a; ESMA, 2011b; ESMA, 2011c). For example, some of 
the undertakings include modifications to the Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs from 
2008 imposed by IOSCO to tackle issues of independence, conflict of interest, transparency 
and competition (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012a). 
In December 2009, the European Parliament and the Council released formal regulation of 
CRAs known as CRA I regulation valid from December 2010 (EC, 2011b). One aspect relates 
to the registration procedures which demand that financial firms in Europe only use ratings 
released by CRAs which are registered or certified. This regulation was reshaped in May 2011 
(CRA II) in relation to the formation of the European CRA regulator, namely the European 
Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) (EC, 2011c). ESMA was assigned with formal 
responsibilities of certifying CRAs and having oversight of their actions from July 2011.  
In November 2011, the EC announced a further proposal known as CRA III regulation (EC, 
2011d). The document focuses on several areas including release timings for sovereign ratings, 
addressing issues of conflict of interest,2 accountability of CRAs, issues of transparency3 and 
finally overreliance on ratings.4 The new proposal forbids European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs)5 from making references to external ratings.  
In June 2013, amendments to the CRA III regulations took effect (OJEU, 2013a). The 
regulation operates on the same principles as outlined in the original documentation Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and applies these rules to outlooks and watches.6,7  
Since the regulation was enacted, ESMA has been involved in scrutinising the rating process, 
carrying numerous inspections and investigations. This resulted in the first penalty issued to a 
                                                 
2. I.e. capping ownership of CRAs. 
3. For example, via disclosure requirements. 
4. EC released the application for a directive aimed at external use of ratings by investors (EC, 2011e).  
5. ESMA, EBA and EIOPA. 
6. Also known as long-term and short-term rating reviews respectively. 
7. The main aims of regulation include promoting accuracy, transparency and reduction of conflict of interest.  
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CRA operating in Europe (DBRS was fined by ESMA in June 2015 for insufficient internal 
controls) (ESMA, 2015a). 
In the coming years, ESMA aspires to minimise the hard-wiring of ratings in securities 
regulation while supplying technical reports to the EC with regards to structured finance 
products (ESMA, 2014a). The regulator seeks to strengthen its relationship with the IOSCO 
Committee and complete the alterations to the Code of Conduct. Steps are also being taken to 
reduce the current reliance on ratings by market participants (FSB, 2014). 
These recent regulatory changes are a topical issue and this Thesis aims to present original 
evidence on this theme. The changes are still evolving, and therefore evidence on their 
effectiveness is much needed. The Thesis assesses the impact of new regulations on the quality 
of ratings but also investigates the implications for the financial system as a whole. Concerns 
exist that the new regulation could further undermine the economic competitiveness of new 
entrant CRAs. Additionally, there are fears that the methodological requirements might 
jeopardise the independence of the CRAs (EC, 2012). The regulator finds itself in a difficult 
position as it needs to make choices between competition and stability.  
The objective of this Thesis is to evaluate whether European CRA regulations accomplish their 
purpose or whether they result in unintended consequences. As a result, this work can have 
major implications for policymakers, regulators and market participants. Examining recent 
regulatory changes and their impact on the economy can inform future regulations in Europe. 
The Thesis empirically analyses the impact of regulatory changes imposed on CRAs in Europe 
upon banks and financial markets. It comprises three main topics. The first empirical study 
(Chapter 4) critically evaluates the recent steps taken to reduce the mechanistic reliance on 
ratings via increased transparency requirements. The main research question states: “Are the 
profitability and competitiveness of CRAs intact following the raised expectations for 
transparency and disclosure?” The chapter suggests that there are shortcomings in the basic 
assumptions made by the regulators. For example, the EC inflate the problems of CRAs to the 
global level without using any empirical evidence and relying on many subjective assessments. 
The chapter also finds possible drawbacks of the investor-pays paradigm and suggests serious 
reconsideration of proposals surrounding this proposed alternative model. Recent scandals 
relating to the only CRA applying this form of remuneration provide evidence that the 
alternative model is not free from conflicts of interest. Moreover, inconsistencies in regulatory 
reporting amongst CRAs are detected. This leads to questioning whether it is an issue of 
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compliance on the side of CRAs or shortcomings on the side of regulators for not explicitly 
setting the requirements for CRAs and allowing scope for interpretations of regulation. Further, 
the chapter evaluates whether the costs of running a CRA business increased significantly since 
the regulation was introduced. Profitability measures including a novel proxy, calculated as the 
number of outstanding ratings to the number of analysts, are aimed to determine whether 
CRAs’ fears of impaired ability to compete are valid. 
The chapter offers a synergy of the literature on organizational capital and the financial 
performance of CRAs which has not been explored before. The prior papers consider the 
incentives of analysts and the quality and accuracy of ratings (Che, 1995; Bar-Isaac and 
Shapiro, 2011) and the reputational concerns of CRAs (Strausz, 2005; Mathis et al., 2009). The 
chapter utilises the existing literature on the effect, role and performance of credit analysts and 
their coverage to justify possible undesirable effects of regulation. The transparency 
requirements might put a strain on the CRAs to employ more staff, and consequently raising 
their costs and reducing profitability.8 
Furthermore, the chapter supplements existing studies on the impact of US regulation on CRAs 
(e.g. Jorion et al., 2005; Dimitrov et al., 2015). The novelty of this study also derives from its 
consideration of the wider CRA market and not only the largest CRAs. Numerous comparisons 
(i.e. profitability measures) are made for various Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NSROs) rather than the three biggest CRAs only.  
The second empirical study (Chapter 5) investigates the conversion of the solicitation status of 
sovereigns induced by ESMA disclosure rules (Article 10 (5) of the EU Regulation 1060/2009). 
The CRA regulation requires that all ratings issued on an unsolicited basis need to be identified 
as such. Following enactment of EU regulation, S&P announced conversion to unsolicited 
status for 14 of its rated sovereigns in February 2011 (S&P, 2011a). The research question is: 
“Did the conversion to sovereign unsolicited rating status (induced by regulation) result in 
lower bank ratings in the sovereign states whose status was converted?” Solicited ratings result 
from the contract between the CRA and the issuer who requests and pays for the rating. 
Unsolicited ratings do not involve this agreement and are released by a CRA without the prior 
request or remuneration from the issuer.  
                                                 
8. Although the effect on the profitability of the CRAs might be neutral it might negatively affect the shareholders.  
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The solicitation status of ratings remains one of the most controversial characteristics of the 
CRA industry which raised debates and disputes amongst policymakers in Europe and Asia 
(The Japanese Center for International Finance (JCIF), 1999; Fitch, 2006; Behr and Güttler, 
2008). The previous literature uncovers that intermediaries and firms which are rated on an 
unsolicited basis have relatively lower ratings than those issuers who pay for the service. Three 
main theories might explain this phenomenon: self-selection, conservatism and the blackmail 
theory (Bannier et al., 2010; Van Roy 2013). Despite this existing literature, there is no prior 
study investigating the impact of sovereign solicitation and its consequences.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the CRA regulatory requirements achieve 
their purpose of more transparent and reliable rating services or whether they lead to 
unintended outcomes. The issue of solicitation conversion is important because it links with 
the recent disclosure rules imposed by ESMA. This literature on unsolicited (non-sovereign) 
ratings forms a theoretical framework for the chapter. Moreover, it is known from previous 
studies that sovereign risks can be transferred onto financial institutions via different channels 
(BIS, 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014). Furthermore, Borensztein et al. 
(2013) finds that sovereign ratings act as a ceiling on non-sovereign ratings. As a result of this, 
the ratings of the latter issuers usually do not exceed those of the sovereign state where they 
are domiciled. By bridging these three themes of research (regulation, unsolicited ratings and 
the sovereign-bank rating ceiling), Chapter 5 achieves a unique contribution to the CRA 
literature.  
The third empirical study (Chapter 6) assesses the effects of the requirement for identifiers 
introduced by ESMA in April 2012 and its influence on rating quality. More specifically, the 
chapter investigates the influence that identifiers had on the market. The study questions 
whether the market performs better in the sense that it is more aligned with ratings through 
bond yields. The research question is: “Did the quality of ratings change after the ESMA 
identifiers were introduced?” The quality is identified as the information content of ratings 
which emerges through the ability of ratings to explain bond yields. When the rating precisely 
mirrors the risk of an issuer and correlates highly with bond yields it is considered a high quality 
rating and vice versa (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). 
In line with Act 4.3 of the EU CRA Regulation, ESMA requires that CRAs disclose which 
ratings are issued in the EU, which originated outside the EU and have been endorsed, and 
which have not been endorsed. Only ratings which obtained either EU-issued or endorsed status 
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can be used for the regulatory purposes e.g. capital adequacy requirements of a bank (EC, 
2011c). Effectively, for ratings to be used by financial firms, the rating analysts must be situated 
in a jurisdiction with a CRA regulatory regime at least as stringent as that in the EU (EC, 
2011c). The rationale behind the introduction of identifiers is to improve rating quality, 
increase supervisory integration of the CRAs, protect investors in the EU and to seek an overall 
improvement in the functioning of financial markets (ESMA, 2011b). 
The novelty of this chapter stems from the fact it considers the effect of regulation which does 
not evolve around the competition aspect as in earlier studies (see Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; 
Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Doherty et al., 2012). Additionally, this is 
a unique study because it is the first to consider the influence of ESMA identifiers on the CRA 
market.. In essence, it captures the direct feedback of regulation (induced by the presence of 
identifiers) on the quality of ratings. It is important to study this issue more closely because it 
is believed that endorsement requirements could add credibility to CRAs’ opinions and thereby 
cause ratings to be more rather than less important to market participants. 
The data used in this Thesis covers numerous CRAs operating globally and regionally. In 
Chapter 4, statistics on the number of analysts, outstanding ratings and competition levels are 
acquired from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and ESMA Transparency 
Reports. Interactive Data Credit Ratings International (IDCRI) is also used as an alternative 
source of issuer ratings data across seven CRAs. 
The datasets used also offer a wide cross section of countries with differing industrialisation 
levels. For example, the sample in Chapter 5 covers 42 sovereigns and 147 listed banks 
originating from these countries rated by S&P. Chapter 6 uses sovereign ratings from Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P covering 69 countries. The sovereign rating data is acquired from my 
supervisors’ database and from CRAs’ publications. The bank rating data derives from the 
IDCRI database. Financial and accounting statistics on publicly listed banks is sourced from 
Bankscope whereas the macroeconomic variables are sourced from DataStream. Further, the 
bond characteristics and pricing data along with global risk factors are from Bloomberg. 
To ensure rigour in the findings, the methodologies used in Chapters 5 and 6 apply the quasi-
experimental design such as difference-in-difference (DD) estimation. Further, the chapters 
apply fixed effect models and additionally include ordered probit analyses. They also offer 
numerous robustness tests including falsification tests, covariate matching (CVM) and 
propensity score matching (PSM).  
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The contribution of this Thesis is mainly based on the originality of the research questions. For 
instance, this is the first analysis of the steps aimed at reducing mechanistic reliance on ratings 
in an empirical setting. The link between the sovereign-bank rating channel, solicitation status 
and regulation has not been explored before. Additionally, originality stems from the 
investigation of the ESMA identifiers which did not receive any attention whatsoever in the 
prior literature. Lastly, extensive data coverage enables the robust contributions of this Thesis. 
The significance and relevance of the studied issues is substantial because the EU CRA 
regulatory changes are new and remain on-going. The Thesis identifies implications of 
regulation on the financial system and on the CRAs themselves. For example, changes in the 
solicitation status of sovereigns are found to have a negative effect on banks operating in the 
countries which switched their status. Moreover, the profitability and competition of the CRAs 
is marginally (negatively) affected as a result of transparency requirements. On the other hand, 
the efforts aimed at increased quality of ratings via the use of identifiers do not imply any 
effects (neither negative nor positive) and require further examination. The question which 
arises here is whether these results are the impact of the new regulation itself or an effect arising 
from revealing aspects of CRAs’ behaviour that were previously opaque. 
The structure of the Thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides the context and introduces 
fundamental characteristics of the CRA industry. Chapter 3 reviews prior literature in the field 
and points to the gaps in the literature. Chapter 4 begins the empirical investigation and 
provides an overview of regulatory actions aimed at reducing mechanistic reliance on ratings 
via increased transparency requirements. The chapter offers a critical appraisal of the actions 
taken by the European regulators. Chapter 5 investigates the impact of the changes in sovereign 
solicitation status upon bank ratings in those countries. Chapter 6 considers the effects of 
ESMA identifiers on the quality of ratings. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the Thesis, presents 
limitations and opens potential avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Background of the credit rating industry and recent 
regulatory reforms 
2.1 Introduction 
CRAs are an important contributor to financial markets by measuring creditworthiness. 
Without the presence of CRAs, repeated credit assessments would prove costly and time 
consuming for investors. By entrusting the task of issuing ratings, market participants rely on 
the robustness and accuracy standards of the issuing CRAs. Investors implicitly trust that rating 
assessments are performed to the highest possible standards and represent full commitment of 
the analysts (Duan and Laere, 2012). The CRAs face a dilemma of whether to rate accurately 
(in a short-term sense) or in a stable manner that does not unnecessarily disrupt markets by 
reversing their ratings in a short time window (Löffler, 2005). Another issue relates to the fact 
that the prevalent model of remuneration is not perfect and leaves scope for criticism. Namely, 
the issuer-pays paradigm is prone to conflict of interest issues since the issuer pays for the 
ratings (see Fennell and Medvedev, 2011).   
In the recent years CRAs have been put in the spotlight and criticised for their lax ratings and 
inability to predict the sub-prime crisis (Stolper, 2009). CRAs also stand accused of worsening 
the European debt crisis by downgrading ratings of Eurozone sovereigns too far and too fast 
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). Politicians across the EU called for further regulation and 
competition in sovereign ratings. Several policy actions have been agreed and new legislation 
has been voted by the European Parliament (EC, 2011b, c, d). The overall objective of 
regulatory changes is to reduce the impact of rating actions in financial markets, especially the 
mechanistic reactions induced by hardwiring and cliff-effects as well as imposing civil liability 
for ratings. 
The problem of CRAs is not one sided however. Some of the issues arise from the business 
model of ratings itself while others from the regulatory negligence on the side of regulators and 
the market players. For example, users of credit ratings were often found to over-rely on the 
given information and blindly made their decisions without performing in-house assessments 
(House of Commons, 2012). In addition, regulators kept a blind eye for a very long time (BOE, 
2011). The ratings became strongly imbedded into regulations and this assured investors about 
their reliability and encouraged reckless behaviour. The purpose of this chapter is to present 
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the current issues and features relating CRA industry. In addition to providing the background 
of the ratings used in this Thesis and their importance, the chapter links the recent regulatory 
efforts regarding rating industry in Europe. Namely, the chapter shows steps undertaken by 
responsible authorities, by providing detailed information about policy proceedings, legal 
actions and regulatory proposals and directives.  
The chapter structure is as follows: section 2.2 introduces philosophy and methodologies used 
by CRAs. Section 2.3 demonstrates the types of existing ratings and number of players in the 
CRA market. Moreover, section 2.4 stresses the importance of ratings for the financial markets 
and the economy as a whole. In section 2.5, the business model of CRAs is presented along 
with the recent criticisms of the paradigm. The need for regulation resulting from these issues 
and the steps taken and challenges faced by the regulators is subject of section 2.6. Section 2.7 
concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Philosophy and methodology of credit ratings 
The ratings construct is based on two leading philosophies. The first school of thought, 
Through the Cycle Rating, is predominant in external CRAs whereas approach based on Point 
in Time Ratings is mainly employed internally by intermediaries.  
The former approach allows CRAs to focus on long term perspective which covers from one 
to many business cycles. This gives smoothening effect as ratings are not influenced by one 
particular point during the business cycle. This relates to the fact that if a change of 
creditworthiness is made, it is very difficult to be reversed to the initial rating as there is a 
permanent change in credit worthiness rating of the issuer. Market participants who appreciate 
this methodology are regulators, bond issuers and investment managers as it smoothens out the 
turbulences in the business cycle of the rated security. 
A Point in Time Rating methodology imitates the future borrower’s position in the exact short 
time frame. Accordingly, as the business cycle changes issuer’s rating position alters. This 
paradigm is sought by investors of hedge funds or traders who prefer ratings to be accurate at 
the time they purchase securities. 
Rating approaches can be divided into qualitative, quantitative and mixed. The approaches vary 
across CRAs. For this reason, users should be careful when comparing ratings and treating 
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them as benchmarks for their investment decisions. According to S&P (2011), some CRAs use 
analysts, others build mathematical models, whereas some of them combine two approaches. 
S&P applies analyst driven credit ratings where specialists appraise issuer based on financial 
data as well as weight in qualitative information (e.g. future strategies). Scope of S&P’s 
approach embraces financial performance, policies and risk management strategies of the 
debtor together with the external business environment affecting the business. Likelihood of 
default is the central factor in rating process. It mirrors ability and willingness to meet debt 
obligations. Importantly, ratings deriving from this approach do not measure absolute default 
probability (S&P, 2012a). 
Fitch Rating’s rating methodology reviews institutional framework, intermediate risk 
assessment, competitive dynamics and system-wide funding. Their approach splits credit risk 
into two components: default probability and loss given default. Each sovereign and corporate 
is issued with Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and Recovery Rating (RR) which are then combined 
together giving final Issue Rating. The former rating measures ability of debtor to repay agreed 
amounts on time whereas the following rating suggests the likelihood of recovery of an issuer 
in case of defaulting (Fitch, 2012). 
Moody’s utilises the “expected loss” (EL) methodology which takes into account probability 
of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) of the issuer. Those measures are subsequently 
multiplied to derive at EL value. Similar to the earlier CRA PD quantifies the probability of 
issuer not meeting debt obligations and defaulting whereas LGD is computed by dividing losses 
of the issuer against his/her exposures during default (Moody's, 2012a). 
2.2.1 The rating process 
The rating process within which a sovereign or bank rating is produced differs quite 
substantially. The principles on which the analysis is conducted are presented using examples 
based on the two largest CRAs. 
The sovereign rating criteria of S&P (2014) refer to factors which influence a government’s 
willingness and ability to pay its debt obligation promptly and in its entirety. The analysis 
conducted by the CRA focuses partially on the past behaviour in terms of the economic and 
political cycles but also the factors which might shed light on the higher or lower fiscal and 
monetary flexibility in the upcoming economic cycles. S&P investigates five factors which 
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form the foundation of the credit analysis. These are: institutional and governance efficacy and 
security risks, economic structure and growth outlooks, external liquidity and international 
investment position, fiscal performance and flexibility followed by debt burden and finally 
monetary flexibility. The analysis of these factors consists of quantitative and qualitative 
elements. For example, the robustness of the political institutions comprise mainly qualitative 
information whereas economic factors such as debt and external liquidity are mainly based on 
quantitative indicators. 
Each of the categories receives a score on the six-point numerical scale from the strongest (1) 
to the weakest (6). These values are then combined together to achieve the sovereign’s 
institutional and governance effectiveness and economic profile (an average of the first two 
scores) and its flexibility and performance profile (an average of the remaining three scores). 
These two elements are used to determine the indicative rating level. S&P notes that the 
expected sovereign foreign-currency rating will most likely fall within one notch of this level 
depending on a comparison against other sovereigns. 
The entire rating process is normally initiated by the issuer willing to be rated (the same applies 
to bank ratings and to other CRAs) i.e. solicited ratings. Once the request from the sovereign 
is received the CRA typically enters into an agreement to rate the issue/issuer. Although most 
governments have agreements with CRAs, some sovereigns’ ratings are released on unsolicited 
basis where no agreement with the issuer was reached. The CRA continues to rate those issuers 
when it believes that there is significant interest in the market and sufficient public information 
available to support the analysis.  
To rate a sovereign, S&P allocates a lead analyst who acquires information from published 
statements and reports, along with interviews and dialogue with government representatives. 
The formulation of the rating opinion is conducted according to specific criteria and is informed 
by the expertise and judgement of credit analysts and other professionals involved in the 
process (S&P, 2014). The information prepared by the analysts during the rating process is 
reported to the rating committee. The quantitative and qualitative assessments performed by 
the teams are presented by the lead analyst together with views and recommendations which 
are finally considered by the voting members of the rating committee to arrive at the assigned 
rating. The issuer is notified about the outcome and publication and dissemination of public 
rating opinions follows.  
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Bank ratings are determined not only by bank-specific factors but also macroeconomic factors 
and the extent of external support that they receive. S&P (2011d) stresses that their framework 
for rating financial institutions comprises of two steps: verifying Stand-Alone Credit Profile 
(SACP) and evaluating extraordinary support by either government or a group. Combining 
both steps establishes the bank’s Issuer Credit Rating (ICR).9 The estimation of SACP depends 
on six factors grouped into macro and bank-specific factors. The first two indicators such as 
economic risk and industry risk rely on the Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment 
methodology (BICRA) which measures the conditions of the surrounding economic 
environment. The following four indicators signify strengths and weaknesses of the particular 
intermediary such as business position, capital and earnings, risk position, funding and 
liquidity. Finally, the support framework takes into account the rapport between the bank and 
the parent group or the government and considers how it affects banks creditworthiness. 
Moody’s (2015a) assigns sovereign ratings based on four principal factors: economic strength, 
institutional strength, fiscal strength and susceptibility to event risk. Each of these factors 
encompasses the sub-factors which have quantitative weights attached and are represented by 
indicator variables (i.e. macroeconomic variables).10 After each indicator has been calculated, 
it is mapped into one of the 15 ranking categories. These in turn determine the score for the 
particular sub-factor. Finally, the scorecard informs the determination of the overall rating.  
Moody’s recently revised its bank rating methodology in the light of the financial crisis and 
the ongoing fundamental shifts in the banking sector and its regulation. The methodology 
includes a similar approach to S&P to an institution’s creditworthiness. Additionally, the 
analysis addresses the expected losses while considering whether external support is available 
to the bank or not. Moody’s approach to assigning bank ratings takes the form of sequential 
analysis, which comprises an assessment of the standalone financial strength of the bank – 
Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) followed by an assessment of possible affiliates. Thirdly, 
Loss Given Failure (LGF) captures the influence of the bank’s failure on the expected loss of 
                                                 
9. Once the probability of extraordinary support is ascertained, S&P first establishes the bank’s indicative issuer credit rating 
(ICR). This indicative measure is the component of the final ICR which is the combination of the SACP and the support factor. 
In most cases, the indicative ICR is the same as the final ICR, however there are instances when it differs by plus/minus one 
notch. This may occur when the bank is subject to political, social or economic trends which either impede or facilitate its 
creditworthiness or some positive or negative transition which adds/lessens the risk not captured earlier by the ICR (S&P, 
2011d). 
10. For example, the sub-factor of the economic strength ‘growth dynamic’ is quantified by using the average real GDP growth, 
volatility in real GDP growth and the WEF Global Competitiveness Index. 
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various creditor classes. Finally, Moody’s considers the potential support by governments to 
conclude the credit rating for a particular instrument. The assessments include qualitative (i.e. 
business diversification, opacity and complexity) as well as quantitative components (financial 
ratios relating to solvency and liquidity). Moody’s stresses that it seeks information on bank 
statistics such as funding bases through examination of public information together with 
dialogue with the issuers.  
As highlighted by Moody’s (2015a), the factors identified in published methodologies as being 
used to rate issuers may not always capture all considerations taken by the CRA. Moody’s 
might use additional adjustment factors specific to that issuer (e.g. sovereign) which may not 
be universally available or relevant. If such confidential information is used, it is not disclosed 
to the public. Moody’s suggests that it may consider some supplementary factors, which are 
difficult to measure. In some cases, the elements used are complex and expressing them in the 
published methodologies is problematic. In addition, the weighting of factors used for 
calculations might sometimes differ from those published. The new regulatory environment 
has failed to extract all methodological details from the CRAs, who have a clear incentive to 
protect their business and commercial advantages. 
S&P (2014) suggests that in addition to publicly available information, discussions with issuers 
contribute to the assessment involved in the rating process. For example, when rating 
sovereigns, S&P collects information during meetings with officials from the treasury or 
finance ministry. Information also derives from reports and discussions with other official 
observers, politicians in and outside government, and private-sector commentators on 
economic and political trends (economists, bankers, media sources). S&P highlights that some 
information used in the rating process might not be considered public.  
 To summarize, ratings are opinions on the issuer’s creditworthiness and reflect both 
quantitative and qualitative assessments of risk and the expert judgements of a rating committee 
(often using soft information). For this reason, ratings cannot be explained entirely by a 
particular set of data and formal rules (BIS, 2011). Moreover, it is often stressed that the 
assessment produces a relative not absolute measure. The assigned rating level must be 
regarded relative to other issuers. Therefore, the value added from using ratings stems from 
CRAs’ private information and the cost savings to issuers and investors that arise from that. 
The added-information role of CRAs aids transparency and market efficiency and reduces 
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers in debt markets (Fitch, 2013). 
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2.3 Types of ratings 
As of July 2015, the EU CRA industry comprised 25 registered and 4 certified11 CRAs. Within 
the group of registered CRAs, the three main players (Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and S&P) 
constitute a group of 17 legal entities (ESMA, 2015b). S&P has representation in three 
European states whereas Fitch and Moody’s reside in six European markets each. The three 
CRAs comprise approximately 90 percent of the outstanding ratings (ESMA, 2014c). The 
growth of market share remains at similar levels since 2013 although the regulator observes 
increasing numbers of applications for registration from CRAs (ESMA, 2015c). 
As of December 2014, there were 10 NRSROs12 registered with the SEC. The larger CRAs 
(Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P) comprised approximately 9713 percent of the market share (SEC, 
2014). In terms of concentration of CRAs, larger NRSROs rate over 99 percent of the 
government, municipal and sovereign issuers, 84 percent of financial institutions and 74 
percent of insurance companies in the US. 
The range of services provided by ratings lie within five classes: (1) financial institutions (i.e. 
brokers, dealers); (2) insurance companies; (3) corporate issuers; (4) asset-backed securities’ 
issuers and (5) government securities’ issuers (i.e. government securities, municipal securities, 
or securities issued by a foreign government) (SEC, 2014). 
According to Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010a), issue and issuer ratings can be distinguished 
for short-term and long-term debt. An issue credit rating is the judgment of the CRA about the 
creditworthiness of a party concerning a particular financial project or asset class. On the other 
hand, an issuer rating is the opinion about the overall ability and motivation of the party to 
repay its debts on time. Short-rating comprises appraisal of short term debt (i.e. bonds) which 
matures in less than 365 days. The long term ratings are for instruments and investments with 
a maturity in excess of 12 months.  
                                                 
11. According to the EU CRA Regulation CRAs willing to provide rating services need to be registered or certified by the 
regulatory body European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) (ESMA, 2013c). The CRAs established in the EU or their 
subsidiaries operating in Europe are entitled to apply for registration. The ratings issued in third countries are allowed for 
regulatory purposes if they are issued by certified CRAs. Certification obliges that “the Commission has adopted an 
equivalence decision regarding the third country’s regulatory regime for CRAs” (EC, 2011d; p.22). 
12. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations. 
13. As of 2014 the total reported ratings amounted to 2,437,046. Other NRSROs include A.M. Best, DBRS, EJR, HR Ratings, 
JCR, KBRA and Morningstar (SEC, 2014). For comparison of concentration of the CRA market across the years see Table 
4.3b. 
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Further, credit ratings can relate to debt issuers whose obligations lie in home or foreign 
currency (i.e. local versus foreign currency ratings). According to S&P (2012a), the local 
currency ratings can be higher than foreign rating up to two notches to account for possible 
advantage in governments’ position. This might include issuing currency and control over 
country’s financial system.14  
Different classifications of ratings exist. For instance, issuers willing to measure their ability 
to repay debt and are incurring cost of the appraisal are issued with solicited ratings. An 
unanticipated assessment by the CRA using publicly given information about the issuer is 
known as unsolicited rating. In the latter, the CRA is not awarded a fee, unlike the former (Gan, 
2004; Behr and Güttler, 2008). 
In addition to traditional rating changes which express the creditworthiness of an issuer, CRAs 
publish reviews: watchlists and outlooks on issuers.15 The former also known as rating review 
is an evaluation of particular rating for the next 90 days. If there is a sign that the rating might 
need alteration such issuer is placed on a watchlist with the negative changes resulting in a 
downgrade or a positive changes followed by an upgrade. Watchlist category may also give 
direction of uncertain category (E) however this classification is generally omitted in the 
literature (see Hamilton and Cantor 2004; 2005). Outlook on the other hand, involves 
estimations of the course of ratings in the coming 12-18 months which can take form of 
positive, negative, developing or stable (Hamilton and Cantor, 2005, 2004; Klaar and Riley, 
2005). 
This work will focus on two types of rating services, namely sovereign and bank ratings. 
Sovereign and financial institutions ratings are based on appraisal of bonds released by 
governments or financial firms and reflect their ability to repay outstanding debt obligations.  
Sovereign long-term foreign-currency ratings assess the ability and willingness of a country to 
repay its foreign currency obligations on time. The ranking reflects social, economic, financial 
as well as political situation of considered country together with its overall advancement.   
                                                 
14. Situation changes when a government belongs to the monetary union where it answers to the central bank. In such instance 
the ratings might equal to the foreign currency ratings (S&P, 2012b). 
15. S&P started producing outlook and watch status, together with its sovereigns, in 1989 (Vazza et al., 2005; Chambers and 
Ontko, 2007). Moody’s introduced watch in 1991, as the second CRA. Outlooks followed in 1995 (Hamilton and Cantor, 
2004). Fitch implemented watch status in August 1994, when it first joined sovereign ratings market (Klaar and Riley, 2005). 
Moreover, Fitch started reporting outlook status on long-term foreign-currency sovereign ratings from September 21, 2000.  
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Quite the contrary holds for bank ratings as valuations are created using economic and financial 
information.  
2.4 Importance of credit ratings  
Globalization as well as complexity of available investment products and its originators has 
triggered need for universal and nationally recognised risk assessment (Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym, 2010a, 2013; Hill and Faff, 2010). Need for rating derives from the fact that market 
participants who wish to join capital markets are required to obtain credit assessment. Some 
even call them “tickets to entry” to capital markets (Langohr, 2006; Langohr and Langohr, 
2010). According to Von Schweinitz (2007), approximately 80 percent of the capital flow is 
influenced by credit ratings. 
Moreover, due to hardwiring ratings into regulations, certain financial institutions are not 
allowed to invest in debt securities which have not obtained an investment rating from 
restricted group of CRAs (i.e. NRSRO) (Löffler, 2004; Stolper, 2009; Kisgen and Strahan, 
2010). For example: according to rule 2a-7 of the US Investment Company Act of 1940 money 
market funds are obliged to acquire eligible securities which include the highest two short-term 
ratings classes (SEC, 2010). These need to be classified by one of the NRSROs or comparable 
to securities which fall in the same category.16 According to adjustments of the regulation from 
May 2010, funds are restricted from purchasing second tier rated securities. Additionally, 
pension funds municipalities17 are obliged to invest merely within grade classes assigned by 
the certified group of CRAs (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010b; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010).  
Moreover, ratings act as an intermediary between financiers and debtors thus reducing 
information asymmetry. This in effect leads to lower cost of capital (Löffler 2004; Duff and 
Einig, 2009a). Beneficiaries of ratings comprise of issuers themselves, potential investors, 
intermediaries as well as regulatory bodies as they provide credit assessment and deliver it to 
other parties. 
 
                                                 
16. Amended rule 2a-7(a)(12) (eligible security). 
17. A political unit, such as a city, town, or village, incorporated for local self-government. 
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2.4.1 Sovereign ratings 
The importance of sovereign ratings in particular lies in the fact that investors willing to 
diversify abroad should understand the credit risks of sovereign issuers (Cantor and Packer, 
1996). Moreover, sovereign ratings help countries to gain access to new sources of capital by 
entering international markets and enabling a flow of foreign investment (Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick, 2004; Andritzky et al., 2007; Kim and Wu, 2008). The announcement of sovereign 
ratings has major implications on financial markets such as rising cost of credit and hindered 
market access (BIS, 2011). In addition, the release of rating has become a very sensitive area 
in the world of politics. Politicians and regulators are concerned about the impact credit ratings 
may have on Governmental policy. For instance, in an interview to the Financial Times (FT), 
president Sarkozy admitted that his concern was only about maintaining the triple “A rating” 
for France.18 Designing and delivering special packages aimed at sustaining current sovereign 
rating (triple A) of the United Kingdom provides evidence on the impact of ratings on 
governmental legislation.  
Furthermore, sovereign ratings used to act as ceilings on ratings allocated to intermediaries, 
corporates, and local governments. This means that if the country received a particular rating 
the corporate bonds amongst others could not be rated above this grade. Although rating 
ceilings no longer exist, after Moody’s, S&P and Fitch removed it from their directives, it still 
positively influences other classes of ratings (Williams et al., 2013). Borensztein et al. (2013) 
name this phenomenon as the sovereign ceiling lite.  
2.4.2 Bank ratings 
The reliance on bank ratings has grown in the recent years when the number of financial 
transactions increased in quantity and their complexity amplified. Additionally, the finance 
moved from banks to capital markets (Boot and Thakor, 2010). This simultaneously with the 
deregulation and inventions in the financial services (e.g. securitisation, derivatives) resulted 
in the intermediaries’ market being bigger in size, more concentrated, complex and closely 
linked with the capital markets (Hau et al., 2013). Additionally, bank ratings play an important 
role in shaping the cost of issuing senior unsecured debt. This type of debt is the most important 
                                                 
18. However, France was downgraded from AAA to AA+ by S&P in January 2012. In November 2012 Moody’s also 
downgraded France from Aaa to Aa1 and has kept its negative outlook. During the entire 2012 Fitch rated France at AAA with 
a negative outlook (FT, 2012). 
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type of funding for intermediaries in the long run (Wyman, 2011). Rating banks pose some 
difficulties on the side of CRAs however. For example, intermediaries are opaque and subject 
to range of different risks. They are also exposed to issues of asymmetric information and under 
constant pressure of regulatory interference.  
Following, the importance of bank ratings stems from the fact that banks play dominant role in 
the economy by providing intermediation such as distribution of capital and risk and liquidity 
creation. The policies in the US made CRAs responsible for determining the quality of banks 
portfolios (White, 2010). For example, to obtain liquidity central banks need to satisfy the 
minimal quality of collateral identified through the CRA ratings. This connects closely to the 
capital requirements stated in the Basel II accord which rely heavily on the use of the external 
bank ratings. Hau et al. (2013) suggests that, although large intermediaries might apply internal 
credit assessments, their models often depend on external ratings (e.g. methodological 
grounds). While Basel III acknowledges the need to lessen the dependence on ratings for 
securitised loans, it creates another responsibility for ratings in over the counter derivatives 
markets (BCBS, 2010). 
2.5 Business model of CRAs 
Rating industry is characterised by ‘for profit business model’ which at its onset relied on the 
investor-pays principle where investor incurred cost of credit assessment of the institution 
he/she wanted to invest in. The paradigm changed in the late 70’s when it was replaced by the 
issuer-pays model (Pagano and Volpin, 2010; White, 2010). Credit ratings arising from the 
technological innovation around that time, which induced free-riding problem, as well as 
resulting from increased complexity of financial instruments became known as sell-side credit 
ratings (Randhawa, 2011). 
The issuer-pays model offers advantages including free information about investments 
available to market participants and researchers. In addition, CRAs are not encumbered with 
the free-riding problem since the income is not dependent on investors but issuers. Some 
believe this leads to greater economies of scale for CRAs and in effect more adequate ratings 
(McDaniel, 2009). According to SEC (2012), from the nine CRAs registered as NRSROs at 
the end of 2012 six were operating under the investor-pays model19 which accounted of nearly 
                                                 
19. A.M. Best Company, Inc. (A.M. Best); DBRS, Inc. (DBRS); Fitch, Inc. (Fitch); Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. (JCR); 
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (Moody’s); and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P). 
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99 percent of issued ratings at the end of 2011. Two CRAs20 have previously been using the 
subscriber-pays model and recently started providing services under the first paradigm. The 
only CRA fully relying on the subscriber-pays model is EJR.21 
When a new rating is issued (under the issuer-pays model), a CRA is typically compensated as 
part of the contract with the issuer (unless the rating is unsolicited and is issued free of charge). 
Such compensation depends on different factors such as rating type and the debt issuance 
amount. According to S&P (2016), there might be a supplementary fee for rating more complex 
and unique structures which require additional analytical attention. Extra fees might also be 
charged for requests which require action in more restricted time frames. S&P’s website states 
its fees for rating services in the US as of January 2016 (see Table 2.1). Moody’s information 
is much more ambiguous by stating that their fees range from $1,500 to approximately 
$2,500,000. Moody’s includes this information in the form of a disclaimer in all of its 
publications. Fitch reports prices for its services in a similar manner as part of the disclaimer 
message. It receives fees between US$1,000 to US$750,000 for rating services from issuers, 
insurers, guarantors, other obligors and underwriters. Fitch might also charge annual fees to 
those issuers wanting to rate multiple issues amongst others. These fees range between 
US$10,000 to US$1,500,000. 
The issuer-pays model became subject to criticism in recent years. Justifications for 
disapprovals of the model are presented in the subsequent section. In addition to issues directly 
concerned with the business model, the general criticisms of the industry such as overreliance 
on rating and competitiveness of the markets are introduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20. Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (KBRA) and Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (Morningstar). 
21. Egan-Jones Ratings Company. On January 22 2013 the CRA became barred from some ratings by SEC (Reuters, 2013) 
(see section 4.2.2.5). 
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Table 2.1- Fees charged by S&P 
Type of the rating Fee 
Corporate*  Up to 6.25 basis points for most transactions 
 Minimum fee $100,000 
Public Finance  Depends on the sector, par amount, structure and 
complexity of the transaction 
 Fees range from $7,500 to $500,000 
 Fees on large transactions (>$500million) are 
determined on a case-by-case basis 
Sovereigns  Up to 6.25 basis points for most transactions 
 Minimum fee $100,000 
Structured Finance  Fees range up to 12 basis points 
Complex Transactions  Higher fees apply to more complex transactions 
Frequent Issuer and Multi-Year 
Fee Arrangements: 
 Alternative fee arrangements can be made for volume 
issuers and multi-year rating service agreements.  
Notes: This Table presents fees charged by S&P for their rating services. Information accessed from S&P (2016). 
* Corporate includes industrial and financial service companies. 
 
2.5.1 Critiques of the paradigm 
Firstly, despite the fact that assessment of credit worthiness revealed by CRAs has an influence 
on financial decisions across internal investors as well in a cross country spectrum; until 
recently, CRAs did not reveal information outlining methodologies applied while producing 
such ratings. The transparency issue was one of the prevalent arguments pointed out by 
politicians,22 as well as among market participants pressing for amendments in regulation 
(ESMA, 2011a). 
Secondly, the actual methodology calls for attention from rating providers. The economic 
significance of ratings produced is being disputed and criticisms are directed at their ability to 
forecast creditworthiness. Some authors argue that ratings are backward looking (Duan and 
Laere, 2012). For instance, in the early 2007-2008, CRAs were incapable of recognising risks 
associated with securities backed by sub-prime mortgages (Duff and Einig, 2009b; Stolper, 
2009). During the recent crisis CRAs have also been blamed for lagging the sovereigns and 
                                                 
22. European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier called for enhanced transparency on how ratings 
evaluate sovereign debt, January 2012. 
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downgrading them too far and too fast (EC, 2010). Further, uniformity of ratings across CRAs 
remains an issue requiring immediate attention. Although CRAs’ methodologies might share 
some similarities, they are very different (House of Lords, 2011). It is often the case that CRAs 
release contradicting issues. Split ratings arise due to, inter alia, different time frames applied 
by raters and varying methodologies capturing different aspects of an investment environment.  
Thirdly, problems arise due to the fact that issuer of the credit rating is the same party 
remunerating the CRA for their thorough analysis. Until outburst of the crisis, CRAs’ business 
relied mainly on source of funding arising from corporate and structured products ratings. For 
instance, Moody’s main revenue derived from ratings whereas the rest of their operations and 
services were dedicated to sensitivity analysis, risk management and consulting (Partnoy, 
2002). Sell-side ratings became a multi-billion industry where majority of income stems from 
bond ratings. Deb and Murphy (2009) refer to these services as ‘cash cows’ of the CRAs. 
The conflict of interest, in turn, might trigger the shopping for ratings phenomenon which is 
usually seen in structured products and leads to pressures on CRAs.23 Issuers are given 
preliminary information about the rating and might decide to request ratings from multiple 
sources and pressurise CRAs to receive the most desired rating (Fennell and Medvedev, 2011). 
Given the fact that in majority of cases it is the issuer who encounters cost of rating procedure 
(i.e. example of solicited ratings), many big financial firms (i.e. large banks) may gain 
favourable treatment of its regular rating supplier (see White, 2002; Hau et al., 2013). In line 
with this belief, studies find that unsolicited ratings tend to be knowingly lower (Economist, 
2005) and for this reason have raised concerns amongst issuers and policy makers (see Matsuo, 
2005; Fitch, 2006).24  
Further, commentators often label rating industry as uncompetitive and harmful for issuers and 
very beneficial for CRAs. The fact that 97 percent of the market share remains in the hands of 
the three main players in the industry (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) is an indicator of the lack of 
competitiveness and implies oligopolistic market form.  
In addition, one can observe various barriers to entry to the rating industry, as follows:  
1) Regulation proves to be a costly barrier to entry born by incumbent rating firms.  
                                                 
23. CRAs are remunerated based on issuance of rating. 
24. The public debate across countries on the procedures relating unsolicited ratings is subject of section 3.4.  
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2) Brand awareness constitutes a major problem for smaller firms offering ratings to 
issuers. When the issuers think CRAs, they most often assimilate particular brand 
names such as S&P and Moody’s, therefore it is difficult for rivals to break this 
credence and loyalty (Fennell and Medvedev, 2011). 
In summary, it is known that rating services were considered part of the aggregated analysis in 
measuring credit worthiness of an issuer. However, this role deepened over time and such 
appraisal became a requirement for variety of market indentures. Problematic nature of 
hardwiring is that market participants cannot simply ignore ratings since they became strongly 
embedded into regulation and financial contracts (Bank of England (BOE), 2011). This 
hardwiring effect coupled with the overreliance of investors who instead of viewing such 
appraisals as input towards decision making relied on them carelessly.  
On the other hand, regulators blamed for turning a blind eye on CRAs. In one of parliamentary 
meetings in the UK, Paul Taylor CEO of Fitch ratings lashed out at members of the Treasury 
Select Committee for their incompetence and inability to appropriately scrutinise the CRAs. 
Members of the Treasury were blamed for lack of briefing and not utilizing the available 
research produced by Fitch and other CRAs. In his interview for the Times, Taylor added: 
“Unless you understand the depth of the information we're producing, and the work that goes 
into it, you're not criticising us from a well enough informed position” (The Times, 2012). 
2.5.2 European sovereign debt crisis 
Generally, financial crises have been considered an emerging country phenomenon (Reinhart, 
2010). Developed world have not seen financial crisis since 1995. In contrast, numerous crises 
have stroke emerging markets in the same time span. These include crisis in Mexico 1994-
1995, financial turmoil in Asia 1997-1998 and downturn in Turkey 2001-2002, amongst others.  
The debt crisis of 2007-2010 has shown that not only the emerging economies are unstable and 
face downgrades of their sovereign ratings. The example of such occurrence could be seen 
when Iceland experienced a series of downgrades starting in November 2008. Greece, Spain 
and Portugal have shown their deterioration in credit worthiness in January 2009 when S&P 
has announced its downgrades. This was followed by subsequent downgrades of these 
countries up until 2012 and remains an on-going issue. Sovereign debt crisis restarted the 
debate about impact of sovereign ratings during crises as well as the linkages between financial 
markets (Arezki et al., 2011). 
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During sovereign crisis, one could observe numerous sovereign downgrades (see Arezki et al., 
2011 for details); problems in trading stocks as well as amplified spread of sovereign bond and 
credit default swap (CDS) markets. BIS (2011) stresses participants of mature economies 
concerned about the state of the economy and tensions in the Euro have recently boosted the 
demand for safe haven assets. This resulted in significant reduction of yields on most highly 
rated and liquid government bonds such as German, Swiss or the US.  
CRAs have been accused of worsening the European debt crisis by downgrading the ratings of 
Eurozone sovereigns too far and too fast. At the same time many participants followed their 
ratings blindly without taking up necessary and independent research. Overreliance on ratings 
is explained by many in strong hardwiring of CRAs into the regulation in Europe (Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010). In the sovereign debt crisis, this dependence resulted in cliff-edge effect where 
downgrades of particular security from investment to junk grade25 had disproportionate 
cascading effect26 (Manso, 2013). 
Situation in Europe has further emphasised hazardous effect of spilling over the negative 
signals and actions born by investors to other neighbouring states and countries but also onto 
interconnected international financial markets (e.g. banks) (Arezki et al., 2011). Rationale 
behind worsening credit worthiness of these countries, amongst others, could be attributed to 
close interconnectedness of these markets with emerging economies as well as with each 
other.27 The channels through which spillovers are transmitted to countries and markets are 
various, and include inter alia, holding sovereign debt by outside economies (Blundell- Wignall 
and Slovik, 2010) and cross-border holding (BIS, 2010) (for more details on spillover channels 
see section 5.2.1.1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
25. Investment grade debt-issuers and issues with relatively high levels of creditworthiness and credit quality. Junk grade-non-
investment grade debt-issuer has the ability to repay its debts but faces significant uncertainties (S&P, 2011b). Issuers rated 
Baa3/BBB- and above are classified as investment grade whereas issuers rated Ba1/ BB+ or below are considered speculative 
grade. 
26. In many cases these downgrades caused cost of credit to rise pushing the debtor into financial problems and in extreme 
cases, default. 
27. For example, via the currency within the Eurozone.  
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2.6 EU Regulation of CRAs 
Repeatedly CRAs have been blamed for failing to recognise financial crises around the globe.  
CRAs were criticised for not anticipating the Asian financial crisis which broke out in 1997 
and the Latin-American debt crisis of the late 1980’s (Ferri and Stiglitz, 1999). The global 
crisis events, resulting from the collapse of individual institutions such as Lehman Brothers,28 
have brought a major stroke to the economy. The efficacy of CRAs also became seriously 
damaged. CRAs were criticised for furthering the US sub-prime crisis by being too permissive 
while rating structured finance products (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). The inability of 
CRAs to recognise risks associated with securities backed by sub-prime mortgages (Crouhy et 
al., 2008; Duff and Einig, 2009b; Stolper, 2009) constitutes one of the main reasons of their 
infamous publicity and ongoing scrutiny by authorities.  
In the history of ratings, there were examples of CRAs being accused of the misguidance of 
market participants or even deteriorating economic conditions. Nevertheless, resolutions have 
been ineffective, responsive at the time of the actual downturn and slow in process (Duan and 
Laere, 2012). In many cases role of CRAs was overestimated as instances of fraud and data 
manipulation were found on the side of the issuers.29 The recent regulatory efforts concerning 
CRAs had their source not only in sub-prime crisis initiated in the US but were also due to 
events which stroke Europe during a debt crisis. In contrast to the previous allegations of 
issuing ratings which were too high, CRAs were blamed for downgrading sovereign ratings 
(e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain) too quickly and too severely (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013).  
Restructuring the financial industry stands as the priority task of policymakers wishing to 
strengthen and improve the shape of the international financial markets. It has been widely 
pronounced that gaps in regulations on CRAs stimulated negligence and abusive performance 
which in turn triggered a breakdown of the global financial system (Duan and Laere, 2012). 
Numerous proposals have been drawn to improve the resistance of the financial system. Some 
authorities implemented legislative measures, communicated the necessity of reinforcing 
regulation administering CRAs or have already started taking necessary actions (Duan and 
Laere, 2012).   
                                                 
28. The three major CRAs granted an investment grade to debt of the very investment bank only one day prior its bankruptcy. 
29. In 2001 main CRAs were blamed for not predicting bankruptcy of energy company Enron in the US which was later found 
to misreport their statistical data. Similar situation took place during the recent European sovereign crisis where CRAs were 
accused of causing a crisis in Greece. However, Greece has manipulated its statistical data (including government debt levels) 
(Eurostat, 2009).  
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The formation of the EU CRA regulation can be divided into three main phases: reactive, 
implementation and enhancement; and is subject of the subsequent sections.  
2.6.1 ‘Reactive’ phase of EU CRA Regulation 
In spite of the systemic nature of CRAs (BOE, 2011) industry in Europe has been mostly self-
regulatory. Up until 2010 there was no direct legislation under which CRAs would fall. Shortly 
before the crisis, in March 2005, ESMA in its communication to the EC recommended that no 
regulation in Europe was needed and proposed to rely on the self-regulation of CRAs and 
observe the extent to which CRAs work in accordance with IOSCO Code30 (CESR, 2005). 
Consequently, the EC did not propose legislation regarding CRAs to the European Parliament 
as it was convinced that existing directives (e.g. Capital Requirements Directive, Market Abuse 
Directive) as well as self-regulation applied by CRAs accountable to the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR) suited this role sufficiently (EC, 2006). ESMA was 
responsible for monitoring the compliance of DBRS, Fitch, Moody’s and S&P which 
voluntarily decided to endorse rules of the Code and reported to the authority (Alcubilla and 
Del Pozo, 2012). Since that time the authority has been reporting to the EC on a continuous 
basis (CESR, 2005). 
The need for tighter regulatory framework aimed at CRAs has been observed during the crisis 
during which stability of the system has been at risk (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). The G-7 
and Governors from central banks invited the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to carry out the 
investigation of the sources of the crisis and to propose possible action plan (FSF, 2008). 
During the G-20 summit in Washington 2008 member states “aimed to ensure that no 
institution, product or market was left unregulated at EU and international levels” (EC, 2013; 
p.2). The EC categorised the weaknesses of the CRA business into: issues of integrity, 
reliability and transparency. 
In December 2009, EC introduced a new set of laws involving CRAs within European 
jurisdiction. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) summarises them in two paragraphs 
(Fennell and Medvedev, 2011). The first division relates to registration procedures which 
                                                 
30. See (IOSCOPD151). 
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demand that credit institutions, investment firms, insurance companies, and pension funds 
operating in the EU use ratings solely from certified CRAs.31   
Second aspect of the new rules targets reducing issues of conflict of interest. Sanctions 
comprise governance requirements and inside the CRA inspections. Regulations target 
increased transparency and ways to enhance methodologies and attributes of ratings. For 
instance, CRAs are prohibited from providing advisory services and are not permitted to rate 
instruments in instance when an insufficient amount of information is available. CRAs are 
required to publish their methodologies, models and key assumptions underlying their analysis. 
Moreover, transparency reports need to be delivered on a yearly basis. Additionally, CRAs are 
required to establish a function within their entity to evaluate the quality of ratings. In addition, 
at least two directors at the board of one CRA (unconnected with each other) will be rewarded 
irrespectively of the accomplishment of the CRA. Furthermore, single term appointment of a 
director must not exceed five years and the reason of discharge is to be based on their 
professional delinquency. Finally, if the CRA delivers structured product ratings one of the 
directors is required to be an expert in the field of securitisation and structured finance. 
During the Toronto summit in June 2010, G-20 and FSB debated about the mechanistic reliance 
on ratings. As a result in October 2010, a list of principles targeting a decrease of dependence 
on credit ratings was announced by the FSB. The main aim of the report was to reduce the 
mechanistic reliance on ratings and enhance processes of independent credit worthiness 
assessment by market participants at the international level (FSB, 2010). The first goal was to 
encourage regulators and evaluate references to CRAs and if possible replace or remove them. 
Secondly, the report stressed that market participants should be making their own risk 
evaluation and not depend fully or routinely on CRAs’ opinions. According to the FSB (2010) 
32 principles should be specific depending on the nature of financial operators and include rules 
targeting central bank operators, the prudential supervision of banks, investment policies of 
investment managers and institutional investors, private sector margin agreements and 
disclosures by issuers of securities. The body requested international regulators, central bankers 
and other financiers to apply these rules into practice in a coherent and unbiased manner. As a 
helping tool to reinforce the rules and regulations equally across states, FSB recommended 
endorsing code of conduct set by the IOSCO. 
                                                 
31. This came as a result of inquiries of, inter alia, the G-20 group who put forward a formal request for registration which 
came into action since November 2008.   
32. See Principles for reducing reliance on CRA ratings, Financial Stability Board, 27 October 2010. 
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2.6.2 ‘Implementation’ phase of EU CRA Regulation 
As a response to the political agreement between G-20 nations, European Parliament and the 
Council formed EU regulation on CRAs, known as CRA I Regulation,33 which took effect from 
December 2010. In January 2011, the Committee of European Securities Regulators was 
replaced by European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). In addition to ESMA, three other 
European financial supervisors were introduced: EBA,34 EIOPA35 and ESRB.36 The 
adjustments to the first regulation were introduced in May 2011,37 as a result of handing over 
the direct supervision of CRAs in Europe to ESMA. 
On the November 15 2011, plan to alter the current regulation of CRAs has been published by 
the EC. Proposal for CRA III regulation (EC, 2011d ),38 was followed by a proposal of the 
directive on the application of external ratings by fund managers (EC, 2011e).39  
The proposed changes of CRAs regulation focused on four main areas. Firstly, sovereign debt 
ratings are to be assessed every six months and require release of a report when new rating or 
amendment is issued. The unsolicited ratings are required to be published after the close of 
business (Friday) and minimum one hour before markets open again (Monday).   
Secondly, issues of conflict of interest are tackled by introducing rotation rules,40 capping on 
the ownership of CRAs41 and preventing CRAs from rating issuers in which they have financial 
gains or financial incentives. 
                                                 
33. Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating 
agencies (EC, 2011b). 
34. European Banking Authority. 
35. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. 
36. European Systemic Risk Board. 
37. Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1060/2009. Also known as CRA II regulation (EC, 2011c). 
38. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on 
credit rating agencies (EC, 2011d). 
39. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination 
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers (AIFM) in respect of the excessive reliance 
on credit ratings (EC, 2011e). 
40. Based on the principle that the issuer would be required to change the CRA assessing it’s creditworthiness every four years 
(using services of CRA no more than 3 years) in case of solicited ratings. 
41. If a shareholder holds 5 per cent in one CRA it is not allowed to hold 5 per cent and over in another CRA or to provide 
services and advise to issuers rated by the CRA. Likewise, the CRA will not be able to rate an issuer which holds more than 
10 percent of its capital. 
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The third aspect of the CRA III proposal deals with accountability of the CRAs. This relates to 
violations performed either intentionally or by negligence and which have impact on credit 
ratings.  
The fourth and final sphere tackles issues of transparency and overreliance on ratings. On the 
side of CRAs, the EC requires the CRAs to disclose information about their securitised 
products on continuous basis. In addition, CRAs need to present details of methodologies and 
underpinning assumptions of all types of rated assets. Moreover, CRAs are obliged to inform 
the issuer about its rating 12 (working) hours before it is made public and one working day 
before publishing the rating.  
Regarding supervisory authorities, EBA and ESMA and EIOPA are banned from making 
references to CRAs in their workings. ESMA is required to introduce the platform for ratings 
for public use42 along with the dedicated webpage which tracks the performance of the 
underlying assets provided information from issuers, sponsors and the originators. Namely, 
CRAs are required to provide information on their past activities to the central depository 
CEREP, which serves a public purpose. Reported data should include statistics from the 
minimal period of 10 years prior to the regulation was enacted. If the CRA did not produce 
ratings before 1999 it needs to provide data from times of its earliest ratings. CRAs do not need 
to release data on ratings issued before registration and certification of the CRA. The data 
should be uniform and transferrable to be easily compared CRAs (in terms of complexity, 
scale). Data collected centrally by the system will accept ratings issued by third country CRAs. 
Regulation states types of ratings which might be reported are classified as: (a) corporate 
ratings; (b) structured finance ratings; (c) sovereign and public finance ratings. In case of the 
sovereign and public finance ratings short and long term issuer rating as well as local and 
foreign currency (sovereign ratings) rating is to be submitted. If the issuer rating is not available 
the long-term debt needs to be provided. In terms of reporting up to six rating scales are allowed 
and only one rating scale relating to the specific time frame and type of issuer. 
Moreover, fees which are charged by CRAs are to be overseen by the organisation. 
Additionally, ESMA released four draft Regulatory Technical Standards reports which ensure 
the equal opportunities for all CRAs and safety for investors and consumers in the EU (ESMA, 
                                                 
42. Regulation required two IT platforms: the former CEREP is the publicly accessible whereas SOCRAT stores reporting on 
rating events statistics and is used for supervisory purposes available to ESMA only (see 15 Point (e) of article 21(4) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 19).  
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2013a). Moreover, authority acts as informer to the Commission on technical issues such as 
competition, rotation plans and their expansion amongst others. Body also informs the EC 
about the viability of rating scales of each CRA (mapping), amounts needed for resources and 
recruitment. In addition, ESMA is to recommence the evaluation process of outside EU CRAs 
which require endorsement status.43 Finally, every year organisation is required to release 
market share for individual CRAs (ESMA, 2013a).  
As part of consolidation of the last aspect of proposal and reducing dependence on ratings by 
market participants, EC also proposed to make alterations to the UCITS IV Directive 
(2009/65/EC) and Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (2011/61/EU) (AIFM 
Directive). 
The November proposal withdrew the earlier proposition to found European rating agency. The 
research has shown, that such institution would incur costs approaching to 300-500 million 
Euros every five years. Regulators feared this could cause potential danger to conflict of 
interest, of the member states, which would be ultimately funding the enterprise (EC, 2013). 
In January 2012, Executive Director of ESMA informed the European Parliament on its 
progress in executing revised regulation relating CRAs, also known as CRA II (ESMA, 2012a). 
Verena Ross, in her public speech in Brussels, said that in the first six months of operating the 
organisation has performed first on-site inspections of three major CRAs. The authority 
planned to “finalise the establishment of the reporting data tools provided by the Regulation 
and of the CEREP44 central database – an essential disclosure facility for investors” (ESMA, 
2012b; p.1). In addition, organisation confirmed that procedures aimed at evaluating ratings 
from third countries were in progress. In terms of the CRA III proposals, ESMA supported and 
recommended procedures relating to disclosure of information, conflict of interest and 
harmonised rating scale45 together with civil liability.46  
To this point, regulations ordering CRAs were introduced from a micro-prudential perspective 
and aimed at boosting the confidence of investors and market participants at the same time 
                                                 
43. The assessment renewal is required by the 1 June 2018. 
44. It is not unclear whether the central repository designed by ESMA for publishing the rating activity and performance 
statistics of CRAs is comprehensive or successful. 
45. ESMA suggested applying the standardised rating scale to all CRAs operating within the EU. Considering difficulty in 
distinguishing varying rating scales and methodologies the authority implied that uniform rating metric would help in 
achieving greater transparency, comparability and as a result could lead in boosting competition. 
46. According to the proposal, higher accountability could help in avoiding the scenario of structured products observed few 
years ago and urge CRAs to apply more stringent rating practices. 
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improving financial stability (ECB, 2012). In April 2012 the ECB in an answer to the invitation 
by the Council of the European Union released its opinions about the proposal of the European 
Parliament regarding the regulation of the CRAs as well as those of the Council. The main 
proceedings regarding CRAs were classified in to five areas: (i) lessening excessive reliance 
on credit ratings, (ii) alleviating risks relating to the spillover effect when new information is 
being released, (iii) developing a CRAs market in a way to improve the overall quality of rating 
practices, (iv) safeguarding compensation system for investors, (v) improving the 
independence of CRAs together with soundness of rating processes and methodologies with an 
aim to enrich quality of ratings (ECB, 2012). In the proposed directive the ECB stressed the 
need to work on issues relating to overreliance on ratings and supported the view that 
limitations of the existing CRAs industry pose a threat to investors’ confidence and financial 
stability as a whole.  
According to Commission Delegated Regulation, from February 2012, CRAs are liable to 
remunerate ESMA for its supervisory services for the first time. The authority charges annual 
registration and certification fee from the CRAs, which reach certain threshold of turnover 
(OJEU, 2012a). This form of revenue supplements EU budget sources and the member state 
authorities’ funds dedicated to the functioning of European supervisor of CRAs. 
In March, 2012 the EC together with the European Parliament released set of regulations, 
regarding technical standards on the content and format of submitting ratings data,47 technical 
standards for credit rating methodologies,48 presentation of data available via central 
repository,49 and finally technical standards for registration and certification of CRAs.50 All 
four regulations have been published in the OJEU.  
The first regulation outlines technical standards on the content and format of data periodic 
reporting which ESMA receives from CRAs (OJEU, 2012b).  For instance, CRAs should report 
data in a standardised form provided by ESMA. It is also necessary that CRAs store the past 
files, at least for five years in the electronic form, in case viewing requests are made. In case 
errors in the data are discovered, CRAs are obliged to correct the information and send the 
updated version of reports to ESMA. To ensure ESMA’s close and effective supervision of 
                                                 
47. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 446/2012 (OJEU, 2012b). 
48. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 447/2012 (OJEU, 2012c) 
49. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 448/2012 (OJEU, 2012d). 
50. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 449/2012 (OJEU, 2012e). 
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CRAs, the regulator requires CRAs to report their data on monthly basis.51 More specifically, 
time elapses after 15 days to the end of the allowed period. In case of extraordinary 
circumstances, when data cannot be reported on time, CRAs are to inform ESMA immediately. 
Further, legislation itself does not enter into force earlier than six months after it has been 
published by the OJEU. This is to ensure that CRAs provide complete and accurate data, 
accounting for changes in the technical standards set up by ESMA, as well overall changes in 
the financial markets. Data are reported by individual CRAs; in instance when CRAs form a 
group the selected CRA can submit the information on behalf of other group members.  
In accordance with the initial regulation CRAs are required to apply methodologies which are 
rigorous and systematic, continuous and easy to test and to validate using, inter alia, back 
testing methods.  The regulation will present rules of assessing such methodologies. CRAs are 
required to regularly review their existing methodologies including mathematical models, 
assumptions as well as their overall relevance (OJEU, 2012c). CRAs need to demonstrate their 
compliance with the above at any times to the regulator. The process of continuously assessing 
the compliance is also performed by ESMA. Following, rating data should comprise sections 
outlined in the Table 1, Annex II (OJEU, 2012d). Moreover, a reason for withdrawal of a rating 
needs to be recorded with the underlying cause. Any changes relating to cancellations or 
changes in the data need to be updated in the form of a report. The reporting period lasts six 
months between January and June or July to December.  
Lastly, European Parliament and Council set rules and procedures for CRAs willing to register 
or receive certification by ESMA (OJEU, 2012e). For instance, the CRA is required to provide 
details of pursuits of its owners. Details include, inter alia, curriculum vitae and criminal record 
of senior managers. CRA should also supply ESMA with composition of its board together 
with details of its actions. To enhance effectiveness of actions relating avoidance of conflict of 
interest, CRAs is to submit record of existing and threats of possible conflict of interest. As 
part of the certification process the CRA needs to present information about systemic status of 
its ratings and the working of the CRA on the financial stability as well as integrity of financial 
markets. 
In July, 2012 Commission Delegated Regulation released regulatory supplement relating 
process of enforcing fines and penalties on CRAs as well rights available to them (i.e. right of 
hearing by ESMA’s Board of Supervisors, by the investigating officer) (OJEU, 2012f). 
                                                 
51. With an exception of firms which employ less than 50 employees where data can be reported every two months. 
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On November 28 2012, European Parliament together with European Council agreed on new 
directive relating CRAs in Europe proposed a year earlier (15 November 2011). Michel 
Barnier52 released a statement which summarizes agreement between EU policymakers. 
Among others the commissioners stressed that sovereign ratings need to be more transparent 
to the public whereas their timing more defined (EC, 2012).  
The daily magazine Les Echos (2012) stressed, however, that introduced changes are more 
lenient than the original proposals. According to Mr Gauzes53 in terms of the sovereign debt 
the CRAs will be permitted to issue unsolicited ratings for sovereigns up to three times per year 
with their timing specified in advance (Bloomberg, 2012). Additionally, CRAs might release 
additional measures of state’s creditworthiness on prior permission of the regulator. In the 
original proposal Michel Barnier mentioned prohibiting ratings for countries which are in 
receipt of international aid. Additionally, rotation in ratings which was supposedly to boost 
competition has not been approved with the exception of complex structured products. 
According to Reuters (2012), although the rotation of corporate or/and sovereign ratings has 
been ruled out the EC suggested that tougher regulation is required to boost competition 
between the largest three CRAs. According to the source on 27 November 2012, such draft has 
been agreed by negotiators and requires authorisation by the European Parliament and 
individual governments.  
On 16 January 2013, European Parliament has voted in favour the proposals received in 
previous years. In addition to yearly calendars for releasing unsolicited debt ratings, dates of 
publishing outlooks, where relevant, are also required (European Parliament, 2013). The new 
rules increase accountability of CRAs mentioned in CRA III proposals. Issuing a rating as a 
result of a conflict of interest or issuing a rating outside of the reported day will be considered 
a violation. Moreover, mandatory rotation solely for structured products is confirmed. 
Further, consistent with the G-20 initiatives new principles lessen the over-reliance on external 
ratings and enhance internal risk assessments by financial institutions by interalia banning 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) from making references to external ratings. The plan 
of EC is firstly to reduce reference to ratings creating mechanistic reliance and secondly present 
alternatives and substitutes to using external ratings with the intention of eliminating them 
completely by 2020 (EU Parliament press release, 2013). 
                                                 
52. Internal Market and Services Commissioner. 
53. Lawmaker participating in forming the EU regulation on CRAs. 
35 
 
The EC is required to report to the Parliament by 1 July 2016 and reassess the state of affairs 
of the CRAs market and if needed propose modifications and regulatory proposals in years to 
follow. The obligation of the EC includes re-evaluation of the consequences of the issuer-pays 
model recommended by ESMA. 
On May 21 2013, amendments to CRAs III regulation, initially proposed in November 2011, 
were released (OJEU, 2013a).54 The Regulation entered into force in June 2013 whereas the 
accompanying Directive55 was to be employed by December 2014. The regulation applies all 
the requirements summarised in the initial Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, to rating outlooks 
and watches.56 The modifications also include stipulations for sovereigns. For instance, CRAs 
are forbidden from making policy recommendations, prescriptions or guidelines when 
releasing sovereign ratings and/or outlooks. 
In December 2013, as part of its supervisory functions and plan released in January 2013,57 
ESMA published a press release on its examination of the three biggest CRAs (ESMA, 2013b). 
The assessment involved desk research, records and site inspections of the sovereign ratings 
from period between February and October 2013. The publication revolves around three 
themes: independence and mitigation of conflict of interest, confidentiality of rating 
information rules and finally timing of publications of rating events. The authority points to 
the good practices in area of adequacy of resources, training possibilities, and practices during 
committee discussions, consistency and continuity of rating sovereigns and many others. 
Investigation also discloses deficiencies which could result in lower quality and reliability of 
sovereign ratings and the process as a whole. The researched areas include governance and 
organisation, expertise and resources used for rating purposes, procedures involved with 
releasing ratings. ESMA provides possible remedial actions for numerous cases.  
On February 23 2014, ESMA released its 2013 Annual Report. The authority declares six 
action plans (which resulted in approximately 110 actions), owning to ESMAs thematic 
investigations, which were carried over the course of 2012 and 2013 (ESMA, 2014a). The 
authority comments on the improvements and compliance of one or more CRAs to the 
regulation. This includes the record keeping practices and strengthening of the compliance 
                                                 
54. Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (OJEU, 2013a) 
55. Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2013 (OJEU, 2013b). 
56. This stems from the fact that influence of rating outlooks is similar to that of the actual ratings. 
57. ESMA/2013/87, (23 January 2013) CRA supervision and policy work plan ESMA (2013b). 
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function amongst others. Some of the deficiencies include authorisation of the rating 
methodologies and the safety measures implemented in the IT systems applied by CRAs. 
Further, the regulator fears that the revenue generating publishing activities of rating analysts 
might pose potential conflicts of interest. Moreover, contracting the external public relations 
by some of the CRAs threatens the confidentiality of the data. 
ESMA’s activity in 2013 comprised improvements outlined in the 2012 Annual Report which 
were tackled with use of thematic work and individual investigations. The areas included: (i) 
methodology of bank ratings, (ii) examination of the sovereign rating process (published in 
December report; ESMA, 2013c), (iii) scrutinising structured finance ratings of four larger 
CRAs and (iv) weaknesses in the publication mechanisms.58 Regulator also pledged to validate 
all registered CRAs by July 2014. The latter was exercised via detailed investigations of small 
and medium CRAs.59 In the course of 2013 ESMA granted registration of three new CRAs and 
certified one CRA60 at the same time rejecting two applications. 
2.6.3 ‘Enhancement’ phase of EU CRA Regulation 
ESMA’s plan for the forthcoming years involves investigating the remaining CRAs, 
publications and numerous technical reports aimed at EC with relation to situation in the 
structured finance industry and the overall state of affairs on the credit rating market (ESMA, 
2014a). Moreover, the authority endeavours to minimise references to credit ratings from laws 
and regulations. Additionally, there are propositions to perform examination of sovereign debt 
ratings in Europe which might involve ESMA’s technical support. 
With regards to CRA III implementation following the discussion paper released on 10 July 
201361 and a consultation paper on February 11 2014,62 subject to commentaries, the authority 
was to submit the draft RTSs to the EC by July 2014. The organisation also began the 
developments of its IT systems required for the proper enactment of the three RTSs (ESMA, 
2014a). Further, ESMA along with EBA and EIOPA63 was requested by Capital Requirements 
                                                 
58. Including delays in published information and secureness of systems. Such issues were highlighted in ESMA’s March 
2012 report; see ESMA/2012/207 (22 March 2012) – ESMA’s report on the supervision of credit rating agencies. 
59. At the time of the report the authority investigated 14 (out of 22) small and medium sized CRAs which were registered as 
of 31 Dec 2013. 
60. Newly registered CRAs: The Economist Intelligence (UK) Unit Ltd, Dagong Europe Credit Rating Srl (Italy), Spread 
Research (France).Certified agency: Kroll (US). 
61. ESMA/2013/891 (10 July 2013) - Discussion paper on CRA3 implementation. 
62. ESMA/2014/150 (11 February 2014) – Consultation paper on CRA3 implementation. 
63. Also known as Competent Authorites. 
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Regulation (CCR)64 to produce a draft on Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) to the EC 
by July 1 2014. This required identifying whether credit quality steps (CQS) and the rating 
classification used by registered and certified CRAs are equivalent (mapping).  
By the end of 2014 an ESA intended to implement guidelines and recommendations on how 
the Sectoral Competent Authorities (SCAs) should handle reliance on credit ratings across the 
financial sector. The authority along with two other competent authorities will continue 
working jointly on these recommendations.65 
The efforts of ESMA parallel the initiatives taken by the FSB since October 2010, when a 
collection of Principles and Guidelines aimed at reducing overreliance on ratings was 
published. Subsequently after the G-20 Summit, in Russia in September 2013, the FSB 
requested from regulators to speed up the process of reducing reliance on ratings with 
accordance to the roadmap drafted in October 201266 (FSB, 2012). As a way of accelerating 
this process the peer reviews were conducted aimed at helping national authorities in reaching 
objectives set in the Roadmap. This took form of two stages: (i) the first step documents all 
references to ratings included in laws and regulations across authorities, which resulted in a 
report on August 2013 (FSB, 2013);67 (ii) the second ongoing stage focuses on the schemes 
applied by authorities to implement the FSB Principles which are expected by end of 2015. 
The progress was published in May 2014 (FSB, 2014). The authority stresses that approaches 
vary across FSB member jurisdictions and financial sectors. Advancements in the enactment 
of regulation also vary significantly worldwide. For instance, private agreements, collateral 
contracts and risk-prudential frameworks for intermediaries rely on external ratings. The report 
discourages national authorities and market participants from applying measures substituting 
CRA ratings as they might lead to procyclicality and herding among investors. The awareness 
was raised in relation to internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches for which reliability, 
comparability and transparency among others is debatable (BCBS, 2013a, b). FSB suggests 
that in addition to initiatives regarding laws and regulations the mechanistic reliance should be 
reduced by market participants. The authority does not discourage from using CRA ratings but 
advises using them together with investors own judgement. Lastly, the report draws on the 
                                                 
64. Article 136 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR). 
65. On 6 February 2014 competent authorities released set of guidelines; see JC/2014/04 (6 February 2014) – EBA, EIOPA 
and ESMA final report on mechanistic references to credit ratings in the ESAs’ guidelines and recommendations. 
66. FSB, Report to G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank governors on the roadmap and workshop for reducing reliance 
on CRA ratings, November 2012.  
67. See FSB, Interim thematic review on FSB principles for reducing reliance on credit rating agency ratings, August 2013. 
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existing practices and proposes recommendations on the problems encountered by the 
regulators. 
2.6.4 Challenges faced by the policymakers 
In one of the public hearings at the European Parliament ESMA drew attention to the proposal 
on CRA III. Several points raised in the proposed framework have implications and for this 
reason, require particular attention (ESMA, 2012a).  
Firstly, the new draft methodology requirement imposed on new CRAs could collide with the 
existing rules of non-interference and independence condition on CRAs. According to the EC 
(2012) neither Commission nor any public authority can interfere with the methodologies being 
applied by CRAs. EACRA68 confirms that “CRAs enjoy full independence on their 
methodologies as long as they are applied consistently and continuously” (House of Lords, 
2011; p.25). Nevertheless, regulation might outline rules on which methodologies can be 
evaluated. For instance, ESMA assesses the compliance of CRAs with regulation by 
identifying whether their rating methodology is rigorous, systematic and continuous as well as 
if it is possible to test the validity of results. For the latter the authority suggests applying back 
testing using historical data (OJEU, 2012c). 
Further, ever since the mandatory rotation has been proposed for analysts and CRAs it 
encountered significant opposition. During the Treasury Committee meeting at the British 
Parliament in March 2012 Chairman of National Association of Pension Funds expressed his 
disapproval of the rotation. Mr Harrison stressed it might complicate workings of companies 
in understanding new entrant CRAs, add unnecessary cost to companies and cause overall 
imbalances in the rating industry (House of Commons, 2012). Supporting this view was Mr 
Grodzki, the Head of Credit Research, who stressed such invention, apart from rising costs, 
would lead to noise in rating fluctuations which could cause difficulties for corporate bond 
investors and impair the timelessness of ratings. During the same session Mr Cooper, Global 
Tax and Treasury Director,69 supported the abovementioned points and highlighted the 
unworkability of idea of changing CRAs. He claims that his company is a frequent issuer and 
therefore it would need to replace a CRA every year. In line with the rules the issuer would not 
be allowed reappoint the same CRA within four years which could leave his company with no 
                                                 
68. European Association of Credit Rating Agencies. 
69. National Grid plc. 
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rating providers. Also the regulator feared that rotation might bring unintended consequences. 
Namely, according to ESMA (2012a) new entrants could be offering higher ratings or lower 
fees in need to attract customers. Quality of ratings and reliance on them could pose a serious 
threat to the system. 
In relation to the fact that authority is now required to assess concentration levels and 
accompanying risk in the CRAs market in its annual reports ESMA’s spokesperson claimed 
this possess major issues for the organisation and needs closer attention. In addition to technical 
inconvenience, specifically acquiring new levels of expertise and grasping new methodologies 
needed for such task ESMA claims that organisation finds itself in position where it needs to 
choose between competition and stability in ratings (ESMA, 2012a).  
Furthermore, concerns about the timing and close deadlines were stressed in public hearing in 
Brussels in January 2012. For example, the closing date to update the assessment methods of 
the third countries compliance to the regulation in accordance with the CRA III regulation 
posed difficulty for ESMA. Such requirement had practical difficulties as for January 2012 
CRA III proposals were not enforced by all G-20 or IOSCO frameworks. Additionally it could 
have undermined good intentions of the authority in monitoring the efforts of third-country 
rating regulation in which ESMA was involved as part of the prevailing regulation. Another 
issue relates to the extension of time allowed to employ Regulatory Technical Standards stated 
in the CRA III proposal. The proposal suggested January 2013 as the final deadline, however 
ESMA stressed that it required one year for preparation, discussion and reaching a consensus 
on the new paradigms to make sure they meet criteria set by the Parliament. These examples 
show that the increased responsibilities caused a considerable strain on ESMA because they 
did not always correspond with the timing of the ongoing reforms. 
Finally the regulators in Europe (ESMA, EBA and EIOPA) are facing financial difficulties as 
their budgets are being cut in real terms (Reuters, 2015a). The regulators fear that lack of 
resources will prevent them from taking necessary actions aimed at preventing future financial 
crisis. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the main features and characteristics of the CRA market. The types and 
classifications of ratings are presented along with the main players occupying the market. The 
three big CRAs form an oligopolistic market form concentrating the market above 87 percent 
(ESMA, 2014c). The philosophy and differing methodologies used by CRAs are also presented 
(Fitch, 2012; Moody’s, 2012a; S&P, 2012a). 
The flaws of the business model were pointed out by many commentators when the subprime 
crisis hit the US and the sovereign debt crisis struck Europe (Duff and Einig, 2009b; EC, 2010; 
Duan and Laere, 2012). Lack of transparency, flaws in methodologies and conflicts of interest 
are examples of perceived deficiencies of CRAs (ESMA, 2011a). On the other hand, it became 
apparent that gaps in the regulation allowed negligence amongst CRAs (i.e. in the instance of 
the structured products) but also enhanced careless behaviour of market participants who over 
relied on produced ratings. European system became highly hard-wired with references to 
credit ratings and steps to improve the situation are being taken (BOE, 2011). Regulators and 
politicians call for reforms aimed to increase civil accountability to ratings, enhanced 
transparency and reduction of issues of conflict of interest between issuers and CRAs.  
The chapter outlines steps taken by multinational authorities and the supervisory body awarded 
with the responsibility of overseeing CRAs in Europe – ESMA. This process is divided into 
three main phases: reactive, implementation and the enhancement. The regulation responding 
to problems of the European debt crisis mainly aims to reduce mechanistic inclusion of ratings 
within regulation as well as cliff-effects (Cantor et al., 2007; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). 
Some of the reforms recently proposed in the EU include innovative rules to improve 
practicalities of using rating services and mitigating the conflict of interest (i.e. rotation in 
ratings, prevention from using consultancy services from CRAs, number of ratings required for 
particular product, specifying top analysts in the area of ratings). Further, the regulation aims 
to induce transparency and quality of released ratings. 
Many problems are acknowledged in the course of the regulatory reforms. It becomes more 
evident that regulating the CRA market might be more challenging than previously thought 
(ESMA, 2014a). Certain proposals, such as methodology requirements, pose threats to the 
independence of the CRAs and need to be carefully evaluated (e.g. EC, 2012). Other solutions 
such as rotation and increased competition also require attention as, according to the literature, 
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they might simply aggravate the situation and lead to unintended consequences (Kodres, 2010; 
Camanho et al., 2012; ESMA, 2012b).  
Authorities themselves face difficulties such as technological improvements and making a 
choice between competition and stability in ratings (ESMA, 2012b). Also, CRAs face a trade-
off between stability versus accuracy without compromising the quality of their ratings. These 
and many more issues facing regulators will be considered in the subsequent chapters of this 
Thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce empirical literature investigating the main issues relating 
to the CRA business. Firstly, studies focusing on the philosophy and methodologies of the 
CRAs are discussed (e.g. Löffler, 2005; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010c).  The dilemma of 
CRAs in relation to the stability versus accuracy of ratings is managed by using additional 
credit warnings (outlooks and watch status) (see Hamilton and Cantor, 2004; Boot et al., 2006; 
Bannier and Hirsch, 2010). 
Moreover, the chapter offers evaluation of studies examining the importance of ratings 
reinforced when the financial markets became more complex while number of financial 
contracts rose significantly (Hau et al., 2013). CRAs are found to perform three primary roles 
in the economy which include information provision, monitoring and certification (Boot et al., 
2006). Subject of information content of ratings deserves substantial attention since it is a topic 
of the empirical investigation in Chapter 6 (e.g. Hand et al., 1992; Ederington and Goh, 1998; 
Becker and Milbourn, 2011).  
Although the CRAs perform an important role for the financial markets, until recently there 
was a lack of transparency about the factors which contribute to the determination of a rating 
(Bennell et al., 2006). This gave raise to attempts aiming to find rating determinants for various 
issuers (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Afonso et al., 2007; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010b). 
Stemming from the financial crisis in the US and the sovereign crisis in Europe, the business 
model of CRAs received a considerable amount of criticisms. The literature points to issues 
such as rating shopping, deflated unsolicited ratings, lack of competition between the CRAs 
and disagreements among CRAs (split ratings) (Bannier et al., 2010; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 
2012b; Bolton et al., 2012; Hau et al., 2013; Vu et al., 2015; see section 2.5). It also investigates 
whether the ratings affect/drive markets or mirror the information which is already realised by 
the market participants.  
In general, the perceived problems in the CRA industry relate to conflicts of interest, the overall 
independence of rating opinions and the lack of transparency in the rating processes (see 
section 2.5.1). The latter relates to the fact that outsiders are unaware of the rating process, 
rating determinants, and details of rating methodology. CRAs have more information about the 
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issue/issuer than the investors. Before CRA regulations were revised, the methodologies used 
by CRAs to rate their clients were not publicly available (Sy, 2009). Therefore the quality of 
such ratings was difficult to judge while comprehending the rating process was challenging 
(Duan and Laere, 2012). After the introduction of new regulation, the CRAs report the variables 
that are used in the rating process yet they do not reveal the weights applied nor the soft 
information which enters the rating process. The subjective component in the credit rating is 
heavily determined by the quality of the CRA’s human capital such as the experience of the 
credit analysts. CRAs were condemned for the incompetence of their analysts in the aftermath 
of the US sub-prime crisis (Gaillard, 2011). 
This chapter outlines the empirical literature measuring impact of previous regulatory actions 
applied in the CRA industry. The novelty of this Thesis is derived from the fact no other paper, 
except Alsakka et al. (2015), examines empirically the effects of these regulatory undertakings 
on the CRA market in Europe. The gap in the literature is identified and explored in detail to 
give grounds for the empirical work executed in later Chapters (4-6). 
The chapter is structured in the following manner: the philosophy and methodologies of ratings 
is subject of section 3.2. The importance of credit ratings together with information they 
transmit to the market and their determinants is subject of section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the 
business model of CRAs. Section 3.5 presents literature on influence of regulatory actions 
aimed at CRAs in the recent years. Section 3.6 reviews methodologies used in the CRA 
literature including the limited dependent variable models (3.6.1) and difference in difference 
estimation (3.6.9). Each of these methods comprises an outline of the theoretical underpinnings 
together with the applications in the empirical literature. Finally, section 3.7 closes the 
discussion on the recent workings of the CRA market and explains the gaps which this Thesis 
fulfils in contrast to the existing literature. 
3.2 Philosophy and methodologies in ratings 
CRAs find themselves in a dilemma of either reaching stability or accuracy in their ratings 
(Löffler, 2005). Generally, CRAs intend to give ratings which are stable over time and not 
influenced by temporary fluctuations due to the nature of the business cycle (“through the 
cycle” methodology; see section 2.2). Modifications to ratings are made when CRA are 
confident that change in creditworthiness of an issuer is steady and permanent (Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym, 2010c). Market participants such as bond issuers and investment management firms 
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appreciate this methodology as it would add costs to their investments if ratings were constantly 
changing and reversing.  
In addition, capital adequacy requirements often depend on riskiness of the assets held in the 
portfolio. Therefore if ratings are unstable it might change efficacy of ratings as the governance 
instruments. Moreover, since ratings allow investors to access capital their constant 
fluctuations might influence ticket to entry conditions which will be difficult to reverse 
(Langohr, 2006). Although stability of ratings is appreciated by regulators and issuers market 
participants such as investors of hedge funds or traders prefer ratings which are accurate and 
characterised by timeliness (Cantor and Mann, 2007; Cantor et al., 2007). 
To manage dilemma between stability and accuracy CRAs use additional credit warnings such 
as outlook and watch to show possible direction and timing of their ratings (Hamilton and 
Cantor, 2004). As reported by Boot et al. (2006) and Bannier and Hirsch (2010), these 
instruments play an important economic role. The latter study finds CRAs enhance information 
transmission by using watch signals. Löffler (2004, 2005) and Altman and Rijken (2006) 
conclude that credit warnings might be means by which CRAs disclose new information to the 
market because of their through the cycle methodology and stability concerns. 
Empirical literature proves that outlook and watch signals transmit strong information to the 
markets (see Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Hill and Faff, 
2010; Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013). Additionally, Kodres (2010) 
emphasises that CRAs demonstrate their information and certification role using credit 
warnings rather than actual rating changes. Sy (2004) concludes that credit signals (e.g. 
negative watch and outlook) about sovereigns send by Moody’s assist in forecasting probability 
of distress in the following year. Furthermore, literature concludes that the effect of credit 
signals is in fact stronger that the actual changes in ratings (e.g. Hull et al., 2004; 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007; Hooper et al., 2008; Hill and Faff, 2010; Kim and Wu, 2011).  
Hull et al. (2004) using CDS market find that negative watch signals published by Moody’s 
transmit information about that market whereas rating reduction does not. In equity and debt 
market Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) show that outlooks and watch status by S&P also have 
stronger effects on those markets. In fact Hooper et al. (2008) in their comprehensive study of 
42 countries over 1995- 2003 show the impact of sovereign credit warnings to be two times 
stronger than for rating changes. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013) supplement the literature in 
confirming the stronger effect of credit warnings, in comparison to general ratings, by studying 
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the trade-off between accuracy versus stability faced by CRAs. These authors find that policies 
employed by the S&P are aimed at short-term ratings accuracy whereas Moody’s actions are 
more consistent with ratings stability. Additionally, the study confirms a stronger effect 
emanating from negative outlook signals in comparison with watch status. 
3.3 Importance of credit ratings  
According to Boot et al. (2006), CRAs perform three fundamental roles: information 
production, monitoring and certification. Freely available information about, inter alia, the 
relative risk of default of an issuer is produced via publicly released ratings. Additionally, this 
role relates to the fact that CRAs have influence over decisions of the firm by issuing the rating 
which determines their investment and pricing decisions. This might suggest to market 
participants that a credit rating has a “potentially valuable contractual feature and could now 
have informational content” (p.32).70 Moreover, by signalling prospective changes in ratings 
(via outlooks or watchlists) CRAs might foster and motivate debt holder to adjust their 
situation. Lastly, according to Kodres (2010) CRAs perform a certification role. Ratings are 
used by investors to classify investment opportunities according to their risk attributes as well 
as to decide on terms and conditions of financial contracts.  
Kiff et al. (2012) empirically investigate and test the information value represented by ratings. 
The event study, covering period 2005-2010 on 72 sovereigns, confirms information and 
certification role of ratings and finds no evidence for monitoring services. The latter is in line 
with Chan et al. (2011). 
It is believed that CRAs allow borrowers to raise capital more cheaply through reductions in 
asymmetric information where they reduce risk premium of debt issue between investors and 
debtors (Duff and Einig, 2009a) (see section 2.4). 
The information content of ratings is one of the measures used to proxy the quality of ratings 
in the empirical literature (West, 1973; Ederington et al., 1986; Hand et al., 1992; Ederington 
and Goh, 1998; Becker and Milbourn, 2011). Becker and Milbourn (2011) study the impact of 
the increased competition in the rating market on the quality of ratings. The quality is defined 
as the ability of ratings to transmit information to market participants, as well as their ability to 
                                                 
70. This feature is closely related to the fact that in the US CRAs are excused from the Regulation FD which specifies that all 
information is disclosed to the market (see Jorion et al., 2005). This supports a view that there is potential information content 
in rating actions. 
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categorise the risk of a rated product. These authors claim that the correlation between bond 
yields (dependent variable) and rating levels of high quality ratings should be high to contain 
in depth information about bond’s value. The conditional correlation between ratings and bond 
yields helps to evaluate how content of ratings alters according to changes in competition. 
Study finds the information content of ratings decreases with competition.71  
Contrary to this, Doherty et al. (2012) concentrates on other dimensions of competition. In 
terms of the quality of ratings, a more refined scale is used to indicate which ratings carry more 
information. The study analyses the impact of increased competition on informativeness of 
ratings using the entry of S&P into the monopolistic insurance rating market of A.M. Best. The 
study differs from Becker and Milbourn (2011) as it captures transition from monopoly to 
duopoly rather than changes in competition from two to three CRAs. The results indicate that 
issuers who were higher quality in terms of their rating from the first CRA (A.M. Best) would 
be more likely to request the second rating to differentiate them. The results of the paper, unlike 
those by Bongaerts et al. (2012), represent a voluntary act of the insurer to request a second 
rating to communicate its strength to the market; as the regulation in the insurance industry 
does not require multiple ratings.  
Bongaerts et al. (2012) study entry of the third player (Fitch) into the corporate bond market. 
The findings suggest that Fitch’s ratings act as a “tiebreaker” for regulation once ratings by 
Moody’s and S&P are split. The results show that, when the effect is favourable, the cost of 
capital is lower by 45 basis points compared to unfavourable rating. In fact, when two CRAs 
issue contradicting ratings on bonds (speculative rating vs. investment grade), Fitch’s rating is 
decisive about whether the bond becomes investment grade or not. However, according to 
Kisgen and Strahan (2010), the study is not able to isolate the scale of this regulatory-specific 
component. These authors investigate the impact of constrained bond investment on the firm’s 
cost of debt and confirm that ratings affect the cost of borrowing. In line with Jorion et al. 
(2005), the study suggests that if a firm receives a downgrade its cost of credit increases, and 
vice versa.  
Although the importance of ratings for the economy has been explicitly pronounced in the 
abovementioned studies, many believe its value has diminished significantly since the 1970s 
(Duan and Laere, 2012). Partnoy (2002) goes further and claims CRAs were made more 
                                                 
71. The forecasted probability of default on most common non-investment grade ratings is 2.4 times more than on (most 
common) investment grade ratings when competition is low whereas only 1.5 times when the competition is high. 
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important than they otherwise would be simply by including their references in the regulation. 
For instance, under the Basel II Accord standardised approach intermediaries whose internal 
model of ratings was not approved calculated their capital requirements as a portion of risk-
weighted assets. These risk weights were allowed to be calculated using ratings of approved 
CRAs.72 In addition, although large banks could employ internal ratings even those models 
often included input (actual or methodological) influenced by external ratings (Hau et al., 
2013). According to Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012), in times of no crisis and under the 
Basel II framework, risk-weighted leverage ratio performs better in forecasting collapses of 
banks than the unweighted leverage ratio. The opposite is true when probability of a crisis is 
high; the unweighted leverage ratio predicts a failure of an issuer more accurately. 
3.3.1 Credit ratings determinants  
Until recently, the rating methodologies were a black box and did not specify the relevant 
details such as the assumptions of the appraisal (Bennell et al., 2006).73 For this reason many 
empirical studies attempted the question of what drives the sovereign ratings. The determinants 
of sovereign creditworthiness are more complex than ratings of non-sovereigns as they not only 
encompass the information about the ability of an issuer to repay its obligations but also their 
willingness to do so (Butler and Fauver, 2006). For instance, sovereigns can announce the 
defaulting state even if it has the funds to repay its liabilities in time. The indicators explaining 
sovereign ratings can be divided into two groups: economic fundamentals and socio-political 
factors (e.g. Cantor and Packer, 1996; Afonso et al., 2007; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010b). In 
addition to economic and financial fundamentals, CRAs implement factors resembling legal 
and political risks as well as institutional setting (Moody’s, 2008; Fitch, 2011; S&P, 2011c). 
Hill et al. (2010) test for political factors and show that country risk rating and market risk 
premium help in explaining sovereign ratings. 
There are different ways to capture the political risk in the empirical literature. Some studies 
account for it in the error term (Eliasson, 2002; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010b), others apply 
proxy variables (Alexe et al., 2003; Mckenzie, 2004; Butler and Fauver, 2006; Mellios and 
Paget-Blanc, 2006; Erdem and Varli, 2014; Ozturk, 2014). 
                                                 
72. For instance, risk weights for claims based on sovereign ratings as follows: AAA-AA: 0%; A: 20%; BBB: 50%; BB-B: 
100%; CCC-C: 150%; and D: deducted from capital (Von Schweinitz, 2007). 
73. Transparency requirements of regulation correct this issue by introducing disclosure rules amongst others. 
48 
 
Cantor and Packer (1996) in their cross section study of 49 sovereigns in 1995 find that 
sovereign ratings by S&P and Moody’s are determined by publicly accessible economic, social 
and political indicators. The most frequent variables quoted in the CRAs reports include: per 
capita income, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, external debt and 
economic development as well as default history. Although a paper is considered a ground-
breaking research on the determinants of ratings, it applies the OLS estimation and was 
criticised for its inability to capture the discrete nature of ratings (Bennell et al., 2006; Mellios 
and Paget-Blanc, 2006; Afonso et al., 2007). 
Mulder and Perrelli (2001), studying 25 sovereigns during 1992-1999, find that the 
determinants of sovereign ratings are ratios including investment to GDP, debt to exports and 
the short-term debt to reserves. Similarly, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) investigates S&P and 
Moody’s to estimate the connection of sovereign ratings with economic indicators. Author 
applies ordered probit model to 95 sovereigns during 1995-1999. The results suggest that GNP 
per capita, inflation, current account balance and foreign reserves perform important function 
in explaining sovereign ratings in countries with lower ratings.  
Using a rating sample of 70 sovereigns for the period 1989-1999, Bennell et al. (2006) suggest 
that significant explanatory variables include foreign debt to exports, fiscal deficit or surplus 
to GDP, mean of current deficit or surplus to GDP mean of inflation rate, mean in GDP growth, 
GDP per capita and development level. The shortcoming of the method is pooling ratings from 
11 CRAs to form one dependent variable because it is believed the methodological aspects 
across CRAs differ significantly.  
To address this issue, Afonso et al. (2007) estimate separate regressions for different CRAs. 
These authors use a random effects ordered probit model on a panel of 78 sovereigns over the 
1995 to 2005 period. The fundamental indicators explaining sovereign ratings are GDP per 
capita, growth in GDP, government efficacy, government debt, external debt and external 
reserves and default predictions.  
Bank ratings, on the other hand, measure the creditworthiness of intermediaries and by doing 
so they create the information through the cycle which is not otherwise available to the market 
(Hau et al., 2013). Due to the complexity (i.e. opacity) and systematic importance of the 
banking industry bank ratings are driven not only by their specific factors but also by 
macroeconomic environment and potential external support from the government (S&P, 
2011d). Situation of banks is different to other corporations as the sovereigns may elect to assist 
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banks even it if erodes their own creditworthiness (e.g. case of downgrade of Ireland by S&P 
in 2010 due to high sector fiscal costs) (S&P, 2011b). The governments evaluate the potential 
impact of the contingent liabilities of the financial sector on their ratings. When the systematic 
banking crisis strikes the government might be required to recapitalize the system. On the other 
hand, sovereigns might limit financial flexibility of intermediaries through regulatory means. 
Banks are prone to similar sources of stress as the sovereigns and for this reason the sovereign 
risk is considered as a key factor determining a bank rating (S&P, 1997; S&P, 1998; Fitch, 
2002, Poon and Firth, 2005). 
Poon and Firth (2005) study the determinants applied by Fitch to rate banks (see Fitch, 1998) 
on 82 countries and discover that size, profitability, asset quality and liquidity of the bank 
together with the sovereign credit risk contribute towards the bank ratings.  
Van Roy (2013) extends the sample size by investigating ratings from S&P. The author follows 
Fitch (2004) for testing bank rating determinants and find that banking and finance score 
(estimated by the Heritage Foundation capturing aspects related to the market environment of 
banks), loan loss provisions to net interest revenues, net loans to total assets, liquid assets to 
deposits, equity to total assets, net interest margin, return on assets and total assets are the most 
influential. 
Laere et al. (2012) conclude that following sovereign rating, bank size is the second most 
important indicator which has a positive impact on the ratings of intermediaries. Additionally, 
liquidity, profitability, asset quality and Z-index play an important role.  
Hau et al. (2013) employ bank ratings by the big three CRAs over the period 1990 to 2011 and 
suggest that the potential determinants of bank ratings’ quality are CRA’s incentives, the 
regulatory system, reputational capital and competition pressures. 
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3.3.2 How do sovereign rating signals affect markets? 
Credit ratings are known to transmit information to the markets about the creditworthiness of 
the issuer based on the expertise and experience of the CRA. The majority of empirical 
literature indicates that market participants react more strongly to negative rather than to 
positive rating signals (e.g. Hand et al., 1992;  Dichev and Piotroski, 200174; Hull et al., 2004; 
Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013; Kiff et al., 2012).  
According to Jorion et al. (2005), this can be explained in two ways. Firstly, firms react to 
negative news because it affects their real costs (e.g. when firms become downgraded its cost 
of credit changes). Alternatively, this news is stronger because CRAs transmit new (negative) 
information to the market. Ederington and Goh (1998) argue that sources of negative 
information might be considered more ‘valuable’ because firms are more likely to announce 
any positive news about their business and withhold more undesirable information. In addition, 
issuers devote more resources to reveal the underlying causes of negative rating actions. For 
instance, companies will dedicate more means to trace the origins of their declining credit 
worthiness (Jorion et al., 2005).  
Two cross country studies look at the own-market reaction to sovereign ratings. They find an 
effect on equity markets and suggest that the impact attributable to each of three CRAs is 
different.75 Brooks et al. (2004) show that only S&P and Fitch’s ratings yield significant results 
when they downgrade a country. Hill and Faff (2010) find a reputation effect of S&P and Fitch 
during negative events. Moreover, S&P and Moody’s ratings have a stronger effect on 
developing economies. Overall, S&P’s ratings are found more informative than other CRAs’.  
In the contrasting body of literature (see Cantor and Packer, 1996; Reisen and von Maltzan, 
1999; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010), the authors find that rating upgrades lead to fall in yield 
spreads. The effect is also stronger than the downgrades. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) obtain 
a marginally significant impact of positive ratings on CDS spreads in emerging countries 
during 2001-2008. These authors suggest that positive events transmit more information in 
emerging market countries than the negative actions. This could be due to some anticipation 
effect of investors in the CDS markets where the possibility of deteriorating creditworthiness 
is already embedded in the market data whereas the positive information is not. In addition, 
                                                 
74. The authors find that both upgrades and downgrades yield significant results although the latter effect is stronger. 
75. Brooks et al. (2004) use data on Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, Thomson Bank Watch and Fitch IBCA. In 2000 Fitch 
IBCA acquired Thomson Bank Watch (Anderson, 2007). 
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Jorion et al. (2005) find that stock prices in the equity market were positively affected by 
upgrades in ratings after the Reg FD76 came into force. 
Recent research has shown that changes in European sovereign ratings have a spillover effect 
on other sovereigns as well as financial markets, including institutions or other asset classes 
(Arezki et al., 2011). Despite serious implications of the contagion effect of ratings on financial 
stability this stream of literature remains scarce. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) confirm a 
spillover effect of sovereign bond ratings and credit warnings (i.e. outlooks) on other 
sovereigns as well as on different asset classes such as stocks. In their study of 16 developing 
markets including the period 1990-2000 the effect of contagion is magnified during crises in 
countries neighbouring with each other and where the information flow is not transparent. 
Further, upgrades in ratings are recorded when the market is booming (i.e. stock prices are 
rising). On the other hand, downgrades occur mostly during the economic downturns. These 
authors conclude that the pro-cyclical nature of ratings might lead to instability in emerging 
markets. In line with this, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013) complement the body of literature 
confirming a contagion effect of negative news of CRAs during crises. The study reveals that 
the impact of the outlook and watch signals on foreign markets is stronger than that of actual 
ratings. Using a dataset covering Europe and Central Asia prior to (2000-2006) and during the 
crisis (2006-2010), these authors find that the effect of negative rating news is more 
pronounced in the second sub-sample (first sub-sample) period for countries which are 
considered highly (low) rated.  
Arezki et al. (2011) using Eurozone data on CDS spread, banking stock index, insurance stock 
index and country stock market indices covering 2007-2010 uncover that sovereign 
downgrades have strong economic and statistical influence on other countries as well as 
financial markets. Study reveals that sign and scale of the spillover effect depends on the 
information released, on the first affected issuer (e.g. the first downgraded country), and on the 
CRA itself. Further, rating downgrades which result in near speculative grade ratings,77 for 
large countries, show a highly systematic effect. This in turn presents serious threats to 
                                                 
76. Regulation Fair Disclosure came into force on 23 October, 2000. The statute prohibits US companies to disclose 
information to finance professionals with the exception of the CRAs. 
77. For instance, downgrade of Portugal sovereign rating from BBB- to BB+ (negative outlook) in November 2011 by Fitch 
(Financial Market News, 2011). Downgrade of Hungary in December 2011 by S&P and Moody’s from BBB-/Baa3 to 
BB+/Ba1 respectively (Bloomberg, 2011). 
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financial stability. The fact that ratings are hardwired into banking regulation, CDS contracts, 
and investment mandates may help explaining this phenomenon.  
Lastly, Gande and Parsley (2005) in their analysis of emerging bond markets in time spanning 
the period 1991-2000 detect a negative impact of sovereign downgrades on other sovereign 
bond spreads.  
3.4 Business model of CRAs 
The current CRA remuneration framework allows issuers to choose and change their rating 
providers from the available competing CRAs. This in turn might lead to pressures from issuers 
and result in positive rating bias known as ratings shopping (see section 2.5). According to 
Hau et al. (2013) the more incentive the CRA has to stay in business with particular issuer the 
higher likelihood that its ratings will be inflated.  On the similar note, Griffin and Tang (2011) 
find that CRAs which are more closely related with issuers produce more upward biased ratings 
in comparison with those of supervisory division.  
The empirical literature finds that for the comparable companies’ solicited ratings tend to be 
higher than the unsolicited ratings. Gan (2004) relying on a sample of S&P and Moody’s 
ratings on the US industrial companies’ finds that unsolicited ratings are lower after controlling 
for publicly available data. This issue is known in literature as downward bias and the author 
justifies this finding by the self-selection on the side of the issuer. This is in line with Bannier 
and Tyrell (2006) who highlight that the unsolicited ratings are lower because firms who wish 
to be rated present better inside information in comparison to companies which do not inquire 
about solicited ratings. Further, Bannier et al. (2010) show that such ratings are lower due to 
strategic conservatism of CRAs. Namely, when the CRA does not hold the inside information 
it might prefer to rate the issuer too low rather than too high. These authors find that self-
selection among issuers is a potential reason of deflated unsolicited ratings. Bannier et al. 
(2010) also conclude that the more opaque the bank the higher threat of downwards bias (for 
more details on these theories see section 5.2.1.2). 
Another rationale behind lower unsolicited ratings is geographical discrimination. For instance, 
Poon (2003), Poon and Firth (2005) and Behr and Güttler (2008) find that unsolicited ratings 
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of Japanese companies are lower than those from other countries.78 The last study looks at 
reaction of the stock market to unsolicited ratings and discovers a strong negative reaction to 
the release of the initial unsolicited rating for small Japanese firms. This study is an extension 
of Byoun and Shin (2003) where no market reaction is recorded for the initial rating and strong 
negative/positive stock market responses to downgrades/upgrades are observed respectively. 
Furthermore, differences in the way different CRAs award unsolicited ratings are known to 
exist. Fairchild et al. (2009) show that Moody’s ratings become lower in a situation when the 
firm to be granted unsolicited rating presents the CRA with their private information.  These 
authors compare unsolicited ratings of Moody’s and S&P and reveal no differences despite the 
first CRA having the inside information. Fulghieri et al. (2014) using a dynamic rational 
expectations model of the credit rating process provide a formal theoretical basis demonstrating 
coercive behaviour on behalf of CRA but did not test the relationship empirically. The authors 
argue that unsolicited ratings are deliberately lower because CRAs try to induce issuers to sign 
a contract with the CRA by understating their creditworthiness. 
During a Treasury Committee meeting in 2012, Mr Grout79 told the panel that when the issuer 
signs the agreement with the CRA it agrees that in situation when it stops paying to the CRA 
the CRA will keep on providing unsolicited ratings to that issuer. In such scenario, the ratings 
are to be issued based on the publicly gathered information (House of Commons, 2012).80  
Unsolicited ratings were subject of debates and disputes especially in Europe and Asia (JCIF, 
1999; Fitch 2006). Discussion on appropriateness of using unsolicited ratings became concern 
of market participants since the establishment Basel II framework and its capital adequacy 
standards. One of the approaches allowed verifying credit risk which helps in calculating the 
required amount of capital includes standardised approach (BCBS, 2004). National banks 
needed to settle on whether unsolicited ratings are permitted as an addition of the solicited 
credit assessment when standardised approach is used. 
Basel II capital adequacy requirements allow solicited and unsolicited ratings to be used to 
calculate the adequate amount of capital. The second accord maintains that care should be taken 
when solicited ratings are being ordered so that they are issued by the authorised CRA. 
                                                 
78. Nickell et al. (2000) find that even solicited ratings of Japanese companies tend to be lower than their counterparts from 
other countries. 
79. Policy and Technical Director, Association of Corporate Treasurers. 
80. E.g. contract of Turkey with S&P ended in January 2013. 
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Depending on national authorities banks might equivalently utilize unsolicited ratings (Bannier 
et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the important aspect of business model of CRAs is competition between the 
CRAs. According to Hau et al. (2013) competition plays an integral role for the quality of 
ratings. Nevertheless, the literature on the possible effect of competition is divided.  
Camanho et al. (2012) claim competition lessens the good reputation incentive for ratings 
resulting in their reduced quality. Likewise rating quality might be impaired when issuers shop 
for more positive ratings (Bolton et al., 2012). Moreover, Kodres (2010) declares that 
additional CRA in the market results in lower quality of ratings. The higher ratings are 
explained by rise in rating shopping behaviour contrary to previously believed increases in 
information. Furthermore, Becker and Milbourn (2011) find that quality of ratings of S&P and 
Moody’s has weakened since Fitch “material entry” in 1997. In addition, these authors find 
that the ability of CRAs to forecast default of a firm is poorer when Fitch captures larger market 
share. 
A second school of taught believes that competition plays a positive role in terms of the product 
quality. Industrial organisation literature points that this should apply also to the rating industry 
(Hörner, 2002). Hau et al. (2013) find that “multiple bank ratings by different rating agencies 
correlate with less favourable ratings relative to future expected default frequencies (EDFs)” 
(p.5). This notion questions proposition that competition amongst CRAs leads to inflated 
ratings via rating shopping. Doherty et al. (2012) find that entry of a new player leads to 
improved accuracy of default rate estimates.81 
Another characteristic of the rating market is the fact that CRAs do not always agree on the 
creditworthiness of the issuer and release split ratings. It was believed until recently that split 
sovereign ratings are emerging countries’ phenomena due to their political, regulatory and 
economic incoherence (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010a). Recent global situation has shown 
that split ratings affect also developed countries.82 According to Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2009) 
disagreements between CRAs concern sovereigns more often that corporate issuers. Hill et al. 
(2010) estimate that the differences in opinion are typically one or two notches.  IMF (2010) 
                                                 
81. See section 6.3.2 for more detailed comparison. 
82. For example, at the beginning of August 2011 Chinese leading CRA (Dagong Global Credit Rating) downgraded the USA 
from their triple “A” position due to soaring debt. S&P also downgraded the country by one notch to AA+ and negative outlook 
blaming the poor political efforts to decrease spending and lessen national debt (Bloomberg, 2011). 
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explains this fact by the similar public information used by CRAs. Prior studies (see Liu and 
Moore, 1987; Cantor et al., 1997; Jewell and Livingston, 1998) show the importance of split 
ratings in revealing valuable information to markets such as influence on yields for bonds and 
prices.  
In terms of the determinants of split sovereign ratings, limited literature exists. Cantor and 
Packer (1995a) claim that split ratings between S&P and Moody’s are caused by their 
inexperience in rating sovereigns and the complexity of the process. In addition to assessing 
creditworthiness of a government, CRAs need to assess the willingness of a country to repay 
its debt (i.e. stability of institutions, social and economic interrelation). Alsakka and ap Gwilym 
(2009) highlight that disagreements among CRAs are caused by different rating procedures 
and weights employed in their analysis. In addition, the authors claim that CRAs might have 
different opinions about more speculative grade issuers and give extra credit to issuers 
occupying the same geographical area (home bias). However, according to Güttler and 
Wahrenburg (2007), the latter does not apply to Moody’s and S&P.  
Numerous studies examine the underlying causes of split corporate ratings. Differences might 
arise due to random errors incurred by different CRAs (Ederington, 1986), varying 
methodological approaches and weights applied in models (Cantor and Packer, 1995b; Pottier 
and Sommer, 1999; Dandapani and Lawrence, 2007) or because of home bias when issuers are 
rated more favourably in the home country (Beattie and Searle, 1992; Shin and Moore, 2003). 
More recent studies look at the effect of split ratings on future ratings migrations.83 Using bond 
market data, spanning between 1983-2001, Livingston et al. (2008) find corporate bonds which 
received split ratings by S&P and Moody’s are more susceptible to future rating movements. 
Vu et al. (2015) investigating sovereign bonds over period 2000-2012 suggest that market 
responses stronger to negative actions on the inferior ratings and to positive actions of the 
superior ratings. Strong market implications on credit spreads are found for split rating issued 
by the two out of three big CRAs (S&P and Moody’s).  
 
 
 
                                                 
83. Rating migrations portray changes in the quality of credit risk over a time period. 
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3.5 Literature on the influence of regulation 
Most of existing literature focuses on the relationship between rating information affecting 
yields on company's bonds. The literature measuring direct impact of regulation on cost of debt 
on firms or countries remains scarce. 
Kisgen and Strahan’s (2010) innovatory approach looks at direct impact of regulation of ratings 
on firm’s yields in comparison to earlier studies which focus on the impact of having a rating 
on leverage84 (see Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Sufi, 2009). In their natural experiment using 
US data, these authors find that exogenous change in regulation of a CRA affects firm's cost of 
debt capital. Paper extends Kliger and Sarig (2000) on how ratings influence the bond yields. 
In line with the earlier paper change in ratings reduces yield on investment class of bonds. The 
effect on the bonds at the lower end of the rating scale remains insignificant.  
Kisgen and Strahan (2010) support the results of Bongaerts et al. (2012) who claim that ratings 
assigned by Fitch are important due to regulatory reasons. The earlier study explains that 
investors are most likely to employ the Fitch rating if the remaining two large CRAs issue 
contradictory credit ratings within the investment grade margin. Fitch is effectively known to 
“break the tie” for regulatory use of ratings. Positive rating resulting in investment grade by 
Fitch lead to 45 percent lower spreads than when it rates the bonds as speculative grade. This 
is in line with Kisgen and Strahan (2010) where results tend to be stronger in area of 
investment-grade cut-off, where impact of regulatory restraint is the most binding. The above 
studies suggest that ratings influence cost of capital of a company for both information and 
regulatory reasons (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). 
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) use bond market data spanning the period 1986-1993 to measure 
impact of intensifying regulation imposed by NAIC85 in 1990 and coinciding restrictions on 
saving and loan investment86 on the distribution of financing and investment. These authors 
find that changes in the supply of credit have a strong influence on financing and investment 
decisions of firms within the speculative-grade rating categories.  
Using data on the corporate bond market between 2001 and 2005, Ellul et al. (2011) find that 
insurance firms which are restricted by regulation to a large extent are more likely to sell bonds 
                                                 
84. Also known as general supply of capital effects Kisgen and Strahan (2010). 
85. National Association of Insurance Companies (NAIC). 
86. In speculative-grade. 
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with speculative grade at a very low price. The decreasing prices of bonds which reach below 
their fundamental value is an example of the negative effect of regulation.  
Alsakka et al. (2015) is the only study which studies the recent reforms of the CRA industry in 
Europe since the formal regulation was introduced in December 2009. In particular, it focuses 
on whether there is change in the market perceptions to the ratings issued by Fitch, Moody’s 
and S&P since the supervisory role of overseeing CRAs was handed to ESMA in July 2011. 
Using 44 publicly listed banks in Europe, the authors investigate the responses of stock returns 
and price volatilities to bank rating events issued by the big three CRAs during 2008-2013. The 
sample considers only downgrades since they comprise the majority of events in that time 
frame. The applied methodology includes event study. The findings suggest that the reaction 
to regulation is mixed and cannot be interpreted easily. For example, downgrades by Moody’s 
and S&P are found to cause strong negative abnormal returns after the supervision was 
entrusted with ESMA whereas they did not exist before. For the former CRA these effects are 
short-lived. Moreover, the regulation reduces the market reaction for Fitch. Further, after July 
2011 the price volatility of S&P downgrades decreased in contrast to the earlier period. For 
Moody’s the effect is the opposite and the price volatility after regulation increases marginally. 
The regulation is not found to change the insignificant effect of the Fitch downgrades on bank’s 
share price volatility.  
These results represent mixed movements in the market’s perceptions in terms of improving 
rating quality and endorsing market stability and for this reason the authors stress that the 
evidence cannot solely be attributed to regulation. They conclude that the regulatory changes 
had not taken full effect on the market at the time of this investigation. 
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3.6 Methodologies applied in credit rating research 
3.6.1 Limited dependent variable 
The limited dependent variable model relies on the fact that the financial outcome or behaviour 
captured in the dependent variable is not a random continuous variable. Instead, it points to the 
direction whether a particular outcome occurred or not (binary response) (Greene, 2012). The 
discrete nature of the dependent variable means that it can lead to binary response or 
alternatively take a value from a multiple limited number of values exceeding the choice of 
two.87 
Limited dependent (categorical) variable can include binary, multinomial, or ordered 
responses.  
 Binary choice is an effect of one response arising over another (i.e. 0 or 1). 
 Nominal choice is one that occurs from a variety of more than two available options 
(i.e. A, B, C…). 
 Ordered choice reveals the strength or a ranking of a response and takes a numerical 
value (i.e. 1st, 2nd, 3rd…) (Gujarati, 2004).  
When categorical variables are involved, the linear regression models (e.g. OLS) are no longer 
suitable for efficient and non-biased estimation, as they do not result in the best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE). Different econometric models are available to researchers depending on 
their particular needs. Logit and probit regressions account for binary choices (see Eq. (3.1)). 
Multinomial logit is used to analyse nominal responses, while ordered logit/probit regressions 
deal with ordinal responses (see Eq. (3.4)) (Gujarati, 2004).  
Most of the above models are estimated by means of the maximum likelihood (ML) method. 
Its objective is to find values of unspecified parameters, so that the probability of detecting 
dependent variable (e.g. 0 or 1) is as high as possible (maximum).  
 
                                                 
87. It takes a finite number of values into account: e.g. throwing a dice has 6 possibilities; in credit ratings the numerical score 
often includes 20 or 58 categories.  
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3.6.1.1 Binary response: Probit and logit  
Probability density function (PDF) is the probability for a random variable to take on a 
particular value. In the case of binary models, a limited number of responses is considered (e.g. 
0 or 1). The probit model follows standard normal distribution, where error term is assumed to 
have zero mean and variance of one. The probability density (PDF) is characterised by high 
peak and thin tails.  
The logit model, on the other hand, follows standard logistic distribution, where the error term 
is assumed to have zero mean and variance of π²/3. The logit probability density function has 
lower peak and flatter (heavier) tails compared to the earlier model (Greene, 2012). In addition 
to the difference in the assumption of standard errors, the estimation of two models is different. 
Usually, needs and convenience of a researcher determine which model is to be used (Gujarati, 
1995; Afonso et al., 2009). 
According to Wooldridge (2007) the interest of the binary response model is to explain the 
effect of independent variables (X) on the response probability of P(y). Since the responses 
take discrete values, an unobserved latent variable formulation will help in explaining the 
dependent variable y.88 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡+. . 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (3.1) 
y* = an unobserved latent variable 
i = 1,…N entities and t = 1,…T time periods.              
α = intercept term, (i.e. threshold) 
X1, X2 = explanatory variables 
β = regression parameters  
ε = latent error term 
assuming that:  
yit =1  if     𝑦𝑖
∗>0 
yit =0  if              𝑦𝑖
∗⩽0 
                                                 
88. An unobserved latent variable is used to make inferences about the observable variables in the regression model (Gujarati, 
2004). 
60 
 
In the standard binary model, one single cut-off point is projected at 0 as this model has only 
two outcomes {e.g. 0 and 1} (Wooldridge, 2007). 
Depending on the distribution assumption of the error term εit, the discrete response is viewed 
as a reflection of the underlying regression: probit or logit (Greene, 2012). 
The probit model is derived from the latent variable model when the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is normally 
distributed. The model can be written as:  
ɸ(z) = (2π)−
1
2 e (−z2/2)                                                          (3.2) 
ɸ(z) = normal standard density  
e = exponential value approximately equal to 2.71828 
π = mathematical constant approximately equal to 3.14159 
Z = standard normal variable (z= α +β1 +β2Xi+…) 
The logit model on the other hand is estimated when 𝜀𝑖𝑡 follows standard logistic distribution 
and can be seen in Eq. (3.3) below. 
λz = 𝑒𝑧/(1+𝑒𝑧)                                                                             (3.3) 
λz = logistic cumulative distribution function 
e = exponential value approximately equal to 2.71828 
z = standard normal variable (z= α +β1 Xi+β2Xi+…) 
It could also be written that: 
λz =1/(1+e-z) = 𝑒𝑧/(1+𝑒𝑧)                                                            (3.4) 
This further leads to the odds ratio of a response written by λz /(1- λz) where λz is the probability 
of the event occurring whereas (1- λz) is the probability of the opposite. One can write: 
 
λz /(1- λz)= (1+ 𝑒𝑧)/ (1+e-z)= ez                                                   (3.5) 
After taking a logarithm the log of odds ratio is linear in X and in parameters (Gujarati, 2004). 
ln(λz i /(1- λz))= z                                                                         (3.6) 
where z= α +β1 Xi+β2Xi+.. 
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The studies which apply the logistic function in the CRA literature include Rijken (2004), 
Fuertes and Kalotychou (2007), Behr and Güttler (2008); Bannier et al. (2010). On the other 
hand, it is believed by some that probit techniques are more adequate to forecast ratings 
(Gujarati, 1995; Afonso et al., 2009) and because they are based on fewer assumptions relating 
the error term (Cluff and Farnham, 1985; Wooldridge, 2005). 
3.6.1.2 Ordered response: Ordered probit and logit 
Ordered logit/probit specification is an extension of the binary model shown in Eq. (3.1). The 
regressand, however, has more than two responses in a ranked order (exceeding choice of yes 
or no; “0” and “1”). Error terms show the same distribution as previous models, and they also 
produce similar results. Namely, ordered logit (with logistic distribution) can be used as an 
equivalent of ordered probit (characterised by normal distribution).  
The ordered model follows the latent variable model explained earlier in the binary option (see 
Eq. (3.1)). Different values of α act as threshold parameters which divide the data sample into 
z intervals. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡+. . 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                       (3.7) 
y* = an unobserved latent variable 
i = 1,…N entities and t = 1,…T time periods.              
X1, X2 = explanatory variables 
β = regression parameters  
ε = latent error term 
The probability of regressand (yit) taking a particular value equates to the probability that latent 
variable ( 𝑦𝑖
∗) will fall in a particular interval.  The latent error term (random effect) is assumed 
to follow standard normal distribution and to be independent of Xit. The model does not contain 
a constant, since in the ordered probit specification one observes threshold parameters rather 
than one intercept. These cut-off points divide the data into z intervals greater than one. Let J 
be the number of available responses {0,1.2,…J} and αJ act as cut-off point. 
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The unobserved latent variable relates to the observed responses yit so that: 
yit =0  if    𝑦𝑖
∗⩽ α1 
yit =1  if    α1 <𝑦𝑖
∗ ⩽α2 
 . 
 . 
yit =J   if    𝑦𝑖
∗> αJ 
For instance, if yit has three responses {0,1 ,2} there will be two cut-off points: α1 and α2.89 
Since ordered models incur multiple responses and consequently have more than one cut-off 
points, there is no intercept term in the ordered probit/logit model. If one finds α term in the 
model, this simply represents the first threshold. 
The (β) parameters of the regression as well as thresholds (α) are estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation (ML)  and are subject to constraint α1<α2 <….<αJ (Wooldridge, 2007). 
Application of ordered logit/probit models in the credit rating literature is widespread. The 
ordered probit model was applied by Blume et al. (1998); Nickell et al. (2000); Trevino and 
Thomas (2000, 2001); Hu et al. (2002); Bennell et al. (2006); Wendin and McNeil (2006); 
Purda (2007); Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2009, 2010a). The methodology allows the researcher 
to take into account the discrete and ordinal nature of the rating scale and of changes in ratings 
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010a). As highlighted by Park (2005) and Bennell et al. (2006), the 
distances between adjacent points on the rating scale are not equal. Thus, using approaches 
which recognise the dependent variable as being continuous or having equal distance between 
points on the scale (e.g. Ordinary Least Squares) might result in biased and inefficient 
estimates.90 In a further sample, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) shows that the ordered probit 
model has advantages over OLS in measuring quantitative determinants of sovereign ratings 
for 95 countries over the period 1995-1999.  
On the other hand, Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006) exploit the logistic model to find 
determinants of sovereign ratings from the three main CRAs using a sample of 86 countries. 
The authors claim that the ordered logistic model, with the 21-point rating scale, allowed them 
to predict sovereign ratings in 95 percent of the cases with two notches range and in 74 percent 
of the cases with an accuracy of plus/minus one notch. Finally, Ederington (1985) applies both 
                                                 
89. Following the rule αJ= yit -1. 
90. Estimates are not BLUE.  
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ordered probit and logit to predict bond credit ratings and finds the former model outperforms 
the latter. 
3.6.1.3 Nominal response: Multinomial logit/probit 
Multistage probability distributions, similarly, to the ordered probit and logit model, involve 
the regressands which have multiple responses. In such models, choice is not ordered and 
nominal in nature {e.g. A, B, C}.91 Similarly to basic probit/logit model, multinomial 
specification relies on similar assumptions and, hence, follows a similar distribution. For 
instance, the multinomial logit model relies on the assumption that the log-odds of choices 
pursue a linear model.  
The example of application of multinomial logit model can be found in Livingston et al. (2008) 
where the authors investigate the relationship between split bond ratings and rating migrations 
by S&P and Moody’s during 1983-2000. 
3.6.2 Marginal effect 
When using a linear regression model, the slope coefficient quantifies the variation in the 
average value of the dependent variable for a unit change in the independent variable, while 
other control variables are held constant. The marginal effect measures the economic 
significance of identified relationships. In the nonlinear model, this situation is different and 
the parameters of the coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects (Greene, 2012). 
In the logit model, the slope coefficient of a variable X results in the change of log of the odds, 
which corresponds to unit change in that control variable holding all remaining regressors 
constant. However, due to the nature of logit model, the change in probability of a particular 
response is influenced by probabilities of all dependent variables rather than an isolated 
coefficient as in the earlier example of linear model.  
The effect is given by βi λz (1- λz), where the parameter of a particular regressor is known as 
βi whereas λz is a probability of a particular response. From Eq. (3.6) it can be seen that, in 
order to estimate the probability of a response, all variables are included.  
                                                 
91. For example, if one talks about different means of transport A-car, B-train, C-plane – there is no ordinal ranking of 
responses. 
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According to Gujarati (2004), in the probit model the rate of change of probability of a 
particular component is more complex and can be written as βi ɸ (z). As seen in Eq. (3.2),          
ɸ (z) is the density function of standard normal variable z= α +β1 +β2Xi+... Also in this 
scenario, the partial effect of a variable X cannot be disentangled from the remaining 
regressors, as all variables of the regression model are used in the estimation. 
For the above reasons, the parameter coefficient which is obtained in basic logit/probit models 
or their extensions (ordered logit/probit) cannot be interpreted as marginal effect. 
According to Greene (2012), there are two approaches to estimate the marginal effect in binary 
models. One can estimate the marginal effect at every observation and take the sample average 
of the individual effect, known as average partial effect (AME). Alternatively, the marginal 
effect can be obtained from the sample means of the data (MEM).  
A difference is made as to how marginal effects for independent variables are estimated for 
binary variables (dummies) or continuous variables. In the former example, one calculates the 
difference between probability of one response occurring (e.g. 1) minus the probability of the 
second response occurring (e.g. 0), while all other variables from the model are kept at their 
mean.  
This could be illustrated by: 
Marginal effect= Prob [y=1 |𝑥 ̅(𝑎), a= 1]- Prob [y=1 |𝑥 ̅(𝑎), a= 0]                  (3.8) 
y = dependent discrete variable  
x ̅(a) = means of all other variables in the sample 
a = binary independent variable  
The partial effect of the continuous variable on the response probability is obtained by 
calculating change in the predicted probability which is due to one unit change in the 
independent variable (a), while holding other explanatories fixed at their mean values. 
Marginal effect of = limit [Prob (y=1 |𝑥 ̅(𝑎), a+Δ)- Prob (y=1|𝑥 ̅(𝑎), a)/Δ]    (3.9) 
as Δ gets closer and closer to 0. 
y = dependent discrete variable  
x ̅(a) = means of all other variables in the sample 
a = explanatory continuous variable 
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Δ = change in the independent variable 
3.6.3 Panel data 
Panel data has both a cross-sectional and a time dimension, which results in numerous 
observations. For unit observations represented by “N”, there are potentially time periods 
depicted by “T” resulting in number of observations N*T. The panel is known to be balanced 
if every cross-section unit has the same number of time dimension observations. If the number 
of observations is different for different units, the panel is unbalanced.  
The benefit of using panel data is that it allows for unobserved heterogeneity. On the other 
hand, relationship between error term and independent variables can be problematic, as 
heterogeneity might be undetected. This gives rise to an assumption concerning the dependence 
of error terms and coefficient, which is described in more detail in the next subsection.   
3.6.4 Fixed effect 
Fixed and random effects are frequently used in estimating regression models in panel data. In 
a panel data, each cross-sectional unit might represent an individual characteristic;92 hence, the 
intercepts for each of them will be different. Subscript i on the intercept (αi) shows this 
individual effect. The fixed effect (regression) model (FEM) for binary choice model is shown 
in Eq. (3.10). Although the model assumes that the intercept for each unit is different, it is time 
invariant – meaning that it remains constant across time for the same cross-section unit.  
For example, if the intercept is described by α1it , this would mean that each unit’s intercept 
varies across entities, as well as across time (is time variant). Furthermore, the slope 
coefficients (β1, β2,) are assumed to be constant amongst all units/time in FEM models, whereas 
the error term follows normal distribution (Gujarati, 2004). 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 𝑑𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                       (3.10) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  = latent dependent variable 
𝛼𝑖 = intercept term 
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = dummy variable taking value of one for individual i at time t, zero otherwise;  
i = 1,…N entities and t = 1,…T time periods.              
                                                 
92. If talking about firms there might be different traits of companies in the sample in terms of their management style etc. 
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X1, X2 = explanatory variables 
β = regression parameters  
εit = latent error term 
assuming that:  
yit =1  if     𝑦𝑖
∗>0 
yit =0  if          𝑦𝑖
∗⩽0 
To practically estimate the model which captures cross-section variations (effects), the dummy 
variable technique is often used.93 Furthermore, one can account for differences in the time 
dimension (e.g. regulation, technological improvements) via including time binary variables. 
Both effects can be included together in a regression model. However, this results in losing 
significant number of degrees of freedom.  
3.6.5 Random effect 
In the random effects model, rather than assuming that the intercept term is fixed α1i one 
presumes the intercept is a random variable with mean value α1. In this scenario, the intercept 
is defined as: 
𝛼1𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝑣𝑖                                                                                     (3.11) 
𝛼1𝑖 = intercept value of individual i = 1,…N entities 
𝛼1 = mean value of the intercept 
𝑣𝑖 = random error term 
where vi is a random error term which follows zero mean and variance of σε2. This model 
assumes that units included in the sample have common mean value of the intercept term (𝛼1), 
and any existing differences are contained in the error term (vi).  
The random effect model can be written as:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝛼1 +𝛽1𝑖𝑡𝑋 1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (3.12) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
                                                 
93. Also known as least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model which is an alternative name to the fixed effect model (FEM). 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  = latent dependent variable 
𝛼𝑖 = intercept term 
i = 1,…N entities and t = 1,…T time periods.              
X1, X2 = explanatory variables 
β = regression parameters  
εit = composite error term 
vi = unobserved latent error term time invariant.  
uit = random error 
The error term (𝜀𝑖 ) comprises of two elements, 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The first component, also known 
as latent variable, is not observable. It captures cross-section variations,94 while it does not vary 
across time. Following normal distribution with the mean of zero and a constant variance of 
𝜎𝑣𝑖  
2 , it assumes to be unrelated to the independent variables (xit). The latent variable represents 
the (random) deviation of a particular entity (its intercept) from the intercept mean value 𝛼1.  
The second component, the white noise, 𝑢𝑖t is assumed to be normally distributed with the 
mean of zero and unit variance 𝜎𝑢𝑖 
2 . The random error term uit merges together the time-series 
element and the cross-section variation (see Eq. (3.12)).  
The random effect model, in contrast to the fixed effect model, assumes 𝑣𝑖 to be uncorrelated 
with independent variables (Greene, 2012). Furthermore, error components are assumed to be 
uncorrelated to each other, across time, or cross-sectionally (Gujarati, 2004). 
These above assumptions can be written as:  
𝑣𝑖  ∼ N (0, 𝜎𝑣 
2) 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡∼ N(0, 𝜎𝑢 
2 )⇾ N (0,1) 
E(𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡)=0   
E(𝑣𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡) =0    E(𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑗)=0  (i ≠j) 
E(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑠)= E(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗𝑡)= E(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑗𝑠)= 0   (i ≠j; t ≠s). 
From the above properties it can be written that: 
var (εit ) =  𝜎𝑢 
2 +𝜎𝑣 
2+ = 1+𝜎𝑣 
2                                                             (3.13) 
                                                 
94. I.e. specific heterogeneity.  
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The final expression derives from probability distributions where 𝑢𝑖𝑡∼ N (0,1). 
According to Gujarati (2004), if the 𝜎𝑣 
2 was equal to 0, there would be no difference between 
the FEM in Eq. (3.10) and REM in Eq. (3.12). 
However, since 𝑣𝑖 is one of the two components of the error term,
95 the composed error 
termεit from Eq. (3.12) is serially correlated across time (εit and εis where t ≠s). 
It can be written that correlation coefficient, corr (εit and εis ) is:  
ρ=corr (εit and εis ) =
𝜎𝑣 
2
𝜎𝑣 
2 +𝜎𝑢 
2  = 
𝜎𝑣 
2
 𝜎𝑣 
2 +1
                                                  (3.14) 
where t ≠s 
The estimated ρ measures the proportion of the panel-level variance component to the total 
residual variance.   
Random and fixed effect can be integrated together with probit or logit models. The 
combination of the random effect probit model is considered more attractive than the logit due 
to higher availability of estimators. When choosing between the fixed or random effect for the 
limited dependent variable, decision is based on the error term characteristics. Namely, if the 
vi is significant, we find random effect in our data, whereas insignificant vi shows that the 
panel does not account for random effect in the data and fixed effect should be used instead. 
The ρ statistic is useful to test for presence of the unobserved effect in the panel (i.e. whether 
the error term has composite nature) and whether random effect ordered probit model should 
be chosen instead of the basic ordered probit model.  
Using likelihood ratio (LR) with one degree of freedom, the two models can be compared. 
When the null hypothesis (ρ=0) is rejected, this implies that the panel-level variance component 
is important and the upgraded specification should be used. On the other hand, if the null 
hypothesis is accepted it is assumed that the error term is not of composite nature. Hence, it is 
normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance (uit∼ N(0, σu 
2 )⇾ N (0,1)). 
Random effect ordered probit specification is widely used in sovereign ratings’ literature and 
is considered the most superior specification (Afonso et al., 2007, 2009; Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym, 2010b). This is due to its ability to capture the cross-sectional variances in its error 
                                                 
95. Which is present in every time period. 
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term.96 Such factors include geographical insecurity, political risks, social imbalances which 
influence the sovereign credit ratings. It is believed that no time series component can replicate 
the social and political conditions across sovereigns. According to Afonso et al. (2009) and 
Eliasson (2002), REM error term corrects for not including these dynamics in the regression 
model.  
3.6.6 Fixed versus random effects 
In the FEM model, each cross-section entity has its separate (fixed) intercept. In the REM, the 
intercept consists of the mean value of all cross-sectional intercepts plus the error term which 
explains the deviation value of a particular intercept from the mean.  
Moreover, FEM does not require the assumption of no relationship between time variants 
(individual effects) and the regressors. Random effect, in contrast, requires independence 
between them (i.e. error term and the regressors must not be correlated). When choosing 
between two models, the Hausman statistic test is used.  
3.6.7 Robust standard errors 
One of the assumptions of the regression model (linear as well as non-linear) is 
homoscedascity. It implies that variance of the disturbance term in the regression model is 
constant and corresponds to σ2.  
E(𝜀𝑖𝑡
2 )= σ2                                                                                           (3.15) 
ε = error term of the regression model 
i = 1,…N entities and t = 1,…T time periods.              
According to Brooks (2008), since the basic limited dependent variable takes one out of two 
possible outcomes, the disturbance term also takes only one out of two values. Therefore, 
normal distribution of the error term is not possible. Furthermore, since the disturbance term 
adjusts systemically with independent variables, the error term does not have a constant 
variance, thus it is not heterodastic. To treat this problem, it  is advised to use robust standard 
errors (Brooks, 2008). The standard error calculations are based on the assumption that the 
sample size is large (asymptotic assumption). The estimation method is maximum likelihood, 
                                                 
96. The cross-section error term follows normal distribution. 
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while the critical values follow normal distribution. To ensure the standard errors (SE) are 
robust, statistical Huber or White tests can be applied.  
In addition to the homoscedasctity assumption, both the non-linear and linear model require no 
autocorrelation. According to Kendall and Buckland (1971; p.8), autocorrelation is a 
“correlation between members of series of observations ordered in time [as in time series data] 
or space [as in cross-sectional data]” Consequently, autocorrelation should not be present 
within the error term. This means that the error term of one unit observation is not subjective 
to the error term of another observation, either in time or in cross-sectional spectrum. 
E(𝜀𝑖𝜀𝑗)= 0  (i ≠j)                                                                                 (3.16) 
3.6.8 Clustered standard errors 
Often data might include independent observations which have a cluster structure, which 
results in correlations between groups due to their similarities. These clustered observations 
invalidate the main assumption of regression analysis which requires errors to be independently 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) (Primo et al., 2007). This issue is closely related to 
heteroskedascity or non-constant error variance.  
According to  Primo et al. (2007) clustered data results in higher dependency of data, which 
subsequently could result in misleading results. If there is a number of independent 
observations and the data are clustered, it might mean that what the sample holds is not the 
number of cases, but the number of clusters which decreases the information content.  
According to Moulton (1990), who conducts state and local policy research, if one does not 
take into account the clustered nature of the data, the model will understate the standard errors 
of the parameters. When adjusting for clustered nature of the data, one makes allowance for 
the observations within the cluster to be linked with each other, although observations amongst 
clusters are assumed to be independent (Primo et al., 2007).  
The clustered standard errors approach is a modification of Huber-White heteroscedascity 
standard errors and involves a more relaxed approach. Namely, the general form of 
heterescadascitity is permitted, as long as errors are not correlated across or within units 
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The clustered standard errors tackle the problem of typical 
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heteroscedascity and intra-cluster correlation.97 For limited dependent variable models, the 
clustered standard errors technique requires a high amount of clusters.  
3.6.9 Quasi-experimental research design: Difference-in-difference (DD) 
The difference-in-difference (DD) approach is an example of the quasi-experimental research 
design. It relies on the notion of ‘natural experiments’ where a particular group of individuals 
or entities experience a treatment (treatment group), while others do not (control group). 
Exogenous shocks used in this methodology might include changes in government policy, 
implementation of a new drug, natural disasters or wars (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
The panel data method shows the result of a treatment action (intervention) by comparing how 
the outcome changes over time and between both groups (treatment and control).  According 
to Angrist and Pischke (2009), the controls in the model do not necessarily need to include the 
time and state dimensions which are the ones most used in examples. Data can be grouped by 
using other characteristics or groups. The aim of the study is to perform treatment versus 
control comparison. According to Angrist and Pischke (2009), the method is a type of fixed 
effect estimation where aggregated data are employed. 
This estimator is obtained via the regression model framework: 
yit= α1 + β1 Treatmenti+β2 Postt +β3 (Treatment *Post)it + εit                (3.17) 
 
yit = binary indicator of an outcome; the estimate follows (TG
POST-TGPRE) - (CGPOST-CGPRE) 
where: TG is a treatment group, CG control group, POST(PRE) relates to the post (pre) event 
period. 
i = 1,…N entities and τ = 1,…T time periods 
Treatment = dummy variable takes value of 1 of the entity is in the treatment group; 0 
otherwise. 
Post = dummy variable takes value of 1 if the observation is in a post-treatment period; 0 
otherwise. 
β1 = average of the outcome variable for the treatment group relative to the control group pre-
treatment period. 
β2 = change measurement in the outcome variable between periods within the control group. 
                                                 
97. The intra-cluster correlation leads to bias in standard errors. However, it does not affect estimated coefficients.  
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β3 = treatment effect measures of how much outcome variable changed in the treatment group 
due to treatment in respect to how much outcome variable changed in the control group in the 
same time period.  
Jiang et al. (2012) apply the DD approach to test if ratings of the same corporate bond issued 
by S&P (treatment group) and Moody’s (control group) alter under different payments 
models.98 The findings suggest that the only ratings affected by the change of the remuneration 
model are bonds which bear some characteristics of conflict of interest. Natural experiment of 
Becker and Milbourn (2011) uses the entry of Fitch99 as a shock to the market which triggered 
competitiveness between CRAs. 
Kisgen and Strahan’s (2010) quasi-natural experiment uses certification of Dominion Bond 
Rating Service (DBRS) by SEC, in February 2003, as an exogenous shock on the bond 
investment market to investigate its impact on the firm’s cost of debt. These authors find a 
negative effect of DBRS on the cost of capital for firms which used their services preceding its 
certification. The paper complements Kliger and Sarig (2000) and Tang (2009) who study bond 
yield before and after Moody’s 1982 enhancement of its rating scale.  
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) using DD approach study the impact of three exogenous shocks 
to the supply of credit influencing corporate funding opportunities and investment behaviour 
of speculative- rank firms. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Leary (2007), Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006) and Sufi (2009) also study the supply forces on firms’ workings by means of treatment 
and control group comparisons. The former two papers make a distinction between large and 
small firms, whereas Faulkender and Petersen (2006) differentiate whether the credit rating is 
present or absent. Finally, Sufi (2009) compares speculative- against investment-grade firms.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98. In July 1974 S&P replaced the investor-pays model with the issuer-pays model already implemented by Moody’s since 
October 1970. 
99. More specifically its gained prominence in providing rating services which significantly increased during end of 1990. 
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3.7 Chapter conclusions  
The current literature emphasises the relevance of studying workings of the CRAs. For 
instance, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Arezki et al. (2011) offer evidence that CRAs 
play an integral role in financial markets and spillover between markets and countries may 
have serious repercussions on stability of financial systems. Additionally, the ratings alter the 
cost of capital of companies due to regulatory and information reasons (Kisgen and Strahan, 
2010; Bongaerts et al., 2012). The information transmission function of the CRAs received a 
considerable attention. Although the literature presents mixed results regarding which signals 
are more influential the majority of evidence points out to the negative rating events (Hull et 
al., 2004; Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013).  
Further, the chapter evaluates studies relating to business model of CRAs. There is significant 
body of literature examining the issues of conflict of interest originating from the predominant 
paradigm (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Hau et al., 2013). Despite this there is no empirical 
evidence which could point out to the right model (Jiang et al., 2012). Furthermore, the studies 
find that the ratings which are issued on the solicited basis are higher and more favourable to 
the issuers (Gan, 2004; Behr and Güttler, 2008). Although competing theories of the 
phenomenon are put forward the studies omit the sovereign ratings altogether (Behr and 
Güttler, 2008; Bannier et al., 2010). Additionally, the issue of competition in the CRA market 
is being criticised by many competitors however the views on this topic are divided (Kodres, 
2010; Camanho et al., 2012; Doherty et al., 2012; Hau et al., 2013). Lastly, the literature shows 
that the reaction of the market to changes in ratings and credit signals vary across CRAs which 
implies on the possible superiority of CRAs in forecasting credit worthiness (Güttler and 
Wahrenburg, 2007).  
In relation to the recent regulatory undertakings relating CRAs in Europe there is no literature 
except Alsakka et al. (2015). The existing papers either focus on the US market or on indirect 
effect of regulation (Kisgen and Strahan’s, 2010; Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Bongaerts et al., 
2012).100 Lack of publications on the EU markets in this sphere calls for more evidence and 
emphasises the gap in the literature. This thesis is the first attempt to empirically investigate 
                                                 
100. Majority of the papers on CRAs apply limited dependent variable models whereas the newer generation of studies uses 
quasi-experimental research design. 
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the direct effects of recent reforms to CRAs in the European markets with regards to disclosure 
rules, transparency and mechanical reliance. 
The empirical Chapters 4-6 of this Thesis investigate whether the regulatory changes had 
impact on the workings of CRAs. This analysis acts as means of measuring effectiveness of 
regulatory efforts implemented by EU authorities. One of the questions is whether the 
regulation achieves its objectives. The effect of recent changes to CRAs regulation is of 
economic importance and comprises an important point on the agenda of regulators and 
policymakers. These, together with many interlinked issues, are studied in greater depth in the 
course of this Thesis.  
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Chapter 4: The effects of disclosure rules on CRAs’ profitability and 
competition: A critical assessment 
4.1 Introduction  
 “The growing use of ratings in regulation had given rise to three potentially adverse industry 
dynamics: 1) the substitution of regulatory demand for investor-driven demand for ratings, 2) 
growing perception that ratings were something more than an opinion as a result of their 
official recognition by regulators, and 3) a vicious cycle of intrusive regulation to induce 
ratings and rating agencies to behave in line with regulatory use needs, potentially changing 
the nature of ratings”. 
(Cantor, 2013; p.1). 
Several commentators (see Cantor and Packer, 1995b; Moody’s, 2003), urge regulators to take 
necessary steps to limit the underlying cause of the abovementioned problems – an ongoing 
overreliance on credit ratings in financial market and securities regulation. 
The issue was outlined among other problem drivers in EC (2011a) where deficiency on the 
side of the CRAs has been grouped into six areas and visualised in the form of a tree shown in 
Figure 4.1. The EU’s CRA III regulation is the third attempt which focused on tackling these 
problems in Europe. 
Reducing mechanistic dependence on ratings is considered as one of the main goals of the CRA 
regulation (Cantor, 2013) and is at the heart of this investigation (see red box in Figure 4.1). 
The over-dependency on external measures was attributed to hardwiring external ratings in 
legislation, excessive use of ratings for internal risk assessments, investment strategies directly 
connected with ratings and lack of sufficient information when rating securitized products. Side 
effects of such events including procyclicality and cliff-effects, gave rise to global problems 
such as stability issues and weakened investor confidence (EC, 2011a). 
Closely related to reducing mechanistic reliance is the transparency of the systems and 
practices which are in place ensure that ratings are reliable and of the highest quality. During 
the financial crisis, CRAs were heavily criticised for the competence of their analysts. Among 
other issues, the insufficient number and inadequate education and experience of analysts were 
highlighted. To address the problem, regulators increased the transparency requirements. As 
an example, for CRAs aiming to be registered or certified by ESMA, Annex I.A.8. of the 
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Regulation requires the disclosure of information about the quantity and quality of human 
resources (Gaillard, 2011). The detailed information about company structure, experience of 
the senior staff members and their assigned responsibilities along with compensation are to be 
reported directly to ESMA. Such requirements might increase the operating costs of CRAs.  
This chapter consists of an innovative study of mechanistic reliance on ratings and recent 
developments in regulation which tackle this issue. Cantor (2013) emphasizes that actions in 
the US aimed at decreasing reference to ratings on a wide scale were of great success. However, 
the author believes that the Basel Committee101 does not have a strategy to realize the same in 
Europe (see also Moody’s, 2012b, 2003).  
Moody’s (2012b) supports the need to reduce reliance on ratings although it raises concerns 
with the way that regulators are tackling the problem. The CRA highlights that the process is 
time consuming. Laws and regulations are either adopted but not implemented or have been 
advised but require further attention. The company fears that the current and future regulation 
might augment costs to the CRAs. They also fear that legal responsibilities will increase thus 
lessening their profitability. Moody’s stresses that its capability to compete with other CRAs 
could suffer due to increasing regulatory costs, price competition and the entry to the market 
of newly registered CRAs. 
Although the above mentioned concerns were directly raised by Moody’s (2012b) it is not clear 
why they affect any particular CRA disproportionally.102 For instance, similar fears were 
expressed in the recent annual report by McGraw-Hill Financial which owns S&P Ratings 
Services (McGraw-Hill, 2014). The rating group stresses that the rising regulation both in the 
US and abroad escalates the costs of running the business and might have adverse repercussions 
on their business, its financial health and the resulting operations. Namely, it might influence 
communications with issuers and CRAs and the way in which ratings are issued, hence 
changing how their users operate. CRAs need to understand and interpret laws and regulations 
accurately as the inability to do so will lead to risks of incurring fines, penalties or sanctions. 
One recent example is the substantial penalty imposed on S&P in January 2015 by the SEC. 
                                                 
101. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014) proposal to revise the standardised approach for credit risk aims to erase 
the references from external credit ratings. The Committee is looking to substitute ratings with risk drivers which should be 
“simple, intuitive, readily available and capable of explaining risk consistently across jurisdictions” (BIS, 2014; p.1). The 
examples for bank exposures would include capital adequacy ratio and an asset quality ratio. However, as stated in the 
document, the process is at the preliminary phase where feedback and data to improve the proposal are desired from market 
participants. 
102. The effect could be disproportional if CRAs have heterogeneous client bases (e.g. different proportion of sovereign versus 
non-sovereign ratings being issued) and the regulations affect these segments of the clientele differently. 
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The first fine exercised on by ESMA was in June 2015, when DBRS was penalised for 
insufficient internal controls. Since these costs are passed onto customers they might affect the 
demand for credit ratings and workings of the CRA business. “Each of these developments 
increases the costs and legal risk associated with the issuance of credit ratings and may have 
a material adverse effect on our operations, profitability and competitiveness, the demand for 
credit ratings and the manner in which such ratings are utilized” (McGraw-Hill, 2014; p.11). 
However, one could argue that similar costs would face other CRAs hence the competitive 
impact might be neutral. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether the expressed fears of CRAs are justifiable 
and if externalities (higher costs to CRAs due to transparency requirements) impair the way 
that CRAs operate. The chapter examines whether (staffing) and operational costs of the CRAs 
increased because of regulatory interventions leading to decreased profitability. Additionally, 
the consequences of greater transparency and disclosure rules on the level of competition 
between CRAs are considered. This leads to the main research question: Are CRA profitability 
and competition between CRAs intact following increased transparency and disclosure 
requirements? 
This chapter fills a gap in the literature by presenting a thorough analysis of the most recent 
undertakings in reducing references to ratings. It contributes towards the existing studies on 
the impact of regulations aimed at the CRAs in the US (e.g. enforced by SEC) (see Jorion et 
al., 2005; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bruno et al., 2015). Additionally, it delivers a unique 
perspective empirical work (except Alsakka et al., 2015), on the impact of the recent CRA 
regulation in Europe. Overall, the chapter offers comparisons between the two governing 
systems which have not been studied before. Evaluation of the regulatory efforts in the US is 
very important since they were initiated much earlier than those in Europe. This can give a 
clear indication about their effectiveness and act as potential guidance for future European 
policy making.  
The CRAs used in the analysis exceed 95 percent of the market share. This wide coverage of 
CRAs adds credibility and reliability to the inferences. Most studies up to date concentrate on 
the bigger CRAs when making judgements about the regulatory efforts or the overall working 
of the industry (e.g. Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Bongaerts et al., 2012; Alsakka et al., 2015).  
Although the big three CRAs dominate the market share, it is important to observe the impact 
of regulation on staffing costs not only at the largest CRAs but also the smaller players. The 
78 
 
latter might be relatively more affected by the possible increases in staffing costs. In addition, 
the only users of the investor-pays model, which was suggested as an alternative to the 
conventional remuneration model, are smaller CRAs such as KBRA, Morningstar and EJR (the 
only CRAs depending on this model exclusively). Therefore, it would be a risky move to shift 
the remuneration model of the entire CRA market based on the experiences of only one CRA.  
Additionally, the chapter uncovers some surprising facts about the very low number of staff 
dedicated to rating an extremely large number of issues. This leaves a question mark 
surrounding the information quality of some CRAs’ ratings.  
Another novelty of this comparative study stems from the proxies used to assess the impact of 
regulatory efforts aimed at reducing overreliance on ratings. Measures including earnings, 
staffing of CRAs (e.g. number of analysts), number of outstanding ratings and the ratio between 
the two have not been applied in the earlier empirical literature on CRAs. This is the first study 
which investigates impact of recent regulatory undertakings in this sphere. 
The wide portfolio of statistics available for CRAs within two main regulatory jurisdictions in 
the world (US and Europe) gives a clear picture of the recent workings of the CRA market. 
This offers a strong foundation for the critical assessment of the recent regulatory undertakings. 
For example, issues such as reporting style and compliance of CRAs with regulation as well as 
controversies over the “appropriate” business model are considered. Additionally, the rationale 
behind the recent fines and penalties incurred by CRAs is evaluated.    
To summarize, this chapter contains many original and significant aspects. These are policy 
implications, empirical evidence and critique. This is relevant to policymakers, market 
participants and academics alike since the regulatory initiatives aimed at CRAs are still 
ongoing. The chapter offers many contributions to the debate.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 summarises the literature and 
the critiques of the regulatory regime. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present the data sources along with 
results. Finally, section 4.5 concludes the study. 
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4.2 Literature 
To investigate the effects of the regulation aimed at reducing the mechanistic reliance on 
ratings, this chapter builds on three streams of literature. Firstly, the action plans and responses 
of regulators are discussed. This section provides a critical appraisal of the implemented 
actions. Secondly, human capital literature is incorporated into the chapter as a means to 
explain the dynamics which drive capacity and productivity of firms. Lastly, literature on the 
role of analysts and the analyst coverage versus firm performance is introduced. 
4.2.1 Response of the regulators  
As a response to the mechanistic reliance on ratings and issue of hardwiring ratings in the 
regulation, key policy actions were initiated.  
In July 2009 and December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) made 
amendments relating ratings in regulation and reducing cliff-effect. Changes related increasing 
motivation of banks to perform in-house risk evaluations. These efforts were aimed mainly at 
securitised products however.  
The Dodd-Frank Act obliges US regulators of financial intermediaries to “specify the use of 
an assessment of the creditworthiness of a security or money market instrument and any 
references to, or requirements regarding, ratings” (OCC, 2012; p.1).  
Federal Banking Agencies and the SEC in the US released proposal outlining which 
alternatives to rating assessments could be introduced to lessen references in the existing 
regulation (see Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) by FDIC, 2010; Securities 
Act and the Investment Company Act by SEC, 2011b). The proposal was finalised in December 
2013 and took effect from February 2014 (SEC, 2013b). 
Moreover, Financial Stability Board (FSB) released Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA 
Ratings in October 2010. The proposal requires responsible authorities in the international 
arena (such as BCBS, ESMA or national regulators) to take steps necessary to implement these 
rules. Report stresses need to increase transparency and disclosure of information in financial 
markets to lessen dependence on ratings and motivate investors to perform internal credit 
assessments (FSB, 2010). The updates on the progress were released in May 2014 (FSB, 2014) 
(for more details see section 2.6.3). 
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For instance, CRA III requires disclosure of information about securitised products and 
reporting of assumptions and features of methodologies for all rated asset classes. ESMA built 
publicly available platform for ratings accompanied by webpage which informs about 
performance of underlying assets (CEREP). Requirements of CRA regulation in relation to 
transparency issues relating disclosure rules, technical standards and public releases of 
information can be found in section 2.6.1 and 2.6.2. 
Bank of England (BOE) recognised the need to improve transparency and introduced suitability 
standards for collateral in securitized products by requiring ABS originators to release more 
detailed information about loan levels and terms of contract amongst others (BOE, 2011). 
Organisation aims to make participants as well its practices less reliant on ratings. In 2009 
European Central Bank (ECB) also announced to introduce similar principles.  
BOE (2011) gives a summary of the possible steps to remove regulatory hardwiring of ratings. 
Some of them include emphasizing need for internal risk assessment methods in the existing 
Basel Accord framework. Introduction of substitutes such as market and non-market based 
indicators and marrying them with the current ratings and internal assessment is also under 
consideration. Moreover, handing the credit assessment to independent party is considered as 
an additional option. BOE admits however, such proposals require further analytical 
investigation.   
4.2.2 Critical appraisal of regulation 
This section outlines some of the issues relating to the existing regulations aimed at CRAs. 
Shortcomings of the resulting actions taken by both the policymakers but also the CRAs 
themselves are discussed. For example, the identification of the global problems lacks 
objectivity and empirical grounds. Further, the reporting styles to the mandatory publications 
and compliance with regulation in not consistent amongst the CRAs. The similar issue relates 
to fines and penalties for misconduct. Lastly, the inquiry into the business model is performed 
by exploring evidence from both remuneration models. Undermining evidence of the investor-
pays, not discussed in earlier studies is revealed. 
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4.2.2.1 The “Problem Tree” 
Figure 4.1 segregates the main problem drivers of CRAs into four groups, as identified by the 
European Commission (EC) (EC, 2011a). Those lead up to the six main consequences which 
finally list four resulting global issues. However, there is a problem with how the executive 
body specified and identified some of the issues when forming of CRA regulation.  
Two of the problem drivers are more subjective and judgemental whereas others are reasonably 
objective. For instance, the first box in the second pillar states: “Insufficient objectivity and 
completeness of the sovereign rating process”. This is questionable since it is difficult to judge 
the objectivity of the CRA by the regulator. Claiming that the sovereign process is incomplete 
is also serious accusation without any underpinning evidence. The comparison of the press 
releases justifying rating actions before and after the regulation was introduced might lend hand 
to investigate whether these accusations had validity at the time of the EC report. For example, 
Moody’s in its press releases before 2011, such as a downgrade of Hungary on the 22 December 
2006, includes a short section on the details of the rating action such as the issuer and its 
location. There is a brief description of what determined the rating to change. This together 
with the details of the managing director and the senior staff close the section which does not 
exceed 1 A4 page (for downgrade of Hungary see Moody’s, 2006; for downgrade of city of 
Athens see Moody’s, 2009). The press releases of rating actions after 2011 provide much more 
detail about the rating process. For instance, the downgrade of Greece on the 1st July 2015 and 
a change of outlook on Hungary on 7th November 2014 provide relatively extensive analysis 
of the performed creditworthiness assessment (Moody’s, 2014; Moody’s, 2015b). Firstly, 
documents consider the rationale for the rating change and the key drivers of the outlook 
changes respectively. The anticipation of what could drive the rating up or down from the 
current state is also explained. Further, press releases provide macroeconomic indicators such 
as GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal and external balance among others. Finally, 
the publications include the details how rating/outlook changes fit the regulatory disclosure 
rules. As in the earlier reports the CRA gives details about its analyst and managing director 
followed by the releasing office. The length of the document exceeds the 3 A4 pages and is an 
indication of the improved transparency standards.  
Further, the box “Inappropriate timing of ratings publication”, which was an immediate 
criticism after downgrading the EU countries too fast, in the same pillar (as well as the last box 
in the last pillar) raises another question. At the time when no regulation was in place there was 
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no appropriate time for releasing rating news. In addition it might be harmful to restrict the 
natural workings of the market?103 (see section 2.6.4 for more details). On the positive note, 
the problem driver identified in box 3 of pillar 1 “Investment strategies directly linked to 
ratings” has been empirically investigated and demonstrated by Cantor et al. (2007), and 
references therein. 
Additionally, the EC’s subjective view is expressed in the list of consequences in the next 
column -“Insufficiently sound credit rating methodologies and processes”. It is controversial 
to claim that the processes are inadequate without providing evidence. CRAs were blamed for 
failing to predict defaults of Enron and during WorldCom as well for the rise of Asian crisis in 
the 1998.104 In addition, the failure in the structured finance market added to their growing 
criticisms. Lack of transparency regarding methodology CRA regulation did not reveal the 
methodologies applied by CRAs and the CRAs were regarded as black “boxes”. Therefore, it 
is understandable that the EU regulation tried to deal with these issues after the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. The issue remains however, as to how much CRAs can interfere into the 
working of CRA industry. 
The Problem Tree also lists the main four global problems claimed to exist as a result of the 
listed shortcomings of the CRA industry. However, the two out of four problems do not have 
any sources of evidence. Namely, “Low confidence in financial market” and “Undermined 
investor confidence” have not been supported by any academic literature and mean exactly the 
same thing. On the contrary, the rate of issuance has increased in the recent years which could 
indicate that investor confidence has not decreased. As it stands ratings classes are bundled 
together by policymakers when such judgements are being made. They should be separated 
into structured finance and the rest rather than being generalized. For instance, the criticisms 
are valid for structured finance where the number of issuances has significantly dropped since 
the breakthrough of the financial crisis (see Table 4.3b). One could speculate about the 
sovereign ratings while the corporate ratings market is booming and the investor confidence 
has not shown any sign of depreciation (see Table 4.3b). Such generic statements are 
misleading and show a lack of substance. This oversimplification is either a consequence of 
negligence or an attempt to make the regulation easier to push forward and implement. As can 
be seen in the Figure 4.1 the illustrated problems have also been lifted to the global scale. By 
                                                 
103. According to CRAs III regulation the sovereign ratings are supposed to be released after the close of business (Friday) 
and at least one hour before opening markets (Monday). 
104. Although in case of Enron fraudulent behaviour (i.e. misreporting data) on the side of the issuer was found later. 
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inflating the problem the regulators can better justify and validate their regulatory actions, 
especially allowing assignment of a greater weight onto the possible resolutions. 
4.2.2.2 Reporting styles  
Additionally the reporting style of the documents required by regulation leaves a big scope for 
improvement. This related directly to Transparency Reports published by CRAs in Europe as 
well as globally in the Annual Reports on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations by SEC.  
The Transparency Reports are part of the disclosure rules introduced in CRA I regulation 
(Article 12 and Part III of Annex I, Section E). They require that CRAs release information 
outlined in Part III of Section E of Annex I of CRA I regulation on annual basis. These include 
legal structure and ownership status, information about internal control mechanisms, allocation 
of staff between rating tasks, report of record-keeping policy, and conclusions from the annual 
internal reviews, accounts on rotation policy and accounting information including revenues, 
followed by governance statement on the annual accounts.     
When the staffing information across rating tasks is considered the only CRA which complies 
fully with the regulatory requirements is Moody’s. The CRA publishes statistics on staff 
dedicated to new credit ratings, credit rating reviews, methodology or model appraisal and 
senior management as precisely quoted in Part III of Section E of Annex I. S&P and Fitch 
either report statistics relating to staffing which have not been mentioned in the regulation or 
present aggregate numbers which are not split across categories as required. For instance, Fitch 
reports total analytical staff which comprises of individuals employed in new credit ratings, 
reviews and methodology and appraisal (see more in section 4.4.1). 
Further issue relates to availability of European CRAs data to conduct the analysis. Namely, 
the start reporting date for Transparency Reports amongst the big three is different. According 
to the Article 12 and Part III of Annex I, Section E of CRA I regulation each CRA is obliged 
to publish an annual Transparency Report. It should be released at the lasts three months after 
the end of the financial year. In case of the first report ESMA recommendation is that it should 
be published three months after registration in case when the date of registration exceeds more 
than four months from the end of the financial year (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). All the 
three big CRAs were registered on the same date, namely 31 October 2011. S&P and Moody’s 
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released their first Transparency Reports in March 2011 while still undergoing the registration 
process.  
As written by Moody’s (2011) “Moody’s Investor Service has prepared this first Transparency 
Report in the European Union (“EU”) pursuant to the Regulation… At present none of the 
MIS EU Subsidiaries have been registered. This Transparency Report reflects the structure 
and operation of MIS’s business in the EU for the year ended 31 December 2010, with specific 
information provided for each MIS EU Subsidiary as required by the Regulation. MIS 
anticipates that, if registered, the nature and content of this Transparency” (Moody’s 2011; 
p.2). 
This might raise the question as to why Fitch did not produce their first report in the same time? 
Was it the voluntary action of the other two CRAs or an effect of ambiguous regulation which 
allowed flexibility in choosing the date of the first report? Further, was there was any incentive 
for Moody’s and S&P to release their reports one year earlier? 
Furthermore, the format and content of Transparency Reports does not provide consistency of 
the submitted statistics across the CRAs (also see discussion in section 4.4.1). This lack of 
format standardisation prevents from cross sectional comparisons which seem to be the aim of 
having publicly available information in the first instance.  
Similar issue in reporting styles is present in the SEC reports required by Section 6 of the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. The reliability of annual reports is questionable given the 
volatility in the measures (see section 4.4.2.2). There is lack of standardisation of what is 
required. For example, CRAs report different types of outstanding ratings (issue vs issuer level) 
which are then tabulated and presented as alike in the SEC reports. Namely, the smaller 
CRAs105 report number of issuer ratings (i.e. number of companies) whereas others106,107 
including the big three (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) disclose issue ratings (debt securities) (for 
more details see section 4.3). This practice lacks consistency and precludes not only the market 
participants but also regulators themselves from making assessments which will inform the 
debate about the CRAs.        
                                                 
105. E.g. A.M. Best, EJR, JCR, Morningstar, R&I. 
106. E.g. DBRS, KBRA.  
107. Furthermore, inconsistencies among the reported outstanding ratings per asset class are present. For example in 2012 
KBRA reports issue outstanding ratings on sovereigns while in previous and following years it discloses issuer ratings. 
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To this end one of the lessons that can be learned is that the regulation is not robust enough, 
since it allows individual interpretations by CRAs and fosters disclosing the information which 
is convenient for CRAs. In some cases it could be seen that the information provided is 
voluntarily presented by the CRAs rather than required by the regulation. There should be a 
precise requirement as to which statistics are to be produced and in which format to prevent 
this inconsistency in the reporting styles and enable apple vs apple comparisons. 
4.2.2.3 Compliance with the regulation 
Further critique relates to how the CRAs comply with the regulation itself. For instance, EU 
Regulation 1060/2009 Article 10 (5) on disclosure rules requires that when a CRA issues an 
unsolicited rating108 it needs to be classified as such (see section 5.1). However, the reason the 
Chapter 5 is based only on S&P data is that this CRA is the only one which clearly specified 
which sovereigns were assigned with the unsolicited and solicited ratings across times when 
the regulation was being introduced. This is also the only CRA which is transparent about the 
solicitation status of their issuers prior to the regulatory changes. Moody’s presents securities 
rated on the unsolicited basis after October 2010, however it was not possible to retrieve the 
solicitation status before that. They also report the information about which securities were 
rated with or without the participation of the rated issuer. Fitch on the other hand, is the vaguest 
amongst the three and working with their website is extremely difficult. The Rating Solicitation 
and Disclosure Policy released in October 2011 clearly states that the CRA obliges to disclose 
the solicitation status in every Rating Action Commentary. However, it is very challenging to 
find the list of unsolicited issuers on the website. The search engine does not recognise the 
word “unsolicited” and one is better off looking for this information using the generic search 
engine outside their web page. To find out which issuers are of which status one is required to 
search manually for that particular issuer at the time. Although this is not a misconduct since 
the CRA includes that information on their website finding it is extremely challenging and does 
not leave impression of an open transparency.109 Majority of reports are also not available to 
the standard account user and are reinforced by an additional payment. Therefore 
standardisation in the accessibility of information across CRAS is this respect is highly 
important. 
                                                 
108. A solicited rating is a credit rating requested by the issuer who incurs the cost of the appraisal. An unanticipated (by the 
issuer) assessment by the CRA using public information about the issuer is known as an unsolicited rating. 
109. It is very clear from the DBRS website on the other hand. 
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Another example implying about lack of compliance by CRAs to the regulation is visible in 
Chapter 6. Since April 2012 ESMA requires CRAs to disclose which ratings originate in the 
EU and which are issued outside but are EU endorsed. However, the reason why the empirical 
analysis is based solely on the three biggest CRA is because other CRAs are not transparent 
about this information. The exception is the DBRS which clearly states the location of the 
analyst.110  
Directly related to this issue is the fact that ESMA itself does not provide direct targets and 
aims which are supposed to be achieved via introduction of identifiers. ESMA publications 
relating endorsement give an ambiguous explanation as to what purpose they serve (see section 
6.2.2). For example, one of the statements mentions improving functioning, efficiency, 
competition and stability of financial markets with the use of equivalence rules. It is not 
explained however, how these identifiers are aimed to achieve this goal? Another issue which 
arises is how ESMA intends to examine whether such targets have been met? Are there any 
particular variables of interest which could indicate about progress triggered by the identifiers? 
Lastly, and most importantly little is known about rationale for introducing the identifiers in 
the first instance.  
4.2.2.4 Fines and penalties 
Closely related to the compliance of CRAs to the regulation is the subject of what actions are 
taken to correct their misconduct. 
In January 2015 SEC announced charges held against S&P which was the first endorsement 
action ever conducted on the big three CRAs. The press release mentions three orders against 
S&P which are already being settled (violation of rating methodology, false and misleading 
publication and RMBS surveillance issues).111 The CRA is settling the order by paying out $77 
mln fine of civil charges. There is also an ongoing order in which SEC investigates whether 
the head (Barbara Duka) of S&P CMBS Group concealed the less stringent methodology of 
                                                 
110. The CRA also informs about the solicitation status of the issuer. 
111. The first case relates to misrepresentation of the methodology used when rating CMBS transactions. As a result of not 
disclosing the methodology which was being used, as opposed to the one S&P claimed to be in place, S&P agreed to withdraw 
from rating conduit fusion CMBS. After the enforcement, and as a way of getting back to the CMBS market and convincing 
market participants about its conservatism (stemming from the new rating criteria), S&P issued the “false and misleading 
article” (SEC, 2015). The research was found to be using the erroneous data and to be built on incorrect assumptions. The final 
order relates to deficiency in the surveillance of RMBS ratings. S&P altered one of its basic assumptions when rating these 
debt obligations which effectively made the ratings less conservative. According to the SEC, the outlined orders are violations 
of sections such as fraud, internal control, books and records violations and lastly no documentation explaining discrepancy 
between output of the numerical model and ratings. 
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the CMBS ratings. Public hearings are scheduled by the SEC Enforcement Division to 
determine if the allegations hold and if countermeasures are required (SEC, 2015). 
Interestingly, the other two of the big tree CRAs did not undergo examinations by SEC or DOJ 
in the recent times. Neither did they receive penalties for their ‘contribution’ in deteriorating 
economic conditions leading towards financial crisis as widely expressed by market 
participants and academics (Hill and Faff, 2010; Financial Times, 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014). 
In September 2010 SEC dropped fraud charges, aimed at Moody’s, which originated in 2007 
due to a computer defect when rating CDO products (FT, 2010). As of February 2015 DOJ was 
at the preliminary stage of inspecting the CRA and its allegedly inflated MBS ratings from the 
pre-crisis period (Reuters, 2015b). It is not certain whether there will be a lawsuit. To this point 
Fitch was not subject of legal scrutiny by the US Justice Department.   
The timing of the empirical investigation of this chapter gives a mixed picture of S&P in 
comparison to other CRAs. At the same time, focus of the regulatory attention and significant 
fines imposed on solely S&P raises the question whether the CRAs are subject to the same 
treatment by the regulator.  
The first enforcement action on the CRAs in Europe was handed down by ESMA on the 29th 
June 2015 to DBRS for insufficient internal controls in place (ESMA, 2015a). However, the 
fine of €30,000 seems inconceivably small and not worth the effort of the legalities to conduct 
assessments and carry out inspections. In this respect the monetary value of the penalties and 
the interventions taken by the regulators should be commensurate with the amount of time 
spent and other costs involved when inquiring and inspecting the CRAs. Otherwise it might 
leave the market participants and CRAs in belief that the regulator is lenient and the 
consequences of not complying with regulation are not severe enough to avoid them. 
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4.2.2.5 Business model of CRAs 
The predominant business model of the CRAs has raised number of criticisms over the recent 
years. The issuer-pays112 remuneration approach offers rating information to the wider market 
(academics and market participants) and not only investors who purchase ratings as it is the 
case in the investor-pays113 model. It also eliminates the free-rider problem which might result 
in better quality of ratings (see section 2.5 and 2.5.1). Although both remuneration models are 
prone to the conflict of interest the issuer-pays model is questioned more frequently.  
Some of the problems mentioned by policymakers include independence of CRAs as well as 
high market concentration where often shareholdings between CRAs and rated institutions 
overlap (SEC, 2009) (also see section 2.6.4). For instance, such conflict of interest might lead 
to shopping in ratings and put pressure on the level (thus quality) of ratings assigned by CRAs 
(e.g. Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Hau et al., 2013; for more information see section 3.4). Some 
commentators claim that the issuer-pays model leads to the failure of CRAs. The chief 
economist for the Financial Times Wolf (2009) believes “It is a scandal that the model of 
payment for the credit rating agencies has not been changed. They should be paid by agents 
for the buyers not by the sellers.” The theoretical literature also calls for implementing the 
investor-pays model (Mathis et al., 2009; Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Sy, 2009; Pagano and 
Volpin, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012). 
On that note the World Bank (2009) published a revision document where the introduction of 
the subscriber-pays model is encouraged. Nevertheless, the report sheds light on the possible 
side effects of implementing such system. For example, the investors are unlikely to replace 
the income stream to the CRAs with their individual subscriptions. Additionally, the smaller 
issuers or less frequently traded issues could receive less interest in being rated. Others 
including CRAs believe that the conflict of interest rather being minimised could shift from the 
issuers to investors. The supranational organisation suggests hybrid solution, where the issuer 
pays for the rating the conventional way and searches for the second rating released by 
subscriber-pays based CRA,114 as a viable resolution to the problem. 
                                                 
112. The issuer employs the CRA to issue the rating.  
113. In the investor-pays model the CRA attracts investors who purchase the right to view (single or) pool of credit ratings 
issued by them. These buy-side credit ratings are self-motivated and an effect of private needs of investors (Duan and Laere, 
2012). 
114. Or the hybrid CRA formed by group of intuitional investors. 
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In the same vein, Calomiris (2009a) criticised changing the model and stressed that the 
investor-pays model would result in inflated ratings. Namely, the investors would compensate 
CRAs for underestimating risk since the high ratings relax the regulatory constraints as to in 
which products they can finance. Additionally, Richardson and White (2009) allude to the free 
rider problem which might not be resolved even with increased competition. 
SEC (2003) claims that although the conventional model gives rise to conflicts of interest and 
often inflated ratings, market participants consider CRAs to be successful at mitigating these 
problems. Additionally, it is argued that CRAs do not allow themselves to engage in short-
sighted monetary aims by releasing low quality ratings due to reputational concerns (Schwarcz, 
2002; Covitz and Harrison, 2003; SEC, 2003; for more see section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). However, 
the subsequent experience of the US sub-prime crisis has starkly identified that practices in 
different rating segments (e.g. structured finance versus corporate ratings) can be vastly 
different. Publicly available ratings increase discipline in the field and prove to be a low-cost 
coordination mechanism (Boot et al., 2006). 
To date, there is limited empirical evidence on which CRA business model is more appropriate 
(Jiang et al., 2012). A body of literature suggests that subscriber-paid ratings tend to be more 
timely and informative than the issuer-paid ratings (Beaver et al., 2006; Cornaggia and 
Cornaggia, 2013; Xia, 2014; Bruno et al., 2015).115 Bruno et al. (2015) suggest they the former 
are more timely because it is the paying investor who demands the rating therefore 
incentivising a CRA to update them more often.116  
Further, Xia (2014) adds to the literature which finds a negative connection between the new 
entrant CRA and the incumbent CRA’s information quality.117 Unlike other papers it considers 
the investor-paid CRA (EJR) which enters the market and compares the performance of the 
issuer-paid CRA (S&P) as an effect of that. The presence of the former appears to improve the 
discipline and the quality of ratings by the latter CRA in line with the reputation cost 
                                                 
115. Although the paper finds that ratings based on the investor-pays model are more timely and symmetric they do not advise 
against the converse model as a solution to the rating inflation. Firstly, because if all ratings are buy-side type some CRAs 
might provide ratings to those investors who prefer when they are inflated to be able to be compensated for their risk. Secondly, 
the conventional model “facilitates public dissemination of ratings which serve as a disciplinary tool and a low-cost 
coordination mechanism” (Bruno et al., 2015; p.27). 
116. In their study, the CRA operating under this model (EJR) updates its ratings three times more often than the one of the 
largest CRAs operating under the issuer-pays model (Moody’s). Moreover, the former ratings are more symmetric with respect 
to positive and negative rating events. 
117. This paper adds to the dialogue on whether more competitive market is desirable (see sections 3.4 and 6.3.2). 
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hypothesis/channel (Mathis et al., 2009; Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Bolton et al., 2012; Bar-
Isaac and Shapiro, 2013; Fulghieri et al., 2014; Opp et al., 2013).  
What has to be considered is that the little literature which focuses on the subscriber-pays based 
model118 does not inquire about (the proportion of the) number of analysts involved in the 
rating process (to the amount of outstanding ratings). This chapter is unique in this sense as it 
presents long reaching comparison of the CRA market with regards of staffing against the 
rating output (see section 4.4.2 and 4.4.2.2). 
Furthermore, the credibility of the investor-pays model has been undermined when EJR and its 
president Sean Egan (the only CRA fully operating under this model) were banned by SEC in 
January 2013 from issuing ratings to sovereigns and asset-backed securities (SEC, 2013). 
Paradoxically the allegations concern the violations of the conflict of interest and misreporting 
information. Prior to that, the CRA was openly expressing its critique over the issuer-paid 
CRAs and the flaws of the industry operating under this theme. Active participation in the 
CRAs’ and SEC hearings resulted in numerous regulatory proposals and triggered uncertainty 
of market participants involving the credibility of the current paradigm and the big three CRAs 
in particular (Lindorff, 2001; Greenberg, 2002; Morgenson, 2002; Egan, 2003, 2009). 
4.2.3 Human/Organization capital 
The objective of this section is to introduce the importance of human capital for the working 
of a firm. The reviewed literature portrays the role of analysts, their coverage, incentives and 
performance and reveals links with the profitability and productivity of the firm. This issue 
relates closely to the subject of the recent regulatory changes aimed at improving transparency 
and disclosure rules of CRAs. By studying the value of analysts for the firm one is able to 
realise that the regulations increasing the disclosure rules (and as an effect need for more staff) 
might result in significant increase in costs for the CRAs which negatively affects their 
profitability. Employing this stream of literature in such context is not only an innovative 
approach which helps in uncovering the CRA business but also gives grounds to understanding 
the feedback effect of the recent regulatory efforts. 
Organization capital, otherwise considered as human capital, is the expertise and knowledge 
that counts towards firms’ capacity and productivity (Prescott and Visscher, 1980; and Lev and 
                                                 
118. Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR) is the only one fully working under this theme; see section 2.5. 
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Radhakrishnan, 2005). Due to the fact it is difficult to measure, organization capital has not 
received much attention and only recently shown to have influence on asset pricing, corporate 
practices, labour forces and economic growth (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev, 
Radhakrishnan and Zhang, 2009; Lustig et al., 2011; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013; and Li 
et al., 2014). The key issue with human capital in contrast to physical capital is that the firm’s 
key talent can never be fully owned by shareholders and there is always an outside option 
(Prescott and Visscher, 1980; Becker, 1993; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou, (2013) show that when options to work outside the company improve for the 
key talent members the shareholders earn lower capital rents. Therefore they demand higher 
expected returns to cover for this risk. 
4.2.3.1 Case for CRAs 
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) investigate the CRA analyst market and the incentives of its 
employees, affecting CRA quality, driven by market fundamentals. These authors 
conceptualize a theoretical model where the analyst initially works for the CRA and later has 
an option to move and work for the investment bank subject to financial incentives in place. 
The authors find that the accuracy of ratings increases when the CRA has in place a system to 
scrutinize its analysts (this example directly feeds with the recent crisis situation where the 
complicated structured finance products ratings were of questionable accuracy since it was 
difficult to monitor their issuance). It is also demonstrated that ratings are more accurate when 
investment banking sector profits are higher since an analyst might take additional training to 
prepare himself for the potential post at the investment bank. Similarly, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro 
(2013) find that rating accuracy is countercyclical. Mathis et al. (2009) and Strausz (2005) 
reach similar conclusions while focusing on the incentives of analysts and the reputational 
effect on the rating quality. However, their studies do not incorporate changes in the economy 
or labour market over the business cycle. Che (1995) suggests that the thought of working for 
the investment bank one day incentivises novel analysts at CRAs to improve their skills and as 
a result captures the positive externality of revolving door between CRAs and banks. 
According to Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) the effect is positive. Namely, possibility of gaining 
entry to the investment bank increases rating accuracy when the opportunities are scarce 
(positive revolving-door effect) whereas it might lessen rating accuracy when these 
opportunities are vast. These authors explain that the phenomenon of decreased accuracy has 
two underlying causes. Firstly, there is a possibility that a majority of CRA’s analysts are less 
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talented novices. Secondly, after losing more experienced analysts to investment banks CRAs 
might reduce their motivation to train them. The latter could be observed during the peak in 
the mortgage boom in 2010 when many seasoned analysts from CRAs fled to investment banks 
for significantly higher pay packages (New York Times, 2010). 
4.2.3.2 Role of analysts 
In more general spirit analysts perform two roles: information provision and intermediation 
(Bhushan, 1989). Depending on which role they represent in the capital markets will influence 
firm disclosure on the demand for analyst assistance. For example, if the analyst performs 
intermediation role the improved firm disclosure dictates that analyst report has more value 
and the demand for his assistance grows. On the other hand, if the analyst is the primary 
information contributor, who competes with disclosures provided by firm immediately to 
investors, and his services do not outperform those of the firm, the demand for his assistance 
decreases. This conjecture is in line with Diamond (1985) who concludes that companies with 
more informative disclosures diminish the gains from information privately attained by 
analysts. 
According to Rees et al. (2014) the main role financial analysts perform in capital markets is 
information intermediation.119 Beyer et al. (2010) document that analysts’ predictions are part 
of the accounting information utilized by capital markets. It is found that these forecasts can 
justify 6% of the return variances of (medium) US firms. Rees at al. (2014) examine the 
determinants of analyst coverage in the press and its impact on their careers. They conclude 
that those who represent traits of higher quality analysts are more likely to be quoted in business 
publications. The quality characteristics are proxied by analyst’s prestige, abilities, experience 
and effort.120 Earlier studies find that markets respond stronger to negative news and forecasts 
disseminated by analysts who are known by the public (Harrington 1989; Hamilton and 
Zeckhauser 2004; Soroka 2006; Gaa 2009). 
 
                                                 
119. For more information see Ramnath et al. (2008) who summarize literature on the role of analysts in the capital markets. 
120. Some of the variables include number of analysts, firm experience, broker size and total of firms or industries dedicated 
to an analyst. 
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4.2.3.3 Analyst coverage and performance 
Results in the literature on information production and analyst attitudes are divided. One group 
of studies in finance finds that analyst coverage increases when firm traits are linked with the 
information asymmetry which follows the information provider function of analysts (Bhushan, 
1989; Moyer et al., 1989; Chung et al., 1995; Ahn et al., 2005).121 They find that firm 
characteristics related to information asymmetry have positive impact on the quantity of 
analysts following a company. This is in line with the concept that private information has 
greater value when the firm’s future is more uncertain (or when there is information 
asymmetry).  
The reverse is concluded in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) who suggest that the more 
analysts follow a company the lower adverse selection and information asymmetry via their 
increased information creation. Their paper together with Van Ness et al. (2001; p.79) 
concludes that analyst coverage diminishes “in various estimates the adverse selection 
component of bid-ask spread” which is in line with intermediary function of analysts. 
Accounting literature finds mixed results of the relationship between firm disclosure quality 
and following analysts. According to Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Healy et al. (1999) 
higher disclosure quality leads to more analysts following firms. Barth et al. (2001), on the 
other hand, report that demand for analysts is greater when accounting reports are less able to 
provide signals about the company’s worth. Barron et al. (2002) show that forecasts for firms 
with numerous intangible assets consist of more private information. Lobo et al. (2012) builds 
on the literature which finds links between analyst coverage, intangible assets and elaboration 
of company’s reporting. They propose that since lower quality accruals are linked with more 
information asymmetry firms which show lower accruals quality are more inclined to give 
more incentives to analysts. This is because they might benefit more from private information. 
Overall the study examines how such accruals quality influence supply of and demand for 
analysts. 
By studying the effect of changes in analyst coverage on corporate policies, Derrien and 
Kecskes (2013) find evidence that analysts directly affect firms decisions. Graham et al. (2005) 
document that 80% of  managers value analysts so deeply that they would be willing to decrease 
                                                 
121. Ahn et al. (2005) suggest analyst coverage rises when costs of asymmetric information costs escalate. 
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investment just to meet their earnings expectations. 36% of surveyed managers regard analysts 
as the most important factor determining stock price of their company.  
These authors test this premise using two natural experiments which address the likely 
endogeneity problem of analyst coverage (broker closures and broker mergers). Their paper is 
one of the few studies which investigate analyst coverage and corporate policies. The existing 
literature provides evidence that drops in analyst coverage trigger increased information 
asymmetry and consequently higher cost of capital. Doukas et al. (2008) illustrate firms with 
higher analyst coverage incur more capital expenditure and rely more on external sources of 
funding (debt and equity). Chang et al. (2006) focus on coverage and the capital structure 
whereas Yu (2008) investigates its link with the earnings management. The latter paper fills 
the gap by exposing that exogenous contraction in analyst coverage negatively affects 
investment and financing decisions. This effect is more prevalent (costly) for smaller firms and 
those with lower analyst coverage and those with the information asymmetry on the raise.122  
Additionally, Derrien and Kecskes (2013) investigate the quality of brokers and analysts. It is 
anticipated that analysts bring value to the company by conducting their research given that 
when they leave firms’ corporate policy changes. As a measure of research quality, these 
authors use earnings estimate accuracy of analysts (and brokers), which is also supported by 
Mikhail et al. (1999), Hong and Kubik (2003), and Wu and Zang (2009). Hong and Kubik 
(2003) document that analysts who are not promoted but also have not been demoted are less 
accurate overall. Moreover, Derrien and Kecskes (2013) use relative expectations of analysts 
against their peers as a measure of their quality. 
To summarise, the existing literature on the information production, analyst incentives and firm 
disclosure quality gives indication as to how the demand and supply of analysts is created in 
the financial markets. The importance of analyst coverage for the corporate policies suggests 
that any adjustments in staffing might have repercussions for the firm value, investment 
decisions and gearing. The research provided by analysts is significant for the workings of the 
firm and therefore is an important aspect to be considered when designing new policies. With 
respect to this chapter the increasing transparency and disclosure requirements might translate 
                                                 
122. One analyst is more valuable to the CRA with only 5 analysts in comparison to the CRA covered by 30 analysts. Loss of 
one individual causes a bigger upsurge in information asymmetry if there are only few others to cover for him than when there 
are number of analysts available. On the similar note, since the smaller CRA has more information asymmetry than the big 
CRAs, when an analyst is discharged it results in growth of information asymmetry (for the small firm) for which the coverage 
is very important. 
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into changes to the workings of the CRA by pushing pressure on the value of human capital. 
For example, the need to report the number of staff might increase costs of the CRAs which 
will aim to present themselves as the best equipped among other CRAs. This issue requires 
investigation as it might affect profitability of CRAs. This feedback effect of regulation might 
be shifted onto customers by the CRAs willing to keep their proceeds intact. 
4.2.3.4 Effect of financial analysts 
This strand of literature measures effects of financial analysts on firm value. Numerous 
findings suggest analysts have positive effect on firms because they lessen information 
asymmetry, have forecasting abilities and act as external scrutinizers of management (e.g. 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Hong et al., 2000; Yu, 2008; Ellul and Panayides, 2009). 
For this reason, they are found to positively influence firm’s investment choices, share prices, 
liquidity and valuations (Bradley et al., 2003; Irvine, 2003; Chang et al., 2006; Derrien and 
Kecskes, 2013; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2011).  
On the other hand, Dechow et al. (2010), Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Hong and Kubik (2003) 
argue that analysts grant overoptimistic earnings growth forecasts. This leads to miscalculation 
of firm’s equity (Bradshaw et al., 2006). Graham et al. (2005) identify that analysts place strain 
on managers at the same time triggering myopic attitudes. Managerial myopia suggests that 
managers in public firms focus on short term achievements and profits rather than on the long-
term gains. This is because they are under more pressure to show good short-term performance 
in relation to their private-firm counterparts (Hea and Tian, 2013; Asker et al., 2015). Bushee 
(1998) documents the cost of research and development is likely to be reduced as a result of 
earnings drop when short-term investors constitute majority of ownership. 
Hea and Tian (2013) show that analyst coverage induced by an exogenous shock negatively 
affects firm’s innovation. The underlying rationale is that analysts exercise significant pressure 
on managers, which manifests itself in focusing on short-term plans instead of long-term 
investments (i.e. in innovation). These authors conclude that firms with higher coverage of 
analysts invent less patents or lower quality ones. This combined with the notion that patents 
positively correlate with firm’s market value (Hall et al., 2005) shows that analysts have 
negative effect on firm value by dampening innovative operations. Although analysts are 
known to reduce information asymmetry this positive function is outweighed by their negative 
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effect on innovation. Their paper adds to the existing body of literature in finances and 
innovation.  
Manso (2011) finds that accepting failure in the short horizon and encouraging success in the 
long horizon by managers works best for inspiring innovation. Ferreira et al. (2013) claim that 
private ownership with literally no analyst coverage is the best setting for firms’ innovation. 
Factors which were found to influence managers to take on innovations include size of the 
company (Aghion et al., 2013), corporate venture capital (Chemmanur et al., 2014), equity 
ownership (Lerner et al., 2011; Bernstein, 2015) and financiers’ resilience to failure (Tian and 
Wang, 2014). 
This section suggests that the increased analyst coverage (via an exogenous shock) might have 
a negative effect on the firm’s innovation and consequently market value (since these measures 
are closely correlated with each other). This might raise questions whether CRA regulation 
could act as an exogenous shock which can trigger negative effects on firms via changes to 
analyst coverage (e.g. via profitability or the competition channel). As a result, this chapter 
presents some threats that regulators should uncover while forming future policies. Its main 
contribution lies in the synergy of three streams of literature: human capital, CRAs’ analysts 
and regulation. 
4.2.4 Contribution to the literature 
Section 4.2 adds to the discussion of the recent regulatory changes aimed at reducing 
mechanistic reliance on ratings. The reporting styles and standards when submitting 
information to the supervisory body are compared amongst CRAs. Consequently advantages 
and disadvantages of using various reports as data sources for analysis are discussed. 
Additionally, the section offers a critical assessment of actions taken up to date and possible 
scope for improvement. For instance, the rationale behind the recent fines and penalties 
incurred by CRAs up to this date is evaluated. The effect of such actions on the profitability 
via increasing costs to the CRAs and its effect on the workings of the CRAs’ business is a 
major contribution. To my knowledge there is no other study which investigates the link 
between increased transparency requirements and profitability of CRAs. Further, this chapter 
evaluates whether the ability of CRAs to compete in the global markets is affected as previously 
shared by the CRAs. 
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Furthermore, this is the only study which employs the human capital literature in the context 
of the lowered profitability induced by the channel of regulation. Understanding the importance 
of the organization capital for the working of the CRAs and raising costs due to transparency 
and disclosure requirements helps in portraying the feedback effect of the regulatory actions 
and therefore is of policy relevance.  
To summarize, this chapter bridges the three streams of research. It links the effect of regulatory 
actions and its effect on the performance of the firm with the close focus on the role of analysts.  
4.3 Data sources  
Statistics on qualifications required by analysts and senior analysts at S&P and Moody’s are 
available from CRA’s Transparency Reports. This constitutes an integral part of the disclosure 
rules introduced by CRA I regulation (see section 4.2.2.2). Although these reports provide 
details on the number of analysts and costs incurred by the main three CRAs across EU entities, 
their time series coverage is limited due to the recent regulatory change. For S&P and Moody’s 
it starts in 2010 whereas for Fitch in 2011. These statistics are presented in Appendix 4.A 
Tables 4.A.1-4.A.3 for further information.  
To expand the sample size but also enable across CRAs comparisons, two alternative sources 
of data are used. SEC Annual Reports on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs) report the global number of specialists (analysts and supervisors), 
the number of outstanding ratings and the concentration levels (HHI index; inverse HHI) of the 
10 NRSROs. The available data covers the period between 2008-2014. However, SEC reports 
data on outstanding ratings is not uniform amongst the CRAs (see Tables 4.3-4.4). This is 
especially transparent when sovereign ratings across CRAs are considered (see column 7 Table 
4.3a) (for critical overview of regulation see section 4.2.2). 
To make the quantity of ratings amongst CRAs more comparable, the issuer level ratings 
assigned between 2008-2015 to different CRAs is accessed from the Interactive Data Credit 
Ratings International (IDCRI) (see Table 4.5).123,124 Each issuer is counted only once however 
there are a few exceptions when double counting on specific asset types could occur in this 
                                                 
123. Data is available from November 1999 to April 2015 in monthly frequency. To obtain the yearly frequency the outstanding 
number of ratings is recorded as of January of each year. 
124. Herein I refer to this dataset as rating “IDCRI” dataset whereas sources used previously are classified as “SEC” dataset. 
The data is provided to me by my supervisor Owain ap Gwilym. 
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database.125 IDCRI provides (issuer) ratings for Capital Intelligence and R&I which are not 
available from the SEC dataset. These CRAs are dropped from sample because there is no 
information about their number of analysts. In comparison with the first (SEC) dataset EJR, 
KBRA and Morningstar ratings are not available from IDCRI. The CRAs compared amongst 
the two datasets comprise outstanding ratings by A.M. Best, DBRS, Fitch, JCR, Moody’s and 
S&P. See Table 4.6 for comparison of the two data sources.  
Profits and revenue data for big three is available from SEC annual fillings 10-K Forms of the 
parent companies (see Table 4.8). For example, S&P statistics are provided in reports by 
McGraw-Hill Financial Services’ with those for Fitch from the Fimalac Group. The availability 
of segmented data for rating activities by S&P is available for the period 2008-2014. There are 
earlier consolidated figures on profit and revenues for McGraw-Hill Financial Services, 
however they do not differentiate the rating activities. Fitch data are continuously reported up 
until 2013 and date back as far as 1999. Since the CRA is based in Europe the reporting in Euro 
(€) was converted into Dollars ($) using the historical exchange rates provided in the (same) 
annual reports. The revenue statistics for Moody’s are available between 1998-2014. In terms 
of profits, the reports do not differentiate the operating income (operating profit) which has 
been gained from the rating services standalone for the first three years (1998-2000). As 
explained in Moody’s (2000), these activities comprise 86% of the company’s revenues. 
4.4 Empirical evidence 
4.4.1 Evidence on analysts-European perspective 
Table 4.1 presents statistics for qualifications required by analysts and senior analysts available 
from Transparency Reports in the EU. As can be seen S&P separates the functions on more 
levels than Moody’s. Fitch does not report this information. This situation illustrates the 
differences in approach of the CRAs when releasing information (of voluntary versus 
compulsory). 
In addition, the reporting style between the CRAs in the Transparency Reports differs 
significantly. Each of the CRAs produces different categories and segments of the analyst 
coverage (see Appendix 4.A Tables 4.A.1-4.A.3). For example, S&P informs about the number 
                                                 
125. E.g. for Moody’s banks are included with debt both and deposit ratings; for S&P and a few instances for Fitch, insurance 
companies are included with both debt and financial strength ratings; for Capital Intelligence banks have long term debt ratings 
and financial strength ratings assigned. 
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of analysts working on the different rating classes such as corporate and government, structured 
finance and following this depicts number of quality and criteria as well as analytical and 
general managers. Moody’s on the other hand, focuses on the angle of rating activities 
performed by analysts when quoting their numbers (i.e. new credit ratings and/or reviews, 
methodology appraisal). They additionally outline the number of support staff and senior 
management. Lastly, Fitch presents the total number of analytical staff with the differentiation 
between supervisors, global heads and support staff.  
The time span of these data sources is very short and inconsistent, therefore the main analyses 
within this chapter are based on other data sources. S&P and Moody’s report data continuously 
between 2010-2014 whereas Fitch only started releasing their information from 2011 (for 
critical evaluation see section 4.2.2.2). The sample applies to the data on revenues published 
by the CRAs. Therefore it is not tabulated.126  
There is an evident slump in the number of analysts between 2011-2012 for Moody’s and Fitch 
which picks up again in 2013. Moody’s is on the increase even after 2013 whereas S&P and 
Fitch reduce their staffing levels. Due to short time-series and the reporting style of these two 
CRAs it is not possible to distinguish whether this drop is attributed to the particular rating 
segment (in contrast to S&P information, where this differentiation is made). For example, one 
could strongly anticipate that fewer analysts were needed for structured finance than 
previously.  
Short time-series and lack of comparability is the major drawback of these reports. More 
standardised reporting format is needed in the future to allow more in depth comparisons across 
the CRAs in Europe. For example, once this is achieved, detailed analysis of each geographical 
segment per CRA entity can be performed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126. Data on revenues across European entities per CRAs is available from Transparency Reports for the period 2010-2014 
for S&P and Moody’s and 2011-2014 for Fitch. 
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4.4.2 Evidence on analysts- Global view 
The corresponding (global) number of specialists for each CRA reported to SEC between 2008-
2013 is depicted in Table 4.2. As suggested in SEC annual report for NSROS’s (2014) the 
rising staffing levels (i.e. rating analysts) could indicate actual or (possible) increases in rating 
activity. This could also imply that a CRA is expanding its operations by entering new markets. 
Additionally, increasing analysts’ coverage could be aimed at improving rating quality or re-
assuring regulators about CRAs compliance with regulation. Overall, this measure is useful to 
compare the state of the CRA’s business and its business outlook. 
As presented in Figure 4.2 (based on Table 4.2) the changes in number of staff involved in 
rating process for the smaller CRAs have been rising between 2009 and 2011 when they 
reached the peak especially for KBRA, DBRS and Morningstar.127 For these CRAs changes in 
staffing show a dramatic drop around 2012 and start picking up again. The remaining three 
CRAs (A.M. Best, EJR, JCR) show much slower gradual increases in their staffing after the 
significant drop in 2010. Overall, smaller CRAs such as EJR, KBRA and Morningstar, which 
rely (entirely or partially) on the investor-pays model, report the number of analysts falling 
below sixty. The case of EJR is especially alarming. It is debatable if the CRA can operate 
reliably under the investor-pays model with help of only few analysts. In the period 2008-2013 
the CRA reports having 7 analysts on average while releasing over a thousand issue ratings 
(for a discussion see section 4.2.2.5). 
Among the big three, Moody’s and Fitch show a decline in the analyst number around 2010. 
For the latter it is very steep reaching a 24% drop (331 less analysts were recorded). Moody’s 
experiences a sink of nearly half of this magnitude -10.3% (129 analysts were discharged) in 
the 2012. This was followed by a strong raise in 2013 where the previous levels were obtained 
(i.e. 10.8% of them are reported back and the number of analysts increased by 121). S&P on 
the other hand, shows the opposite effect. Namely, it recruits more analysts reaching its peak 
at 8.3% (increase by 103 analysts) in 2010 after which it undergoes a steady decline. 
                                                 
127. SEC (2014) suggests that the rising levels of analysts for KBRA and Morningstar could be due to increasing number of 
ratings based on the issuer-pays model in the previous couple of years (not only subscriber-pays model as before) (for an 
overview of the business model of CRAs see 2.5 and 2.5.1. For comparison of the two models see section 4.2.2.5). 
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4.4.2.1 Outstanding ratings 
Number of outstanding ratings per CRA available from SEC is depicted in Table 4.3a. It 
captures the dynamics of the industry in the years prior and after the legislative and regulatory 
changes emerged. However, since the beginning of the available data coincides with extreme 
staffing activities, by DBRS128, Moody’s in 2008 and in 2011 for Morningstar, the outstanding 
ratings are scaled (by dividing them) by the total number of analysts to illustrate them 
graphically (see Table 4.4).  
As an additional exercise ratings by S&P classified between the main asset groups and 
solicitation status are explored (for latter classification see section 2.3). Data on long-term 
foreign currency ratings together with the solicitation status is acquired from S&P Global 
Credit Portal publications. The data spans between 2006-2012 and comprises issuers from 
variety of industries including ABS, corporates, financials, sovereigns, insurance and utilities 
(see Appendix 4.B Table 4.B.1). The former group relies solely on the contracts with the 
issuers, the same as the utilities. Corporate, financial institutions’ and insurance ratings are 
issued on the unsolicited basis only in less than 0.5% cases. The group which receives the most 
ratings without the request of the issuer is sovereigns which account for 1.6% of released 
ratings. For an in depth discussion and empirical investigation of solicitation status of 
sovereigns and its economic implications see Chapter 5. 
4.4.2.2 Ratings to analysts (R/A) ratio  
The magnitude of ratings to the analyst ratio is used to see if the staffing costs to the CRAs 
increase relatively to the supply for ratings (e.g. number). Alternatively it picks up if staffing 
expenses are irrespectively higher with respect to the number of ratings produced (no change 
in supply) which could be due to other reasons (i.e. regulatory). Using this measure the impact 
of regulatory pressures is investigated from the perspective of the CRA in contrast with the 
majority of papers which focus on the reaction of the market (issuer). Decreasing ratio indicates 
about raising costs to the CRA due to staffing despite the same or lower amount of outstanding 
ratings. This could potentially result in the enhanced quality of released ratings as more analysts 
are allocated to perform rating activities. On the other hand, increasing ratio would signal that 
                                                 
128. Additionally there is a change in the reporting style to the SEC by DBRS after 2007. Namely, the issuer ratings disclosed 
in 2007 are replaced by issue ratings in the years to follow (and hence the large magnitude of the percentage change in the 
total amount- column 10 of Table 4.3). This does not affect data sample since the majority of statistics are available since 
2008.  
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the number of ratings is increasing or remains the same whereas the number of analysts is 
dropping. Although in such scenario costs to the CRAs are not increasing having less analytical 
staff could have serious consequences on the quality of given ratings.  
After scaling ratings (by dividing them by number of analyst), some extreme values still 
remain. For EJR the number of analysts is surprisingly low in contrast to the number of 
outstanding ratings and therefore the Ratings/Analyst ratio is very high. The percentage 
changes of the R/A ratio across the years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 are the highest amongst 
all CRAs in the examined data sample129 (see Table 4.4). For instance, in 2009 the CRA 
claimed to be reporting above 1000 ratings by only 8 analysts of which 3 are supervisors. The 
ratio increased even further in the following year (Table 4.4, Figure 4.3- EJR). One could argue 
that releasing this amount of ratings per year by only a few analysts is not credible and raises 
doubts about the business model and ethics of EJR. Additionally, it is to be kept in mind that 
the CRA uses the subscriber-pays model, which involves issuing far higher number of ratings 
by an analyst than would be the case for CRA under the issuer-pays model. This finding is of 
policy relevance and is further discussed in section 4.2.2.5. 
Similarly high change in the ratio is reported for KBRA in 2011 when it decreased by 54%. In 
2010 the CRA issued more than 17600 ratings with help of a team smaller than 15 analysts. In 
the following year the CRA employed 100% more staff who despite that constitute less than 
30 analysts.  
Figure 4.3 presents differences in the dynamics of the ratio between smaller versus big three 
CRAs. As can be seen DBRS shows similar patterns to S&P and Moody’s representing steady 
and smooth movement across the years. As can be seen the trend for smaller CRAs is 
downward sloping. Additionally, as depicted in Table 4.4, the changes in the R/A are in 
majority on the negative side implying increasing costs to the CRAs. These are not extreme 
costs burdens without few exceptions when the change in the ratio exceeds 20%. On the 
opposite side, there is only handful of instances when the CRA is understaffed while producing 
vast amounts of ratings. 
Certainly, it can be stated that Fitch is the most volatile CRA with regards to R/A Ratio amongst 
the studied CRAs. In 2009 and 2011 there is a significant decrease in the ratio indicating about 
amplification of the costs to the CRAs to produce the same or similar amount of ratings. The 
                                                 
129. Change of 102% (66%) is recorded for the 2008-2009 (2009-2010) period respectively.  
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slump in 2011 is one of the most dramatic amongst all other CRAs (33.9%).130 Namely, the 
numbers of analysts increased by 4.5% while the number of ratings dropped by 31% (see Table 
4.2 and 4.3a). 
Since SEC data on outstanding ratings is not consistent amongst the CRAs (representing issuer 
ratings for some CRAs and issue ratings for others; see section 4.2.2.2 and 4.3) the alternative 
source of data is used. Table 4.5 presents number of outstanding issuer ratings obtained from 
the IDCRI dataset and repeats the number of analysts per CRA from the original dataset, it then 
presents ratio between the two. As can be seen there are minor discontinuities in the data 
especially when the ratio is calculated. Although the ratings information from IDCRI is 
available between 1999-2015 the analyst data series from SEC dataset only covers period 2008-
2013. Having an additional dataset enables comparisons of the available statistics between the 
six CRAs (see Table 4.6).131 There is strong positive correlation (0.94 significant at 1%) 
between the outstanding ratings from both data sources which suggests using either measure 
will produce similar results although the CRA coverage differs (see Figure 4.8).132 The Ratings 
to Analyst (R/A) Ratio is strongly negatively correlated between the two datasets (-0.59 at 1%) 
(see Figure 4.9). Analyst data is fixed therefore it is only influenced by ratings count. 
4.4.2.3 Competition amongst CRAs 
The final statistic provided in (column 8) Table 4.4 captures the competitive environment of 
the industry measured by the outstanding number of credit ratings as a proportion of the largest 
10 CRAs. The percentage change and levels are also reported and plotted in the Figure 4.5 
differentiating between smaller and bigger CRAs. The change in the market share over the 
years is relatively steady for A.M. Best, S&P and Moody’s. The strongest inclination in 
opposite directions can be seen for Morningstar, DBRS and Fitch. Namely, in 2011 
Morningstar gained approximately 108% of its own market share, DBRS 31% whereas Fitch 
lost almost 26% of its relative market share. Outstanding ratings per asset class suggest the 
shift across ratings in 2011 where Fitch recorded a drop in financials by 11% (from 61550 to 
54586) and sovereign ratings by 40% (from 363897 to 217198). Overall, the drop that year for 
                                                 
130. Except for the EJR where the ratio dropped by 36.8% in 2013, KBRA by 54.5% in 2011 and Morningstar 39.1% in 
2013.The latter two series have not been plotted due to short time series (i.e. 2010-2013). 
131. Obvious differences in reporting types of ratings (i.e. issue versus issuer) are distinguishable between the two data sources. 
The IDCRI dataset is consistent as it only shows issuer ratings for all CRAs. In SEC dataset out of six CRAs only two CRAs 
(A.M. Best and JCR) report issuer ratings while the remainder disclose the issue ratings. The differentials between reporting 
of two data sets are highlighted in bold. See section 4.2.2.2 for directly related policy issues. 
132. Deviation is influenced by sovereign and ABS categories in particular. 
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number of all rated classes yielded 31% (see Table 4.3a). DBRS recorded raise in the financial 
ratings of 45% (from 14941 to 21695) and an increase in corporate ratings by 5% (from 3863 
to 4037), furthermore sovereign ratings output increased by 17% (from 13533 to 15798). 
Overall DBRS issued 21% more ratings across all categories (Table 4.3a). 
In absolute terms the concentration of the CRAs market did not change as much as individual 
CRAs workings. In Table 4.7 the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) was calculated using the 
formula below (Equation 4.1) where the N is number of firms, si is the share of firm i in the 
market. The HHI index can range up to 1002, or 10,000. The inverse HHI was calculated by 
dividing the 10,000 by the HHI. The values below 1,500 suggest unconcentrated market, 1,500 
to 2,500 indicates moderate concentration whereas anything above is high concentration. 
           (4.1) 
 
HHI (or inverse HHI) suggests that CRAs experienced increased concentration levels between 
2008-2011, which remained at a similar level after that. This suggests that the competitiveness 
among CRAs is slowly decreasing and the main players dominate the market despite the 
regulatory efforts. Amongst all categories the market in 2008 was dominated by 2.99 CRAs 
whereas post-regulation in 2013 by only 2.72 CRAs.  
The HHI of 3649.63 shows that in 2011 the total credit rating market was highly concentrated 
and this is an equivalent of (10,000/3649.63) 2.74 equally weighted CRAs (see Table 4.7). This 
result shows a drop from the previous year when it amounted to 2.88. What can also be seen is 
that there is the least competition amongst sovereign ratings. This pattern has been increasing 
over the years where the concentration reached its highest level in 2013 (4065.04). If 
sovereigns are excluded from the analysis the market was least (most) concentrated in 2011 
(2010) respectively. The former date coincides with the introduction of CRA II regulation in 
Europe and nominating ESMA as a supervisory body for CRAs (Alsakka et al., 2015). The 
financial ratings are the only business segment where the concentration reached lower levels 
than 2500 (moderate concentration) and at the same time allowing more than 3 players to 
compete in the market.133  
                                                 
133. The alternative measures of competition/concentration used in the banking literature include Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-
Statistic, and measure of bank density, the ratio of banks to population (log). The non-structural measures such as Lerner index 
(1934) and Boone indicator (Boone, 2008) are considered more precise and robust than the structural measures since they do 
not correlate with the concentration measures (i.e. H-Statistic) as strongly (Love and Peria, 2014). 
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These findings give strength to the argument shared by CRAs when regulatory changes started 
taking effect. Namely, it can be seen that the level of competition in the CRAs industry has 
been deteriorating in recent years, especially in case of sovereign ratings. Unquestionably, the 
span of time series (i.e. number of years) and the measure itself, which does not change 
significantly from year to year, is not the best predictor of the state of affairs for CRAs. 
Therefore, these results will be assessed in parallel with the profitability measures reported by 
CRAs. 
4.4.2.4 Profitability measures 
Revenue and profit figures for the big three CRAs are depicted in Table 4.8. The measures are 
assessed over time to see if there are any noticeable fluctuations surrounding the regulation. 
Applying these variables differentiates this study from the rest of the literature.134 Due to data 
availability other market players are not evaluated here.   
Since the S&P time series of revenues and profits is much shorter and starts relatively late, 
these statistics are plotted against each other (individually) separately from other two CRAs 
(see Figure 4.6). The two series form almost straight lines diverging from each other with 
similar magnitude until the 2013 where profits plummet unexpectedly (reaching 166% decrease 
from the previous year). Although the revenues recorded in 2014 increased by 8% from the 
previous year mainly due to growing corporate and financial ratings services, increased fees 
and fines among others significantly reduced profits in those years (see section 4.2.2.4). In fact 
in 2014 profits reached its lowest levels ever recorded (-583 mln loss). According to McGraw 
Hill Financial K-10 filing from 2014 this drop can be justified by $1.6 billion of legal and 
regulatory settlements which took place in 2014. To give a perspective in 2013 these 
settlements amounted to $77 million.  
In 2013 and 2014 the company underwent major restructuring aimed at changing the 
management structure to increase cost effectiveness and taken steps to exit the non-strategic 
businesses. The initial restructuring charge for S&P Ratings in 2014 however was significantly 
higher than for the previous year.135 This together with elevated legal costs can potentially 
explain the severe losses in 2014.  
                                                 
134. According to SEC (2014) although this information is required by the Commission under section 17g-3(a)(3) it is not 
required to be publicly available. 
135. In 2013 it amounted to $13 whereas in 2014 it reached $45 million. 
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The revenues of Moody’s and Fitch show a similar upward trend up until 2013 however, data 
for 2014 has not been released yet. The highest revenues for Moody’s were reported up until 
2007 during the outburst of the crisis whereas the biggest slump followed in the year 
subsequently after that. The revenues stagnated in between 2008-2009 and picked up again 
after 2009 and are on a constant raise. A similar pattern was observed for Fitch with the peak 
reaching up in the 2008 and its subsequent decline after that (see Figure 4.7b). In terms of 
percentage changes, the biggest drop for Fitch (Moody’s) was recorded in 2009 (2008) with -
36.8% (-30.9%). The biggest positive change in revenues for Fitch (Moody’s) was recorded in 
2008 (2001) with 50.3% (47.4%) (Figure 4.7a). 
In terms of profits (levels), Fitch reports relatively steady accounts with a small increase in 
2008. Moody’s on the other hand is more varied across the years (see Figure 4.7b). Up to 2007 
profits were on a constant growth reaching its peak and then dropped significantly in 2008-
2009 reaching lowest estimates in almost two decades.  
Changes in profits by Moody’s present relatively steady accounts with the significant slump 
around 2008 represented by 40.6 percentage points drop in profits (see Figure 4.7a). Fitch series 
are more volatile reaching highest peak in 2001 yielding 112.5 percentage change. 
To summarise, this section presents mixed results on the impact of regulation on CRA’s 
profitability. As can be seen from Table 4.8 the direct measures of profitability do not detect 
any increases in costs for Fitch and Moody’s which could be attributed to the regulatory 
changes. Namely, problems with profitability end in 2009 for Moody’s and in 2010 for Fitch 
and the productivity is on the increase after that. Somewhat mixed picture is presented by S&P 
which after the crisis suffers losses in 2011 and 2014. The latter can be explained by the 
significant fines imposed by the regulator along the restructuring costs which supports the fears 
of CRAs towards regulation expressed in their publications. 
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4.4.2.5 Revenues to profits ratio (R/P) 
Additionally, to enable comparison amongst the three CRAs the revenues have been scaled by 
dividing them by profits (see R/P in Table 4.8). The smaller the ratio is (in absolute terms) the 
higher proportion of profits is in relation to revenues; therefore indicating about higher 
productivity and vice versa. It can be seen that overall Moody’s has the highest proportion of 
profits in relation to its revenues. In 2004 and 2006 the profits reached $782.2m and $1010.7m 
respectively, which corresponds to the highest peaks in profitability between 2001-2014 (the 
ratio is 1.68 in both instances). The biggest drop in profitability was observed around 2008 
when the ratio amounted to 2.11 (which is a 16.3% increase from the year earlier). In the 
following year CRA experienced the lowest profitability to date.  
For S&P, 2008 is associated with the highest profitability among the available data. The CRA 
reported $749.3m profits out of $1583m revenues. The profitability (as proportion of revenues) 
has been on the decrease ever since 2008 until the end of the sample period 2014. The biggest 
slump in productivity is encountered in 2014 when the profits reach negative value. 
Additionally, in 2011 the ratio increased considerably to 2.45 from the earlier position of 2.22 
constituting 10.3% drop in profitability. 
For Fitch, 2013 was the year of the best financial performance when $332.3m profits were 
recorded in contrast with $753.3m revenues (ratio stands at 2.27). The CRA shows gradual 
improvement in profitability across years 1999-2013. Ever since 2005 Fitch recorded profits 
of above $130m with the R/P ratio below 4. The biggest intensification in profits was observed 
in 2001, 2005 and 2013. The biggest slump, on the other, hand took place around the crisis 
period in 2008 when the ratio amounted to 3.33 representing 22.6% increase from the year 
earlier. This resembles other CRAs’ performance from that period (although for S&P data is 
not available prior to 2008 the R/P ratio level is the same as that of Moody’s- 2.11). 
These findings add to the discussion presented in the earlier section (4.4.2.4) where the direct 
profitability measures were analysed and the link with the regulation was made. The ratio 
allows somewhat more detailed examination of the trends presented by each of the CRAs. For 
example, it is evident that the S&P is on the negative spiral in terms of its profitability from 
the beginning of the available data which evolves around the financial crisis. In comparison to 
this Fitch shows high volatility in respect of its productivity. On the other hand, Moody’s 
profitability was in jeopardy until 2008 and has been improving ever since. Looking at these 
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mixed estimates it is difficult to ascribe a definite weight to the CRA regulation. With certainty 
there is a discrepancy in the financial health of the major players and their behaviour should be 
investigated in the coming years whether it is due to regulatory reasons or other underlying 
problems. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter offers a twofold contribution. Firstly, it investigates the responses to the regulatory 
changes aimed at reducing mechanistic reliance to ratings via increased transparency 
requirements. The chapter fills a void in the literature which measures the impact of the 
regulatory changes on CRAs in Europe and complements studies which investigate the US 
regulations (ultimately giving a cross-country perspective). The portfolio of studied CRAs 
covers the vast majority of the market share which thereby offers a reliable overview of the 
industry. Investigation of the number of analysts compared to the outstanding ratings finds 
suggestive evidence of amplification in costs to the CRAs in the recent years. Nevertheless, 
these results are mixed. In this exercise, Fitch is found to be one of the most volatile amongst 
all other CRAs. Moreover, the chapter considers the direct measure of profitability of the big 
three CRAs and does not find any rise in costs. The only exception is S&P which faced heavy 
fines and legal fees in 2014.  
Moreover, it is also found that the level of competition across CRAs reduced under the new 
regulatory regime. The concentration levels have been on the increase subsequently after the 
2011 slump which corresponds with the CRA regulatory interventions in Europe. These 
findings might confirm the fears expressed by CRAs when the disclosure rules were being 
implemented. 
Secondly, the chapter offers a discussion and critique of the recent regulatory actions with 
respect to their objectivity, practicality and reliability. For instance, some of the problems of 
the CRA system identified by the EC suggest subjectivity on their part. The issues have been 
raised to the global problem and half of them do not have underpinning evidence (two out of 
four main areas). 
Additionally, the chapter finds many inconsistencies in data reporting by the CRAs which 
sheds light on the lack of standardisation and explicit requirements by the regulators. Problems 
with compliance with regulations were also recognised when dealing with data across different 
CRAs.  
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Further, it is unclear why S&P is the only CRA (as at May 2016) which has been fined 
significant amounts for their misconduct and deficiency in surveillance while all CRAs have 
been accused for contributing to the deteriorating economic conditions during the financial 
crisis. This raises the question as to whether other CRAs are receiving the same attention from 
the regulators. 
Finally, the chapter draws attention to the need to reconsider whether the investor-pays model 
(which is considered superior by many commentators) should be proposed as an alternative to 
the conventional remuneration model (Pagano and Volpin, 2010; Bolton et al., 2012; Cornaggia 
and Cornaggia, 2013; Xia, 2014; Bruno et al., 2015). The recent restrictions on the only CRA 
working explicitly under this business model place doubts on the credibility of the paradigm. 
This is further questioned by the surprisingly low number of staff employed to rate a very large 
number of issues.  
To conclude, this chapter demonstrates empirical evidence which can have future policy 
implications. The above-mentioned findings contribute towards several aspects of the debate 
on CRA regulation. The outcomes should be of interest to policymakers, academics and market 
participants alike. The portrayed issues offer potential for future research, as the regulatory 
actions progressively increase their influence in the CRA industry. 
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Table 4.1 Qualifications for credit analysts 
CRA Type of 
role 
Education level Minimum 
years of 
experience 
Moody's  
 Junior level 
credit 
analyst 
Bachelor's degree in Finance, Economics, Accounting or 
Computer Science; additionally Master's degree or higher 
degree in Finance, Economics or related field or Chartered 
Financial Analyst or Certified Public Accountant 
2 
      
 Senior  
level credit 
analyst 
Master's degree or advance degree in Finance, Economics or 
related field and a professional qualification such as Chartered 
Financial Analyst or Certified Public Accountant 
4 
      
 Credit analysts 
supervisor 
Master's degree or advance degree in Finance, Economics or 
related field and a professional qualification such as Chartered 
Financial Analyst or Certified Public Accountant 
15 
S&P      
 Junior level 
credit 
analyst 
Bachelor's degree, MBA, CFA, JD or other relevant degree or 
designation preferred 
2 
      
 Mid-level 
credit 
analyst 
Bachelor's degree, MBA, CFA, JD or other relevant degree or 
designation preferred 
5 
      
 Senior level 
credit 
analyst 
Bachelor's degree, MBA, CFA, JD or other relevant degree or 
designation preferred 
7 
      
 Credit analyst - 
supervisor  
(mid-level) 
Bachelor's degree, MBA, CFA, JD or other relevant degree or 
designation preferred 
7+5 
      
 Credit 
analyst 
supervisor 
(senior) 
Bachelor's degree, MBA, CFA, JD or other relevant degree or 
designation preferred 
7+7 
Source: Information collected from Forms NRSRO “Application for registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical  
Rating Organization (NRSRO)” released on websites of individual CRAs. S&P’s form available at:  
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/form-nrsro/en/us, Moody’s form available at:  
http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/NRSRO%202013.pdf 
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Table 4.2 Number of credit analysts and credit analyst supervisors 
Year CRA 
Credit 
Analysts 
Credit Analyst 
Supervisors* 
Total  ∆ Amount ∆ Perc 
2008 A.M. Best 144 50 194  - - 
2009 A.M. Best 134 42 176 -18 -9.3 
2010 A.M. Best 77 43 120 -56 -31.8 
2011 A.M. Best 82 41 123 3 2.5 
2012 A.M. Best - - 126 3 2.4 
2013 A.M. Best - - 123 -3 -2.4 
2008 DBRS 62 24 86  - - 
2009 DBRS 67 20 87 1 1.2 
2010 DBRS 75 20 95 8 9.2 
2011 DBRS 84 34 118 23 24.2 
2012 DBRS - - 93 -25 -21.2 
2013 DBRS - - 98 5 5.4 
2008 EJR 12 3 15  - - 
2009 EJR 5 3 8 -7 -46.7 
2010 EJR 2 3 5 -3 -37.5 
2011 EJR 2 3 5 0 0.0 
2012 EJR - - 5 0 0.0 
2013 EJR - - 7 2 40.0 
2008 Fitch 1057 305 1362  - - 
2009 Fitch 1035 345 1380 18 1.3 
2010 Fitch 712 337 1049 -331 -24.0 
2011 Fitch 758 338 1096 47 4.5 
2012 Fitch - - 1092 -4 -0.4 
2013 Fitch - - 1102 10 0.9 
2008 JCR 59 23 82  - - 
2009 JCR 61 27 88 6 7.3 
2010 JCR 27 30 57 -31 -35.2 
2011 JCR 24 33 57 0 0.0 
2012 JCR - - 59 2 3.5 
2013 JCR - - 57 -2 -3.4 
2008 KBRA 8 4 12  - - 
2009 KBRA 7 4 11 -1 -8.3 
2010 KBRA 9 4 13 2 18.2 
2011 KBRA 22 6 28 15 115.4 
2012 KBRA - - 37 9 32.1 
2013 KBRA - - 58 21 56.8 
2008 Moody's 1124 126 1250  - - 
2009 Moody's 1096 143 1239 -11 -0.9 
2010 Moody's 1088 116 1204 -35 -2.8 
2011 Moody's 1124 128 1252 48 4.0 
2012 Moody's - - 1123 -129 -10.3 
2013 Moody's - - 1244 121 10.8 
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Year CRA 
Credit 
Analysts 
Credit Analyst 
Supervisors* 
Total  ∆ Amount ∆ Perc 
2009 Morningstar 15 7 22 0 0.0 
2010 Morningstar 17 7 24 2 9.1 
2011 Morningstar 26 10 36 12 50.0 
2012 Morningstar - - 22 -14 -38.9 
2013 Morningstar - - 30 8 36.4 
2008 R&I 80 80 160  - - 
2009 R&I 81 6 87 -73 -45.6 
2010 R&I 74 4 78 -9 -10.3 
2011 R&I - - - - - 
2012 R&I - - - - - 
2013 R&I - - - - - 
2008 S&P 1081 228 1309  - - 
2009 S&P 1019 223 1242 -67 -5.1 
2010 S&P 1109 236 1345 103 8.3 
2011 S&P 1172 244 1416 71 5.3 
2012 S&P - - 1436 20 1.4 
2013 S&P - - 1465 29 2.0 
*Some credit analyst supervisors may also have analytical responsibilities. Source: Data acquired from annual reports on 
NRSROs by SEC published between June 26, 2009 and December 25, 2014. Reports are available from: 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm#nrsroannreps. Notes: There is no breakdown between analysts and 
analysts supervisors for 2012 and 2013. ∆Amount stands for the amount change in the Total whereas ∆Perc for the percentage 
point change in the Total. 
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Table 4.3a Outstanding ratings reported by CRAs  
Year CRA Financial Insurance Corporate ABS Sovereign Total ∆Amount ∆ Perc 
2007 A.M. Best 3 6129 2696 54 0 8882  - - 
2008 A.M. Best 3 6009 2710 54 0 8776 -106 -1.2 
2009 A.M. Best 3 5364 2246 54 0 7667 -1109 -12.6 
2010 A.M. Best - 5062 2043 54 - 7159 -508 -6.6 
2011 A.M. Best - 4826 1910 56 - 6792 -367 -5.1 
2012 A.M. Best - 4610 1787 55 - 6452 -340 -5.0 
2013 A.M. Best - 4492 1653 56 - 6201 -251 -3.9 
2007 DBRS 855 35 590 840 45 2365  - - 
2008 DBRS 18040 110 7080 7470 10560 43260 40895 1729.2 
2009 DBRS 16630 120 5350 8430 12400 42930 -330 -0.8 
2010 DBRS 14941 156 3863 10091 13533 42584 -346 -0.8 
2011 DBRS 21695 151 4037 9889 15798 51570 8986 21.1 
2012 DBRS 16222 148 3736 10054 15952 46112 -5458 -10.6 
2013 DBRS 13624 150 3790 10706 16038 44308 -1804 -3.9 
2007 EJR 62 46 803 0 0 911  - - 
2008 EJR 62 46 803 14 9 934 23 2.5 
2009 EJR 82 45 853 14 13 1007 73 7.8 
2010 EJR 89 47 877 13 19 1045 38 3.8 
2011 EJR 101 51 962 13 9 1136 91 8.7 
2012 EJR 109 48 1004 - - 1161 25 2.2 
2013 EJR 104 46 877 - - 1027 -134 -11.5 
2007 Fitch 79125 4871 15865 72278 787781 962920  - - 
2008 Fitch 83649 4797 14757 77480 491264 671947 -290973 -30.2 
2009 Fitch 72311 4599 12613 69515 352697 511735 -160212 -23.8 
2010 Fitch 61550 1657 13385 64535 363897 505024 -6711 -1.3 
2011 Fitch 54586 4010 14427 58315 217198 348536 -156488 -31.0 
2012 Fitch 51718 3786 15367 56311 223188 350370 1834 0.5 
2013 Fitch 49821 3222 15299 53612 204303 326257 -24113 -6.9 
2007 JCR 155 32 559 68 85 899  - - 
2008 JCR 155 31 544 71 71 872 -27 -3.0 
2009 JCR 156 31 518 64 53 822 -50 -5.7 
2010 JCR 159 30 495 - 52 736 -86 -10.5 
2011 JCR 163 27 478 - 54 722 -14 -1.9 
2012 JCR 159 27 472 - 56 714 -8 -1.1 
2013 JCR 150 27 463 - 56 696 -18 -2.5 
2010 KBRA 16515 48 1002 0 59 17624  - - 
2011 KBRA 16127 52 1001 40 58 17278 -346 -2.0 
2012 KBRA 15646 50 1000 352 1945 18993 1715 9.9 
2013 KBRA 15982 44 2749 1401 25 20201 1208 6.4 
2007 Moody's 70000 6500 25000 110000 175000 386500  - - 
2008 Moody's 84773 6277 31126 109261 880880 1112317 725817 187.8 
2009 Moody's 76801 5455 31008 106337 862240 1081841 -30476 -2.7 
2010 Moody's 61581 4540 30285 101546 841235 1039187 -42654 -3.9 
2011 Moody's 56486 3953 30439 93913 814087 998878 -40309 -3.9 
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Source: Data acquired from annual reports on NRSROs by SEC published between June 26, 2009 and December 25, 2014. Reports 
available from: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm#nrsroannreps. ∆Amount stands for the amount change in 
the Total whereas ∆Perc for the percentage point change in the Total. Notes:1 The value of ∆ Perc is large because in 2010 Morningstar 
reported number of outstanding issuer ratings whereas in 2011 issue ratings.2 The same applies for R&I where in 2009 CRA reported 
number of issuer and in 2010 issue ratings. 
 
 
Source: Data acquired from annual reports on NRSROs by SEC published between June 26, 2009 and December 25, 2014. Reports 
available from: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm#nrsroannreps.The statistics represent the total of 
outstanding ratings per rating class as seen in the Table 4.3a (above). The total comprises the following CRAs: A.M. Best, DBRS, 
EJR, Fitch, HR Ratings JCR, KBRA, Moody’s, Morningstar and S&P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year CRA Financial Insurance Corporate ABS Sovereign Total ∆Amount ∆ Perc 
2012 Moody’s 50795 3639 32510 82357 754062 923363 -75515 -7.6 
2013 Moody’s 53383 3418 40008 76464 728627 901900 -21463 -2.3 
2010 Morningstar - - - 8322 - 8322  - - 
2011 Morningstar - - - 16070 - 16070 7748 93.11 
2012 Morningstar - - - 13935 - 13935 -2135 -13.3 
2013 Morningstar - - - 11567 - 11567 -2368 -17.0 
2007 R&I 100 36 629 214 89 1068  - - 
2008 R&I 100 32 600 210 100 1042 -26 -2.4 
2009 R&I 100 30 543 186 123 982 -60 -5.8 
2010 R&I 503 48 2836  - 1031 4418 3436 349.92 
2007 S&P 44800 6900 28900 197700 967600 1245900  - - 
2008 S&P 47300 6600 26900 198200 976000 1255000 9100 0.7 
2009 S&P 52500 8600 41400 124600 1004500 1231600 -23400 -1.9 
2010 S&P 54000 8200 44500 117900 965900 1190500 -41100 -3.3 
2011 S&P 60700 7800 45400 108400 948300 1170600 -19900 -1.7 
2012 S&P 60300 7600 47400 97500 930500 1143300 -27300 -2.3 
2013 S&P 59000 7200 49700 90000 918800 1124700 -18600 -1.6 
Table 4.3b Outstanding ratings reported by CRAs-Total of 10 CRAs between 2007-2013 
T
o
tal o
f 1
0
 C
R
A
s
 
Year Insurance Corporate ABS Sovereign Financial Total 
2007        213,000         24,649  
         
75,052         394,635      1,930,658     2,638,094  
2008        252,082         24,002  
         
86,520         401,960      2,359,184     3,123,748  
2009        235,846         24,304  
         
95,531         318,056      2,232,087     2,905,824  
2010        209,338         19,788  
         
99,286         302,461      2,185,726     2,816,599  
2011        209,858         20,870  
         
98,654         286,696      1,995,504     2,611,582  
2012        194,949         19,908  
       
103,276         260,564      1,925,887     2,504,584  
2013        192,064         18,599  
       
114,539         243,806      1,868,038     2,437,046  
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Notes: Ratio: Ratings/Analysts. Source: Data acquired from annual reports on NRSROs by SEC published between June 26, 2009 and 
December 25, 2014. Market share was calculated based on the total number of outstanding ratings by the 10 largest CRAs reported by 
SEC in given annual reports. ∆Amount stands for the amount change in the R/A whereas ∆Perc for the percentage point change in the 
R/A. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Ratings to Analyst ratio per CRA (Data source I) 
 
Year CRA Analysts Ratings  R/A ∆ Amount ∆ Perc Mkt share 
∆ 
Perc 
2008 A.M. Best 194 8776 45.2 - - 0.28 - 
2009 A.M. Best 176 7667 43.6 -1.7 -3.7 0.26 -6.1 
2010 A.M. Best 120 7159 59.7 16.1 36.9 0.25 -3.7 
2011 A.M. Best 123 6792 55.2 -4.4 -7.4 0.26 2.3 
2012 A.M. Best 126 6452 51.2 -4.0 -7.3 0.26 -1.0 
2013 A.M. Best 123 6201 50.4 -0.8 -1.5 0.25 -1.2 
2008 DBRS 86 43260 503.0 - - 1.39 - 
2009 DBRS 87 42930 493.5 -9.6 -1.9 1.48 6.7 
2010 DBRS 95 42584 448.3 -45.2 -9.2 1.51 2.3 
2011 DBRS 118 51570 437.0 -11.2 -2.5 1.98 30.6 
2012 DBRS 93 46112 495.8 58.8 13.5 1.84 -6.8 
2013 DBRS 98 44308 452.1 -43.7 -8.8 1.82 -1.3 
2008 EJR 15 934 62.3 - - 0.03 - 
2009 EJR 8 1007 125.9 63.6 102.2 0.04 15.9 
2010 EJR 5 1045 209.0 83.1 66.0 0.04 7.1 
2011 EJR 5 1136 227.2 18.2 8.7 0.04 17.2 
2012 EJR 5 1161 232.2 5.0 2.2 0.05 6.6 
2013 EJR 7 1027 146.7 -85.5 -36.8 0.04 -9.1 
2008 Fitch 1362 671947 493.4 - - 21.51 - 
2009 Fitch 1380 511735 370.8 -122.5 -24.8 17.61 -18.1 
2010 Fitch 1049 505024 481.4 110.6 29.8 17.93 1.8 
2011 Fitch 1096 348536 318.0 -163.4 -33.9 13.35 -25.6 
2012 Fitch 1092 350370 320.9 2.8 0.9 13.99 4.8 
2013 Fitch 1102 326257 296.1 -24.8 -7.7 13.39 -4.3 
2008 JCR 82 872 10.6 - - 0.03 - 
2009 JCR 88 822 9.3 -1.3 -12.2 0.03 1.3 
2010 JCR 57 736 12.9 3.6 38.2 0.03 -7.6 
2011 JCR 57 722 12.7 -0.2 -1.9 0.03 5.8 
2012 JCR 59 714 12.1 -0.6 -4.5 0.03 3.1 
2013 JCR 57 696 12.2 0.1 0.9 0.03 0.2 
2010 KBRA 13 17624 1355.7 - - 0.63 - 
2011 KBRA 28 17278 617.1 -738.6 -54.5 0.66 5.7 
2012 KBRA 37 18993 513.3 -103.7 -16.8 0.76 14.6 
2013 KBRA 58 20201 348.3 -165.0 -32.1 0.83 9.3 
2008 Moody's 1250 1112317 889.9 - - 35.61 - 
2009 Moody's 1239 1081841 873.2 -16.7 -1.9 37.23 4.6 
2010 Moody's 1204 1039187 863.1 -10.0 -1.2 36.90 -0.9 
2011 Moody's 1252 998878 797.8 -65.3 -7.6 38.25 3.7 
2012 Moody's 1123 923363 822.2 24.4 3.1 36.87 -3.6 
2013 Moody's 1244 901900 725.0 -97.2 -11.8 37.01 0.4 
2010 Morningstar 24 8322 346.8 - - 0.30 - 
2011 Morningstar 36 16070 446.4 99.6 28.7 0.62 108.3 
2012 Morningstar 22 13935 633.4 187.0 41.9 0.56 -9.6 
2013 Morningstar 30 11567 385.6 -247.8 -39.1 0.48 -14.7 
2008 S&P 1309 1255000 958.8 - - 40.18 - 
2009 S&P 1242 1231600 991.6 32.9 3.4 42.38 5.5 
2010 S&P 1345 1190500 885.1 -106.5 -10.7 42.27 -0.3 
2011 S&P 1416 1170600 826.7 -58.4 -6.6 44.82 6.1 
2012 S&P 1436 1143300 796.2 -30.5 -3.7 45.65 1.8 
2013 S&P 1465 1124700 767.7 -28.5 -3.6 46.15 1.1 
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Table 4.5 Ratings to Analyst ratio per CRA (Data source II) 
Year CRA  Analysts  Ratings ∆ Amount ∆ Perc R/A ∆ Amount ∆ Perc 
2008 A.M. Best 194  - - - - - - 
2009 A.M. Best 176  - - - - - - 
2010 A.M. Best 120  - - - - - - 
2011 A.M. Best 123  3844 - - 31.3 - - 
2012 A.M. Best 126  3775 -69 -1.8 30.0 -1.3 -4.1 
2013 A.M. Best 123  3487 -289 -7.6 28.3 -1.6 -5.4 
2014 A.M. Best -  3522 36 1.0 - - - 
2015 A.M. Best -  3530 8 0.2 - - - 
2008 DBRS 86  1209 - - 14.1 - - 
2009 DBRS 87  1203 -6 -0.5 13.8 -0.2 -1.6 
2010 DBRS 95  1046 -157 -13.1 11.0 -2.8 -20.4 
2011 DBRS 118  1043 -3 -0.3 8.8 -2.2 -19.7 
2012 DBRS 93  1038 -5 -0.5 11.2 2.3 26.3 
2013 DBRS 98  1026 -12 -1.2 10.5 -0.7 -6.2 
2014 DBRS -  1010 -16 -1.6 - - - 
2015 DBRS -  981 -29 -2.9 - - - 
2008 Fitch 1362  4752 - - 3.5 - - 
2009 Fitch 1380  4862 110 2.3 3.5 0.0 1.0 
2010 Fitch 1049  4921 59 1.2 4.7 1.2 33.2 
2011 Fitch 1096  5495 574 11.7 5.0 0.3 6.9 
2012 Fitch 1092  5757 262 4.8 5.3 0.3 5.2 
2013 Fitch 1102  5365 -392 -6.8 4.9 -0.4 -7.7 
2014 Fitch -  5643 278 5.2 - - - 
2015 Fitch -  4997 -646 -11.4 - - - 
2008 JCR 82  926 - - 11.3 - - 
2009 JCR 88  909 -17 -1.8 10.3 -1.0 -8.5 
2010 JCR 57  880 -29 -3.2 15.4 5.1 49.5 
2011 JCR 57  869 -11 -1.3 15.2 -0.2 -1.3 
2012 JCR 59  818 -51 -5.9 13.9 -1.4 -9.1 
2013 JCR 57  808 -10 -1.2 14.2 0.3 2.2 
2014 JCR -  798 -10 -1.2 - - - 
2015 JCR -  803 5 0.6 - - - 
2008 Moody's 1250  10744 - - 8.6     
2009 Moody's 1239  9324 -1420 -13.2 7.5 -1.1 -12.4 
2010 Moody's 1204  8180 -1144 -12.3 6.8 -0.7 -9.7 
2011 Moody's 1252  8109 -71 -0.9 6.5 -0.3 -4.7 
2012 Moody's 1123  7953 -156 -1.9 7.1 0.6 9.3 
2013 Moody's 1244  7495 -458 -5.8 6.0 -1.1 -14.9 
2014 Moody's -  7754 259 3.5 - - - 
2015 Moody's -  8010 256 3.3 - - - 
2008 S&P 1309  9262 - - 7.1 - - 
2009 S&P 1242  8892 -370 -4.0 7.2 0.1 1.2 
2010 S&P 1345  8188 -704 -7.9 6.1 -1.1 -15.0 
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Year CRA  Analysts  Ratings ∆ Amount ∆ Perc R/A ∆ Amount ∆ Perc 
2011 S&P 1416  8253 65 0.8 5.8 -0.3 -4.3 
2012 S&P 1436  8573 320 3.9 6.0 0.1 2.4 
2013 S&P 1465  8747 174 2.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 
2014 S&P -  9474 727 8.3 - - - 
2015 S&P -  9944 470 5.0 - - - 
Notes: Ratio: Ratings/Analysts. Source: Analyst data acquired from annual reports on NRSROs by SEC published between June 26, 
2009 and December 25, 2014. Outstanding issuer ratings sourced from Interactive Data Credit Ratings International (IDCRI) available 
in monthly frequency between November 1999 to April 2015. For the purpose of this chapter, data are reported in yearly frequency 
(Jan of each year) between 2008-2015 to correspond to the analyst statistics and form a more balanced panel. ∆Amount stands for the 
amount change in the Total (R/A) whereas ∆Perc for the percentage point change in the Total (R/A) respectively. 
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Table 4.6 Ratings to Analyst ratio per CRA: Comparison of data sources 
Analysts Ratings (Source I) Ratings (Source II) 
Year CRA  Total  Total R/A ∆ Amount ∆ Perc Total R/A ∆ Amount ∆ Perc 
2008 A.M. Best 194 8776 45.2 - - - - - - 
2009 A.M. Best 176 7667 43.6 -1.7 -3.7 - - - - 
2010 A.M. Best 120 7159 59.7 16.1 37.0 - - - - 
2011 A.M. Best 123 6792 55.2 -4.4 -7.4 3844 31.3 - - 
2012 A.M. Best 126 6452 51.2 -4.0 -7.3 3775 30.0 -1.3 -4.1 
2013 A.M. Best 123 6201 50.4 -0.8 -1.6 3487 28.3 -1.6 -5.4 
2008 DBRS 86 43260 503.0 - - 1209 14.1 - - 
2009 DBRS 87 42930 493.5 -9.6 -1.9 1203 13.8 -0.2 -1.6 
2010 DBRS 95 42584 448.3 -45.2 -9.2 1046 11.0 -2.8 -20.4 
2011 DBRS 118 51570 437.0 -11.2 -2.5 1043 8.8 -2.2 -19.7 
2012 DBRS 93 46112 495.8 58.8 13.5 1038 11.2 2.3 26.3 
2013 DBRS 98 44308 452.1 -43.7 -8.8 1026 10.5 -0.7 -6.2 
2008 Fitch 1362 671947 493.4    4752 3.5 - - 
2009 Fitch 1380 511735 370.8 -122.5 -24.8 4862 3.5 0.0 1.0 
2010 Fitch 1049 505024 481.4 110.6 29.8 4921 4.7 1.2 33.2 
2011 Fitch 1096 348536 318.0 -163.4 -34.0 5495 5.0 0.3 6.9 
2012 Fitch 1092 350370 320.9 2.8 0.9 5757 5.3 0.3 5.2 
2013 Fitch 1102 326257 296.1 -24.8 -7.7 5365 4.9 -0.4 -7.7 
2008 JCR 82 872 10.6 - - 926 11.3 -  -  
2009 JCR 88 822 9.3 -1.3 -12.2 909 10.3 -1.0 -8.5 
2010 JCR 57 736 12.9 3.6 38.2 880 15.4 5.1 49.5 
2011 JCR 57 722 12.7 -0.3 -1.9 869 15.2 -0.2 -1.3 
2012 JCR 59 714 12.1 -0.6 -4.5 818 13.9 -1.4 -9.1 
2013 JCR 57 696 12.2 0.1 0.9 808 14.2 0.3 2.2 
2008 Moody's 1250 1112317 889.9 - - 10744 8.6 -  -  
2009 Moody's 1239 1081841 873.2 -16.7 -1.9 9324 7.5 -1.1 -12.4 
2010 Moody's 1204 1039187 863.1 -10.0 -1.2 8180 6.8 -0.7 -9.7 
2011 Moody's 1252 998878 797.8 -65.3 -7.6 8109 6.5 -0.3 -4.7 
2012 Moody's 1123 923363 822.2 24.4 3.1 7953 7.1 0.6 9.3 
2013 Moody's 1244 901900 725.0 -97.2 -11.8 7495 6.0 -1.1 -14.9 
2008 S&P 1309 1255000 958.8 - - 9262 7.1 - - 
2009 S&P 1242 1231600 991.6 32.9 3.4 8892 7.2 0.1 1.2 
2010 S&P 1345 1190500 885.1 -106.5 -10.7 8188 6.1 -1.1 -15.0 
2011 S&P 1416 1170600 826.7 -58.4 -6.6 8253 5.8 -0.3 -4.3 
2012 S&P 1436 1143300 796.2 -30.5 -3.7 8573 6.0 0.1 2.4 
2013 S&P 1465 1124700 767.7 -28.5 -3.6 8747 6.0 0.0 0.0 
Notes: Ratio: Ratings/Analysts. Source: Analyst data and Ratings (Source I) acquired from annual reports on NRSROs by SEC 
published between June 26, 2009 and December 25, 2014. Ratings (Source II) acquired from Interactive Data Credit Ratings 
International (IDCRI) available in monthly frequency between November 1999 to April 2015. For the purpose of this chapter, data 
are reported in yearly frequency (Jan of each year) between 2008-2015 to correspond to the analyst statistics and form a more 
balanced panel. Note that data from SEC is observed as 31 Dec, and this may explain some minor differences in figures. ∆Amount 
stands for the amount change in the R/A whereas ∆Perc for the percentage point change in the R/A. 
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Table 4.7 Concentration of the CRA business 
 Year Financial Insurance Corporate ABS Sovereign 
Total (all 
categories) 
Total 
excluding 
sovereign 
securities 
Inverse HHI       
2008 3.7 4.1 3.8 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.6 
2009 3.9 3.8 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.6 
2010 4.0 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.6 
2011 4.2 3.8 3.0 3.4 2.5 2.7 3.7 
2012 4.0 3.7 3.0 3.4 2.5 2.8 3.7 
2013 4.0 3.7 3.0 3.5 2.5 2.7 3.7 
HHI               
2008 2688.2 2469.1 2638.5 3546.1 3533.6 3344.5 2809.0 
2009 2597.4 2604.2 3144.7 3144.7 3773.6 3496.5 2793.3 
2010 2506.3 2967.4 3154.6 3125.0 3717.5 3472.2 2816.9 
2011 2403.9 2659.6 3311.3 2958.6 4048.6 3649.6 2702.7 
2012 2475.3 2688.2 3333.3 2907.0 4000.0 3636.4 2717.4 
2013 2506.3 2717.4 3300.3 2873.6 4065.0 3676.5 2739.7 
Source: Data acquired from annual reports on NRSROs by SEC published between June 26, 2009 and December 25, 2014. 
Market share was calculated based on the total number of outstanding ratings by the 10 largest CRAs reported by SEC in given 
annual reports. The formula is               where the N is number of firms, si is the share of firm i in the market. The HHI index 
can range up to 1002, or 10,000. The inverse HHI was calculated by dividing the 10,000 by the HHI. 
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Notes: This Table presents revenues and (operating) profits for three CRAs expressed in $ mln. The changes (∆) are expressed in percentage terms. R/P is the Revenue to Profit ratio used for scaling purpose 
to enable comparison amongst the CRAs. Source: Data for S&P and Moody’s obtained from SEC annual filings of the parent company and annual reports for Fitch. Where data not available, or no breakdown 
of rating activities is available it is reported as  “-”.   
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8                    Table 4.8 Revenues and profits of the big three CRAs  
 S&P Ratings  Fitch Ratings  Moody’s Investors Service  
Year Revenue ∆    Revenue 
% 
Profit ∆  
Profit % 
R/P Revenue ∆  
Revenue 
% 
Profit ∆  
Profit % 
R/P Revenue ∆  
Revenue % 
Profit ∆  
Profit % 
R/
P 
1999 - - - - - 157.7 - 29.8 - 5.3 502.2 - - - - 
2000 - - - - - 259.4 64.5 42.6 43.1 6.1 519.6 3.5 - - - 
2001 - - - - - 385.9 48.7 90.6 112.5 4.3 765.9 47.4 401.5 - 1.9 
2002 - - - - - 441.7 14.5 103.0 13.6 4.3 941.8 23.0 543.4 35.3 1.7 
2003 - - - - - 454.9 3.0 112.9 9.6 4.0 1140.2 21.1 658.1 21.1 1.7 
2004 - - - - - 501.6 10.3 123.1 9.1 4.1 1317.5 15.5 782.2 18.9 1.7 
2005 - - - - - 605.4 20.7 189.1 53.6 3.2 1600.3 21.5 936.3 19.7 1.7 
2006 - - - - - 655.9 8.3 201.6 6.6 3.3 1685.6 5.3 1002.2 7.0 1.7 
2007 - - - - - 642.4 -2.1 236.5 17.3 2.7 1835.4 8.9 1010.7 0.8 1.8 
2008 1583.0 - 749.3 - 2.1 965.4 50.3 289.9 22.6 3.3 1268.3 -30.9 600.6 -40.6 2.1 
2009 1537.3 -2.89 712.2 -4.95 2.2 609.8 -36.8 221.5 -23.6 2.8 1277.7 0.7 557.2 -7.2 2.3 
2010 1695.0 10.26 762.0 6.99 2.2 550.5 -9.7 149.4 -32.6 3.7 1466.3 14.8 647.2 16.2 2.3 
2011 1767.0 4.25 720.0 -5.51 2.5 606.1 10.1 164.8 10.3 3.7 1634.7 11.5 761.2 17.6 2.1 
2012 2034.0 15.11 809.0 12.36 2.5 799.5 31.9 255.4 55.0 3.1 1958.3 19.8 946.5 24.3 2.1 
2013 2274.0 11.80 882.0 9.02 2.6 753.3 -5.8 332.3 30.1 2.3 2150.2 9.8 1069.5 13.0 2.0 
2014 2455.0 7.96 -583.0 -166.10 -4.2 - - - - - 2353.4 9.5 1227.8 14.8 1.9 
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Figure 4.1 “Problem Tree” by the European Commission  
 
Source:  European Commission Staff Working Paper, November 15, 2011.   
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Figure 4.2 Number of analysts (I-IV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2(a) Number of analysts: Expanded scale 
 
Expanding on the previous Figure 4.2 (III); by reducing the 
y-axis one can see more clearly dynamics of the levels of 
analysts among Smaller CRAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
T
o
ta
l
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Year
A.M. Best DBRS
EJR JCR
KBRA Morningstar
Smaller CRAs: Number of analysts level
123 
 
0
1
0
0
-4
0
-2
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
C
h
a
n
g
e
 (
%
)
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Year
A.M. Best DBRS
EJR JCR
Smaller CRAs: Ratings/Analysts Ratio change (%)
-4
0
-2
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
C
h
a
n
g
e
 (
%
)
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Year
Fitch Moody's
S&P
Big Three CRAs: Ratings/Analysts Ratio change (%)
0
1
0
0
3
0
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
T
o
ta
l
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Year
A.M. Best DBRS
EJR JCR
Smaller CRAs: Ratings/Analysts Ratio level
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
T
o
ta
l
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Year
Fitch Moody's
S&P
Big Three CRAs: Ratings/Analysts Ratio level
0
4
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
T
o
ta
l
Ja
n 
20
00
Ja
n 
20
05
Ja
n 
20
10
Ja
n2
01
5
Date
A.M. Best Capital Intelligence
DBRS JCR
JRII
Smaller CRAs: Number of outstanding ratings
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
T
o
ta
l
Ja
n 
20
00
Ja
n 
20
05
Ja
n 
20
10
Ja
n 
20
15
Date
Fitch Moody's
S&P 
Big Three CRAs: Number of outstanding ratings
Figure 4.3 Ratings/Analyst Ratio across CRAs (source I) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Number of outstanding ratings (I-II) (source I) 
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Figure 4.4(a) Number of outstanding ratings: Expanded scale  
 
Expanding on the previous Figure 4.4 (I); by reducing the y-
axis one can see more clearly number of outstanding ratings 
among Smaller CRAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Concentration across CRAs (I-IV) 
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Figure 4.5(a) Concentration across CRAs: Expanded scale 
  
Expanding on the previous Figure 4.5 (III); by reducing the 
y-axis one can see more clearly the market share levels 
among Smaller CRAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Revenues and Profits: S&P 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7a Revenues and Profits: Moody’s vs Fitch  
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Figure 4.7b Revenues and Profits: Moody’s vs Fitch  
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Correlation between Outstanding Ratings               Figure 4.9 Correlation between R/A across two 
across two data sources                data sources 
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Appendix 4.A Data acquired from Transparency reports 
Source: Data available from Transparency Reports by S&P Ratings published in relation to Article 12 and Annex I, Section E, Part III of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on CRAs, subsequently amended by Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011.Between years 2010-2012 
the corporate rating also include sovereign ratings. CMS abbreviates for Credit Market Services; one of the three legal entities of Standard & Poor’s. Europe entity represents UK (it has three external 
branches: Germany, Spain and Sweden).
Table 4.A.1 S&P Staffing across EU Entities       
Year EU Entity Corporate Financial Sovereign Structured  
finance 
Total Analytical  
managers 
General  
managers 
Total Criteria 
staff 
Quality 
staff 
Total 
2010 CMS Europe 169 - - 88 257 - - - 6 5 11 
 CMS France 45 - - 4 49 - - - 4 2 6 
 CMS Italy 11 - - 8 19 - - - 0 0 0 
 Total 225 - - 100 325 - - - 10 7 17 
2011 CMS Europe 202 - - 92 294 32 5 37 4 5 9 
 CMS France 57 - - 5 62 8 2 10 4 2 6 
 CMS Italy 16 - - 8 24 2 1 3 0 0 0 
 Total 275 - - 105 380 42 8 50 8 7 15 
2012 CMS Europe 250 - - 100 350 30 3 33 3 5 8 
 CMS France 56 - - 5 61 9 4 13 3 2 5 
 CMS Italy 14 - - 7 21 3 1 4 0 0 0 
 Total 320 - - 112 432 42 8 50 6 7 13 
2013 CMS Europe 111 96 47 93 347 34 8 42 3 6 9 
 CMS France 29 22 7 5 63 8 3 11 3 4 7 
 CMS Italy 6 6 3 8 23 3 1 4 0 0 0 
 Total 146 124 57 106 433 45 12 57 6 10 16 
2014 CMS Europe 107 89 48 80 324 28 10 38 3 6 9 
 CMS France 29 22 9 4 64 7 2 9 5 4 9 
 CMS Italy 6 6 2 6 20 0 1 1 0 0 0 
 Total 142 117 59 90 408 35 13 48 8 10 18 
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Source: Data available from Transparency Reports by Moody’s Investors Service published in relation to Article 12 and Annex I, Section E, Part III of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on CRAs. MIS 
LTD represents branches located in Czech Republic, Russia and Dubai (Poland belongs to this group since 1st January 2014). Since 1st January 2013 the Dubai branch became an affiliate- Moody’s 
Investors Service Middle East Limited. EMEA abbreviates for Europe, Middle East and Africa. 
Table 4.A.2 Moody’s Staffing across EU Entities 
Year EU Entity New credit ratings and reviews New ratings only Reviews only Methodology appraisal Support staff Senior management Total 
2010 MIS LTD 109 47 31 8 76 6 277 
 Deutschland 34 12 9 0 23 10 88 
 France 15 10 9 2 4 7 47 
 Italia 14 7 1 0 2 3 27 
 Espana 13 7 3 0 0 3 26 
 Cyprus 10 0 0 0 1 3 14 
 EMEA 0 1 0 0 0 6 7 
 Total 86 37 22 2 30 32 486 
2011 MIS LTD 142 49 30 12 108 6 347 
 Deutschland 37 13 9 0 22 10 91 
 France 14 9 9 2 5 7 46 
 Italia 15 7 1 0 2 3 28 
 Espana 13 7 3 0 0 3 26 
 Cyprus 10 0 0 0 1 3 14 
 Total 231 85 52 14 138 32 552 
2012 MIS LTD 162 48 28 14 96 6 354 
 Deutschland 38 14 5 0 18 9 84 
 France 14 8 7 2 1 7 39 
 Italia 14 8 0 0 3 3 28 
 Espana 14 6 3 0 0 3 26 
 Cyprus 11 0 0 0 1 3 15 
 Total 253 84 43 16 119 31 546 
2013 MIS LTD 235 52 28 12 66 6 399 
 Deutschland 48 12 6 0 6 9 81 
 France 22 3 4 0 0 7 36 
 Italia 8 7 0 0 0 3 18 
 Espana 16 6 3 0 0 3 28 
 Cyprus 10 0 0 0 0 3 13 
 Total 339 80 41 12 72 31 575 
2014 MIS LTD 263 46 29 11 66 7 422 
 Deutschland 49 12 6 0 8 8 83 
 France 22 3 3 1 0 9 38 
 Italia 8 7 0 0 0 2 17 
 Espana 14 6 3 0 0 2 25 
 Cyprus 12 0 0 1 0 3 16 
 Total 368 74 41 13 74 31 601 
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Source: Data available from Transparency Reports by Fitch Ratings published in relation to Article 12 and Annex I, Section E, Part 
III of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on CRAs, subsequently 
amended by Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011. Fitch Ratings Limited 
established in the UK operates mainly in the UK however it has branches in Sweden, Dubai, South Korea and Taiwan. Fitch Ratings 
CIS functions exclusively via its office in Russia. The remainder of companies operate from the country of establishment (e.g. Fitch 
Polska S.A. (Poland) operates from Poland). 
Table 4.A.3 Fitch Staffing across EU Entities 
Year EU Entity Total 
analytical 
staff 
Out of 
which: 
analytical 
supervisors 
Out of 
which: global 
heads 
Support 
staff 
Total no 
of staff  
2011 France 25 12 0 18 43 
 Germany 25 4 0 17 42 
 Italia 20 5 0 10 30 
 Poland 12 1 0 6 18 
 Spain 18 7 0 13 31 
 Limited 242 72 2 246 488 
 CIS 21 3 0 19 40 
 Total 363 104 2 329 692 
2012 France 29 13 0 16 45 
 Germany 27 6 0 17 44 
 Italia 23 5 0 10 33 
 Poland 12 1 0 6 18 
 Spain 18 7 0 12 30 
 Limited 248 70 2 221 469 
 CIS 27 3 0 19 46 
 Total 384 105 2 301 685 
2013 France 30 13 0 18 48 
 Germany 29 8 0 17 46 
 Italia 23 8 0 9 32 
 Poland 10 2 0 6 16 
 Spain 18 7 0 12 30 
 Limited 257 66 3 206 496 
 CIS 33 3 0 21 54 
 Total 400 107 3 289 722 
2014 France 30 11 0 17 47 
 Germany 30 7 0 9 39 
 Italia 25 7 0 10 35 
 Poland 12 2 0 6 18 
 Spain 21 7 0 8 29 
 Limited 279 77 3 209 488 
 CIS 35 6 0 20 55 
 Total 432 117 3 279 711 
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Appendix 4.B Solicitation of rating events 
Source: Data available from S&P Global Credit Portal publications. This Table presents the proportion of the rating events 
issued by S&P between 2006-2012 based on the solicited vs unsolicited basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.B.1 S&P rating events 2006-2012  
 
Rating Solicited % Unsolicited % 
ABS 100.0 0.0  
Corporate 99.9 0.1  
Financial 99.8 0.2  
Sovereigns 98.4 1.6  
Insurance 99.6 0.4  
Utility 100.0 0.0  
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Chapter 5: Unsolicited sovereign ratings and the sovereign- bank 
ceiling: An unintended consequence of regulatory disclosure 
5.1 Introduction  
CRAs play a prominent role in modern financial markets. Globalization and the increasing 
complexity of investment products have triggered a growing demand for widely recognised 
risk assessment. Sovereign ratings serve as a basis for evaluating the creditworthiness of a 
country, and thereby influence long-term investment and lending decisions across borders. 
Rating downgrades have major implications for financial markets and institutions, including 
rising costs of credit and hindered market access (e.g. BIS, 2011; Alsakka et al., 2014; Correa 
et al., 2014).  
The global financial crisis brought CRAs renewed publicity and ongoing scrutiny by regulators. 
CRAs were blamed for worsening economic conditions by downgrading some sovereigns too 
quickly and too severely. The overreliance on ratings by market participants led to cliff effects 
whereby downgrades had a disproportionate effect. The situation in Europe has further 
emphasised the hazardous effects of negative spillovers while highlighting interconnectedness 
between international financial institutions (e.g. Arezki et al., 2011). The influence of ratings 
on global financial stability has become a major concern.  
In 2009, the EC implemented a new set of regulations aimed at CRAs including registration 
procedures, governance requirements, internal controls, disclosure rules and improvements in 
rating methodologies. This chapter draws attention to the disclosure rules with particular focus 
on Article 10 (5) of the EU Regulation 1060/2009, which requires that when a CRA issues an 
unsolicited rating, it needs to be identified as such. Moreover, CRAs are required to declare 
whether the issuer (or third party) participated in the rating process or not, and whether the 
inside information about the rated entity (such as financial accounts) was available to them 
(EC, 2011c). 
 As a result of implementing the Article in February 2011, S&P disclosed the conversion to 
unsolicited status of 14 rated sovereign governments (S&P, 2011a, e, f). Unsolicited ratings 
are one of the most controversial features of the CRA business. Prior literature (e.g. Poon et 
al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010; Van Roy, 2013) finds that banks and corporations rated on an 
unsolicited basis have significantly lower ratings. Concerns exist that unsolicited ratings are 
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biased downward because CRAs are not compensated for their service. Additionally, 
policymakers have focused on this feature, because both solicited and unsolicited ratings are 
permitted for some regulatory uses.  
The implementation of the EU Regulation by S&P acts as the treatment in the regression model. 
The sample comprises group of sovereigns which do not change their solicitation status 
meaning that they pay for ratings at all times. The control group acts as a benchmark to evaluate 
how the switch in status affects banks which belong to the treatment group. For each bank the 
rating change is calculated which is then tested for differences before and after the solicitation 
status of sovereigns has switched. This helps to empirically examine the direct impact of 
ongoing regulatory changes on banks and financial markets.  
The broad aim of this chapter is to examine whether the disclosure rule on solicitation status 
achieves its objective of more credible rating services or has unintended consequences. 
Specifically, it is investigated whether conversion to sovereign unsolicited rating status 
(induced by disclosure rules) results in lower bank ratings (in the re-designated unsolicited 
sovereign states). Previous literature on the controversies related to unsolicited (non-sovereign) 
ratings provides a theoretical framework (see section 5.2.1.2). Additionally, it is well known 
that sovereign risk spills over to financial institutions through many channels (BIS, 2011; De 
Bruyckere et al., 2013; Alsakka, et al., 2014). Studying whether the mandatory disclosed 
unsolicited status of sovereign ratings transmits risk to banks is a key motivation for this 
research.  
The novelty of this study derives from building on three streams of research, which 
meaningfully overlap and result in a synergy which has not been previously explored. The first 
theme relates to the unique opportunity to investigate the dynamics of rating solicitation for 
sovereigns. To the best of my knowledge, no prior study has investigated the rationale and 
impact of rating solicitation status for sovereigns. The existing literature concentrates on the 
solicitation of corporate and bank ratings (Poon, 2003; Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010; 
Van Roy, 2013) yet it does not include any study of solicitation conversions. The second theme 
relates to the impact of sovereign ratings on bank ratings through the rating channel. This aspect 
of the chapter builds on recent work (Alsakka et al., 2014; Huang and Shen, 2015) while adding 
a new dimension to the type of constraints imposed by sovereigns on banks via rating ceilings.  
Thirdly, this chapter considers the influence of the recent EU CRA regulation. To the best of 
my knowledge, there is no published empirical work on the effects of enhanced disclosure by 
133 
 
CRAs introduced since 2009. Jorion et al. (2005) study the effect of US Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD), introduced in 2000, and find that both positive and negative rating 
changes have a stronger informational effect on stock prices after the Reg FD took effect. Poon 
and Evans (2013) find that the impact of rating downgrades on bond yield premia (after Reg 
FD) depends on the size of the firm. Studies on other forms of rating-related regulation focus 
on periods prior to the EU CRA regulation (e.g. Becker and Milbourn (2011) utilize a US 
sample from 1995 to 2006).  
The chapter uses a large sample of 147 banks rated by S&P incorporated in 42 countries in 
Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin America for the period between 2006 and 2013. An ordered 
probit model estimation is applied, along with many robustness checks including placebo tests 
and matching exercises. I strongly endeavour to rule out the possibility of sample selection bias 
or that the observed phenomenon arises from events other than the adoption of EU disclosure 
rules for CRAs.         
The results strongly suggest that disclosure of unsolicited sovereign status adversely influences 
bank ratings through the rating channel. Banks in countries converted to unsolicited status are 
more likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded compared with banks in sovereigns 
which retained solicited ratings at all times. The marginal effects (MEs) analysis suggests that 
the former banks are 1.73%, 0.74% and 0.47% more likely to be downgraded by 1, 2 and ≥ 3 
Comprehensive Credit Rating (CCR) points respectively. The significance of the MEs should 
be considered in relation to the total number of bank (sovereign) rating downgrades which 
represent 3.28% (2.73%) of all observations. Additionally, the analysis confirms a strong 
ceiling effect between sovereigns and banks. These findings have clear policy implications for 
regulators and banks, since there are potential costs to the institutions and the wider economies 
through this rating ceiling effect. The phenomenon represents an unintended consequence of 
regulation, and suggests a need for greater awareness of CRA rating policies in designing future 
regulation. Policymakers should take a closer look at unsolicited sovereign ratings and their 
implications. The findings of this study reveal an undesirable impact of recent regulatory 
developments on the European economy and will be informative in shaping future proposals. 
The chapter design is ordered in the following manner. Section 5.2 brings about the research 
question together with the underpinning theoretical premises and testable hypothesis. Sample 
and data sources including descriptive statistics are presented in section 5.3. Further the 
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estimation method and the model along with proposed variables and necessary robustness tests 
are explained in parts 5.4-5.6. The last section 5.7 revises the chapter and concludes. 
5.2 Research question and hypothesis 
Current EU regulation on credit ratings, among other things relating to disclosure and 
presentation, requires CRAs to present solicitation status when assigning ratings (EC, 2011c; 
S&P, 2011a, e, f). 
By studying the close relationship between sovereign and bank ratings, this chapter aims to 
investigate whether solicitation status of the country has an effect on banks. In other words, 
does sovereign solicitation status impact creditworthiness of bank ratings? 
The literature suggests a possible contagion which feeds from the sovereign sector to other 
asset classes (Arezki et al., 2011; BIS, 2011; Moody’s, 2012c; ESMA, 2013a; Alsakka et al., 
2014; Correa et al., 2014). The papers investigating spillover effect between the sovereigns and 
the banking sector are limited but the literature has grown during the European debt crisis 
(Ejsing and Lemke, 2011; Alter and Beyer, 2014; Angeloni and Wolff, 2012; De Bruyckere et 
al., 2013; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013). Although the sovereign rating ceiling 
technically no longer exists, there is evidence that sovereign ratings still strongly affect ratings 
of non-sovereigns (Borensztein et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2013). The empirical papers on 
unsolicited corporate and bank ratings imply that entities rated on a solicited basis have 
significantly higher ratings (Poon, et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010; Van Roy, 2013). The issues 
related to unsolicited ratings caused controversies and regulatory responses especially in 
Europe and Asia (JCIF, 1999; Fitch, 2006) (see section 3.4 for more details).     
This research combines above two streams of literature and examines whether sovereign 
solicitation matters. This chapter investigates whether the downward bias concerns sovereign 
issuers as much as it affects banks sector participants. Further, it investigates if solicitation 
status of the country spills onto financial institutions and determines their ratings. The study 
seeks to identify whether banks bear a penalty for their sovereign’s rating status being 
unsolicited.  
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5.2.1 Derivation of the hypothesis 
5.2.1.1 Spillover channels 
In studying the close relationship between sovereign and bank ratings, I am interested in 
whether the rating solicitation status of the government has an effect on bank ratings.136 The 
spillover between sovereigns and banks, affecting the latter’s costs and funding opportunities, 
is known to transmit through four main channels: (i) asset holdings, (ii) collateral, (iii) 
government guarantees and (iv) ratings. Firstly, when banks hold sovereign debt they are faced 
with a loss in balance sheet value and overall profitability while funding becomes more 
expensive if the sovereign risk increases (BIS, 2011; Arezki et al., 2011; Angeloni and Wolff, 
2012; De Bruyckere et al., 2013).  
Secondly, higher sovereign risk results in lower value of collateral available to banks when 
negotiating costs of funds e.g. with the central bank (Kaminsky et al., 2003; Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 2005; Sy, 2009; BIS, 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Correa et al., 2014).  
Thirdly, any reduced creditworthiness of the sovereign lessens the funding opportunities for 
banks arising from implicit and explicit government guarantees. A weakened government 
position undermines the credibility of any support for banks (BIS, 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 
2013). For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) and Brown and Dinc (2011) show 
how the country’s ability to support banks influences their market valuations. 
The last channel relates to the fact that lower ratings of sovereigns are found to translate directly 
into lower bank ratings in that country (Alsakka et al., 2014; Huang and Shen, 2015). The 
spillover is known to occur for two reasons. Firstly, the lower sovereign ratings affect the cost 
of debt and equity funding. Arezki et al. (2011) show that sovereign rating changes affect bank 
stock index levels in Europe over the 2007–2010 period. Similarly, Caselli et al. (2014) find 
evidence of significant bank losses following sovereign rating downgrades in the European 
market. Correa et al. (2014) find that banks which are expected to receive government support 
demonstrate lower stock returns after a sovereign rating downgrade, while Williams, et al. 
(2015) show that S&P actions induce a significant impact on bank valuations in emerging 
markets. Further, BIS (2011) emphasises that sovereign debt concerns push up banks’ funding 
costs. BIS (2011) show that in 2010 a large proportion (30%, or 120 basis points) of the spread, 
                                                 
136. For channels between sovereigns and corporates, see Borensztein et al. (2013). 
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between the bond yield and the swap rate of similar maturity, on bank bonds reflected the 
conditions of the sovereign (in terms of sovereign ratings and CDS premium).  
Secondly, the ceiling effect arises because sovereigns have greater resources and policies at 
their disposal which mean that a higher non-sovereign rating is rarely justifiable. Borensztein 
et al. (2013) suggest that sovereign risk transmits onto non-sovereign issuers via the capital and 
other administrative controls and restrictive measures available to the government. Prohibitions 
against inflow and outflow of investment into the country (transfer and convertibility risk) 
restrain companies from repaying their external debt when the government reaches default or 
near default. In such a relationship, the non-sovereign debt always defaults when the state 
defaults, as it cannot access currency or transfer its funds outside the borders. Fitch (2012) 
suggest that sovereign actions such as altered regulated tariffs, deposit freezes, penalty taxation 
or expropriation are other reasons which justify the sovereign ceiling. Additionally, many 
banks participate in cross-holding claims of other intermediaries across countries, and thereby 
become exposed to one another (Arezki et al., 2011). Other channels include banking 
regulation, CDS contracts, and investment mandates (Sy, 2009).  
5.2.1.2 Theories of inflated ratings 
Theoretical insights on deflated unsolicited ratings arise under four concepts:137 
 Self-selection bias 
 Strategic conservatism  
 Blackmail theory 
 Geographical discrimination 
                                                 
137. In contrast, Byoun et al. (2014) find no evidence of deflated unsolicited ratings. Using long-run stock market performance 
of Japanese firms paper finds that release of new unsolicited ratings leads to a negative long-run stock performance whereas 
announcement of new solicited ratings has insignificant effect. These authors suggest that this contradicts the strategic 
conservatism theory which implies unsolicited rating to be deflated. Further, the positive (negative) events for solicited firms 
lead to abnormal positive (negative) stock performance while they do not detect any abnormal reaction for those of unsolicited 
ratings. The argument suggests there is no bias between two types of ratings but simply the information conveyed by them is 
different. Solicited ratings are based on mixture of both public and private information whereas the unsolicited ratings are 
based on the former only. 
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i) Self-selection bias 
Bannier et al. (2010) explain the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings by the 
strategic behaviour on the part of the issuers (self-selection bias) or strategic behaviour on the 
part of CRAs. 
Self-selection bias indicates that entities with unsolicited ratings who wish to convey a message 
that their creditworthiness is in fact better than stated will request solicited ratings. Once the 
rating improves, such entities benefit from a lower cost of capital. The overall reduction in cost 
explains the willingness of firms to incur fees for solicitation. Conversely, issuers which are 
aware of their weak creditworthiness, do not request and pay for a solicited rating (Bannier and 
Tyrell, 2006; Bannier et al., 2010; Fulghieri et al., 2014). Consequently, low quality issuers 
remain with their (relatively low) unsolicited ratings. Self-selection is thereby predicted to 
assist in reaching the most adequate credit appraisal for issuers regardless of the solicitation 
status. In this context, one could argue that a sovereign expecting a future rating downgrade 
would be more relaxed about an impending conversion to unsolicited status (e.g. not wishing 
to pay fees to a CRA if they consider a lower rating to be inevitable). The exact opposite of 
this premise arises under the strategic conservatism theory. 
ii) Strategic conservatism 
Bannier et al. (2010) suggest that unsolicited ratings might be driven by CRAs’ “strategic 
considerations in the rating process” (p.264).138 When CRAs face a reduced information flow 
from an issuer, they might prefer to rate “too low” rather than “too favourably”. These authors 
argue that issuers who share the same creditworthiness can be assigned different ratings, based 
on different solicitation status. Those who do not mandate for ratings receive a (lower) 
unsolicited rating whereas those who purchase a rating obtain a (higher) solicited rating (after 
controlling for the economic and financial conditions of the sovereign). Likewise, the same 
rating level assigned to both solicited and unsolicited borrowers conveys a message that the 
unsolicited issuer is in fact less risky than implied by its rating.139 However, this does not assist 
a non-sovereign with solicited ratings in this context. In a scenario where an issuer converts to 
                                                 
138. Self-selection and strategic conservatism act as an exact opposite predictions of lower unsolicited ratings in Bannier et 
al. (2010). 
139. In such instance, the unsolicited rating is assumed to share negative correlation with the probability of default of the firm. 
For example, Bannier et al. (2010) as an indicator of default apply: default rates; bank individual z-score; market base estimate 
of default risk in line with Merton (1974). 
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unsolicited status, the CRA does not have access to private information and might therefore 
decide to rate lower after the conversion in order to ensure conservatism. Also, prior literature 
has not considered how this effect may proceed under the sovereign-bank ceiling e.g. a bank 
paying for its solicited rating might face a downgrade attributable to the sovereign’s decision-
making in opting for an unsolicited rating. 
Lack of soft information is particularly problematic when publishing unsolicited ratings for 
financial institutions (Bannier et al., 2010). These ratings rely purely on publicly available 
information. Conversely, unsolicited sovereign ratings might encompass inside government 
information in addition to widely available statistics. Bannier et al. (2010) stress that the effect 
of underrating is the strongest for high opaque borrowers: banks and insurance companies. 
Their asset structures and legal responsibilities are the most complex (Morgan, 2002; Hirtle, 
2006; Iannotta, 2006). 
Furthermore, Löffler (2005) explains that issue of strategic conservatism is related to rating 
errors: type I and II. The overrating, (type I error), takes place when the entity defaults, despite 
its high rating (i.e. low risk of default). Underrating (type II error), on the other hand, occurs 
when non-defaulting issuer is assigned with a very low rating. According to Morgan (2002), 
conservative CRAs are more concerned about the type I error. The pessimistic ratings, which 
are a result of lacking soft information and thus conservatism of the CRAs, might explain 
differences between levels of solicited and unsolicited ratings.  
iii) Blackmail theory 
According to Bannier et al. (2010) and Van Roy (2013), the blackmail theory shares similar 
results as the strategic conservatism theory. In line with the previous theory one would expect 
the unsolicited ratings issuers to be less risky relatively to solicited issuers (see Bannier et al., 
2010). The blackmail theory assumes that CRAs might persuade issuers to purchase ratings, 
otherwise threatening them (indirectly) by releasing disproportionately low unsolicited ratings. 
The rationale suggests that when the issuer is not transparent and does not disclose information, 
the risk assessment is difficult to perform and therefore downward biased ratings are not prone 
to being questioned by market participants (Van Roy, 2013). 
Bannier et al. (2010) conclude it is relatively simple to increase the rating of the opaque issuer 
subsequently after solicitation was mandated, and to justify it by the enhanced soft information. 
Although this theoretical explanation seems possible one could speculate whether it is likely to 
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be the case in a modern world. Would a company providing services allow itself to threaten its 
own or potential clients without fear of harming its reputation?  
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) stipulate that blackmail is not a tenable position for the 
CRAs, since their reputational capital plays a more important role than any short-term financial 
gains. Covitz and Harrison, (2003) reach the same conclusion empirically. However, Bar-Isaac 
and Shapiro (2013) and Opp et al. (2013) argue that the reputational concerns of CRAs change 
over the business cycle. CRAs increase their ratings quality in low points of the economic cycle 
and relax them during booms.  
iv) Geographical discrimination 
JCIF (1999) suggests that non-Asian CRAs discriminate against Japanese and other Asian 
issuers due to cultural bias. After observing six major CRAs the institution concludes that 
Japanese CRAs,140 unlike others, consider distinct governance structure of Japanese enterprises 
and take into consideration Japanese culture. The remaining non-Japanese CRAs rely on the 
standardised and globally applied rating standards.  
Survey of managers of Japanese financial and industrial firms, conducted by JCIF, affirms that 
the US originated ratings do not recognise corporate nature of Japanese industry such as the 
keiretsu links. “Keiretsu is a large financial or business network based on cross shareholdings, 
mutual appointment of officers and other key personnel, intra-group financing to group firms 
by group financial institutions, and formation of presidential councils” (Byoun and Shin, 2003; 
p.21). In a situation of financial difficulty of one of the keiretsu affiliates, the entity would be 
bailed out by an associate from the related industry, either financial or an industrial alliance. 
Li et al. (2006) conclude that raters outside Japan (Moody’s and S&P) do not reflect the keiretsu 
affiliation status. 
Behr and Güttler (2008) are not able to explain why ratings of Japanese issuers by one of the 
global agencies (S&P) indicate higher risk of default than the Asian originated CRAs. They 
propose simple explanations as to why this could be the case. Firstly, they allude to the varying 
approaches of CRAs when issuing unsolicited ratings. Poon (2003) proves empirically that 
S&P assigns different weights to economic variables when rating Japanese and non-Japanese 
companies.  
                                                 
140. Such as Japan Rating and Investment Information (R&I) and Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR). 
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Secondly, the reason might lie behind the home bias where the CRAs in the rated country or 
region favour the issuer.  The fact that Japan suffered crisis at the turn of the XX and XXI 
century might have given an incentive of Asian CRAs to spare firms and the economy as a 
whole, by rating them more optimistically. In case of significant rating downgrades the entire 
economy could have been impaired. Related literature by Shin and Moore (2003) and Trevino 
and Thomas (2000) also confirms that the CRAs assign higher sovereign ratings to issuers in 
their own region. 
The final more provoking explanation suggests the strategic behaviour of non-Asian CRAs is 
to supposedly sabotage Japanese firms, by intentionally lowering ratings, to harm their repute 
and ability to compete. This explanation is widely expressed among Japanese government and 
market participants (Behr and Güttler, 2008). 
5.2.1.3 Hypothesis 
Two streams of literature discussed above provide a potential explanation for differentials 
between ratings of banks incorporated in solicited versus unsolicited sovereigns. Firstly, the 
theories of downward biased ratings for unsolicited non-sovereigns provide reasons to believe 
that the solicitation status of sovereigns will impact their credit ratings. Secondly, the evidence 
that bank ratings are influenced by sovereigns through the rating channel (e.g. BIS, 2011; 
Alsakka et al., 2014) might lead the sovereign’s solicitation status to become a concern for 
banks. Under the interaction of these effects, I propose:  
Hypothesis: Bank ratings are more likely to be downgraded in countries whose sovereign 
rating status is converted to ‘unsolicited’. 
Such an effect has a negative impact on the funding costs of banks in that country. Investigation 
of the interplay between sovereigns and banks in this setting poses challenges in interpretation 
of the competing theories of unsolicited ratings. There is no literature (theoretical or empirical) 
which examines the issue of solicitation of sovereigns, not to mention the dynamics of any 
conversion in status. Individual governments do not reveal their rating subscription details and 
it is difficult to deduce whether self-selection plays a role in the status of sovereign ratings. 
CRAs themselves are also not very clear as to how the solicitation procedure of sovereigns is 
initiated. For instance in publication released in February 2011, S&P states it is converting the 
US issuer and issue ratings following previously announced conversions on the seven European 
issuers as an answer to new EU regulations on credit ratings (S&P, 2011e). The publication 
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adds that the CRA does not have the agreement with the issuer. It is not clear from the report 
itself whether the government of US was previously purchasing the ratings or not. On the other 
hand, news about Turkey terminating its contract with S&P in May 2012 is an example of the 
action taken on the side of the sovereign. Additionally, what is uncertain is also the fact whether 
particular solicited country purchases agreements with all three (or more) CRAs in order to be 
rated fairly?  
On the other hand, sovereigns are relatively transparent in terms of their liability structures 
(unlike banks) however, when a sovereign converts its solicitation status, the CRA might 
perceive a deficiency of soft information and start rating the sovereign more conservatively. 
The blackmail theory could offer a plausible explanation in a case where the issuer is less 
transparent (Van Roy, 2013). However, it is unlikely that a CRA providing services not only 
to a sovereign but also to a number of non-sovereigns in that constituency would threaten its 
current or potential clientele without genuine concern about harming its reputation 
(Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984).   
The geographical bias could be potentially part of the explanation. According to Poon (2003), 
S&P assigns different weights to economic variables when rating Japanese and non-Japanese 
companies and the same could be true for other Asian sovereigns. The reason might lie behind 
home bias where the agencies in the rated country or region favour the issuer.   
5.3 Sample and data sources 
In order to address the research questions, investigating the impact of solicitation status on the 
bank rating changes the following data is selected. Firstly, to examine the rating channel from 
sovereigns onto banks the credit ratings data is utilised. This dataset comprises of long-term 
foreign sovereign and bank ratings. The details of the ratings selected along with their matching 
process and requirements are subject of section 5.3.1. The reasoning behind using bank ratings 
as opposed to other non-sovereign issuers is explained in section 5.3.1.2. Further, bank 
financial data used to capture the banking environment across the sample is subject to section 
5.3.2. Lastly the macroeconomic variables controlling for differentials between the countries 
in the dataset are presented in section 5.3.2.1. 
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5.3.1 Credit ratings dataset 
The sample comprises monthly sovereign and bank long term foreign currency issuer ratings 
by S&P between January 2006 and January 2013. 1 March 2011141 is treated as the single date 
of the regulatory intervention (see section 5.3.1.1) and for this reason it is believed that 5 year 
pre-treatment period should sufficiently explain existing trends across markets. The end date 
is restricted by the availability of macroeconomic variables. 
The reason for using ratings from one CRA (S&P) stems from the fact that its solicitation status 
on sovereigns including historical status is the most transparent and verifiable among all big 
CRAs. This is with regard to the sources available on the website as well as approachability of 
the analysts.142 Using ratings by S&P forms clear and uncontaminated dataset. The choice of 
the CRA is supported by Williams et al. (2013) where the authors find that bank ratings issued 
by S&P, in contrast with Fitch and Moody’s, are most likely (80% of studied cases) to be at 
the sovereign level. 
5.3.1.1. Sovereign ratings data 
Monthly frequency sovereign ratings data together with watch and outlook status is available 
from my supervisor’s database for the entire sample period. Solicitation status of sovereigns is 
obtained from S&P Global Credit Portal publications. In February 2011, S&P (2011a, e, f) 
released reports on conversions of solicitation status for: 1) seven European countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom); 2) six Asia-
Pacific countries (Australia, Cambodia, India, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan); and 3) the US. Table 
5.1 illustrates the dates of S&P’s conversion of solicitation status of sovereigns. The press 
releases from S&P state: ‘Standard & Poor's is converting its issuer and issue ratings on 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and the European Central 
Bank (ECB) to "unsolicited", in light of the new European Union regulations’ (S&P, 2011a), 
and ‘Standard & Poor's is converting its issuer and issue ratings on Australia, Cambodia, India, 
                                                 
141. It is believed to be the precise approximation when considering a monthly data frequency. 
142. Moody’s does not have a constant record of labelling sovereign ratings as solicited vs. unsolicited. In the correspondence 
with head of the sovereign risk group it was mentioned that he had limited and coincidental knowledge about contractual 
arrangements past and present. Nonetheless, the manager would prefer to preserve the confidentiality of the contractual 
arrangements. Fitch, on the other hand, does not continuously identify unsolicited ratings (shadow ratings) as a result of 
numerous mergers and acquisitions which changed its operating structure (Bannier et al., 2010). The CRA does not publicise 
the history of the solicitation status. This information is not available for purchase due to confidentiality agreements with its 
rated issuers, neither current nor historical. 
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Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan to "unsolicited"’ (S&P, 2011f). In addition, all the issue ratings 
are then withdrawn shortly after the conversion of the issuer rating to ‘unsolicited’, which lends 
support to there being a fundamental change in S&P’s relation with these sovereigns. For 
example, S&P (2011f) states: ‘On May 24, 2011, we will withdraw all our issue ratings on the 
debt of Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan’. Further, Argentina’s solicitation status was converted 
on the 4th April 2011 and was the final case arising from the regulatory requirements on 
disclosure during our sample period.143 The US is excluded from the reported results due to it 
having a high proportion (approx. 20%) of all S&P-rated financial institutions, which would 
distort the sample and dominate any evidence on the research question.  
In the analysis the treatment group consists only of those countries which status changed in 
February 2011 (with the exception of Argentina) to rule out influences other than those driven 
by the EU regulation. As a result, Turkey and the Republic of Madagascar are omitted from 
the sample.144 The US is excluded due to high number of financial institutions (approximately 
20%).145 Consequently the treatment group consists of 13 sovereigns: Argentina, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Republic of India, Republic of Italy, Japan, The State of Netherlands, Republic of 
Singapore, Swiss Confederation, Taiwan (Republic of China) and the United Kingdom. 
The new regulation (Article 10 (5) of the EU Regulation 1060/2009) is compulsory for CRAs, 
and is therefore applicable to all sovereigns rated by S&P. For banks operating in the EU to 
use sovereign ratings for regulatory purposes, the rating’s solicitation status (of all countries) 
must be disclosed.146 Hence, any government may request to withdraw their ratings, but the 
CRA may elect to convert the rating to ‘unsolicited’ status rather than withdraw the rating (S&P 
Policy on Withdrawals, Suspensions, Discontinuances and Conversions, December 2014). 
Further, S&P may assign unsolicited credit ratings when it believes sufficient market interest 
                                                 
143. Correspondence with the S&P analyst (2013a) confirmed the solicitation status of all sovereigns before the regulatory 
changes took place. 
144. Turkey ceased its contract with S&P on January 14, 2013 whereas Madagascar withdrew its contract with the CRA on 
May 11, 2009. 
145. These institutions would dominate the sample and could bias results which are aimed at cross-country analysis and the 
interplay between sovereigns and banks. 
146. For example, S&P (2011f) states: “These actions, in turn, follow new European Union regulations on credit ratings 
(Article 10(5) of EU Regulation 1060/2009), which address matters relating to the disclosure and presentation of credit ratings, 
requiring, among other things, that unsolicited credit ratings be identified as such. [.......] We are converting our issuer credit 
ratings on the six governments to "unsolicited," as we do not have rating agreements with these governments. Nevertheless, 
Standard & Poor's will continue to rate these governments and classify the ratings as unsolicited, as we believe that we have 
access to sufficient public information of reliable quality to support our analysis and ongoing surveillance, and because we 
believe there is significant market interest in these government ratings.” 
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exists for the rated entity (S&P Policy on Assignment of Credit Ratings, May 2014). Hence, 
whenever there is no agreement with a government to be rated, the CRA can convert the rating 
to ‘unsolicited’. 
The treatment group predetermines the rest of the sample geographically. Namely, the control 
group sovereigns need to be both rated by S&P and be restricted to regions such as Europe, 
Asia and Pacific and Latin America. The sample excludes remainder of America, Africa and 
Middle East regions. This results in a manageable number of entities for which accounting and 
financial data can be found.  
5.3.1.2 Bank rating data  
Monthly bank rating data including watch and outlook status is obtained from the Interactive 
Data Credit Ratings International (CRI) database. This data is cross checked with help of 
Global Rating Handbooks by S&P which discloses solicitation status of bank issuers (Poon and 
Chan, 2010).147 The sample only comprises financial institutions because there is a far stronger 
link between sovereigns and banks than between sovereigns and corporations (see Borensztein 
et al., 2013; Huang and Shen, 2015). For example, corporates do not use sovereign bonds as 
collateral and for this reason are not equally affected by sovereign rating fluctuations. Also, for 
most countries (but not the US), banks are typically much more likely than corporations to be 
rated at the sovereign ceiling. 
Initially 2284 financial institutions meeting the geographical criteria are found. However, when 
an institution’s status is withdrawn (NR) at any point of time the item is removed from the 
sample and reported as a separate event (see Table 5.A.1 in Appendix 5.A). Further, the original 
sample included four instances of Watch developing announcements148 (which indicate entity 
being placed on a Watch with developing implications). A rating with this particular type of a 
watch signal is not taken into account when calculating rating events. 
Once the bank rating sample is obtained the credit rating data149 is matched with the financial 
and accounting data sourced from Bankscope (section 5.3.2).   
                                                 
147. The final dataset comprises of 147 institutions which have ratings assigned by S&P.  
148. BTA Bank JSC (2009/02/03 and 2009/02/16), Piraeus Bank SA (2007/01/12) and West Siberian Commercial Bank-
Zapsibcombank (2008/10/15). 
149. Including sovereign rating data from section 5.3.1.1 and bank ratings from this section. 
145 
 
5.3.2 Bank financial data  
Yearly statistics on bank financials and accounting data are available through Bankscope. Poon 
and Firth (2005) and Hau et al. (2013) motivate choice of the bank variables. The example of 
available accounting and financial data includes:  
 Total assets 
 Total equity 
 Net loans to total assets 
 ROAE 
 Loan loss reserves to gross loans 
 Equity to total assets 
The sample is narrowed to publicly listed companies which provide good source of financial 
statistics. Further, banks are selected based on their specialisation and include: commercial 
banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, real estate and mortgage banks, investment banks, 
other non-banking credit institutions, bank holdings and holding institutions, finance 
companies and group finance companies. After filtering in accordance with the regional 
classification 906 entities meeting these criteria are obtained. 
5.3.2.1 Macroeconomic data 
Data containing macroeconomic environment in yearly frequency is accessed via DataStream 
database. The obtained statistics originate from:  
 The World Bank (WB): World Development Indicators (WDI), Aggregated 
Governance Indicators (AGI), Global Development Finance (GDF), World Bank’s 
Analytical Classification of income. 
 The IMF: World Economic Outlook (WEO), International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
 Oxford Economics 
5.3.3 Monthly dataset 
As a result of matching the credit rating and bank sample, 147 intermediaries originating from 
42 countries are obtained. This includes 13 unsolicited and 31 solicited sovereigns. This is the 
final dataset used in the empirical analysis after some banks and countries exit the initial dataset 
due to winsorising the accounting data. Removal of the outlying observations which are above 
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the 99.5 percentile and below the 0.5 percentile of the distribution is achieved using the 
trimmed estimator in STATA. Amongst the variables which required winsorisation were: 
ROAE (minimum values; 97 observations deleted); LEVERAGE (maximum values; 36 
observations deleted); INCREV (maximum values; 37 observations deleted). For the list and 
description of variables, see Table 5.8. 
The full lists of sovereigns participating in the study and their corresponding intermediaries are 
available from Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 in Appendix 5.A. The rating daily data is collapsed onto 
the monthly observations to decrease the number of zeros in the sample. This results in 8900 
observations. 
Monthly data suits the experimental design of this study. According to Bertrand et al. (2004) 
in their review of 92 papers, which applied DD methodology, more than 75 percent included 
more than five years of data. The longest time series inluding 51 and 83 periods (months) were 
observed in approximately 95 and 99 percent of the examined publications.150 
 
5.3.3.1 Rating events: Sovereigns 
To calculate the sovereign rating events, ratings which were present as of January 1 2006 and 
continued until 2013 are used. This involved collecting the entire history of events for 42 
sovereigns in case backtracking was necessary. This is due to the fact that the frequency of 
actions for sovereigns is very low. For instance, on couple of occasions country retained the 
rating which was awarded long before start of the sample period and which did not change until 
this date (e.g. Denmark-with its triple A rating since 27th February 2001). Others experienced 
an action only in the recent years (e.g. Finland changed from AAA/Stable outlook which 
carried since 1st February 2002 to AAA/Watch Negative on the 5th December 2011).151  
To identify rating events, the 20-notches scale is applied first. The scale assigns numerical 
scores such as: SD, CC, D=1, CCC-=2, CCC=3, CCC+=4,…, AA+=19, AAA=20. To add 
weight to the rating changes and to increase number of observations, the ratings scale is 
supplemented with watch and outlook status. This results in the comprehensive credit rating 
scale (CCR-58 points scale). Literature on watch and outlook status is found to produce 
                                                 
150. This is explained by papers using monthly data. 
151. The release of rating events is not fixed to particular day of the month and for this reason it is difficult to find rating events 
matching exactly the beginning of the sample period (i.e., the first recorded rating event in 2006 might exceed January 1st). In 
such instance the most recent rating event before that date is extracted and set it as the base year (1st January 2006). 
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stronger effect than actual ratings (Kim and Wu, 2011; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2013) (see 
section 3.4). In the CCR scale, each rating class is assigned a value between 1 to 58 (i.e. C, SD, 
CC, D=1, CCC-=4, CCC=7,…, AA+=55, AAA=58) (as seen in Sy, 2004 and Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym, 2012a, 2013). For positive watch +2 is added, for positive outlook +1 whereas for 
negative outlook and negative watch 1 and 2 is subtracted respectively. Stable outlook and no 
watch, or no outlook does not add points to the existing rating scale.  
Credit events include the following:   
Positive events include: 
 rating upgrades (solo) 
 positive outlook actions (solo) (change from stable outlook to positive outlook status 
or change from negative outlook to stable/positive outlook status) 
 positive watch actions (solo)(action where the rating is confirmed (no rating change) 
after being  placed on negative watch or positive watch status is introduced) 
 change from negative watch to negative outlook (in relative terms this event is 
considered as a positive signal since weight of the negative watch is -2, in the CCR 
scale, and is replaced by negative outlook which weighs -1 points) 
 positive combined action: rating upgrade accompanied by outlook or watch status 
Negative events include: 
 rating downgrades (solo) 
 negative outlook actions (solo) (change from stable outlook to negative outlook status 
or change from positive outlook to stable/negative outlook status) 
 negative watch actions (introducing negative watch status or positive watch status is 
replaced with stable outlook status with no rating change) 
 change from positive watch to positive outlook (positive watch weights 2 points and is 
replaced by positive outlook which carries 1 point in the CCR scale) 
 negative combined actions: rating downgrades accompanied by outlook or watch status 
Descriptive statistics for the sovereign ratings actions can be found in Tables 5.2-5.4. The first 
Table presents the rating events expressed in the 20-notch scale. In total the sovereigns incurred 
154 rating events during the investigated period; 71 positive and 83 negative. The positive and 
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negative actions are distributed in similar proportions representing 46% and 54% of the rating 
events (2.33% and 2.73% of the total number of observations respectively).  
Single rating actions amount to 27% (1.38% of the total observations) of the rating events 
where 18% constitute upgrades and 9% downgrades. Single outlook events comprise 37% of 
all events (1.9% of observations), out of which 19.5% followed positive and 17.5% negative 
route. Single negative watch events significantly outweigh the positive and comprised 9% of 
all events (translates to 0.46% of sample observations). Finally, the combined actions represent 
22.1% of events (1.12% of the studied sample). The recorded events total 3.9% and 18.2% for 
positive and negative combined actions respectively.  
Table 5.3 expresses rating events in the CCR scale. The total number of rating events (positive 
vs. negative) is the same regardless whether 20-notch or 58-point scale is used. Table 5.4 on 
the other hand, splits the sovereigns into treatment and control group and reports their ratings 
in the CCR scale respectively. The control group encounters the same number of positive and 
negative actions in the data sample (62). Treatment group experiences 30 negative actions 
against 9 positive actions.  
Panel II of Table 5.7 presents the aggregated statistics concerning sovereigns. The sample 
period is divided into pre- and post-intervention phase. The pre-regulatory period yields 
positive as well as negative rating events in similar proportions (52 positive and 46 negative). 
They are distributed evenly among the two groups (treatment 7 vs 8 and control 45 vs 38). The 
post-regulatory phase conversely shows a steep decline in upgrades and increase in downgrades 
for the treatment group (2 upgrades against 13 downgrades). The control group also shows 
deteriorating economic conditions through higher number of downgrades. Nonetheless, 
negative events remain proportional to the upgrades (17 upgrades vs 24 downgrades). 
Additionally, the overall sample of rating actions is attributed to 40% (60%) speculative 
(investment) grade sovereigns respectively.152 
Figures 5.1-5.4 in Appendix 5.A present distributions of two groups of sovereigns by rating 
score depicted in 20-notch scale. The credit ratings of sovereigns are transformed into 20-notch 
scale. Frequency relates to the percentage of monthly rating observations which correspond to 
a particular rating in the scale. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the distribution of ratings, in the 
                                                 
152. Ratings of issuers equal to and below BB+ (i.e. BB+, BB, BB-,…, C, SD, CC, D)  are considered speculative grade 
ratings. Ratings equal to and higher than BBB- are known as investment grade (i.e. BBB-, BBB, BBB+, …, AA+, AAA). 
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treatment group, in both pre and post-treatment data period. As can be seen the dispersal of 
sovereigns in this group skews towards the A+ and ratings above in both periods. 
Approximately 90 percent of the distribution in the pre-treatment sample is driven by the 
investment grade ratings (BBB-= 11; and above). The remainder comprises speculative ratings 
which include BB+ and below (10). 
Similar distribution is present in the post-treatment period with the exception that majority of 
speculative ratings are assigned to “B” rating. Allocation of investment grade ratings changes 
by introducing BBB+ (13) and A (15) ratings in that period. Additionally, fraction of AA- 
ratings rises by almost a half. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 depict ratings distribution of the control group sovereigns. These 
distributions are more balanced representing ratings in the group between CCC+ to AAA+ (4-
20) in the pre-treatment period. In the post-treatment period the entire rating scale is 
represented with the exception of “CCC-” (2) and “CCC+” (4) and “B-“ (5) rating. Fraction of 
triple “A” (15) ratings drops to less than 20 percent. Significant increase in “B+” (7), “B-“ (8), 
“BBB” (12), “BBB+” (13) and “AA-” (17) ratings can be observed. In the second period, 
sovereigns with a default status unlike in the earlier period are observed. 
5.3.3.2 Rating events: Non-sovereigns 
Table 5.5 and 5.6 depict the number of bank’s monthly rating events according to 20-notch 
scale and 58-point scale respectively. The differentiation between events as well as their 
calculation follows that of sovereigns mentioned earlier.  
In summary, 516 events out of which 224 (292) are positive (negative) are found. The total 
number of single rating events amounts to 136 (1.5% of the sample). This includes 79 upgrades 
and 57 downgrades. In terms of distribution of individual upgrades, 94% of all solo upgrades 
are increases by one notch (74 in total) whereas the remaining 6% by more than one notch (5 
in total). On the other hand, 93% (53 in total) of all individual (solo) downgrades in the bank 
sample fall by one notch. The remainder (7%) are the downgrades of two, three and four 
notches (4 in total). Solo outlook events comprise 32% of all events (1.85% of the data sample). 
Single negative outlook actions outweigh the positive by approximately 4% on the whole.  
Watch events constitute integral part of the studied bank dataset amounting to 19.3% of the 
total actions (1.12% the sample observations). Watch negative actions prevail in 64% of cases 
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relative to positive watch signals.  In relation to the entire events data, watch negative events 
occur more frequently by 5% than those of positive nature.153 Also, negative combined actions 
are dominant in the data sample. Out of 101 combined actions, 22 are positive whereas 79 yield 
negative signals. In relative terms combined actions equate 19.6% of the rating events (1.13% 
of the data sample).  
In addition to rating events, Panel I in Table 5.7 splits the sample into pre and post-treatment 
periods.  The positive (negative) events in the former period amount to 1.75% (1.79%) of all 
observations. After the treatment, banks incur 0.76% (1.49%) positive (negative) events 
respectively. Data from both periods suggests that 366 (71%) of overall events relate to 
investment grade ratings whereas 150 (29%) to speculative grade ratings. Pre-treatment sample 
includes 81 (234) events linked to speculative (investment) grade. The post-treatment sample 
includes 69 (132) speculative (investment) grade events.  
Descriptive statistics identify a strong ceiling effect which is observed for 78% of sample 
observations (B<S). The instance when banks and sovereign ratings coincide persists in the 
19% of data sample (B=S). Bank ratings are able to pierce the ceiling in 3% of cases (B>S). 
One can identify the ceiling by comparing averages of bank numerical ratings in comparison 
to sovereign ratings. According to 20-point (58-point) scale, sovereigns obtain a numerical 
rating of 14.5 (43.86) whereas banks of 13 (36.8) respectively. The magnitude of the ceiling 
effect is also observed when the sample is split into pre and post-regulatory period. 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 in Appendix 5.A show the distribution of the monthly bank ratings in the 
sample in the pre and post-treatment data period. As previously ratings are converted into 20-
notch rating scale. The bank ratings form the normal distribution skewing towards the 
speculative grade ratings. Very low fraction of the sample consists of default institutions (less 
than 2 percent). Conversely, the other end of the distribution does not stretch above “AA+” 
(“AA”) in in the first and (second) period respectively. The junk grade ratings amount to less 
than 20 percent of the sample in the pre-treatment period. This fraction rises after March 2011. 
In the latter period number of “A” ratings rises to 20 percent whereas the neighbouring category 
“A-” drops from by approximately 5 percent. 
                                                 
153. Negative watch amounts to 64 events which constitutes 12% of all bank rating events (0.72% of the data sample), whereas 
positive watch adds up to 36 events which amounts to 7% rating events (0.4% of the sample). 
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Figure 5.7 in Appendix 5.A presents the country distribution of bank ratings in the sample. The 
Japanese financial institutions dominate the sample comprising approximately 20% of its size. 
This could be due to high number of rated Japanese FI which are publicly listed companies. 
Further, approximately 5% intermediaries derive from Australia and Italy followed by India, 
United Kingdom and Russian Federation. Since merely listed companies are used the number 
of German or Dutch banks might seem underrepresented in the sample.154 
5.3.4 Trends between sovereign and bank ratings 
To graphically illustrate the trends between sovereign and bank ratings the dataset is collapsed 
onto yearly observations. The ratings are observed as of 1st January every year.155 This results 
in 886 observations. Figures 5.8-5.17 illustrate trends in 10 unsolicited countries (treatment 
group). Sovereign line (blue) represents a rating of a country. The bank rating line (maroon) 
corresponds to an average rating of the financial institutions incorporated in that country at the 
same point in time. The dashed line (cranberry) represents the change of solicitation status by 
the sovereign. 
The treatment group illustrates the ceiling effect is present in the sample156 meaning the bank 
ratings rarely exceed those of the sovereign issuer. There is a wide gap in between bank and 
sovereign ratings with the exception of Argentina and India where they overlap with each other. 
The cranberry line indicating treatment effect illustrates slump in ratings approximately around 
the period when regulation was introduced. In case of France, Germany and Italy both 
sovereign and bank ratings show a substantial decline cumulated around the first quarter of 
2011. On the other hand, Australia, Taiwan and the UK exhibit slump in bank ratings while the 
sovereign credit worthiness remains constant. This graphical interpretation illustrates the 
ceiling effect observed in section 5.3.3.2 which is captured in Panel I of Table 5.7.  
 
 
 
                                                 
154. FI excluded from the sample included non-listed institutions such as: Germany: Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale, DZ 
Bank Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG, HSH Nordbank, Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg, Landesbank Berli; 
France: Societe Generale, Netherlands: Rabobank Nederland, ABN Amro Bank NV among others. 
155. For 2006, 2011 and 2012 there is no trading day on the 1st January and 6th January is selected instead. 
156. The graphical interpretation of Cambodia, Singapore and Taiwan is not presented but yields similar results.  
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5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 Univariate tests 
5.4.1.1 Summary statistics 
Preliminarily, the choice of the control variables for the univariate and subsequently 
multivariate analysis is influenced by the literature highlighting determinants of bank and 
sovereign ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Poon and Firth, 2005; Afonso, 2007; Hau et al., 
2013) (see section 3.3.1). Additionally, variables with the least number of missing observations 
were kept for further analysis. Appendix 5.B lists all of the tested variables.  
The summary statistics such as mean, standard deviation, number of observations and 
percentiles along with abbreviations and definitions of variables used in the multivariate 
analysis are depicted in Table 5.8. These statistics are a useful tool of detecting possible errors 
and the outliers in the dataset. Table 5.8 provides summary statistics for monthly observations 
of independent and dependent variables employed in the regressions over the studied period 
Jan 2006- Jan 2013. The sample represents a balanced panel data.  
The rating change of sovereigns represents the mean -0.05 percent which illustrates the high 
number of “zeros” in the data sample. The negative sign suggests that the number of 
downgrades outweighs the upgrades on average. The lower average rating change is found for 
banks (-0.02) which confirm the ceiling effect is present. The maximum rating a bank received 
in a sample period equals 55 CCR points. This translates into AA+ rating with a Stable 
Outlook.157 The minimum bank rating, on the other hand, amounts to 1 CCR point.  This 
presents CC rating with Negative Outlook or Negative Watch.158 On average banks in the data 
sample are rated at 37 CCR points which translates into BBB+ rating with a Stable Outlook.  
In relation to control variables the highest standard deviation (18.5) in the distribution is 
recorded for non-interest income over gross revenue-INCREV. That is where the minimal and 
the maximum values diverge most from the mean and median values.  
                                                 
157. The rating was recorded to the BNP Paribas (France) up until August 2007. 
158. Such instance was recorded for three intermediaries: Banco Hipotecario SA (Argentina), BTA Bank JSC (Kazakhstan) 
and Nadra Bank (Ukraine).  
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5.4.1.2 Univariate analysis 
This section tests for differences in financial profiles of the two groups of banks (treatment and 
control group). It helps to identify whether groups comply with the parallel trend assumption 
required for the multivariate analysis. In other words, in the absence of regulatory intervention 
the difference between treatment and control group should be constant over the time. To verify 
this t-test statistic of the means between two groups is estimated (solicited vs. unsolicited 
sovereigns) for a number of covariates where the t-value statistic is expected to yield 
insignificant results. The lower frequency (yearly) data is used in this exercise to reduce the 
number of “0” in the sample.159 The ratings are observed on the first trading day of January 
across years 2006 to 2013. 
Firstly, differences in distributions between changes in bank ratings incorporated in countries 
which did (did not) undergo the change of solicitation status treatment (control group) 
respectively are tested for. Since the change in bank ratings (ΔBANK) is not continuous but 
ordinal variable the Mann-Whitney U test160 (also known as Wilcoxon rank-sum test) is applied 
to test for differences in two groups of unmatched data (Poon, 2003). The null hypothesis (H0) 
indicates that there are no differences in distributions between ratings events in treatment and 
control group. The alternative hypothesis (H1) states that two groups differ in terms of bank 
ratings changes. 
The null hypothesis, that the change in bank ratings in both groups is identically distributed, is 
rejected for the post-treatment as well as for entire sample period (see Panel I Table 5.9). 
Namely, the two groups represent different characteristics and the rating changes for banks in 
each group are statistically different from each other. When the test is performed for mean 
ratings the p-value indicates that two groups are statistically different from each other in all 
tested periods (pre, post-treatment and the whole sample) (Panel II Table 5.9). Mean rating of 
banks in unsolicited countries is equal to 40.03 as opposed to 32.97 under solicited jurisdiction. 
A statistically significant mean difference of 7.06 with 99 percent confidence intervals is 
obtained for the entire data sample. Somewhat lower difference is accounted in the post-
treatment period however it remains significant at the one percent level. The most significant 
                                                 
159. T-tests for change in bank ratings in daily, monthly and yearly frequency yield the same results. 
160. The Mann-Whitney U test is a nonparametric test used as an alternative to the independent sample t-test when the data 
are ordinal in nature. 𝑈 = 𝑛1𝑛2 +
𝑛2(𝑛2+1)
2
− ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=𝑛1+1
 where: U=Mann-Whitney U test; n1 = sample size one; n2= sample 
size two; Ri = rank of the sample size. 
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difference between two means can be observed in the pre-treatment period where it amounts 
to 7.59. On average, bank ratings in solicited countries take the value of 33 CCR points whereas 
in the opponent group they approximate to 40 points. 
Additionally, differences in financial profiles of banks incorporated in both solicited and 
unsolicited countries are examined. Differences in financial variables and ratios are tested using 
the t-test. 
These include: 
 Profitability measures: Return on average equity % , Non-interest income over gross 
revenue % 
 Size: LN(ASSETS) 
 Asset quality measure: Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans % 
 Capital adequacy: Total Assets / Equity Multiple 
The same hypothesis follows. The null hypothesis suggests that there is no difference between 
the financial profiles of banks in the treatment and control group. Alternative hypothesis 
indicates that there are significant differences between the financial profiles of banks 
incorporated in sovereigns with solicited and unsolicited ratings. 
Tests in Table 5.9A show that on the whole banks incorporated from the two groups of 
sovereigns have distinctive characteristics and are not balanced groups (for 4 out of 5 variables 
the null hypothesis is rejected). Banks in the treatment group are characterised by lower returns 
on equity and keep lower loans reserves. Portfolios in these banks are composed of a larger 
amount of assets and are more leveraged. According to the mean population comparison, banks 
in each group are not different in terms of non-interest income. 
To correct for the differences in profiles across of banks a more detailed paired subsample test 
in later phase of multivariate analysis is conducted (see section 5.6.2). The subsample is 
selected by pairing (matching) banks based on their financial profiles and ratings. The issuers 
with similar profiles are then tested for differences between mean ranks and t-statistics (seen 
in Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2005; Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). 
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5.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
The studied phenomenon of a regulatory change provides grounds for applying the quasi-
experimental research design such as the difference-in-difference (DD) estimation161 (Angrist 
and Krueger, 1999) (for more details see 3.6.9). The methodology allows capturing the 
endogenous shock in the sample (effect of regulation) and its effect on variable of interest (bank 
ratings). However, the DD is a method which relies on the linearity assumption and since the 
dependent variable is of a discrete nature one could fall into censoring issues (Wooldridge, 
2007).162 
Although the ordered probit model is applied, this study is constructed with the intention to 
contain all the important elements needed for testing the impact of the treatment effect in the 
linear as well as non-linear setting. For the same reason the sample is grouped similarly to the 
DD empirical papers and consists of treatment and a control group. To correct for possible 
variation amongst treatment and control group variety of fixed effects are tested for with use 
of dummy variables.  
As already mentioned the solicitation status of a sovereign issuer after the regulation took place 
acts as a treatment. The assumption that the shock induced by the European regulation is 
exogenous is fundamental for proper estimation of its effect on the dependent variable (Roberts 
and Whited, 2013). It is unlikely that the bank ratings among other covariates could in any way 
enforce the regulation regarding the solicitation status. However, to validate this premise, the 
sample is checked for such instances. It is very rare to find bank rating actions which would 
precede their home sovereign actions within a short time window. Similarly to Alsakka et al. 
(2014), I find no evidence whatsoever of a bank-to-sovereign rating channel.  
                                                 
161. yit= α1 + β1 Treatmenti+β2 Postt +β3 (Treatment *Post)it + εit   
where: yit = binary indicator of an outcome; the estimate follows (TGPOST-TGPRE) - (CGPOST-CGPRE) where: TG is a treatment 
group, CG control group, POST(PRE) relates to the post (pre) event period. 
i = 1,…N entities and τ = 1,…T time periods 
Treatment = dummy variable takes value of 1 of the entity is in the treatment group; 0 otherwise. 
Post = dummy variable takes value of 1 if the observation is in a post-treatment period; 0 otherwise. 
β1 = average of the outcome variable for the treatment group relative to the control group pre-treatment period. 
β2 = change measurement in the outcome variable between periods within the control group. 
β3 = treatment effect measures of how much outcome variable changed in the treatment group due to treatment in respect to 
how much outcome variable changed in the control group in the same time period. 
162. The author explains that when the dependent variable is discrete in nature, a data problem could arise because the 
“responses might be censored above or below some value; that is, it is not observable for part of the population” (Wooldridge, 
2005; p. 517). 
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To maintain the experimental design, the study also needs to satisfy the assumption requiring 
both groups to share similar characteristics with the exception of receiving the treatment. The 
parallel trend assumption dictates that in the absence of the treatment in the form of regulation, 
the pre-treatment difference between treatment and control group is constant over time. This 
means that ratings issued by solicited or unsolicited sovereigns should follow the same time 
trend without regulatory reforms (intervention). Likewise, the treatment effect should introduce 
deviation from this trend (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Since the univariate tests in section 5.4.2 
show discrepancies between the groups in the initial test the matching exercises in section 5.6.2 
investigate this issue in more detail.  
Series of additional robustness tests in section 5.6.1 test the data to rule out the possibility that 
events other than regulation itself could be driving the results. The falsification tests are 
motivated by Roberts and Whited (2013). 
In view that the non-linear probability model is used for estimation, it does not allow to draw 
the same inferences about effects on regulation as the linear model would. Once the effect of 
regulation is confirmed more narrowed robustness tests are performed to see the magnitudes 
of this effect using Ordinary Least Squares method (section 5.6.4). Based on this postulation, 
one can approximate the causal effect between groups prior and post the treatment using the 
DD estimation. 
5.4.2.1 Ordered probit model: Model estimation and variables 
To test the hypothesis from section 5.2.1.3, the ordered probit framework is employed. The 
ordered probit approach is widely used in the credit ratings literature since it accounts for the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010c; Caporale et al., 
2012).163 Using approaches which do not account for the discrete nature of the dependent 
variable (i.e. which treat the responses at equal distance such as in OLS) can lead to errors in 
inferences and produce biased estimators (Park, 2005; see section 3.6.1.2). In other words, the 
difference between two levels of a rating scale (e.g., 1 compared to 2, 2 compared to 3) is not 
                                                 
163. For applications of the ordered probit model in CRA literature see section 3.6.1.2. 
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the same, therefore one observes strictly non-linear transformation captured by the thresholds, 
which are estimable parameters in an ordered choice model.  
The model estimates upgrades and downgrades as well as no change probabilities for bank 
ratings identified by points in the CCR scale. Equation (5.1) captures the effect of an external 
and exogenous event (disclosure rules) which feeds through sovereign ratings and continues 
onto the financial markets participants (banks rating changes) in the considered countries, as 
follows: 
t,j,it,j4t,j3sj,2j,t1t,j,i
YF*CFXBankRΔSovRTreatment)*Post(*y    
)1,0(N
t,j,i
                                                                        (5.1) 
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 is an unobserved latent variable connected to the ordinal responses of 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡; change in 
rating of bank i in country j at month t based on the 58-point CCR scale and taking values of -
3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, by the measurement model:  
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The (β,ℷ) parameters of the regression as well as thresholds (α) are estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation (ML)  and are subject to  constraint α1<α2 <….<αJ  (Wooldridge, 2007).164 
As can be seen the model does not contain a constant, since in the ordered probit specification 
threshold parameters rather than one intercept are observed. The bank rating changes by {-3, -
2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3} points are the cut-off points which divide the data into 6 intervals. 
 
 
                                                 
164. More details on the latent variable model can be found in section 3.6.1. 
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5.4.2.2 Explanatory variables 
Selection of the appropriate determinants and their specification is based on stepwise 
methodology together with the backward elimination. The latter allows finding relationships 
which could be omitted when employing variables in the first step (Menard, 2002). To avoid 
multi-colinearity the key explanatory variables are tested using _rmcoll command in STATA. 
Additionally, the pairwise collinearity test is carried out and no collinearity is detected among 
any two variables. 
The economic significance of the observed controls and their impact on the discrete dependent 
variable is measured by the marginal effect (Greene, 2012). The marginal effect of sovereign 
rating action reveals the influence of sovereign changes in country j on the probability of bank 
rating changes in the same country j. For continuous variables, the marginal effect is the 
difference in the predicted value of the dependent variable (change in bank rating) as one 
independent variable changes value by one standard deviation (1 s.d.) while all other variables 
are held constant at their mean.  
According to Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012c; p.15) the marginal effect for dummy variable is 
the “partial derivative of the predicted probability of the dependent variable that results when 
the independent dummy variables take the value of 1 while the other variables are held at their 
mean.”  
The list of variables is as follows: 
1) Treatment is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country belongs to the treatment 
group; 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is from 
the post-treatment period (March 2011 onwards for all countries, but May 2011 for Argentina); 
0 otherwise. This main interaction dummy (POST*TREATMENT) captures the impact of 
disclosure rules in the regression model. In line with the theoretical explanations of unsolicited 
ratings (see section 5.2.1.2) and economic intuition, the expected sign of this variable is 
negative. This is consistent with the notion that bank ratings in countries with unsolicited 
ratings might face more downgrades (and fewer upgrades) than the banks in the other group 
due to the rating ceiling effect.  
2) The key explanatory variable, ΔSovRj,s represents the change in sovereign CCR by S&P 
based on the 3-month window prior to month t (i.e. s = the t-3 to t window). It takes the value 
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of -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 or 3. The predicted sign of the coefficient is positive since bank ratings 
have the tendency to move in the same direction as ratings of their home sovereigns (e.g. Huang 
and Shen, 2015). The CRAs and academic literature confirms that sovereign risk is the key 
factor influencing bank ratings (S&P, 1997; 1998; Fitch, 2002; Poon and Firth, 2005). Poon et 
al. (2009) conclude that: “sovereign rating of a country is important in determining individual 
bank ratings because it captures some important macroeconomic and institutional 
characteristics of the countries in which the banks are located” (p.307). In addition to evidence 
on spillover effect seen in section 5.2.1.1 the expected sign of the coefficient is positive. 
The sovereign changes are selected instead of rating levels to avoid issues of collinearity with 
the bank rating level used as an independent variable. There are two specifications of this 
variable. The first one captures the change in the sovereign ratings at the same point in time as 
the bank ratings are being measured. In the second specification 3 month rolling window is 
applied which allows capturing the potential variation in the banking industry resulting from 
the most recent sovereign action(s). In that way one avoids omitting a relevant sovereign action 
which may take some time to elapse and affects the intermediaries in the given country.  
3) 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑅𝑗,𝑡 represents banks’ CCR taking values 1-58. This controls for the banking 
environment. The variable is expected to have a positive sign given that higher bank ratings 
result in higher probability of bank upgrades and lower probability of bank downgrades and 
vice versa.  
4) Vector Xj,t  includes other control variables which originate from literature on bank ratings 
determinants and portray the banking environment. Variables describing bank size, 
profitability, quality of held assets, capital adequacy and liquidity are found significant in 
explaining bank ratings in inter alia Poon and Firth (2005) and Hau et al. (2013) (for more see 
section 3.3.1). Appendix 5.B lists example of variables tested as bank controls. The correlation 
matrix has been considered, and I find no evidence of multi-collinearity for the control 
variables in Eq. (5.1) (see Appendix 5.C). 
5) CF is a full set of country dummy variables. YF is a full set of year dummy variables. 
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5.5 Empirical results  
The estimation results of Eq. (5.1) are provided in Table 5.10. The examination begins with 
measuring the direct effect of regulation on the probability that bank rating changes. In model 
I of Table 5.10 it is found that the bank ratings in the treatment group face more downgrades 
than banks in the other group. The effect is not statistically significant despite correcting for 
observable time-varying bank characteristics (e.g. bank size, profitability or credit ratings) as 
well as country specific and time effects.165 The specification does not yet account for 
unobserved differences in the economic development and industrialisation level or 
geographical bias concerning the sovereigns. On the similar note, the model does not control 
for unobservable time-variant banks heterogeneity such as bank’s risks, quality and investment 
opportunities amongst others (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Subsequently it is difficult to identify 
the strength and effect of regulation on these banks. To help with this problem several model 
specifications are tested with help of various fixed effects and cluster options used 
interchangeably similarly as seen in Jiménez et al. (2012). Before focusing on these issues in 
more detail (section 5.5.2) the coefficients on the main explanatory variables are discussed 
first.  
5.5.1 Explanatory variables 
The estimated coefficients on sovereign rating changes and banks ratings are significant, 
economically relevant and stable in all model specifications I-VIII. The sign on both 
coefficients is in line with the predictions. This confirms that applying these regressors is 
necessary. 
The positive sign on the sovereign rating changes supports the theory on ceiling effect. Namely, 
the bank ratings in a given country are predetermined by the economic and political situation, 
fiscal and monetary status of the home sovereign. In other words, banks incorporated in 
countries which received a credit rating downgrade, in given three months window, are more 
likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded. This effect could not be captured using 
sovereign and bank ratings simultaneously (on the same day). For this reason window of three 
months is used to enhance and strengthen this effect. This is due to the time needed between 
S&P reflects the sovereign news when rating banks.   
                                                 
165. The fixed effect dummy variables are obtained using n-1 number of entries; hence 41 countries and 6 years’ dummies are 
obtained. 
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The marginal effects (MEs) suggest one CCR point in sovereign rating upgrade increases the 
probability by 0.8%, 0.5% and 0.3% of a bank rating upgrade by one, two and three and above 
CCR points and leads to reduced probability of downgrade by one, two and three and more 
CCR points in 0.9%, 0.5% and 0.4% (see Table 5.11). The MEs across model specifications 
also imply about the asymmetry of a given effect. The downgrades yield moderately stronger 
marginal effects than upgrades consistent with Borensztein et al. (2013). These results are 
robust to introduction of year-country, bank and month fixed effects.                                                                                        
The positive sign on the bank ratings coefficient resembles the fact that intermediaries with 
higher credit ratings are more likely to become upgraded and less likely to become 
downgraded. The marginal effects imply that one CCR point increase in the bank rating 
increases the probability of an upgrade by 1, 2 and 3 points and above in 0.07%, 0.04% and 
0.02% and decrease probability of a downgrade by 1, 2 and 3 and more points in 0.09%, 0.04% 
and 0.04%. These estimates are robust to inclusion of bank and/or monthly fixed effects tested 
in latter models. 
The bigger sized banks are more likely to become downgraded and less prone to become 
upgraded. This could relate to the fact that such banks take on more risky investments and 
participate in less traditional form of banking which focused on originating loans and taking 
deposits. The negative coefficient remains statistically significant throughout all model 
specifications I-VIII.  
The coefficients of the remaining controls are marginally or not significant although their signs 
present anticipated economic rationale. For instance, banks with higher leverage (return on 
equity) are more likely to become downgraded (upgraded) and vice versa. Hence, more banks 
with stronger- balance sheet characteristics are more likely to receive rating upgrades. These 
controls are retained in regressions to control for the banking environment previously tested in 
the empirical literature.  
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5.5.2 Various fixed effects models 
This section presents rationale and estimates of various fixed effect models and clustering 
options applied to the baseline model (model I) in the rest of the Table 5.10. 
In model II the year and country fixed effects in the initial model is replaced with the interacting 
year-country fixed effects.166 Interacting fixed effects became a more common practise in the 
recent empirical literature (for more details see Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Mathis et al., 2009; 
Jiménez et al., 2012). 
This practice enables control for possible omitted variable bias which could result in 
endogeneity issues (Lemmon and Roberts, 2010). The interaction term accounts for any 
variation across the time and country spectrum which might not be controlled for in the 
preliminary model. It will also correct for the differences in the economic development and 
industrialisation level of sovereigns (e.g. industrialised vs. developing countries). This is of 
importance since countries in the treatment group include only one low income economy: 
Cambodia. In addition, Argentina and India are the only non-investment grade sovereigns in 
that group. Using the interacting fixed effect regional differences in Europe, Asia and Latin 
America are controlled for. 
The interaction dummies capture the changes in the macroeconomic environment such as GDP 
growth, inflation and shocks influencing the economies. These fundamentals are also 
inherently controlled by the sovereign credit rating changes and for this reason no additional 
macroeconomic variables are included. The identification of macroeconomic conditions 
derives entirely from the interactions. This reasoning is in line with Thompson (2011)167 and 
Jiménez et al. (2012).  
Once the interacting fixed effects was incorporated the magnitude of the main coefficient on 
treatment dummy (POST*TREATMENT) increased nearly five times and is now statistically 
different from zero with the predicted sign (see Table 5.10 model II onwards, pp.190). The 
treatment has a negative adverse effect on bank ratings changes. The switch of the sovereign 
status from solicited (0) to unsolicited (1) leads to higher probability of bank downgrades and 
                                                 
166. Since data is in monthly frequency it would be more appropriate to include the month-country fixed effects. Results 
obtained in this combination suffer from convergence issues due to high number of interactions. To control for the time effects 
the month fixed effects are tested for in models VI-VIII. 
167. The author suggests that when the fixed effects are used one needs to drop the macroeconomic covariates from the 
regression as they become collinear with the dummy variables. 
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lower probability of upgrades in the concerned states. Hence, ceteris paribus banks which 
belong to the treatment group are more likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded 
compared with banks not in the treatment group. The marginal effect suggests that such banks 
are 1.85%, 0.93% and 0.79% more likely to be downgraded by one, two and more than two 
CCR points respectively (see Table 5.12).  
The effect of the treatment dummy standalone represents a strong marginal effect in 
comparison with the 3.28% (2.73%) of the negative bank rating (sovereign) events recorded in 
the entire data sample (see Table 5.7). The distribution of bank negative events against total 
number of observations is as follows: downgrades by one, two and more than two CCR points 
represent 1.56%, 0.8% and 0.92% of the entire observations (see Table 5.6). The sovereign 
rating downgrades of one, two and more than two points represent 1.08%, 0.53 % and 1.12% 
of the sample observations (see Table 5.3). 
In Model III, the second specification (Model II) is supplemented with one way clustering on 
bank level (Table 5.10). The rationale stems from the fact that in panel data one deals with 
several observations for the same unit (e.g. multiple of firm, country, industry or month, year 
observations) which could be correlated across observations (Primo et al., 2007; Petersen, 
2009; Thompson, 2011). For instance, the residuals of the particular firm or country can be 
found correlated across different time periods. On the other hand, the residuals at the same 
point in time can be correlated among different firms or countries (Petersen, 2009).  
The bias arising from not correcting these cluster correlations are significant in nature whereas 
the White standard errors, commonly used in the literature, correct merely for 
heteroscedasticity. The standard errors which are not clustered are understated, and 
consequently inflate the t-statistic. This produces statistical significance for coefficients which 
are in fact not significant (Thompson, 2011). This might result in rejecting the hypothesis 
which would not be rejected otherwise. On the whole it is suggested that the clustering option 
produces more precise results (Petersen, 2009).  
Petersen (2009) provides that that most clusters in finance literature appear for given firms 
(firm effect arising from time-series dependence) and/or time dimension (time effect arising 
from cross sectional dependence). Based on this premise separate regressions with alternative 
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single dimension clustering options are estimated (no cluster, firm cluster and time cluster).168 
The Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.1 presents the results of competing models. The standard error 
on the treatment dummy in variation I shows lower estimates than when clustering is applied 
which demonstrates underestimation of the correlation between time (i.e. month), cross-section 
(i.e. bank), or potentially two dimensional effect. Although higher standard error estimates in 
variation II and III are not as strong as advised in the classification by Petersen (2009)169 they 
are considered as an indication of the possible firm and time (or both) effect which are tested 
further in the upcoming models. Namely, further simulations are carried out with use of 
combinations of fixed effects and clusters to observe the sensitivity of the standard errors. 
Results after inclusion of the bank clustering depicted in Model III170 remain robust (Table 
5.10). The coefficients for all variables are consistent with the earlier specification. The 
standard error estimate for the main explanatory variable increases leading to smaller z-
statistic. The economic inference of treatment dummy and its adverse effect on bank ratings 
remains strong and significant.   
To this moment the model corrected for country-wide and bank observable characteristics 
which helped in testing the differences between the treatment and control group which arose 
due to regulatory action. However, to ensure the proper estimation of this effect the 
randomisation of the treatment effect has to be confirmed.171 Without randomisation one is 
essentially testing the differences between the treatment and control group due to not only 
regulation but also other differences between the groups which are related to the bank ratings 
changes. Solving it by inclusion of bank controls in the model helps in correcting for the 
observable differences in banks profiles affecting rating changes but does not handle the 
unobserved effects which could be driving these differences and the dependent variables itself. 
Incorporating the bank dummy variables in the regression helps to correct for these omitted 
and possibly unobserved effects (Roberts and Whited, 2013). 
                                                 
168. Since the model already corrects for the macroeconomic environment with year-country fixed effects no clustering on 
these dimensions is applied. The clusters by firms and month amount to 147 and 85 respectively. 
169. When the standard errors for time (firm) are two to four times higher to the White standard errors they indicate the 
presence of time (cross-sectional effect). On the other hand, when the standard errors combined for country and time effect 
are significantly higher than those clustered for a single factor, both time and cross-sectional effect is observed in the data. The 
double clustering, bank-month, is not performed as the number of clusters outnumbers the total observations of the sample 
(8478). However, the same exercise is performed in the later models (VI, VII and VIII) with the use of month dummies 
followed by clustering on bank level similarly to paper by Faulkender and Petersen (2006) amongst others. 
170. The model estimations are equivalent to variation II presented in Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.1. 
171. Section 5.4.2 explains in more detail the exogeneity assumption of the model. 
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Model IV presents the results of incorporating bank dummy variables to an earlier specification 
seen as Model II (Table 5.10). All estimated coefficients except the treatment dummy (also 
insignificant) are bigger with the same predicted sign. The effect is stronger especially for the 
bank ratings (BANK58ALL) and LN(ASSETS) where the coefficient increased almost three 
and five times respectively.  
Further, model V is estimated with the use of both the bank fixed effect as well as the clustering 
option on the bank level (Table 5.10). The reason for including both effects together was 
inspired by the paper by Jiménez et al. (2012). Petersen (2009) achieves unbiased estimates 
when using firm dummies and errors clustered on firm level in his simulations on various panel 
datasets.172 Also earlier studies by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Kezdi (2004), which looked at the 
single way clustering, suggest that the panel data with numerous cross-sections might require 
the cluster option after the time/firm/state effects have been included to ensure legitimate 
results. Cameron et al. (2011) experiment with the use of fixed effects along with clustering 
options and report unbiased standard errors regardless whether clusters have been included or 
not (see Cameron et al., 2011; Table 2 p. 245). 
Petersen (2009) suggests the standard errors which change once the firm clustering option is 
used, in addition to the firm dummies, indicate that the effect for firms across a time period is 
not fixed. Although most corporate finance papers assume the effect to be constant over the 
time it is not always the case and can result in potential bias of the standard errors.173 
After including the bank dummies along with the bank clustering the standard errors on the 
treatment dummy increased significantly which could suggest that the firm effect in the data 
sample is non-constant (dies over time). This could be explained by observing an effect for one 
bank in 2006 which is more highly correlated with its residual in 2007 than with the residual 
in the latter time period (e.g. 2010). 
When comparing models IV and V there is no difference between the results in the economic 
sense (all coefficients remain the same) (Table 5.10). The inference from the main dummy 
coefficient remains the same as hypothesised the results are insignificant. Namely, banks bear 
a penalty for belonging in the treatment group and face more significant downgrades than their 
counterparts from non-treatment group. There are some minor differences in the statistical 
                                                 
172. A simulation of using OLS with firm dummies with accompaniment of clustered option is reported in Table 5 Panel A in 
Petersen (2009).  
173. Cameron et al. (2011) and Thompson (2011) present examples clustering on more than one dimension when no-constant 
time effects are present. 
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sense. The values for log likelihood and pseudo R-squared seemingly do not change however 
there are slight improvements in the criterion for model selection in model V. Namely, the BIC 
and AIC decrease, from 7646 and 5376 (in version IV) to 5491 and 4902 (in version V). This 
informs that the latter model is preferred. Smaller AIC and BIC values are preferred since the 
higher log likelihood shows improvement in the model. When models are nested, as the case 
in this example, these criteria impose penalty for model size. The AIC penalty is smaller than 
the BIC (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) and for this reason the second measure is used. 
Model VI tests whether time effect is present in the data with use of month fixed effects applied 
to the specification from Model II (Table 5.10). When the clustering test was performed on two 
dimensions it was found that standard error for the treatment dummy increased when clustering 
by month was in place. Therefore there is basis to believe that time effects arising from cross 
sectional dependence (i.e. banks) could exist in the model (see Appendix 5.B, Table 5.B.1). 
The post clustering estimate shows that coefficient on the treatment dummy remains significant 
at one percent with the similar magnitude presented in models I-III. The marginal effects 
remain at similar levels as previously recorded (see Table 5.14).174 The remainder of variables 
retain their sign and significance levels. The log likelihood ratio changes to -2318 whereas the 
pseudo r-squared increases to 0.19.  
The time effect tested in this specification (VI) is found to be constant (see Table 5.10), 
meaning that the given effect influences each bank by the same amount at the same point in 
time, and can be ultimately absorbed with use of time dummy variables (Petersen, 2009).175,176 
The estimations so far controlled for correlation of one aspect, time or cross-section, at the 
time. This is in line with empirical literature including Andrews (1991); Rogers (1993); 
Williams (2000) among others. The specification obtained in model VII combines clustered 
errors on more than one dimension at the same time similar to Petersen (2009) and Thompson 
(2011). When clustering on one dimension it is assumed that the residuals are not correlated 
amongst different clusters. Specifically, when using the firm fixed effect it is presumed that 
there is no time effect such that different firm’s residuals are correlated in particular point of 
                                                 
174. The MEs for all corresponding models explained in this section are depicted in Tables 5.11-5.15. 
175. This assumption does not hold when the effect is not constant.  
176. The tentative test (not reported in this work) is performed to discover whether the time effect is constant. Petersen (2009) 
suggests if the clustering option is added to regression already using time fixed effects on the same level and estimated standard 
errors change in magnitude it is a sign of the non-constant time effect (Petersen, 2009) and vice versa. In addition to month 
fixed effect in specification VI month clusters are added and no difference among standard errors is observed. For this reason 
it is assumed that the time effect is constant.  
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time (month, year). In some instances, however, this assumption does not hold and two 
simultaneous dimensions of correlation might need to be taken into consideration (Thompson, 
2011). 
One way of tackling the dual correlation problem by researchers in finance is to estimate one 
dimension using dummy variables and the latter with clustering option. The panels usually 
have more cross-sections (firms) than time periods and hence the method is to insert time 
dummies and cluster on the firm level (see Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Gross and Souleles, 
2004; Sapienza, 2004, Faulkender and Petersen, 2006).177 In the data there are 84 months and 
147 financial intermediaries hence in specification VII separate monthly dummy variables are 
inserted into the model (equivalent to model VI) and clustering on the bank level is 
implemented. 
The theory suggests that in such setting month dummies eliminate the correlations between 
observations occurring in the same time intervals (time effect). This results in a pure firm effect 
with unbiased standard errors (Petersen, 2009). Simultaneous clustering allows relaxing the 
assumption that the time effect is constant in order to produce unbiased estimates as long as 
the number of periods is proportionate with the number of firms (Cameron, et al., 2011). 
Thompson, (2011) in his Monte Carlo simulation finds that double clustering on more than 25 
time and firm clusters poses sufficient basis for unbiased estimates.178  
In sum, estimates of Model VI and VII suggest that magnitude of the solicitation switch 
becomes more prevalent when monthly fixed effects are in place (Table 5.10). The coefficient 
on the main explanatory variable amounts to 0.45. The sign of the coefficient remains negative 
and is statistically robust which confirms the message conveyed in majority of previous 
models. The marginal effects resulting from two most recent models can be inspected from 
Table 5.14.  The remainder of coefficients on controls is equivalent in both models. In terms 
of the goodness of fit specifications reach the highest value to date amounting to 0.19.   
Model VIII presented in Table 5.10 includes various effects seen in Model VII supplemented 
by the bank dummies. The rationale of using bank fixed effects with the clustering option is 
previously discussed along with model V. The multilevel clustering acts as a remedy which 
                                                 
177. Petersen (2009) stresses, however that this is still not a common practice to insert firm dummy variables as a way of 
correcting for correlation on the firm level. Only a minority of finance papers considered, in his Review of Financial Studies 
paper, apply this method. 
178. The theory suggests that the number of clusters determines the consistency of the estimates (Donald and Lang, 2007; 
Wooldridge, 2007). 
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relaxes the assumption about the fixed firm effects to produce unbiased estimates and correct 
confidence intervals (Petersen, 2009). 
The coefficient on treatment dummy represents the greatest magnitude (-0.69) seen so far. The 
negative sign of the coefficient once more confirms the robustness of the results and supports 
the underlying hypothesis of the ceiling effect. MEs suggest banks in the treatment group are 
1.73%, 0.74% and 0.47% more likely to receive the downgrade by one, two and more than 
three points than banks in the other group (see Table 5.15). In terms of goodness of fit, the 
model improves its specification amongst all other versions (pseudo r-squared of 0.214). The 
explanatory power also remains the highest thus far (log likelihood of -2246) without 
sacrificing the size of the model. The AIC and BIC values are the smallest, amongst all 
variations, which suggest that this is the preferred model. 
5.6 Robustness tests 
5.6.1 Falsification tests 
To link the impact of regulation on the bank rating changes this section focuses on the 
differences arising in the treatment group in comparison to the control group. In this setting, 
one needs to rule out the possibility that any other events coincide with the adoption of the 
disclosure rules. This relates to the notion that changes (due to disclosure rules) should only be 
observed across banks incorporated in the treated countries and not for the opposite group or 
at a different time than the first quarter of 2011.  
To confirm that no undetected issues interfere with the results, I run a set of placebo regressions 
focusing on: (a) time spectrum variations and (b) cross-sectional variations. This directly 
relates to the randomisation assumption noted by Roberts and Whited (2013; p.20) which 
“ensures that our estimate of the counterfactual outcome is unbiased.”  
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5.6.1.1 Time variations  
The first test aims to rule out the possibility that the unobserved events, which could be driving 
the results, do not occur at the same time in which the treatment is measured. To perform this 
each of the Models (I-VIII), estimated in section 5.5 is run with the treatment assigned to earlier 
dates than its true occurrence. Using this identification strategy, it is expected that leads before 
the intervention yield insignificant results. The applied method is similar to Autor (2003) who 
employs leads and lags in his study on contract exceptions in the employment law.  
For instance, in the specification VIII when the regulatory intervention is assumed 1, 2 and 3 
months earlier the estimates for the treatment dummy become insignificant. The results of this 
model (which controls for various fixed effects) are depicted in Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.2. The 
three consecutive columns present results when leads of 1, 2 and 3 months are applied. As a 
result of adding subsequent leads more observations drop from the regressions.  
5.6.1.2 Cross-sectional variations 
The second falsification test examines whether any unobserved effect, which could be driving 
the results, is due to a selection bias. It is investigated whether the treatment yields significant 
results if the group which received it was altered. Namely, it is examined whether the treatment, 
henceforth the placebo effect, received by the control group rather than treatment group is 
statistically different from zero (since the control group did not receive the treatment). This 
randomisation is based on a bank (a) and the sovereign level (b).  
a) Bank level randomisation 
In the first exercise random number generator in STATA assigns a placebo179 to a subset of 
banks from the control group. The placebo equals one when the (randomly assigned) bank in 
question belongs to the control group and if the observation is from the post-treatment period. 
There are 29 sovereigns in the control (untreated group).The treatment group is excluded 
entirely from the sample which explains its lower number of observations. Following that 
numerous replicates of the model are run with inclusion of randomly assigned placebo effects. 
                                                 
179. Previously known as POST*TREATMENT equals one when the bank in question belongs to control group and if the 
observation is from the post-treatment period.  
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It is expected that the coefficient on the placebo will be statistically indistinguishable from zero 
since banks assigned with placebo never received the treatment.  
The results of three trials with use of model VIII are presented in Table 5.B.3 in Appendix 5.B. 
In the first trial, the software assigns the placebo to 36 banks originating from 21 countries, 
version 1b appoints the value of one to 36 banks from 23 countries. The final replication 1c 
treats 37 intermediaries originating from 24 countries. As expected the results in all three 
instances are insignificant. 
b) Sovereign level randomisation 
In the second exercise the generator randomly selects a fraction of sovereigns belonging to the 
control group and assigns the placebo effect to all banks which operate in those sovereigns. 
Subsequently, replicated regressions with the placebo effect follow. As in the first instance, the 
treatment group is excluded from the sample. 
The first three consecutive trials are presented in Table 5.B.3 Appendix 5.B in columns 5-7. 
The test 2a assigns the placebo to all 36 banks across 14 sovereigns. The next attempt allocates 
placebo to 30 intermediaries from 12 states whereas the last simulation assigns effects to 12 
sovereigns and their 26 banks.180 The placebo estimates for all replicates are insignificant 
proving that the initial findings remain robust and hold for the group in question only. 
5.6.2 Matching methods 
The univariate analysis (section 5.4.2) indicated some significant differences between the 
treatment and control groups prior to solicitation conversions. This could be a violation of the 
parallel trend assumption which dictates that to be able to estimate the effect of the treatment 
on the treated both groups need to have similar distributions before the event takes place. As a 
result one cannot be certain that the estimates obtained in section 5.5 are unbiased. 
The matching methods help in projecting the average treatment effect which is calculated by 
estimating the unobserved potential outcome for each observation in the sample (Abadie et al., 
2004). Specifically, the matching estimators assign the missing outcome by substituting it with 
another entity (individual) in the data which has similar characteristics but was exposed to the 
opposite treatment.  
                                                 
180. The list of the intermediaries along with the country selected by the software in each trial is available upon request. 
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The underlying assumptions of matching estimators are as follows: 
 the assigned treatment is exogenous to the outcomes; 
 the assignment of treatment is bound by the covariates and finally 
 the probability of assignment is assumed far from the interval between zero and one 
(Abadie et al., 2004). 
With use of matching the sample is constructed in the way such the control and treatment share 
similar characteristics prior the treatment. The analysis applies two versions of matching: 
covariate and propensity score matching. 
5.6.2.1 Covariate matching (CVM) 
The first form of matching applied in this analysis is matching on covariates which is performed 
with help of nearest-neighbour matching estimator.181 Variations of the matching methods 
feature one-to-one match and multiple neighbours match. The matching estimator isolates the 
treated banks and, from the population of non-treated banks, chooses observations which match 
the treated ones on multiple levels (covariates). In this setting, “the set of counterfactuals is 
restricted to the matched controls which is in the absence of the treatment the treatment group 
would behave similarly to the control group” (Almeida et al., 2016; p.12).   
The individuals (banks) originating from the control group are matched with banks from the 
treatment group using observable covariates. These include: sovereign and bank ratings, bank 
accounting data and macroeconomic indicators. The estimator with replacement allows the 
same participant to be used repeatedly when it becomes the nearest match for another 
observation. This procedure lessens the risk of eliminating the potential quality matches and 
lowers the estimates’ bias (Abadie et al., 2004). These authors suggest that the estimator allows 
many options for adjusting the match which entails little input from the researcher.  
The results can be found in Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.4. The estimator produces the average 
treatment effect of the treated, control group or the entire sample depending on preferences. 
The Average Treatment Effect (SATE) as well as the Average Treatment for the Treated 
(SATT) for various model specifications is reported.  
                                                 
181. The nnmatch command by Abadie et al. (2004) is introduced.   
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Model 1, 2, 4 and 5 incorporates single matching whereas Model 3 and 6 applies four nearest 
matches.182 The latter minimises the risk of depending on observations with less similar 
characteristics. Each specification uses a sovereign and bank rating together with bank 
characteristics including size and leverage and profitability measure among others. Finally, to 
capture the macroeconomic environment inflation growth183 is included. In the first three 
models bank and sovereign ratings are tested using the 58-point scale (column 1-3; Appendix 
5.B Table 5.B.4). Three consecutive models (column 4-6, Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.4) replace 
them with use of 20-notch rating scale to remove the outlook and watch status, and aim at 
reducing matching requirements. This is in line with Firth and Poon (2005) who apply a lower 
classification of ratings in their matching process.184 Additionally, two different specifications 
for inflation pressures are applied. In Model 4, 5 and 6 the inflation is fixed over time.185 
Regardless of the used covariates and specifications, the estimates for the treatment dummy 
are negative and statistically significant (see Appendix 5.B, Table 5.B.4).186 Moreover, the one-
to-one match estimates outperform the multiple neighbour’s results by producing higher 
coefficients for the treatment dummy (see Model 1 vs. 3 and 4 vs. 6; Appendix 5.B Table 5.B4). 
Although the results convey the message of the negative effect of sovereign solicitation status 
on bank ratings, its magnitude is significantly lower than in the non-matched sample (see Table 
5.10). To test this issue further matching with use of propensity score is performed. 
5.6.2.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM)   
Instead of relying on the similarity between treatment and control group, originating from 
covariates, propensity score matching depends on the probability of receiving the treatment- 
propensity score. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) the “propensity score is the 
conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given vector of observed 
covariates” (p.41). Smith and Todd (2005) stress that for the conditional mean independence 
                                                 
182. Four nearest neighbors performed well in terms of the mean-squared errors in the study by Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
and therefore were applied here.  
183. Inflation is measured as average annual consumer price inflation growth on a year-over-year basis for the previous three 
years in percent terms to correct for procyclicality. The empirical literature suggests this method helps in eliminating the 
business cycle effect of sovereigns (see Cantor and Packer, 1996; Bennell et al., 2006; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012c). 
184. These authors use a letter scale equal to 12 rating subgroups. 
185. Similar approach is taken in section 5.6.2.2. The covariates used for matching should not be influenced by the event being 
studied. It has been suggested by Grilli and Rampichini (2011) fixing covariates over time solves this issue. 
186. Models 1, 3, 4 and 6 are significant at 1 percent. Model 2 (5) is significant at 5 (10) percent respectively (see Table 5.B.4). 
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assumption to hold the outcome variable must be independent of treatment bounded by the 
propensity score.  
To calculate the propensity score, all variables which affect both the fact that the treatment is 
observed (solicitation status switch) as well as the outcome of that treatment (bank rating 
changes) need to be included. Selecting an appropriate set of variables depends on theory and 
economic principles as there are no algorithms available. This strongly affects the bias 
estimates of the matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1999; Lechner, 2008). According to Rubin 
and Thomas (1996) when choosing covariates for the score it is advisable to include the 
controls which are known to be related to the outcome even if they are statistically insignificant. 
To select the most appropriate covariates affecting the outcome variable (bank rating changes), 
the existing literature on bank rating determinants is used together with the empirical model 
estimated in section 5.4.2.1. The control variables included in the score are: sovereign and bank 
ratings, bank characteristics including leverage, total assets, loan loss reserves to gross loans, 
return on average equity. These are also covariates tested in the earlier matching estimation. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no literature examining the economics (determinants) of 
the sovereign solicitation status and, for this reason this chapter relies on economic principles. 
The observable characteristics which could potentially influence the decision of the sovereign 
to request (or not, which could result in the CRA issuing an unsolicited rating) a rating from 
the CRA might be triggered by the state of the national economy represented by inflation 
among other factors. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the treatment has impact on the 
factor which is selected to explain its phenomenon. Specifically, the macroeconomic position 
of the country could be easily affected by the treatment itself.187 To ensure that the 
macroeconomic factors used for the propensity score are unaffected by the treatment, they are 
fixed over time. Therefore the mean value of inflation is incorporated throughout the sample 
years which ensures that its levels are not pre-determined by regulation.  
The procedure of the PSM matching is as follow. The propensity score is calculated by 
regressing the treatment dummy on the necessary covariates with use of the probit model (see 
Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.4 for list of covariates). The obtained propensity score is used in the 
regression, with use of psmatch2 command, where the treatment is regressed on the given score 
                                                 
187. E.g. the sovereign solicitation status together with sovereign rating downgrades might spillover onto the banking system. 
In the extreme scenario collective insolvency of banks could in turn result in the wide economic turmoil which puts inflanatory 
pressures and affects country’s per capita income or unemployment.   
174 
 
and the outcome variable (dependent variable- bank rating changes). The test implements the 
default specification which includes one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with replacement 
and without common support restrictions.  
Further, the balancing assumption is tested to ensure that the means of covariates in the 
opposing groups do not differ from each other after the matching (Rubin and Thomas, 1996). 
The resulting balancing test using pstest command confirms that all the covariates are 
insignificant at 1 and 5 percent after the matching is performed (see Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.5).  
As soon as the balancing property is satisfied, the standard bias (developed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985) obtained in the sample prior and post matching are compared. As suggested by 
Rubin and Thomas (1996), matched sampling proposes a technique of minimising bias at the 
time of studying a causal effect. The rule of thumb suggests that bias in the matched sample 
should not exceed 5 percent. Table 5.B.5 suggests a significant reduction in bias as a result of 
matching. On average, covariates bias decreases by 90 percent.  
To confirm that the control group is sufficiently similar to the treatment group, it is required 
that the maximum difference between the propensity score of the two groups (caliper) does not 
exceed 1% in absolute value.188 ROAE and INCREV from the main regression analysis were 
excluded to meet this requirement. 
5.6.2.3 Regression based estimates  
Further, the intensity and sign of the treatment effect is compared with use of the matched 
sample by running set of regressions with model specifications introduced in section 5.5. The 
ordered probit model is estimated where the bank rating change is a function of the propensity 
score, calculated in section 5.6.2.2, treatment dummy and variety of fixed effects (see 
Appendix 5.B, Table 5.B.6). 
The regression based estimates with use of the matched sample closely imitate the initial results 
from unrestricted sample obtained in section 5.5 (Table 5.10). All tested models produce 
negative and statistically significant coefficients for the treatment dummy. Specification 2-5 
(equivalent to earlier II-V) produces significant results for that variable at 1 percent and is 
reported in Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.6. For instance, the coefficient on the treatment dummy in 
the unmatched (matched) sample model IV and V equals -0.132 (-0.41). The estimates for 
                                                 
188. The reported p-value of the difference in mean P-scores ranges between 0.113 and 0.821. 
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Model 1 (earlier I) produce higher magnitude of the treatment effect from the original sample 
significant at 5 percent. The coefficient on the treatment dummy in the unmatched (matched) 
sample model I equals -0.10 (-0.18) respectively. 
The regression approach confirms that the estimates used prior to matching exercise robustly 
represented the economic significance of the effect of the solicitation disclosure on the studied 
sample.    
5.6.2.4 Collapsing the sample  
To rule out the possibility that the estimates are driven by the choice of sovereigns the analysis 
with use of the collapsed sample is replicated. The treatment group of sovereigns is randomly 
matched with the control group using one-to-one method and the model specifications (II-VI) 
studied in section 5.5 are estimated. The collapsed sample includes sovereign ID’s between 1 
and 26.  Sovereigns are coded such that ID’s 1-13 represent the treatment group whereas the 
remaining 14-44 sovereigns belong to the control group. The results are depicted in Appendix 
5.B Table 5.B.7. 
The collapsed sample includes sovereigns such as: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, 
Cambodia, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. The treatment group sovereigns are 
marked with the italic font.  
The sign and significance of the treatment dummy closely imitates the results of all 
specifications in the unmatched sample tested in section 5.5 (Table 5.10). The economic 
inference once more confirms that the studied effect is robust and not induced by the sample 
selection bias. 
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5.6.3 Exogeneity tests 
For the estimation of unbiased and consistent parameters, which allow a reliable inference, one 
the possible sources of endogeneity need to be considered and minimised.189 The first viable 
concern is that all explanatory variables which determine the dependent variable are not 
included in the model. This could be due to many reasons. For instance, rating decisions are 
based not only on public but also on private information suggesting some of the components 
driving the CRAs’ banks ratings are not observable to researchers and will be inherently 
omitted from the model. When these omitted components are correlated with the explanatory 
variables included in the model the endogeneity causes the inferences to break down. This is 
because the error term becomes correlated with the explanatory variables (Roberts and Whited, 
2013). 
To correct for external factors which could be driving differentials, between sovereigns across 
different time periods, the interacting country and year fixed effects (seen in Model II-VIII in 
Table 5.10) are included. Additionally, to ensure that the unobservable differences in banks 
profiles are corrected for, hence their creditworthiness, bank fixed effects are incorporated as 
suggested in Roberts and Whited (2013) (see Model IV, V, VIII in Table 5.10). 
Secondly, the proper estimation of the effect of regulation on bank rating changes requires that 
the shock is randomly assigned, hence not influenced by the dependent variable (among other 
control variables). As suggested by Roberts and Whited (2013) if the intervention is not 
randomly assigned the regression model will be unidentified as the selection bias will confuse 
its estimates. The authors emphasise that using a non-randomised assignment is similar to 
including an endogenous treatment dummy variable in the regression model.  
For this assumption to hold one must ensure that the assignment is self-determining and not 
driven by the potential outcomes. For this reason the main endogeneity concern is that of the 
treatment dummy. Specifically, it is interesting to know whether the regulatory events were 
exogeneous with respect to bank rating changes. The potential concern could be that, the 
negative rating events among banks (and sovereigns) in the pre-disclosure period were a reason 
for regulators to press for transparency on unsolicited ratings. The concerns which led to 
                                                 
189. Roberts and Whited (2013) classify the sources of endogeneity as: omitted variable bias, simultaneity and the 
measurement error. 
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regulatory changes in my sample period could be justified if there were signs of the anticipated 
decline in the creditworthiness of banks and sovereigns. 
The descriptive statistics in section 5.3 invalidate this explanation given that bank upgrade 
outweighed downgrades in the period prior to introduction of the disclosure rules190 (see Table 
5.7). The period is in fact characterised by relatively high proportion of investment grade 
ratings (approximately 75 percent) in comparison with the speculative grade bank ratings.191 
On the contrary, the post-regulatory period proves to be much more volatile, with 201 (56) 
bank (sovereign) rating changes, representing 39% (36%)192 of the total events in the sample 
which accumulate in the course of only two years. The post-regulatory period commences on 
the 1st March 2011 and continues until Jan 2013. The deteriorating economic climate, as the 
analysis points out, is observed through high proportion of rating downgrades in relation to 
upgrades.193 
Economic rationale further disqualifies the possibility that S&P converted the solicitation 
status on several sovereigns due to operations of banks incorporated in these countries. It is 
implausible that the bank rating changes would in any way affect the decision of the CRA since 
the ceiling effect is observed in 97.1 per cent of cases. It is very rare to find bank rating actions 
which would precede their home sovereign actions within a short time window. Similarly to 
Alsakka et al. (2014) no evidence is found of bank-to-sovereign rating channel. 
The motivation of the new disclosure rules was linked to better transparency, disclosure and 
presentation of credit ratings rather than anticipated declines in economic activity. To further 
reduce potential endogeneity concerns, the propensity score matching procedure is employed 
to identify statistically indistinguishable subsamples characterised by bank and country 
covariates. The results remain robust (see Table 9, Section 6.2).  
                                                 
190. There were 156 positive and 159 negative actions among banks and 52 positive and 46 negative sovereign events in the 
pre-regulatory period.  
191. This proportion changes to 65 percent vs. 35 in the latter period. 
192. Bank (sovereign) events represent 5.8 (5.06) percent of the total observations. The post-treatment period includes 201 
(56) bank (sovereign) actions which translate into 2.26% (1.84%) of sample events. These are based on the author’s own 
calculations. 
193. In the data sample, 133 (37) bank (sovereign) downgrades versus 68 (19) upgrades are observed. This effect is especially 
strong for unsolicited sovereign ratings with 2 (13) positive (negative) actions respectively (see Table 5.7). 
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Although it is not possible to completely eliminate the endogeneity problems to guarantee the 
exact inferences this section proposed possible explanations and rationale as to why it is 
believed the treatment effect is an exogenous shock. 
5.6.4 OLS regression 
The final robustness test involves estimating the Model (specifications I-VIII) using Ordinary 
Least Squares which takes the form of difference-in-difference (DD) estimation. Given the 
experimental design of the model, including treatment dummy variable 
(POST*TREATMENT) together with various fixed effects, DD allows capturing the 
endogenous shock in the sample (effect of regulation) and its effect on variable of interest 
(changes in bank ratings).194 The estimates of this method are based on assumption of group 
invariant omitted variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
Although the discrete nature of dependent variable is best estimated with the ordered probit 
model, it became a common practice to use the OLS as an alternative method (e.g. Becker and 
Milbourn, 2011; Doherty et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2012; Van Roy, 2013). Van Roy (2013) 
suggests literature might regard discrete variable as a continuous when the number of responses 
is sufficient enough. Secondly, author suggests results in the credit rating literature are not 
sensitive whether the OLS or ordered probit model is applied (e.g. Cantor and Packer, 1996). 
Moreover, estimation by means of OLS also simplifies the interpretation of the coefficients 
(Jiang et al., 2012). 
The results reported in section 5.5 remain robust if Eq. (5.1) is re-estimated using an OLS (see 
Appendix 5.B Table 5.B.8). The economic inference does not change and the treatment effect 
remains negative throughout all specifications. Similarly to the earlier method, all models 
except specifications I, IV and V yield significant results for the treatment dummy. For 
instance, the coefficient on the treatment dummy, in specification VIII, shows that banks in the 
treatment group will be downgraded 0.116 CCR point due to treatment (relative to banks in the 
control group over the same period). The sign and significance of the remaining variables is 
consistent with the earlier estimations applying ordered probit model.  
These results imply that the increase in number of downgrades amongst banks ratings is due to 
switch in the solicitation status of sovereigns by S&P as a result of adoption of the EU law. 
                                                 
194. According to Angrist and Pischke (2009) DD is a version of fixed effect estimation but on aggregated level. 
179 
 
5.7 Remarks and conclusions 
Recently, the regulatory oversight of CRAs in Europe underwent significant reform with the 
introduction of the CRA I Regulation in September 2009 and assigning to ESMA the function 
of supervising and certifying CRAs across the EU from July 2011. In February 2011, as a result 
of Article 10 (5) of EU Regulation 1060/2009, S&P converted the solicitation status on 13 
sovereigns to unsolicited. This chapter considers whether the regulatory change on CRAs 
negatively affected bank ratings in countries whose sovereign ratings were converted to 
unsolicited. The dataset comprises S&P ratings of 147 listed banks from 42 sovereigns in 
Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin America for January 2006-January 2013. The direct impact of 
disclosure rules on banks is examined using an ordered probit model. 
It is found that banks incorporated in states which switched their solicitation status demonstrate 
higher probabilities of rating downgrades and lower probabilities of rating upgrades in 
comparison to other banks. The results are statistically robust and economically relevant. 
Several model specifications with a number of fixed effects and clustering options are applied. 
The sign and significance of the effect remains unchanged. The inferences endure when the 
Eq. (5.1) is estimated using OLS instead of ordered probit model. Several falsification tests are 
applied to rule out the possibility that any other events coincide with the adoption of the 
regulation or that selection bias is present in the sample.  
The summary statistics in section 5.3 illustrate a constraint sovereigns impose on bank ratings 
by pushing them downwards. The descriptive statistics in Table 5.6 suggest that mean bank 
ratings are lower than their home ratings by 7 CCR points on average, which translates into 2 
notches difference in the 20 notch scale. This evidence is in line with Alsakka et al. (2014), 
where the ceiling effect in the European sample was estimated with the same magnitude. The 
evidence of ceiling effect is present in the pre (Jan 2006- Feb 2011) as well as post (March 
2011-Jan 2013) regulatory period. Table 5.7 illustrates that proportion of bank ratings capped 
in relation to the sovereign ratings is prevailing. It is observed that approximately 52% (26%) 
of bank observations prior (post) the regulation are rated below sovereign ceiling. On the other 
hand, 11.6% (7.2%) of bank ratings are rated at the sovereign ceiling and 2.56% (0.38%) pierce 
the ceiling in the pre (post) treatment period. These results show significantly stronger ceiling 
effect in comparison to Williams et al. (2013). The ceiling effect is graphically presented in 
Figures 5.8-5.17 in section 5.3.4.  
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The multivariate analysis confirms that the ceiling effect imposed by the S&P between 
sovereign and bank ratings is strong and significant. This is in line with Alsakka et al. (2014) 
who suggest that S&P is the most likely CRA to migrate its ratings under a ceiling effect. 
According to S&P (2001), bank ratings do not exceed those of their home countries as in the 
situation of default of a government the intermediaries might also be pushed to default. This 
can be potentially caused by failing to meet their external obligations due to exchange controls 
amongst other factors.  
The ceiling effect pronounced in the previous empirical literature does not differentiate 
between the solicitation statuses of sovereigns. For this reason the bank ratings changes in the 
treatment group are expected to be pushed downwards even more by the sovereign rating 
actions. This assumption derives from the banking literature of lower unsolicited ratings (Poon 
et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010; Van Roy, 2013, see section 5.2.1.2). The ceiling effect is 
captured by two variables: the treatment dummy and the sovereign rating changes. Although 
findings in this study cannot be directly translated and justified by the literature on banks,195 
the same conclusion is derived. 
The negative sign of the treatment dummy affirms that banks which belong to the treatment 
group are more likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded compared with banks 
not in the treatment group. The marginal effect suggests that such banks are 1.73%, 0.74% and 
0.47% more likely to be downgraded by one, two and more than three CCR points respectively 
(see Table 5.15).  
The sovereign rating change control variable is also consistent with the ceiling effect. As 
expected the sign on the sovereign rating change coefficient is positive which confirms the 
premise that sovereign ratings stimulate bank ratings changes (upgrades and downgrades) in 
the same direction with the three month time horizon addressed. The economic magnitude of 
sovereign upgrades on bank ratings is smaller than downgrades and can be seen in Tables 5.11-
5.15. The asymmetry of a given effect is in line with Borenstein et al. (2013). It is found that 
the a bank is -0.59%, -0.22% and 0.12% more likely to be downgraded by one, two and more 
than two CCR points if the sovereign is downgraded by one CCR point recently (Table 5.15). 
                                                 
195. The literature offers explanation as to why banks ratings might be inflated. There is no theoretical nor empirical literature 
which would suggest why unsolicited ratings of sovereigns might be biased downwards and penalise banks as a result of the 
spillover effect. 
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The marginal effect is economically stronger for downgrades in a first threshold (i.e. rating 
downgrade by one CCR point).  
The significance of MEs should be considered with respect to the number of bank rating 
downgrades by one, two and more than two CCR points which represent 1.56%, 0.80% and 
0.92% of the entire observations. The sovereign rating downgrades of one, two and more than 
two points represent 1.09%, 0.53 % and 1.12% of the sample observations (see Table 5.3).  
The results of this chapter suggest that sovereign ratings adversely influence bank ratings 
through the rating channel. These findings fill the clear void in the literature by examining the 
dynamics of the sovereign solicitation status on other asset classes. In addition, the study 
supplements scarce empirical efforts examining the rating channel between sovereigns and 
banks recently addressed by Alsakka et al. (2014). According to Correa et al. (2014), the rating 
channel is closely connected to the collateral dependency of banks. This is due to the fact lower 
ratings of sovereigns affect the cost of debt and funding that intermediaries can secure for 
themselves (Correa et al., 2014). 
These findings address a clear gap in the literature by examining the effect of sovereign 
solicitation status on the banking sector. The synergy of three overlapping themes of research 
reveals a phenomenon which has not been tackled by earlier theoretical nor empirical papers. 
The chapter contributes to research on unsolicited credit ratings by uncovering the significance 
of the solicitation status of sovereigns and its role in the domestic markets. In addition, the 
study supplements recent empirical efforts examining the rating channel between sovereigns 
and banks. It is found that the sovereign solicitation status matters for market participants in 
each country due to the rating ceiling effect. Last but not least, the chapter incorporates the new 
EU regulatory changes imposed on CRAs and is one of the first to report its impact on relevant 
markets. 
CRAs’ use of the sovereign-bank rating ceiling has surprisingly been neglected by researchers 
until quite recently (Borensztein et al., 2013; Williams et al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014; Huang 
and Shen, 2015). It has also seemingly fallen under the radar of regulations to some extent. 
Similarly, rating solicitation has attracted wide attention in the corporate sphere (e.g. Poon et 
al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010), but no attention whatsoever in sovereign rating research 
literature. In designing new disclosure requirements for CRAs in 2009-11 (with good 
intentions), EU regulators failed to connect the issues of unsolicited rating and sovereign-bank 
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linkages. It is somewhat surprising that any consultation process failed to highlight this issue, 
but the lack of closely relevant academic research could be a contributing factor. This chapter 
fills this void and identifies a clear case of an unintended consequence of regulatory disclosure. 
Future regulatory reforms need to be undertaken with caution as they might further aggravate 
the conditions for debt issuers. 
The findings are also of importance to CRAs and market participants. There are obvious 
implications of how the sovereign rating methods influence the functioning of financial 
markets. Governments need to appreciate the consequences of their decision-making with 
regard to rating solicitations. 
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Table 5.1 Change of solicitation status according to S&P 
Notes: This Table presents sovereigns rated by S&P which underwent solicitation switch from solicited to unsolicited as a 
result of EU Regulation on CRAs 1060/2009 (Article 10(5). The sample includes 13 of the above sovereigns excluding: 
Belgium, Republic of Madagascar, Turkey and the US.  
Source: Collected from individual reports released by S&P upon withdrawal of solicited status of the sovereign issuer. See 
S&P (2009; 2011e, c, d; 2013b ).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country  Change of status 
Argentina (Republic of)  Apr 4, 2011 
Australia (Commonwealth of)  Feb 25, 2011 
Belgium (Kingdom of)  Feb 17, 2011 
Cambodia (Kingdom of)  Feb 25, 2011 
France (Republic of)  Feb 17, 2011 
Germany (Federal Republic of)  Feb 17, 2011 
India (Republic of)  Feb 25, 2011 
Italy (Republic of)  Feb 17, 2011 
Japan  Feb 25, 2011 
Netherlands (The) (State of)  Feb 17, 2011 
Republic of Madagascar  May 11, 2009 
Singapore (Republic of)  Feb 25, 2011 
Swiss Confederation  Feb 17, 2011 
Taiwan (Republic of China)  Feb 25, 2011 
Turkey (Republic of)  Jan 14, 2013 
United Kingdom  Feb 17, 2011 
United States of America  Feb 24, 2011 
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Table 5.2 Sovereign rating events on the 20-Notch Scale 
 No. of Rating Events 
   % of obs. 
    
1 No. of 1-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 27 0.89 
2 No. of 2-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0.03 
3 Total Upgrade Actions (row 1+2) 28 0.92 
    
4 No. of 1-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 13 0.43 
5 No. of 2-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0.03 
6 Total Downgrade Actions (row 4+5) 14 0.46 
    
7 No. of Positive Outlook Actions (Solo) 30 0.99 
8 No. of Negative Outlook Actions (Solo) 27 0.89 
9 Total Outlook Actions (row 7+8) 57 1.87 
    
10 Watch Positive (Solo)  1 0.03 
11 Watch Negative (Solo) 14 0.46 
12 Total Watch Actions (row 10+11) 15 0.49 
    
13 No. of Negative Outlooks changed from Negative Watch 6 0.20 
    
14 No. of 1-Upgrade + Positive Outlook (Combined) 6 0.20 
    
15 No. of 1-Downgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 14 0.46 
16 No. of 2-Downgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 6 0.20 
17 No. of 3-Downgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 3 0.10 
    
18 No. of 1-Downgrade + Negative Watch (Combined) 2 0.07 
19 No. of 2-Downgrade + Negative Watch (Combined) 3 0.10 
20 Total No. Combined Actions (row 14+ 15+16+17+18+19) 34 1.12 
    
21 Total No. of Events (row 3+6+9+12+13+20) 154 5.06 
22 Positive events (row 3+7+10+13+14) 71 2.33 
23 Negative Events (row 6+8+11+15+16+17+18+19) 83 2.73 
    
Observations 
 
 3045  
Mean rating  14.5  
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of rating events for 42 sovereigns encompassed in the credit rating dataset which 
consists of monthly observations for January 2006-January 2013 period. The ratings are expressed in 20 notch scale. % obs. 
defines percentage of all sample observations. 
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Table 5.3 Sovereign rating events on the 58-Point Scale 
 No. of Rating Events 
   % of obs. 
1 UP 1-Point 33 1.08 
2 UP 2-Points 20 0.66 
3 UP 3-Points 15 0.49 
4 UP 4-Points 2 0.07 
5 UP 5-Points 1 0.03 
    
6 Total No. of Upgrade Points (row 1+2+3+4+5) 71 2.33 
    
7 DW 1-Point 33 1.08 
8 DW 2-Points 16 0.53 
9 DW 3-Points 19 0.62 
10 DW 4-Points 1 0.03 
11 DW 5-Points 5 0.16 
12 DW 6-Points 5 0.16 
13 DW 7-Points 1 0.03 
14 DW 8-Points 2 0.07 
15 DW 9-Points 1 0.03 
    
16 Total No. of Downgrade Points (row 7+8+9+10+11+12+13+14+15)  83 2.73 
    
17 Total Rating Events (row 6+16) 154 5.06 
 
Observations 3045  
Mean rating 43.86  
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of rating events for 42 sovereigns encompassed in the credit rating dataset which 
consists of monthly observations for January 2006-January 2013 period. The ratings are expressed in 58 point scale. % obs. 
defines percentage of all sample observations. 
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Table 5.4 Sovereign ratings group comparison 
No. of Rating Events-58 Point Scale 
 Control group Treatment group 
   
UP 1-Point 28 5 
UP 2-Points 17 3 
UP 3-Points 13 1 
UP 4-Points 2 - 
UP 5-Points 1 - 
UP 6-Points 1 - 
Total No. of Upgrade Points 62 9 
   
DW 1-Point 23 10 
DW 2-Points 9 7 
DW 3-Points 16 3 
DW 4-Points 1 - 
DW 5-Points 4 1 
DW 6-Points 5 - 
DW 7-Points 1 - 
DW 8-Points 2 - 
DW 9-Points 1 - 
Total No. of Downgrade Points 62 21 
   
Total No. of Rating Events 124 30 
Notes: This Table presents rating events for sovereigns from control (29 sovereigns) versus treatment (13 sovereigns) group 
encompassed in the credit rating dataset which consists of monthly observations for January 2006-January 2013 period. The 
ratings are expressed in 58 point scale. 
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Table 5.5 Bank rating events on the 20-Notch Scale 
 No. of Rating Events  
   % of obs. 
1 No. of 1-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 74 0.83 
2 No. of 2-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 4 0.04 
3 No. of 4-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0.01 
     
4 No. of 1-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 53 0.60 
5 No. of 2-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 3 0.03 
6 No. of 4-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0.01 
7 Total No. Rating Events (row 1+2+3+4+5+6) 136 1.53 
     
8 No. of Positive Outlook Actions (Solo) 73 0.82 
9 No. of Negative Outlook Actions (Solo)  92 1.03 
10 Total No. of Outlook Actions (row 8+9) 165 1.85 
     
11 Watch positive (Solo) 36 0.40 
12 Watch negative (Solo) 64 0.72 
13 Total No. of Watch Actions (row 11+12) 100 1.12 
     
14 No. of 1-Upgrade + Positive Outlook (Combined) 12 0.13 
15 No. of 2-Upgrade + Positive Outlook (Combined) 1 0.01 
     
16 No. of 1-Upgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 6 0.07 
17 No. of 3-Upgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 2 0.02 
     
18 No. of 1-Upgrade + Negative Watch (Combined) 1 0.01 
     
19 No. of 1-Downgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 47 0.53 
20 No. of 2-Downgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 8 0.09 
21 No. of 3-Downgrade + Negative Outlook (Combined) 5 0.06 
     
22 No. of 1-Downgrade + Negative Watch (Combined) 11 0.12 
23 No. of 2-Downgrade + Negative Watch (Combined) 5 0.06 
24 No. of 3-Downgrade + Negative Watch (Combined) 3 0.03 
     
25 Negative Outlook changed from Negative Watch 14 0.16 
26 Total No. Combined Actions (row 14+15+16+17+18+ 
19+20+21+22+23+24) 
101 1.13 
 
27 Total No. of Events (row 7+10+13+26) 516 5.80 
28 Positive events (row 
1+2+3+8+11+14+15+16+17+18+25) 
224 2.52 
29 Negative Events (row 
4+5+6+9+12+19+20+21+22+23+24) 
292 3.28 
     
Observations  8900 
Mean rating  13.00 
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of rating events for 147 banks encompassed in the credit rating dataset which 
consists of monthly observations for January 2006-January 2013 period. The ratings are expressed in 20 notch scale. % obs. 
defines percentage of all sample observations. 
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Table 5.6 Bank rating events on the 58-Point Scale 
 No. of Rating Events 
    % of obs. 
1 UP 1-Point 116 1.30 
2 UP 2-Points 67 0.75 
3 UP 3-Points 27 0.30 
4 UP 4-Points 6 0.07 
5 UP 5-Points 1 0.01 
6 UP 6-Points 4 0.04 
7 UP 8-Points 2 0.02 
8 UP 12-Points 1 0.01 
9 Total No. of Upgrade Points (row 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8) 224  2.52 
     
10 DW 1-Point 139 1.56 
11 DW 2-Points 71 0.80 
12 DW 3-Points 47 0.53 
13 DW 4-Points 10 0.11 
14 DW 5-Points 4 0.04 
15 DW 6-Points 10 0.11 
16 DW 7-Points 2 0.02 
17 DW 8-Points 4 0.04 
18 DW 9-Points 4 0.04 
19 DW 12-Points 1 0.01 
    
20 Total No. of Downgrade Points (row 10+11+ 12+13 
+14+15+16+17+18+19) 292 3.28 
21 Total Rating Events (row 9+20) 516 5.80 
    
 Observations 8900   
          Mean rating 36.80   
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of rating events for 147 banks encompassed in the credit rating dataset which 
consists of monthly observations for January 2006-January 2013 period. The ratings are expressed in 58 point scale. % obs. 
defines percentage of all sample observations. 
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Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics of the data sample 
PANEL I   
No. of listed banks 147 
     
Average numerical rating 36.8      
       
Bank observations-monthly data %    % 
No. of observations 8900      
Positive events 224 2.52  B=S 1672 18.79 
Negative events 292 3.28  B>S 262 2.94 
Total events 516 5.80  B<S 6966 78.27 
       
Banks pre-treatment events  Banks post-treatment events 
No. of observations 5882   3018   
       
B=S 1031 11.58  B=S 641 7.20 
B>S 228 2.56  B>S 34 0.38 
B<S 4623 51.94  B<S 2343 26.33 
       
Positive events 156 1.75   68 0.76 
Negative events 159 1.79   133 1.49 
Total   315 3.54   201 2.25 
       
Events related to speculative grade sovereign ratings 81 15.70   69 13.37 
Events related to investment grade sovereign ratings 234 45.35   132 25.58 
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Table 5.7 Continued        
PANEL II       
Sovereign actions       
No. of countries 42      
No. of “unsolicited” countries 13      
No. of “solicited” countries 29      
Average numerical rating 49.51      
       
 Unsolicited sovereigns Solicited sovereigns Total  
No. of observations* 2102 %  %  % 
Positive actions 9 0.30 62 2.04 71 2.34 
Negative actions 21 0.69 62 2.04 83 2.73 
Total 30 0.99 124 4.08 154 5.07 
       
Events related to speculative grade sovereign ratings 9 0.30 52 41.94 
 
61 39.61 
Events related to investment grade sovereign ratings 21 0.70 72 58.06 93 60.39 
       
Sovereign pre-treatment events     
Pre-treatment positive actions 7 0.23 45 1.48 52  
Pre-treatment negative actions 8 0.26 38 1.25 46  
Sovereign post-treatment events     
Post-treatment positive actions 2 0.07 17 0.56 19  
Post-treatment negative actions 13 0.43 24 0.79 37  
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics for the credit rating dataset (section 4.3.3.1), which uses monthly bank (PANEL I) and sovereign ratings (PANEL II) including outlook and watch 
for 147 banks from 42 countries for pre-regulatory (January 2006 to February 2011) and post-regulatory (March 2011 to January 2013) periods. B=S, B < S, and B > S can be defined as follows: 
banks rated the same as the sovereign, banks rated worse than the sovereign, and banks rated better than the sovereign, respectively. Investment grade consists of ratings including BBB- and 
above; Speculative grade includes ratings below BBB. *Number of observations relates to sovereign data set only. Period covers ratings which match sovereigns and banks. 
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Table 5.8 - Summary statistics monthly frequency 
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics, abbreviations and definitions of variables used in the univariate and multivariate analysis for monthly observations of the sample of 147 banks 
originating from 42 countries for the period January 2006- January 2013. “n” stands for number of observations, “S.D.” is standard deviation. The sample represents a balanced panel data with 
regards to the dependent variable and main explanatory variables. 
Variable  Units Definition     n Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Dependent variable        
 
  
∆BANKORDINAL,j,t-1 +-{0,1,2,3} Change in bank ratings using CCR scale; coded as ordinal values: -3,-2,-1, 0, 1,2,3.  8900 -0.02 0.46 -3 0 0 0 3 
Independent variables           
POST*TREATMENT 0/1 Post dummy= 1 if the observation is from the post-treatment period; =0 otherwise. 8900 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1 
  Treatment dummy= 1 if the country belongs in the treatment group; =0 otherwise.          
∆SOVORDINAL 
+-{0,1,2,3} Change in sovereign ratings using CCR scale; coded as ordinal values: -3,-2, -1,0,1,2,3. 8900 -0.05 0.72 -3 0 0 0 3 
BANK58ALL 1-58 Banks credit ratings expressed in CCR scale, taking values 1-58. 8900 36.80 10.19 1 31 40 43 55 
Bank characteristics              
1) Size              
    LN(ASSETS) ($) ln Logarithm of book value of total assets 8900 18.12 1.87 13.3 17.18 17.99 19.42 22.06 
2) Leverage           
LEVERAGE multiple Total assets over equity 8900 15.16 6.75 2.59 10.63 14.33 17.92 47.50 
3) Profitability              
ROAE % Return on average equity: Net income over average equity 8900 9.96 11.85 -98.32      4.66 9.77 16.44 39.48 
4) Asset quality              
LLR/GL % Loan loss reserves to gross loans  8900 2.89 3.07 0.08 1.17 2.05 3.50 32.5 
5) Revenues              
INCREV % Non-interest income over gross revenue 8900 35.77 18.49 2.24 22.90 32.31 42.44 97.78 
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Table 5.9 Mann-Whitney U test results 
Variable No. of 
observations 
Sample 
period 
Mean 
(control) 
Mean 
(treatment) 
Difference Wilcoxon  
p-value 
PANEL I       
1change in 
bank 
ratings 
 
886 whole 0 -0.128 0.128 0.085* 
change in 
bank  
ratings 
 
486 pre-
treatment 
-0.076 0.032 -0.108 0.539 
change in 
bank 
ratings 
 
PANEL II 
400 
 
post-
treatment 
0.091 -0.328 0.419 0.002*** 
       
2bank mean 
ratings 
 
886 whole 32.976 40.039 -7.062 0.000*** 
bank mean 
ratings 
 
486 pre-
treatment 
33.568 41.158 -7.590 0.000*** 
bank mean 
ratings 
400 post-
treatment 
32.281 38.636 -6.355 0.000*** 
       
Notes: This Table presents results of the Mann-Whitney U test where differences between financial profiles of treatment and 
control group are tested with use of two covariates (PANEL I and PANEL II) for the pre-treatment (January 2006 to February 
2011), the post-treatment (March 2011 to January 2013) and the entire period using yearly data (see section 5.4.1.2).   
Notes: *** indicates significance at the level of 1%; 1The ratings are coded in a six-point scale where positive/negative change 
of 1 point =1, 2 points=2 and 3 and above/below =3. 2 The ratings are presented as an average mean of all bank ratings 
occurring at each particular time period with distinction between treatment and control group. The rating are expressed in the 
58 point CCR scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
 
Table 5.9a Mann-Whitney U test results: Bank characteristics 
 
Variable No. of 
observations 
Sample 
period 
Mean 
(control) 
Mean 
(treatment) 
Difference Wilcoxon  
p-value 
       
LN(ASSETS) 886 whole 17.447 18.740 -1.292 0.000*** 
LN(ASSETS) 486 
pre-
treatment 
17.395 18.760 -1.364 0.000*** 
LN(ASSETS) 400 post-
treatment 
17.508 18.714 -1.206 0.000*** 
       
LEVERAGE 886 whole 12.717 17.133 -4.415 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE 486 
pre-
treatment 
13.313 17.798 -4.485 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE 400 post-
treatment 
12.018 16.299 -4.281 0.000*** 
       
LLR/GL 886 whole 3.611 2.384 1.226 0.000*** 
LLR/GL 486 
pre-
treatment 
3.063 2.247 0.815 0.008*** 
LLR/GL 400  post-
treatment 
4.256 2.556 1.700 0.001*** 
       
INCREV 886 whole 33.674 38.007 -4.332 0.137 
INCREV 486 
pre-
treatment 
34.585 37.539 -2.953 0.616 
INCREV 400 post-
treatment 
32.603 38.594 -5.991 0.085 
       
ROAE  886 whole 12.494 7.578   4.915 0.000*** 
ROAE  486 
pre-
treatment 
13.602 8.425   5.177 0.000*** 
ROAE 400 post-
treatment 
11.191 6.517   4.674 0.000*** 
Notes: This Table presents results of the Mann-Whitney U test where differences between financial profiles of treatment and 
control group are tested with use of five covariates for the pre-treatment (January 2006 to February 2011) and the entire period 
(see section 5.4.1.2) using yearly data frequency. The remaining variable definitions are presented in Table 5.8..Significance 
level such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%.   
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Notes: This Table reports the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from various specifications of the ordered 
probit model using Eq. (5.1) (see section 5.5). The credit rating dataset consists of monthly sovereign and bank ratings for 147 banks 
originating from 42 countries for the period January 2006-January 2013. The dependent variable is ΔBANKORDINAL. The variables 
definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 5.8. Fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”) or not applicable 
in given specification (“-”).The year-country fixed effect is the interaction term between full set of country and year dummies. The 
month fixed effect comprises a fixed effect for every (but one) year: month during the sample period.  Significance level such that: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.      
 
 
 
 
Table 5.10 Ordered probit model results 
MODEL 
 
VARIABLES 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
 
 
POST*TREATMENT 
-0.1016 -0.5998*** -0.5998*** -0.1328 -0.1328 -0.4536*** -0.4536*** -0.6949*** 
 (-1.21) (-4.87) (-4.18) (-1.13) (-0.85) (-2.66) (-2.71) (-2.73) 
∆SOVORDINAL 
window 0.3667*** 0.3989*** 0.3989*** 0.4038*** 0.4038*** 0.3945*** 0.3945*** 0.3925*** 
 -12.81 (12.81) (11.83) (13.09) (12.02) (11.66) (10.56) (10.50) 
BANKS58ALL  
0.0340*** 0.0488*** 0.0488*** 0.1583*** 0.1583*** 0.0357*** 0.0357*** 0.1344*** 
 -5.96 (6.30) (6.01) (8.07) (5.76) (4.99) (4.39) (5.38) 
LN(ASSETS) 
-0.1180*** -0.1667*** -0.1667*** -0.6927*** -0.6927*** -0.1461*** -0.1461*** -0.6943*** 
 (-4.38) (-5.46) (-4.62) (-6.40) (-5.29) (-4.83) (-3.89) (-5.40) 
LEVERAGE 
-0.0038 0.0047 0.0047 -0.0139 -0.0139 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0234* 
 (-0.73) (0.74) (0.81) (-1.00) (-0.93) (-0.74) (-0.78) (-1.75) 
ROAE 
0.001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0108** 
 -0.43 (-0.20) (-0.25) (-1.22) (-1.32) (-0.65) (-0.89) (-2.45) 
LLR/GL 
0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0124 -0.0124 0.0053 0.0053 -0.0159 
 -0.22 (-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.73) (-0.54) (0.55) (0.64) (-0.75) 
INCREV 
0.0012 0.0026* 0.0026** -0.0010 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0027 
 
-0.86 (1.65) (2.42) (-0.20) (-0.19) (0.67) (0.93) (0.47) 
Observations 8900 
8900 8900 
8900 
8900 8900 
8900 
8900 
Log likelihood 
-2553 -2436 -2436 -2368 -2368 -2318 -2318 -2246 
Pseudo R2 
0.107 0.149 0.148 0.171 0.171 0.189 0.189 0.214 
Number of clusters 
. 
. 
147 . 147 
. 
147 147 
AIC 5224.496 5323.65 5063.65 5376.777 4902.7771 5279.60 4927.6 4773.07 
BIC 5643.03 6926.85 5744.66 7646.795 5491.563 7563.81 5963.295 5773.29 
Year and country  
dummies 
yes no no no no no no no 
Year-country 
dummies 
no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank dummy no no no yes yes no no yes 
Cluster by bank ID - - yes no yes - yes yes 
Month dummy - - - - - yes yes yes 
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Table 5.11 Marginal effects results- Model I 
          
Variables     Marginal effect %  
 Coefficient t-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
POST*TREAT
MENT 
-0.1016 (-1.21) 0.12 0.14 0.27 -0.14 -0.20 -0.12 -0.07 
 
∆SOVORDIN
AL window 
0.3667*** (-12.81) -0.40 -0.46 -0.93 0.28 0.78 0.46 0.26 
BANK58ALL 
0.0340*** (-5.96) -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.02 
Notes: This Table presents the impact of three main control variables on the probability of bank rating change (marginal effect) 
resulting from specification I of the Model (see Table 5.10). Significance levels such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 5.12 Marginal effects results- Models II and III 
         
Variables     Marginal effect %  
 Coefficient t-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
POST*TREAT
MENT 
-0.599*** (-4.18) 0.79 0.93 1.85 -2.23 -0.76 -0.39 -0.18 
 
∆SOVORDIN
AL window 
0.398*** (11.83) -0.28 -0.38 -0.85 0.21 0.72 0.39 0.20 
          
BANK58ALL 0.048*** (6.01) -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 
Notes: This Table presents the impact of three main control variables on the probability of bank rating change (marginal effect) 
resulting from specification II and III of the Model (see Table 5.10). The same MEs estimates are obtained for both versions 
since Model III only supplements Model II specification with one way clustering on bank level which does not change the 
economic magnitude of the results (only the statistical inference). Significance levels such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Table 5.13 Marginal effects results- Models IV and V 
         
Variables     Marginal effect %  
 Coefficient t-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
POST*TREAT
MENT 
-0.1328 (-0.85) 0.09 0.13 0.28 -0.15 -0.20 -0.10 -0.04 
 
∆SOVORDIN
AL window 
0.4038*** (12.02) -0.23 -0.35 -0.79 0.20 0.67 0.34 0.15 
BANK58ALL 0.1583*** (5.76) -0.09 -0.14 -0.31 0.08 0.26 0.13 0.06 
Notes: This Table presents the impact of three main control variables on the probability of bank rating change (marginal effect) 
resulting from specification IV and V of the Model (see Table 5.10). The same MEs estimates are obtained for both versions 
since Model V only supplements Model IV specification with one way clustering on bank level which does not change the 
economic magnitude of the results (only the statistical inference). Significance levels such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 5.14 Marginal effects results- Models VI and VII 
         
Variables     Marginal effect %  
 Coefficient t-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
POST*TREAT
MENT 
-0.453*** (-2.66) 0.31 0.46 1.08 -0.98 -0.51 -0.25 -0.11 
 
∆SOVORDIN
AL window 
0.394*** (11.66) -0.16 -0.27 -0.69 0.09 0.59 0.30 0.14 
          
BANK58ALL 0.035*** (4.99) -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 
Notes: This Table presents the impact of three main control variables on the probability of bank rating change (marginal effect) 
resulting from specification VI and VII of the Model (see Table 5.10). The same MEs estimates are obtained for both versions 
since Model VII only supplements Model VI specification with one way clustering on bank level which does not change the 
economic magnitude of the results (only the statistical inference). Significance levels such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 5.15 Marginal effects results- Model VIII 
         
Variables     Marginal effect %  
 Coefficient t-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
POST*TREAT
MENT 
-0.694*** (-2.73) 0.47 0.74 1.73 -1.98 -0.59 -0.27 -0.11 
 
∆SOVORDIN
AL window 
0.392*** (10.5) -0.12 -0.22 -0.59 0.06 0.52 0.25 0.11 
 0.134*** (5.38) -0.04 -0.08 -0.20 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.04 
BANK58ALL 
         
Notes: This Table presents the impact of three main control variables on the probability of bank rating change (marginal effect) 
resulting from specification VIII of the Model (see Table 5.10). Significance levels such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figures 5.1- 5.4 Distribution of sovereign credit ratings196 
 
Figures 5.5 - 5.6 Distribution of bank ratings 
                                                 
196. TG and CT stand for treatment and control group respectively. 
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Figure 5.6. Distribution of bank ratings
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Figure 5.3. Distribution of sovereign ratings- CG
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Figure 5.4. Distribution of sovereign ratings- CG
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
1
0
3
0
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Numerical rating-score
by rating score, S&P, Mar11-Jan13
Figure 5.2. Distribution of sovereign ratings-TG
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Figure 5.1. Distribution of sovereign ratings- TG
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Figure 5.7 Country distribution of monthly bank ratings 
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Figure 5.7. Country distribution of monthly ratings
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Figures 5.8- 5.17 Sovereign vs bank ratings 
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Figure 5.8. Argentina sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Figure 5.9. Australia: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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5.11.Germany: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Figure 5.12. India: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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5.13. Italy: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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5.10. France: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Figure 5.14. Japan: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Figure 5.16. Switzerland: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Figure 5.15. Netherlands: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Figure 5.17. United Kingdom: sovereign vs. bank ratings
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Appendix 5.A Data 
Table 5.A.1 Withdrawal of financial institutions in the sample 
 
 
Entity  
Published  
Name 
Country Long-term  
Rating  
Date 
Solicitation 
status: (Y: 
unsolicited, 
N: solicited) 
    
Bank of Baroda India 30/12/2011 Y 
BTA Bank JSC Kazakhstan 10/11/2011 N 
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM Spain 10/12/2008 N 
Canara Bank India 30/12/2011 Y 
Chugoku Bank, Ltd. (The) Japan 09/04/2009 N 
Credit Saison Co Ltd Japan 09/04/2009 Y 
Daishi Bank Ltd (The) Japan 09/04/2009 Y 
Gunma Bank Ltd. (The) Japan 31/08/2009 N 
Hiroshima Bank Ltd* Japan 09/04/2009 N 
Hong Leong Bank Berhad* Malaysia 30/12/2011 Y 
Industrial Bank of Taiwan Taiwan 10/06/2009 N 
Juroku Bank Ltd. (The) Japan 28/10/2011 N 
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Philippines 30/12/2011 Y 
Nadra Bank Ukraine 28/05/2009 N 
Nanto Bank Ltd. (The)* Japan 09/04/2009 N 
Promsvyazbank OJSC Russian Federation 17/05/2010 N 
PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk Indonesia 30/12/2011 Y 
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.* Philippines 29/12/2008 N 
Shiga Bank, Ltd (The)* Japan 09/04/2009 N 
Westpac Banking Corporation Australia 20/12/2007 N 
Wing Hang Bank Ltd* Hong Kong 20/11/2008 Y 
 
Notes: This Table presents institutions excluded from the data sample of financial institutions rated by S&P originating from 42 
countries (this gives the final 147 entities used in the dataset). *Financial institutions with the asterisk do not have rating in the 
sample period between January 2006-January 2013 (NR- withdrawn status in the database).  
Remainder of excluded entities comprises FIs which ratings are withdrawn at some point in the sample period and for this reason 
are also omitted from the sample.  
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Table 5.A.3 List of sovereigns used in the sample 
 Sovereigns  
1 Argentina 
2 Australia 
3 Austria  
4 Bolivia 
5 Cambodia 
6 Chile 
7 China  
8 Czech Republic 
9 Denmark 
10 El Salvador 
11 Finland (Republic of) 
12 France 
13 Georgia 
14 Germany 
15 Greece 
16 Hong Kong  
17 Hungary 
18 India 
19 Indonesia  
20 Ireland 
21 Italy 
22 Japan 
23 Kazakhstan 
24 Korea (Republic of) 
25 Malaysia 
26 Mexico 
27 Netherlands 
28 Norway 
29 Papua New Guinea 
30 Peru 
31 Philippines 
32 Poland 
33 Portugal  
34 Russian Federation 
35 Singapore 
36 Spain  
37 Sweden 
38 Swiss Confederation 
39 Taiwan 
40 Thailand  
41 Ukraine 
42 United Kingdom 
Notes: This Table lists 42 sovereigns included in the sample. 
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Table 5.A.3 List of banks used in the sample 
 Financial intermediaries Country of 
incorporation 
1 Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires SA Argentina 
2 Banco Hipotecario SA Argentina 
3 Banco Patagonia SA Argentina 
4 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Australia 
5 Bank of Queensland Limited Australia 
6 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited Australia 
7 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia 
8 Macquarie Group Ltd Australia 
9 MyState Limited Australia 
10 National Australia Bank Limited Australia 
11 Erste Group Bank AG Austria  
12 Raiffeisen Bank International AG Austria  
13 Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz SA Bolivia 
14 ACLEDA Bank PLC Cambodia 
15 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Chile Chile  
16 Banco de Chile Chile 
17 Banco de Credito e Inversiones - BCI Chile  
18 Banco Santander Chile Chile  
19 CorpBanca Chile  
20 Bank of China Limited China  
21 Bank of Communications Co. Ltd China  
22 Bank of Nanjing China  
23 China Construction Bank Corporation China  
24 China Merchants Bank Co Ltd China  
25 Komercni Banka Czech Republic 
26 Danske Bank A/S Denmark 
27 Jyske Bank A/S Denmark 
28 Banco Agricola El Salvador 
29 Pohjola Bank plc-Pohjola Pankki Oyj Finland  
30 Sampo Plc Finland  
31 BNP Paribas France 
32 Société Générale France 
33 Bank of Georgia Georgia 
34 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 
35 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 
36 Alpha Bank AE Greece 
37 Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece 
38 Piraeus Bank SA Greece 
39 AEON Credit Service (Asia) Company Limited Hong Kong  
40 Hang Seng Bank Ltd. Hong Kong  
41 OTP Bank Plc Hungary 
42 AXIS Bank Limited India 
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43 Bank of Baroda India 
44 Bank of India India 
45 Canara Bank India 
46 HDFC Bank Ltd India 
47 ICICI Bank Limited India 
48 Indian Bank India 
49 Indian Overseas Bank India 
50 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) - Bank BNI Indonesia  
51 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk Indonesia  
52 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk Indonesia  
53 Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland 
54 Bank of Ireland Ireland 
55 Banca Carige SpA Italy 
56 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena 
Italy 
57 Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna Italy 
58 Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL Italy 
59 Credito Bergamasco Italy 
60 Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM Italy 
61 Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 
62 Mediobanca SpA Italy 
63 77 Bank (The) Japan 
64 Aozora Bank Ltd Japan 
65 Bank of Kyoto Japan 
66 Chiba Bank Ltd. Japan 
67 Chugoku Bank, Ltd. (The) Japan 
68 Credit Saison Co Ltd Japan 
69 Daishi Bank Ltd (The) Japan 
70 Daiwa Securities Group Inc Japan 
71 Gunma Bank Ltd. (The) Japan 
72 Hachijuni Bank Japan 
73 Higo Bank (The) Japan 
74 Hiroshima Bank Ltd Japan 
75 Hitachi Capital Corporation Japan 
76 Hokkoku Bank Ltd. (The) Japan 
77 Hyakugo Bank Ltd. Japan 
78 Joyo Bank Ltd. Japan 
79 Juroku Bank Ltd. (The) Japan 
80 Kagoshima Bank Ltd. (The) Japan 
81 Keiyo Bank, Ltd. (The) Japan 
82 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc-Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial Group 
Japan 
83 Mizuho Financial Group Japan 
84 Nomura Holdings Inc Japan 
85 Orix Corporation Japan 
86 Shinkin Central Bank Japan 
87 Shinsei Bank Limited Japan 
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88 Shizuoka Bank Japan 
89 BTA Bank JSC Kazakhstan 
90 Delta Bank Kazakhstan 
91 Eurasian Bank Kazakhstan 
92 Nurbank JSC Kazakhstan 
93 OJSC Halyk Savings Bank of Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 
94 Industrial Bank of Korea Korea (Republic of) 
95 Woori Finance Holdings Co. Ltd-Woori Financial Group Korea (Republic of) 
96 Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank Malaysia 
97 Financiera Independencia, S.A.B. De C.V.  Sofom Mexico 
98 ABN AMRO Bank NV Netherlands 
99 ING Groep NV Netherlands 
100 DnB ASA Norway 
101 Bank of South Pacific Ltd. Papua New Guinea 
102 Banco Continental-BBVA Banco Continental Peru 
103 Banco de Credito del Peru Peru 
104 Banco Internacional del Peru - Interbank Peru 
105 Scotiabank Peru SAA Peru 
106 Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Philippines 
107 Philippine National Bank Philippines 
108 Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA-Bank Pekao SA Poland 
109 Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA - PKO BP SA Poland 
110 Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp Portugal  
111 Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal  
112 Bank UralSib Russian Federation 
113 Credit Bank of Moscow Russian Federation 
114 International Bank of St Petersburg Russian Federation 
115 JSC VTB Bank Russian Federation 
116 MDM Bank Russian Federation 
117 Public joint-stock company ROSBANK Russian Federation 
118 West Siberian Commercial Bank-Zapsibcombank Russian Federation 
119 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited OCBC Singapore 
120 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain  
121 Banco de Sabadell SA Spain  
122 Banco Popular Espanol SA Spain  
123 Bankinter SA Spain  
124 Nordea Bank AB Sweden 
125 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden 
126 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden 
127 Credit Suisse Group AG Swiss Confederation 
128 UBS AG Swiss Confederation 
129 Vontobel Holding AG-Vontobel Group Swiss Confederation 
130 Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd. Taiwan 
131 China Development Financial Holding Corp Taiwan 
132 First Financial Holding Company Limited Taiwan 
133 Fubon Financial Holding Co Ltd Taiwan 
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134 Sinopac Financial Holdings Taiwan 
135 Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited Thailand  
136 Bank of Ayudhya Public Company Ltd. Thailand  
137 Kasikornbank Public Company Limited Thailand  
138 Krung Thai Bank Public Company Limited Thailand  
139 Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited Thailand  
140 Alfa Bank PJSC Ukraine 
141 Nadra Bank Ukraine 
142 Barclays Plc United Kingdom 
143 HSBC Holdings Plc United Kingdom 
144 Lloyds Banking Group Plc United Kingdom 
145 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) United Kingdom 
146 Schroders Plc United Kingdom 
147 Standard Chartered Plc United Kingdom 
Notes: This Table presents the banks and their country of incorporation which are included in the sample. 
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Appendix 5.B Robustness tests 
Bank rating’s determinants 
1)  Profitability measures: ROAE= return on average equity197 
2)  Asset quality measures: LLR/GL= loan loss reserves to gross loans198 
3)  Size: LNASSET= log of book value of total assets 
4)  Leverage: assets to equity multiple. 
5) Non-interest income over gross revenue  
 
 
 
Notes: This Table compares single clustering options to determine whether the time or the firm effect is present in the dataset 
comprising 147 banks from 42 countries over period January 2006-January 2013. This relates to discussion in section 5.5.2 
where competing fixed effect and clustering options are applied to test for robustness of the regression model (Eq. (5.1)). 
Significance levels such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
197. Net income/average equity 
198. Gross loans= loans + loan loss reserves (LLR) 
Table 5.B.1 Clustering options 
Variation 
Dimension 
of 
clustering 
  
No of 
clusters 
Variable 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
   z p-value 
I  
No 
clustering 
 0 Treatment 0.123 -4.87 0.000*** 
    
SOVORDINAL 
window 
0.031 12.81 0.000*** 
    Bank58all 0.007 6.30 0.000*** 
        
II Bank ID  147 Treatment 0.143 -4.18 0.000*** 
    
SOVORDINAL 
window 
0.033 11.83 0.000*** 
    Bank58all 0.008 6.01 0.000*** 
        
III Month  85 Treatment 0.177 -3.37 0.001*** 
    
SOVORDINAL 
window 
0.057 6.88 0.000*** 
        Bank58all 0.012 3.95 0.000*** 
208 
 
Table 5.B.2 Placebo effects-time variations 
MODEL VIII VIII VIII 
VARIABLES f1. f2. f3. 
PLACEBO 
0.4204 -0.1481 -0.0460 
 
(0.99) (-0.60) (-0.26) 
∆SOVORDINAL window 
0.3959*** 0.4026*** 0.4071*** 
 
(10.80) (10.86) (11.10) 
BANK58ALL  
0.1419*** 0.1450*** 0.1504*** 
 
(5.56) (5.81) (5.87) 
LN(ASSETS) 
-0.6731*** -0.7187*** -0.7263*** 
 
(-5.06) (-5.63) (-5.73) 
LEVERAGE 
-0.0215 -0.0206 -0.0248* 
 
(-1.54) (-1.46) (-1.78) 
ROAE 
-0.0130*** -0.0130** -0.0114** 
 
(-2.60) (-2.44) (-2.33) 
LLR/GL 
-0.0215 -0.0119 -0.0153 
 
(-1.54) (-0.54) (-0.66) 
INCREV 
0.0026 0.0036 0.0039 
 
(0.43) (0.61) (0.66) 
Statistics       
Observations 
8702 8512 8330 
Log likelihood 
-2215 -2165 -2119 
Pseudo R2 
0.217 0.218 0.221 
Number of clusters 
144 144 144 
Year -country dummies yes yes yes 
Month dummy yes yes yes 
Cluster by bank ID yes yes yes 
Bank ID dummy yes yes yes 
Notes: This Table presents results of falsification tests performed in section 5.6.1 to test the results of the ordered probit model 
estimation on the sample of 147 banks from 42 countries seen in Table 5.10. The dependent variable is ΔBANKORDINAL.  
f.1; f.2; f.3 are leads in which the treatment was assigned (1, 2 and 3 months earlier than the regulatory action was announced 
respectively).  Fixed effects are included (“yes”). The year-country fixed effect is the interaction term between full set of 
country and year dummies.  The month fixed effect comprises a fixed effect for every (but one) year: month during the sample 
period.  Variables definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 5.8. Significance level such that: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. 
209 
 
Table 5.B.3 Placebo effects-cross section variation 
 
 a) Subset of banks b) All banks 
VARIABLES 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 
PLACEBO 
0.1421 -0.0687 -0.0328 -0.4805 0.5946 -0.2955 
 
(0.70) (-0.39) (-0.21) (-0.88) -1.4 (-0.70) 
∆SOVORDINAL window 
0.3843*** 0.3849*** 0.3849*** 0.3851*** 0.3873*** 0.3833*** 
 
(7.73) (7.73) (7.74) (7.73) -7.75 (7.66) 
BANK58ALL 
0.1475*** 0.1473*** 0.1482*** 0.1487*** 0.1466*** 0.1483*** 
 
(4.17) (4.12) (4.20) (4.33) -4.12 (4.24) 
LN(ASSETS) 
0.5231 0.5376* 0.5299* 0.5233 0.6075* 0.4821 
 
(1.61) (1.67) (1.65) (1.63) -1.83 (1.50) 
LEVERAGE 
0.0447** 0.0409* 0.0404* 0.0418* 0.0348 0.0445** 
 
(1.98) (1.87) (1.86) (1.92) -1.55 (2.01) 
ROAE 
-0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0053 -0.0019 
 
(-0.49) (-0.42) (-0.53) (-0.50) (-0.80) (-0.33) 
LLR/GL 
-0.0044 -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0067 -0.0055 
 
(-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.30) (-0.25) 
INCREV 
-0.0101 -0.0101 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0096 -0.0101 
 
(-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.17) (-1.22) 
Statistics        
Observations 
4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 4050 
Log likelihood 
-1119 -1120 -1120 -1119 -1118 -1119 
Pseudo R2 
0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.228 
Number of clusters 
70 70 70 70 70 70 
Year times country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Cluster by bank ID yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: This Table presents results of falsification test performed in section 5.6.1.2 to test the results of the ordered probit model 
estimation on the sample of 147 banks from 42 countries seen in Table 5.10. The dependent variable is ΔBANKORDINAL. 
The placebo tests are applied to model VIII specifications. Test 1a-c involves randomly assigning the placebo to subset of 
banks which belong to the control group sovereigns. Test 2a-c randomly picks sovereigns which belong to the control group 
and assigns placebo to all banks belonging in that subset. The number of entities selected by the random number generator in 
each trial is shown in section 5.6.1.2. The sample is restricted to the control group only and for this reason the number 
of observations is constant in all trials. Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.B.4 Covariate matching methods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample and 
matching model 
CVM: Nearest 
neighbour covariates- 1 
match 
CVM: Nearest 
neighbour 
covariates- 1 match 
CVM: Nearest 
neighbour 
covariates- 4 
matches 
CVM:  Nearest 
neighbour 
covariates- 1 match 
CVM:  Nearest 
neighbour 
covariates- 1 match 
CVM:  Nearest 
neighbour 
covariates- 4 
matches 
Covariates SOV58SCALE; 
BANK58ALL; 
LN(ASSETS); 
LEVERAGE; ROAE; 
LLR/GL; INCREV; 
CPI 
 
SOV58SCALE; 
BANK58ALL; 
LN(ASSETS); 
LEVERAGE; 
ROAE; LLR/GL; 
INCREV; CPI 
 
SOV58SCALE; 
BANK58ALL; 
LN(ASSETS); 
LEVERAGE; 
ROAE; LLR/GL; 
INCREV; CPI 
 
SOV20SCALE; 
BANK20SCALE; 
LN(ASSETS); 
LEVERAGE; 
ROAE; LLR/GL; 
INCREV;  
MEANCPI 
SOV20SCALE; 
BANK20SCALE; 
LN(ASSETS); 
LEVERAGE; 
ROAE; LLR/GL; 
INCREV;  
MEANCPI 
SOV20SCALE; 
BANK20SCALE; 
LN(ASSETS); 
LEVERAGE; 
ROAE; LLR/GL; 
INCREV;  
MEANCPI 
Match est. a) SATE b) SATT SATE SATT SATE SATT 
Std. err. 0.059 0.044 0.033 0.036 0.043 0.020 
p-value 0.008 0.048 0.002 0.001 0.100 0.000 
Coefficient -0.159 -0.087 -0.103 -0.120 -0.063 -0.073 
N 6808 6808 6808 8559 8559 8559 
       
Notes: This Table presents results of nearest neighbour matching exercise outlined in section 5.6.2.1; CVM- Covariate Matching;  a) Applies Average Treatment Effect matching estimator and an 
inverse variance weighting matrix; b) Applies Average Treatment Effect on the Treated matching estimator an inverse variance weighting matrix; Variables definitions and summary statistics are 
presented in Table 5.8. Additionally: SOV58SCALE (BANK58ALL) is sovereign (bank) credit rating based on 58-point scale; SOV20SCALE (BANK20SCALE) is sovereign (bank) credit rating 
based on 20-notch scale; CPI stands for Consumer Price Index whereas MEANCPI takes the mean value per sovereign. The remaining covariates with their definitions are outlined in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.B.5 Balancing test- Propensity Score Matching   
        
Variable 
  
Mean 
  
  
%reduct 
  
t-test 
                      Treated Control %bias |bias|  t p>t 
 
SOV20SCALE Unmatched           
 
Matched                      
16.36 15.357 25.4     8.74 0 
  
16.36 16.426 -1.7 93.4   -0.48 0.628 
                 
BANK20SCALE Unmatched  
          
Matched                      
13.598 12.845 24.5     7.94 0 
  
13.598 13.752 -5.0 79.6   -1.59 0.113 
                 
LN(ASSETS) Unmatched  
 
Matched                      
18.673 18.009 37.4     12.76 0 
  
18.673 18.734 -3.4 90.9   -0.99 0.322 
                 
LEVERAGE Unmatched  
 
Matched                      
16.283 14.923 20.9     7.2 0 
  
16.283 16.118 2.5 87.9   0.72 0.47 
                 
LLR/GL Unmatched   
         
Matched                      
2.5377 2.9592 -15.1     -4.91 0 
  
2.5377 2.5937 -2.0 86.7   -0.71 0.477 
                 
MEANCPI Unmatched  
 
Matched                      
2.2738 3.3611 -141.6     -39.8 0 
  
2.2738 2.2716 0.3 99.8   0.23 0.821 
Notes: This Table presents results of balancing exercise performed directly after the propensity score matching (see section 
5.6.2.2). The null hypothesis states that difference in means of covariates is equal to zero. Variables definitions and summary 
statistics are presented in Table 5.8. Additionally: SOV20SCALE (BANK20SCALE) is sovereign (bank) credit rating based 
on 20-notch scale; CPI stands for Consumer Price Index whereas MEANCPI takes the mean value per sovereign. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.B.6 Regression approach 
Notes: This Table reports the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from the ordered probit model 
performed on the matched sample. Models 1-5 imitate the specifications I-V from Table 5.10. The dependent variable is 
ΔBANKORDINAL. Fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”) or not applicable in given specification (“-”). The 
year-country fixed effect is the interaction term between full set of country and year dummies.  The month fixed effect 
comprises a fixed effect for every (but one) year: month during the sample period.  The Pscore is an estimate of a conditional 
probability that the treatment will be assigned based on vector of observed covariates. These comprise: sovereign and bank 
credit ratings (20-notch-scale), bank financial data: leverage, LN(ASSETS), loan loss reserves to gross loans, and 
macroeconomic indicators: MEANCPI. CPI is the Consumer Price Index and MEANCPI takes the mean value per sovereign. 
Significance level such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES           
POST*TREATMENT 
-0.1832** -0.4275*** -0.4275*** -0.4133*** -0.4133*** 
 
(-2.19) (-3.52) (-3.42) (-3.60) (-3.32) 
PSCORE 
1.0598*** 0.8533** 0.8533** 2.5561*** 2.5561*** 
 
(2.97) (2.03) (2.42) (2.90) (3.02) 
Statistics            
Observations 8900 8900 8900 8900 8900 
Log likelihood 
-2694 -2533 -2533 -2501 -2501 
Pseudo R2 
0.0575 
 
0.114 0.114 0.125 0.125 
Number of clusters . 
. 147 . 147 
Year and country  
yes no no no no 
dummies 
Year-country dummies no yes yes yes yes 
Bank dummy no no no yes yes 
Cluster by bank ID - - yes no yes 
Month dummy - - - - - 
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Table 5.B.7 Random sample manual 
MODEL  II III  IV V VI 
VARIABLES           
POST*TREATMENT -0.3674*** -0.3674*** -0.2712** -0.2712** -0.7068*** 
 
 (-2.89) (-2.82) (-2.24) (-1.98) (-2.69) 
∆SOVORDINAL window 0.3679*** 0.3679*** 0.3701*** 0.3701*** 0.4126*** 
 
 (8.76) (8.47) (8.68) (8.54) (8.87) 
BANK58ALL  0.0686*** 0.0686*** 0.2447*** 0.2447*** 0.0679*** 
 
 (6.40) (5.53) (8.26) (4.54) (6.88) 
LN(ASSETS) -0.1540*** -0.1540*** 0.1555 0.1555 -0.1658*** 
 
 (-4.40) (-3.92) (0.58) (0.59) (-4.72) 
LEVERAGE -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0108 -0.0108* -0.0030 
 
 (-1.02) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.95) (-0.66) 
ROAE 
 -0.0204 -0.0204* -0.0177 -0.0177 -0.0225 
 
 (-1.47) (-1.91) (-0.66) (-0.77) (-1.62) 
LLR/GL 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0213 -0.0213 0.0012 
 
 (0.06) (0.07) (-1.40) (-1.41) (0.16) 
INCREV 0.0039** 0.0039*** 0.0038 0.0038 0.0035* 
 
 (2.03) (3.10) (0.60) (0.76) (1.85) 
Statistics            
Observations 6404 6404 6404 6404 6404 
Log likelihood -1725 -1725 -1650 -1650 -1593 
Pseudo R2  0.141 0.141 0.178 0.178 0.207 
Number of clusters  . 104 . 104  
Year-country dummies  yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank ID dummy no no yes yes no 
Month dummy no no no no yes 
Cluster by bank ID  no yes no yes no 
Notes: This Table presents results of model specifications (II-VI), studied in section 5.5, using manual matching of treatment 
group with the control group using one-to-one method on sovereign level (see section 5.6.2.4). The dependent variable is 
ΔBANKORDINAL. The collapsed subsample includes sovereigns with ID’s between 1-26 over the period January 2006-
January 2013. Sovereign ID’s 1-13 represent treatment group and 14-26 are control group sovereigns. For complete list of 
sovereigns see section 5.6.2.4. Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.B.8 Monthly data results: OLS 
Notes: This Table reports the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from various specifications of Models I-VIII from 
section 5.4.2.1 using Ordinary Least Squares exercising Eq. (5.1) (details section 5.6.4). The credit rating dataset consists of monthly sovereign 
and bank ratings for 147 banks originating from 42 countries for the period January 2006-January 2013. The dependent variable is 
ΔBANK58ALL and stands for change in bank ratings using 58-point scale. The dependent variable is the same as ΔBANKORDINAL used 
in Table 5.10 with an exception that the responses are not coded into 7 discrete categories. The remaining variables definitions and summary 
statistics are presented in Table 5.8. Fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”) or not applicable in given specification (“-”). The 
year-country fixed effect is the interaction term between full set of country and year dummies. The month fixed effect comprises a fixed effect 
for every (but one) year: month during the sample period.  Significance level such that: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
MODEL  I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
VARIABLES          
CONSTANT  0.2747*** 0.3965*** 0.3965*** 2.0520*** 2.0520*** 0.3012*** 0.3012*** 2.0000*** 
  (3.53) (4.03) (3.67) (5.91) (5.47) (3.80) (3.36) (4.74) 
POST*TREATMENT -0.0104 -0.1177*** -0.1177*** -0.0294 -0.0294 
 
-0.0751** -0.0751** 
 
-0.1166* 
  (-0.50) (-4.28) (-3.97) (-1.09) (-0.94) 
 
(-2.04) (-2.11) 
 
(-1.94) 
∆SOVORDINAL window 0.1352*** 0.1406*** 0.1406*** 0.1404*** 0.1404*** 
 
0.1383*** 0.1383*** 
 
-0.1378** 
  (9.88) (9.95) (9.30) (9.90) (9.23) 
 
(9.55) (9.52) 
 
(9.29) 
BANK58ALL   0.0105*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0454*** 0.0454*** 
 
0.0075*** 0.0075*** 
 
0.1919*** 
  (6.79) (5.62) (5.40) (7.03) (6.06) 
 
(4.57) (4.22) 
 
(3.84) 
LN(ASSETS)  -0.0354*** -0.0373*** -0.0373*** -0.2090*** -0.2090*** 
 
-0.0296*** -0.0296*** 
 
-0.1800*** 
  
(-5.54) (-5.22) (-4.75) (-6.36) (-5.87) 
 
(-4.45) (-3.96) 
 
(-4.48) 
LEVERAGE 
 -0.0004 0.0018 0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 
-0.0005 -0.0005 
 
-0.0040 
  
(-0.27) (1.16) (1.36) (-0.52) (-0.44) 
 
(-0.38) (-0.43) 
 
(-1.15) 
ROAE 
 0.0014 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0019* 
  
(1.52) (0.17) (0.28) (-0.66) (-0.86) 
 
(-0.20) (-0.40) (-1.86) 
LLR/GL 
 
0.0005* 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 
 
0.0012 0.0003 -0.0019 
 
 
(1.80) (0.19) (0.27) (0.49) (0.46) 
 
(0.57) (1.28) (-0.44) 
INCREV 
 
0.0010 0.0007** 0.0007** -0.0006 -0.0006 
 
0.0003 0.0012 0.0013 
 
 
(0.55) (2.04) (2.48) (-0.16) (-0.10) 
 
(1.02) (0.77) (0.98) 
Observations  8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,900 
R-squared  0.0896 0.1153 0.1153 0.1319 0.1319 
0.1369 0.1369 0.1521 
Root MSE  0.444 0.442 0.442 0.440 0.440 0.438 0.438 0.437 
Number of clusters . . 147 . 147  147 147 
Year and country dummies yes no no no no no no no 
Year-country dummies no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank dummy no no no yes yes no no yes 
Cluster by bank ID no no yes no yes no yes yes 
Month dummy no no no no no yes yes yes 
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Appendix 5.C Correlation matrix 
Table 5.C.1 – Correlation matrix  
  Post*Treatment ∆Sov
R 
BankR ln(Assets) LEVER
AGE 
ROAE LLR/GL INCREV 
Post*Treatment 1.00               
∆SovR -0.14 1.00             
BankR 0.08 -0.02 1.00           
ln(Assets) 0.13 -0.08 0.73 1.00         
LEVERAGE 0.08 -0.05 0.48 0.64 1.00       
ROAE -0.12 0.20 0.04 -0.12 -0.19 1.00     
LLR/GL -0.05 0.05 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 1.00   
INCREV 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.03 1.00 
Notes: This Table reports correlation coefficients for the variables used in Eq. (5.1). The sample includes 147 
banks originating from 42 countries for the period January 2006 - January 2013. See Table 5.8 for variable 
definitions. 
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Chapter 6: The impact of ESMA regulatory identifiers on the quality 
of ratings 
6.1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis brought mounting criticism of the CRAs for their role amid 
deteriorating economic conditions. During both the subprime crisis and the European debt 
crisis, concerns were raised that the CRA system is flawed and that the existing regulation 
exacerbates the problem further by hardwiring ratings into regulations (Hau et al., 2013).  
In December 2009, the European Commission (EC) released new laws relating to CRAs. 
Amongst other requirements, the EU Regulation obliges CRA to be registered or certified by 
ESMA before performing rating activities (ESMA, 2013c). Further, (as of April 30, 2012) 
ESMA requires CRAs to reveal which ratings originate in the EU and which are issued outside 
the Member states but are EU endorsed. To distinguish between them, the identifiers “EU” and 
“EE” are assigned. The former case relates to ratings where the lead analyst is based in the EU 
or a centre which is a branch of the EU legal entity. Endorsement (Article 4.3 CRA Regulation) 
is aimed at CRAs whose ratings are systemically important for the financial stability of the 
Member States (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). For the ratings to be eligible as endorsed, the 
analyst must be located in a jurisdiction which has a comparable regulatory regime with that 
of the EU (EC, 2011d).  
Attaining information and measuring creditworthiness is costly and time consuming for 
investors, therefore many entrust this task to the CRAs. However, the recent evidence from 
CRAs shows that poor quality ratings can aggravate a crisis and might lead to possible cliff-
effects (Manso, 2013). Despite regulatory efforts aimed at maintaining high quality ratings, 
relatively little is known about the determinants of ratings quality. Possible determinants of 
ratings quality include CRAs’ incentives, rating-contingent regulation, complexity of rated 
assets, reputational concerns of CRAs and competition between them (Hau et al., 2013).   
Via the use of identifiers, the EU aims to enable supervisory integration of the CRAs and co-
operation of outside supervisors at the same time protecting EU investors by standardised and 
comparable methodologies and assumptions. Identifiers intend to increase transparency and 
integrity via releasing more information to investors and enabling them to perform internal 
credit worthiness assessment. This improved reliability and good governance arisen from the 
equivalence rules is meant to increase rating quality. 
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The aim of this chapter is to assess whether ESMA’s requirement for identifiers (from April 
2012) led to changes in the quality of ratings reported by CRAs. It investigates the impact that 
rating status identifiers had on the market. The study questions whether the market works 
better, in the sense that bond yields are more aligned with ratings. Did the overall quality of 
ratings improve or not? The quality of ratings refers to the information content which surfaces 
through the ability of ratings to explain bond yields (Becker and Milbourn, 2011). Namely, 
high quality ratings should be disseminating information about bond values. For instance, when 
ratings accurately reflect the risk of an issuer, and therefore correlate highly with its bond 
yields, they have the power to protect investors by reducing information asymmetries. On the 
other hand, lower quality of ratings via lower correlations with bond yields signal that the 
ratings echo other traits than the expected payoff. In this setting it is evaluated whether the 
ratings comprise information about bond values different than commonly perceived attributes 
including bond contracts and firm fixed effects. The main research question is: Does the quality 
of ratings (captured by their informativeness) change after the introduction of ESMA 
identifiers? 
The closely related literature on ratings quality measures the effect of entry (i.e. certification) 
of one of the CRAs and its impact on the rest of the CRA industry (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; 
Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Doherty et al., 2012; Bongaerts et al., 2012). This chapter 
considers the effect of regulation (i.e. identifiers) applied to the existing CRAs. Is important to 
investigate the effect of disclosure rules as it is believed ESMA’s endorsement rules could add 
credibility to CRAs’ opinions and result in making ratings more, rather than less, influential. 
The outcomes of such actions are important for future policies and regulations and for avoiding 
unintended consequences. Asserting a high quality of sovereign ratings is of utmost importance 
for practitioners and governments alike since they influence how nations raise capital and 
influence ratings on other asset classes.  
This novel study is the first attempt to measure the impact of the recent EU CRA regulation in 
relation to ESMA identifiers. It examines the direct consequence of regulatory authorization 
on ratings quality. This contrasts with Kisgen and Strahan (2010) who study the price impact 
of regulation. Investigating current regulatory undertakings and assessing their impact on the 
quality of ratings will add to the debate about the influence of the regulation in the wider 
spectrum (see Bongaerts et al., 2012; Doherty et al., 2012). This research differs in terms of 
the studied sample since the latest literature considers periods before regulation took place. For 
instance, Bongaerts et al. (2012) explore a sample between 2002 and 2008. Becker and 
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Milbourn (2011) utilize a sample from 1995 to 2006 while Kisgen and Strahan (2010) use the 
period between 2001 and 2005. Data sample in this study comprises sovereign ratings from 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P originating from 69 countries and covers the period between Sept 
2007- Sept 2014.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 introduce the background of 
the EU CRA Regulation regime along with a summary of the relevant academic literature. 
Section 6.4 presents data and descriptive statistics then section 6.5 describes research 
methodologies. Section 6.6 and 6.7 report empirical results together with robustness checks 
whereas section 6.8 concludes the study. 
6.2 Recent regulatory developments 
6.2.1 Disclosure rules in the EU 
The recent EU regulatory initiatives (CRA I, II and III) aim to reduce conflicts of interest, 
overreliance on ratings and spillover effects, to increase independence and soundness of rating 
processes and to improve quality of rating methodologies and ratings (ECB, 2012). Alsakka et 
al. (2015) classifies recent regulatory efforts in Europe into three phases: reactive, 
implementation and enhancement. To influence the quality of ratings, ESMA requires CRAs 
to be registered as a regulated CRA in the EU to be able to endorse ratings (into the EU) which 
were originated outside the EU. To meet the equivalence regime, the ratings are to be assigned 
in a jurisdiction which operates in a regulatory establishment for CRAs which is “at least as 
stringent as the relevant EU rules set out in Articles 6 to 12” (EC, 2011d). 
The interpretation of the endorsement rules (Article 4.3 (b)) caused debates between national 
authorities, CRAs themselves and the EC (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). The views split since 
market participants and leading CRAs deduce that requirements should rest on the conduct of 
the third country CRAs’ operations whereas the EC provides that requirements should be 
formed around the legislation of that jurisdiction. A joint declaration was submitted to the EU 
Council in 2010 where concerned countries199 demanded clarification and updating of 
regulation. There were fears that few countries might be considered equivalently stringent 
relative to the EU regulation and therefore a high number of ratings would be withdrawn since 
they could not be used for regulatory purposes. In effect this would lead to the amplification of 
                                                 
199. Declaration submitted by: UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Hungary and Ireland. EU Council 
2344th meeting in Brussels (8, 10, 13 December) 2010. 
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the regulatory capital held by financial firms as fewer ratings would be available for 
standardised approach calculations and securitization purposes. Further, limited endorsement 
of foreign ratings could impede market liquidity within Europe and lead to intensification of 
risk in the market. Despite these issues, ESMA published its final guidance on the subject in 
May 2011, which confirmed the earlier interpretation (ESMA, 2011d). 
The endorsement permits CRAs which operate and are registered in the EU to authorise ratings 
of entities which are part of their own groups and which operate outside the EU. Both the 
ratings assigned in the EU as well as ratings from non-EU countries but endorsed based on the 
equivalence regime can be used for regulatory purposes (e.g. by banks). The equivalence tests 
conducted by ESMA, announced before April 30 2012, concluded that ratings originating from 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Singapore and the United 
States fulfil this requirement. Since that date, market participants in the EU are forbidden from 
using ratings originating from other unrecognised jurisdictions for regulatory purposes.  
There are currently 23 registered and two certified CRAs in the EU (ESMA, 2014b). Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P function in a group structure representing approximately 90 percent of the 
market share (ESMA, 2014c). See Appendix 6.A.1.  
6.2.2 The objective of identifiers 
Steven Maijoor (ESMA chair) commented that endorsing ratings from third countries enables 
supervisory integration of the CRAs. Greater co-operation between outside supervisors 
benefits the functioning of financial markets and protects investors in the EU (ESMA, 2011b). 
According to the EC, a CRA in a third country needs to conform to supervisory customs in the 
EU. Identifiers help to achieve this by disseminating information amongst investors. The 
regulators try to ensure that in the current framework, “users of ratings in the EU benefit from 
equivalent protections in terms of a CRA’s integrity, transparency, good governance and 
reliability” (ESMA, 2011c; p.4). 
When assessing the equivalence of third countries, the rules incorporate all provisions of the 
EU CRA Regulation.200 The equivalence in quality of ratings and methodologies (enabled 
through the identifiers) helps to protect the stability of financial markets. High quality ratings 
                                                 
200. (i) extent of regulatory and supervisory framework; (ii) corporate governance; (iii) conflict of interest; (iv) organisational 
constraints; (v) quality of methodologies and ratings; (vi) disclosure rules; (vii) supervision and enforcement rules. 
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lead to improved efficiency of capital markets and improve transparency and competition 
(ESMA, 2011e).201 In their consultation paper on the application of the endorsement regime 
ESMA (2011e) divides the benefits for the market participants arising from identifiers into four 
categories: 
(i) Quality of ratings 
(ii) Efficiency of securities or capital markets 
(iii) Availability of ratings 
(iv) Access to funding. 
With relation to the first point ESMA believes that the additional supervisory layer performed 
by the local supervisory body in the third country CRA will support efforts of the EU competent 
authorities. It is believed that such cooperation in scrutinising and implementing equally 
stringent regulatory requirements can protect against the supervisory risks.202 It is also 
considered that market participants will benefit from the higher quality of endorsed ratings 
owing to the fact investors will make judgements build on robust creditworthiness assessments 
of assets. This improved information about solvency of issuers or debtors should enable 
financial organizations to improve their facilities aimed at managing expected losses. At the 
same time, it should help securing capital buffers for the unforeseen credit incidents. As a 
consequence organizations will benefit from better resistance to the potential crises situations 
or issues arising at the firm level (e.g. illiquidity issues). As a whole improved quality of ratings 
through identifiers supports contagion prevention and ensures stability and efficacy of the 
system. The framework assumes the endorsement rules will provide an enhanced quality of 
ratings in the medium/long term depending on the cooperation between the EU and third 
countries’ authorities. At the same time, ESMA points out that the effectiveness of the regime 
relies on the compliance of the third country regulators to make the necessary amendments in 
order to meet the “as stringent as” requirement of the EU Regulation. 
The second point relates to the fact that higher quality endorsed ratings should lead to the 
reliable credit assessment of financial assets which as a result influences efficacy and creates 
                                                 
201. For example, inflated ratings might result in undercapitalisation of concerned entities and pose a stability threat to the 
system (see Coval et al., 2009). On the other hand, ratings which overestimate the risk and are too stringent, might enforce 
excessive capital constraints on banks or other issuers, imposing costs on the entire economy.   
202. The risk in this context relates to the possibility that the regulator is not able to alleviate consequences of misconduct or 
avert behaviour which violates the regulation.  
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less volatile markets. Nevertheless, the regulator admits there are possible side effects in the 
short run. As suggested by market participants, in their response to the Act, financial 
institutions might need to modify their portfolios as a result of some ratings not being endorsed 
in the EU. This might have serious repercussions on the prices of assets and lead to fire sales 
and losses for investors which might result in volatility of the system such as a cliff-effect. 
Thirdly, ESMA recognises that non-endorsable ratings might lessen the financial information 
released to the market participants in the short run by disrupting the price discovery and 
restraining issuance of some types of securities. 
Lastly, pointed out by commentators in reply to the endorsement rules, the gains achieved 
through the endorsement might be offset by the effects caused by non endorsability of some 
ratings. This as a result could hinder access to capital for numerous investors or individuals. 
ESMA acknowledges these issues might spread through the channel of securitization. This is 
because supply of credit might be limited to various parties since less investors demand 
structured finance products as holding them carries capital or information costs. Nevertheless, 
this issue should be corrected for in the medium/long term when modifications in the 
procedures and working of the CRAs take place and when ratings issued by the competing 
CRAs are used. 
The regulator mentions another cost of the endorsed ratings as part of their cost benefit analysis. 
There could be a decrease in the number of ratings issued from the third countries since they 
do not pass the stringency requirements. This would induce pressure on the release of non-
conventional ratings still allowed in the EU or prompt CRAs to get involved in costly 
modifications and actions which will allow them to retain the market share and defend their 
position. These increase costs of producing ratings would then be shifted on investors. 
To summarize, the cost benefit analysis anticipates that the advantages to the market 
participants are low/medium in the short run (due to the losses of numerous ratings) and high 
in the medium/long run (because market efficacy and integrity is improved by potentially 
higher quality of endorsed ratings in the EU). 
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6.3 Prior literature 
Although credit ratings play a vital role in financial markets, the literature specifically 
investigating their quality is surprisingly limited. It is of upmost importance to understand its 
determinants since creditworthiness announced by CRAs includes the information on the 
issuers during the course of the business cycle which is not easily deduced from market prices. 
6.3.1 Quality of ratings 
The main stream of prior literature concentrates on the quality (i.e. information content) of 
ratings which is approached by considering the association between credit ratings (or their 
changes) and bond yields (or their changes) (West, 1973; Ederington et al., 1986; Hand et al., 
1992; Ederington and Goh, 1998; Becker and Milbourn, 2011).  
For instance, Becker and Milbourn (2011) define the quality of ratings as the ability of ratings 
to transmit reliable information to market participants and their ability to categorise the risk of 
a rated product. The latter relates to the fact that rating classifications are durable and do not 
change frequently. Classification is especially important for regulations, and EU regulation in 
particular, since they require stable interpretations of ratings when they are used in contracts 
and capital requirements. For this reason, ratings higher than they should otherwise be, are 
considered to be a lower quality of rating which is key to the EU regulation presumably. Becker 
and Milbourn (2011) emphasize that low quality (inflated) ratings might harm the information 
diffusion of ratings unless all market participants are well informed (sophisticated). Not all 
investors are able to extract the inflation effect from the ratings, when interpreting them. This 
lessens the value of ratings paradoxically to those investors who should be making risk 
assessments and decisions based on them. As a result, the benefits for the financial system 
derived from ratings are reduced (Boot et al., 2006; Bolton et al., 2012). Additionally, low 
quality ratings complicate regulations and make contracting with ratings more difficult as they 
depend on established denotations of categories. 
The authors measure the quality of ratings in terms of their informativeness, in three ways: (i) 
the rating levels;203 (ii) correlation between ratings and market implied yields204 and (iii) default 
rates compared against the current ratings or investment grade dummy variables.205  
                                                 
203. Where any rating inflation conveys decreasing rating quality. 
204. Where higher correlations are expected to signal higher quality of ratings and vice versa. 
205. To verify whether the ratings are good predictors of default. 
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Investigation of the quality of ratings often takes the form of natural experiments (Kliger and 
Sarig, 2000; Jorion et al., 2005; Tang, 2009). Other studies focus on the effect of ratings on the 
supply of debt capital with the use of leverage (instead of cost of capital) as a dependent 
variable (Faulkender and Peterson, 2006; Kisgen, 2006, 2009; Sufi, 2009). According to 
Kisgen (2006), around the time when a new rating is to be published, companies are found to 
reduce their leverage. Moreover, subsequent to a downgrade, a firm is more likely to reduce its 
leverage in the hope of regaining its previous rating (Kisgen, 2009). The strongest effect can 
be observed around the investment/speculative threshold.             
Kisgen and Strahan (2010) differs because they investigate the regulatory influence of various 
levels of ratings, and not the impact of having a rating, on bond yields. Using the event of 
certification of Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) for regulatory purposes in 2003, the 
authors establish that rating-contingent regulation influences a firm’s cost of debt capital (bond 
yields). The natural experiment finds the effect to be asymmetric, namely only better ratings of 
the newly certified CRA in contrast to the other CRAs correspond to change (i.e. decline) in 
firms’ cost of capital. Moreover, the results also support Bongaerts et al. (2012) who state that 
ratings by Fitch are important mainly due to regulatory reasons as they are known to “break 
the tie” between Moody’s and S&P when their views about issuer’s creditworthiness differ. 
Both studies find results to be stronger around the investment-grade cut-off where the impact 
of regulatory restraint is the most binding. 
6.3.2 Effect of regulation of CRAs 
The impact of regulation on the rating industry is mainly examined by looking at the effect of 
entry of a regulated CRA and the corresponding effect of increased competition on the rest of 
the CRA industry (Becker and Milbourn, 2011; Doherty et al., 2012; Bongaerts et al., 2012).  
Faure-Grimaud et al. (2009) suggests that competition amongst CRAs might result in reduced 
information revelation to the market. Bolton et al. (2012), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) and 
Dimitrov et al. (2015) also confirm that the overall quality of ratings drops with increased 
competition. Bolton et al. (2012) conclude that increased competition between CRAs might 
lead to increased rating shopping and as a result a decreased wealth effect. They find that when 
more naïve investors are present the countercyclical quality of ratings is reinforced. This is 
based on the notion that the reputation costs are not significant therefore the incentives to 
provide high quality ratings diminish.  
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Dimitrov et al. (2015) study the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform on ratings 
of corporates and find that their quality, measured by accuracy and informativeness, drops after 
the introduction of new laws. These authors associate the behaviour of CRAs with the 
reputational concerns outlined by Morris (2011). The results are consistent with Becker and 
Milbourn (2011), who suggest that increased competition from Fitch, corresponds with 
Moody’s and S&P releasing higher (less accurate) ratings as they are not concerned about their 
reputation.  
Becker and Milbourn (2011) consider the transition in competition as observed from a two-
CRA setting to three CRAs. In contrast, Doherty et al. (2012) capture the conversion from 
monopoly to duopoly studying the insurance ratings market (not the bond market). These 
authors find that the new entrant CRA chooses higher standards than the incumbent company. 
They proxy ratings quality (informativeness) using the insurer’s probability of default 
calculated with a discrete-time hazard model and conclude that increased competition results 
in improved precision of default rate estimates.  
The default rate probability mentioned earlier as an informativeness measurement of quality 
applies to rating accuracy (Cantor and Mann, 2007; Kiff et al., 2012). The existing proxies of 
accuracy include different market-based measures of default risk, investment-grade default 
rates, or average rating levels prior to default (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Löffler 2004). Since 
CRAs face a dilemma whereby greater accuracy is at the expense of rating stability, they apply 
additional credit warnings such as outlook and watch status (Hamilton and Cantor, 2004). For 
instance, Bannier and Hirsch (2010) find that the introduction of the watchlist instrument by 
Moody’s in 1991 improved the informativeness of rating opinions for market participants. This 
is because the rating changes of entities placed on the watchlist reveal different information to 
the market than do direct rating changes of issuers not subject to watchlist status at the time. 
The study supplements literature on the responses of CRAs to regulatory pressures, similarly 
to Cheng and Neamtiu (2009). These authors find that as a response to the threat to their market 
power CRAs increase the timeliness and accuracy of ratings. This contrasts with the studies in 
the first paragraph of this section. 
The related literature on the effect of regulation which does not include a competition 
perspective is very scarce. Alsakka et al. (2015) is the only study to date which looks at the 
effect of new regulatory regime in Europe (supervised by ESMA since July 2011) on the CRA 
market. Study aims to find if the perceptions of investors towards CRA operations changed due 
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to new regulatory actions. These are measured by studying stock returns and volatility of 44 
publicly listed European banks rated by the largest three CRAs over period 2008-2013. There 
are differing perceptions amongst participants towards the three CRAs whereas the evidence 
of improved quality of released ratings or enhanced stability of the market is mixed. 
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) examine the influence of intensifying regulation imposed by 
NAIC in 1990 together with simultaneous restrictions on saving and loan investment on the 
financing and investment. They find that a shock in supply of credit (i.e. contraction) strongly 
affects firms’ financing and investment decisions. Moreover, Ellul et al. (2011) conclude that 
insurance companies, which are strongly constrained by regulation, are more likely to fire-sale 
bonds which fall below investment grade. These authors stress that this causes the prices of 
bonds to plummet below their fundamental value which sheds light on the possible effect of 
regulatory pressures on market imbalances.  
A theoretical paper by Opp et al. (2013) suggests that ratings-contingent regulation diminishes 
the incentives of CRAs for information provision. The framework integrates the applicability 
of ratings for regulatory purposes and its effect on rating quality. Namely, there is known to 
exist a threshold level of regulatory gain beyond which the regulatory arbitrage brings in the 
same advantage as delegated information attainment by the CRA. When issuers receive 
favourable rating treatment and its economic advantage is higher than that of obtaining 
information, regulation causes the collapse of the information provision process and leads to 
ratings inflation. Similarly to Mathis et al. (2009) and Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), the study 
suggests that it might be cost-effective for CRAs to release lower-quality ratings instead of 
dealing with proper assessment of complicated bank structures. This is especially important 
since ratings are found to shape prices via the channel of regulation independent of the actual 
risk they signal to the market (Ashcraft et al., 2011; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010).  
In his proposal for regulatory changes to CRAs, Calomiris (2009b) suggests hardwiring ratings 
into regulations results in inflated ratings as investors and CRAs exploit regulatory arbitrage. 
Nevertheless, according to Efing (2013), even when information is freely available, ratings 
might be inflated since the CRAs and issuers can jointly benefit from it. Arguably, this can 
only be a temporary effect, as one would expect an efficient market to re-calibrate accordingly.
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6.3.3 Inflated ratings 
Inflated ratings might be conflicting with the reputational concerns of CRAs (Cantor and 
Packer, 1995b; Covitz and Harrison, 2003). However, it has been documented that the incentive 
to release high-quality ratings drops when the economy is booming, thereby suggesting counter 
cyclicality in ratings quality (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009; Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013; Hau 
et al., 2013; Hilscher and Wilson, 2013; Opp et al., 2013).  
Hau et al. (2013) find that bank characteristics such as loan share and bank size influence 
ratings quality. Broto and Molina (2014) also find that the CRAs tighten their rating standards 
during the economic downturns. Therefore, due to reputational concerns the rating inflation in 
that period would be very unlikely. Broto and Molina (2014) is the first to empirically test the 
asymmetry of the sovereign rating responses to fundamentals. Using an extensive sample of 67 
countries the paper disentangles the determinants of sovereign ratings cycles for rating 
upgrades and downgrades. They find that favourable fundamentals206 help in easing and 
evening the series of rating downgrades whereas they do not improve during the rating upgrade 
stage.  
Since there are no other published studies, except Alsakka et al. 2015, questioning and 
assessing the consequences of the new regulatory regime for CRAs (i.e. including workings of 
CRAs supervisor- ESMA), this study fills the literature gap. The novelty derives from 
measuring the impact of recent CRA regulation, conveyed via the ESMA identifiers, on the 
ratings quality (measured by their informativeness). Investigating the disclosure rules is 
important for future policies and regulatory actions as ESMAs endorsement regulations might 
make CRAs more credible resulting in ratings more rather than less prominent. 
6.4 Design of the study 
Changes in the quality of ratings are assessed in the ‘before’ and ‘after’ sense with the 
introduction of ESMA identifiers in April 2012. This is a reasonable ‘cut-off’ point because 
henceforth ESMA does not allow market participants in the EU to use ratings originating from 
unrecognised jurisdictions for regulatory purposes. The beginning of the sample period (Sept 
                                                 
206. Domestic variables such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, current balance on GDP, public debt on GDP were found to 
have different impact during upgrades and downgrades of sovereigns. However, there might be some omitted variables as the 
authors do not know the CRA’s model. 
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2007) is chosen as it does not coincide with any major regulatory change in Europe nor the 
US.207 
Since bond prices change far more frequently than ratings, sovereign bond spreads are used 
and matched with daily rating events. Using corporate bonds would restrict the data to monthly 
frequency due to rating data availability. Using sovereign bonds also allows a more manageable 
sample size and enables us to study the differentials among CRAs found in the previous 
literature on split ratings (e.g. Livingston et al., 2010; Bongaerts et al., 2012). The study uses 
sovereign ratings from three main rating CRAs (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P) to explore if there 
is variation in the way they rate the same bonds (i.e. bond rating) depending on the location of 
the analyst. For example, Moody’s rates the sovereign bonds of Belarus, Croatia, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine outside of the EU (EE identifier) whereas S&P rates them 
within the EU area (EU identifier). Using corporate data would not provide this setting.  
Although the studied phenomenon of a regulatory intervention provides grounds for applying 
the quasi-experimental research design such as the difference-in-difference estimation, all 
CRAs registered in the EU are required by regulation to enforce the identifiers. This prevents 
the usage of a counterfactual group where the intervention was not introduced. Therefore, the 
time variation (before and after) and not the cross sectional variation (treated versus non-treated 
group) is observed. However, one cannot guarantee that the inferences in this setting are 
causally related to the treatment or are just an effect of time (i.e. variables which might be 
correlated with time but are not the effect of the intervention). For this reason, fixed effects 
models are implemented with the use of complementary approaches.  
For example, following Finkelstein (2007), the comparison is made (on the sovereign level) 
whether the intensification of the treatment among two groups which received it is different. 
The reason why the perceptibility would be different could be due to two reasons. Firstly, the 
treatment might bring different entities to different levels. Alternatively, different entities might 
demonstrate distinct pre-intervention levels which as a result of treatment are raised to the same 
level as others. In the context of this study, it is investigated whether the EU regulation affected 
sovereigns (with “EU registered” versus “EU endorsed” CRA identifiers) from both groups to 
a different extent. Specifically, are EU originated ratings of higher or lower quality in 
comparison to EU endorsed ratings? The categorical variable (identifier) EE (EU) and the 
                                                 
207. For example, in the aftermath of the Credit Rating Reform Act (September 2006), in June 2007 operative stipulations 
including registration and supervision were introduced by the SEC. During this time, ten CRAs were registered as NRSROs 
(Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). 
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interaction between the binary variable ΔRating with EE (EU) attempt to answer this question 
(see Eq. (6.1b) later). The interaction is the key variable reflecting patterns of the rating levels 
in areas where it might have more pronounced impact with those where it is less influential. To 
rule out the concern that other issues might have changed over time and influenced the 
outcome, global time-varying risk factor covariates are included.208   
6.4.1 Data sources 
The bond characteristics and pricing data, including remaining maturity, coupon rate per 
annum, yield to maturity per annum and the issue amount are accessed using Bloomberg L.P. 
The selection criteria includes publicly placed, unsecured, straight sovereign government 
bonds with fixed coupon and with remaining maturity between 1 to 30 years, issued in US 
dollars. Structured notes, inflation-linked notes, hybrid or dual-currency bonds as well as 
restructured debt are excluded. 
These criteria are met by 812 bonds where 763 have the pricing information available 
(historical data such as YTM). There are 494 non-US bonds.  The availability of bond data 
predetermined the sovereigns for which rating data was collected. The initial sample included 
86 sovereigns. Since US Treasury bonds are used as a benchmark for the sovereign credit 
spread the few rating events for the United States are excluded from the sample. 
Bond spreads, in basis points, are calculated by taking the difference between the yield to 
maturity of the sovereign bond subject to the rating action and subtracting the yield to maturity 
of the comparable US benchmark bond. Herein rating action data is referred as credit ratings 
together with outlook and watch status represented in the 58 point CCR scale (see section 
6.4.1.1). To decide on the choice of the benchmark bond to be matched to each sovereign bond 
with the closest remaining maturity and coupon amount is chosen. The long term foreign 
currency rating information is gathered from the three CRAs’ publications. The coverage of 
countries per CRA is listed in Appendix 6.A.2. Data on identifiers for the three CRAs is 
obtained from the Interactive Data Credit Ratings International (CRI) database. 
The rating action data is matched with the bond data based on the rating events. Multiple bonds 
are often observed on the day of the rating action. Unlike Gande and Parsley (2005) who 
                                                 
208. Similarly to Finkelstein (2007) an alternative specification includes an independent variable which counts the number of 
days before (or since) the identifiers were implemented by CRAs. The results remain unchanged. 
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observe one particular bond for each sovereign throughout their sample period, this study 
samples the bond with the highest issue amount per sovereign on the particular rating event 
date. This enables to minimise risk of discarding too many bonds for which data is not available 
(Vu et al., 2015). For any one rating event only one bond is observed. The dataset comprises 
556 rating events for three CRAs which originate from 69 sovereigns and are represented by 
99 individual sovereign bonds. 40 US bonds are used as benchmarks for spread calculations. 
Details of this exercise along with the description for each CRA are in the next paragraphs. 
6.4.1.1 S&P 
The matched sample of sovereign credit information with bond spreads has 238 rating changes 
of which 118 are positive and 120 negative. These events originate from 64 sovereigns, among 
which 20 are within Europe. 83 unique sovereign bonds are selected209 whereas 35 US Treasury 
bonds are used as benchmark for spread calculations. The sample excludes observations where 
the spreads are negative (1 case of Netherlands)210 or where there is no US bond matching the 
issue amount criteria needed to calculate the spread on the date of event.211  
6.4.1.2 Moody’s  
There are 166 Moody’s rating actions, with 86 positive and 80 negative events, from 49 
sovereign states among which 17 are in Europe. 61 unique bonds are selected for this purpose 
whereas 34 US Treasury bonds are used as benchmark bonds to calculate the spread. Actions 
which were dropped either resulted from (a) the negative spread calculation (1 case for 
Netherlands)212 or (b) did not have available data for the US bonds matched according to the 
applied criteria on the given event dates, which thus prevented calculation of the spread.213 
6.4.1.3 Fitch 
The matched sample includes 152 rating events where 82 (70) are positive (negative) actions 
respectively. The number of sovereigns includes 49 (out of which 17 are European) represented 
by 59 sovereign bonds matched with the 31 US Treasury bonds acting as a benchmark for 
                                                 
209. Each event is represented by only one bond which might change within the same event ‘period’ for the same country. 
210. The event on Netherlands from the 29-11-2013 with 2 CCR point downgrade in rating is deleted from the sample. 
211. Two events were omitted on this basis: Barbados on the 22-10-10 with the 2 CCR points downgrade and Costa Rica on 
the 14-07-08 with the 1 CCR point upgrade in rating. 
212. Netherlands on the 07-03-2014 with 1 CCR point downgrade is dropped from the sample. 
213. Costa Rica on the 12-08-2008 with 1CCR upgrade is deleted from the sample.  
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spread calculations. In the process one event was eliminated because there was no close match 
of the US Treasury bond on the event date (e.g. Ytm was not available for the bond which was 
selected).214 Additionally, there were two instances when the spread for a bond on Netherlands 
was negative.215 
These results and subsequently Tables 6.1-6.4 already exclude the outliers in the data. Outliers 
in sub-samples are identified using the MM-robust regression method (see section 6.5.1).  
6.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Rating events (in the robustness section) are identified using 20-notches scale (see Tables 6.17-
6.19). The numerical scores are as follows: SD, CC, D=1, CCC-=2, AA+=19, AAA=20. To 
add weight to the rating changes the ratings scale is supplemented with watch and outlook 
status which results in the comprehensive credit rating scale (CCR-58 points scale). Rating 
values range between 1-58 as follows: AAA=58, AA+=55, …, C/SD/CC/D=1. For positive 
watch (outlook) +2 (+1) is added whereas for negative watch (outlook) 2 (1) is subtracted 
respectively. Possible events include rating change events (positive/negative), outlook or watch 
signals (positive/negative) with no corresponding rating change. Further, the combined events 
(positive/negative) are those when a rating change occurs together with either watch or outlook 
signal. Lastly, change from negative (positive) watch to negative (positive) outlook is also an 
event on the 58 point scale. Every increase to the CCR scale is considered a positive event 
whereas every decrease to the scale is considered a negative event. 
Table 6.1 presents the number of events in the sample, distinguishing between the three CRAs. 
Overall, the events by one CCR point constitute the biggest share among all CRAs (above 44% 
for positive events and above 34% for the negative). The most extreme upgrade (downgrade) 
for S&P is 12 CCR points216 (11 CCR points)217 whereas Fitch records upgrade of 15 CCR 
points218 and downgrade by 11 and 13 CCR points.219 Moody’s events stay in range of up to 9 
CCR points (see Table 6.1 for more information). The descriptive statistics of the sub-samples 
                                                 
214. Observation for Argentina with 2 CCR points downgrade on the 30-10-2012 is deleted from the sample. 
215. Netherlands received 1 CCR point upgrade on the 11-07-2014, whereas on the 05-02-2013 it received 1 CCR point 
downgrade. 
216. This is equivalent to 4 notches on the 20 notch rating scale recorded for Jamaica on the 24-02-2010. 
217. For Jamaica on the 12-02-2013. 
218. Argentina on the 12-07-2010. 
219. Jamaica on the 12-02-2013 and Argentina on the 27-11-2012 respectively. 
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of the three CRAs for the 20-notch scale used in the robustness section (see 6.7.3) are depicted 
in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.3 extends statistics on the credit events of qualifying sovereigns per CRA giving 
average numerical rating, number of observations and proportions of the events exceeding the 
+/-4 CCR points. The highest average numerical rating amongst the three sub-samples is 
observed for Fitch (28) followed by Moody’s (27) and S&P (26). Overall S&P releases the 
highest proportion of downgrades among the identifying CRAs. S&P as being the most 
conservative corresponds with prior split ratings literature (e.g. Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 
2010c). Fitch has the highest proportion (30%) of positive actions by more than 4 CCR points. 
In terms of downgrades, Moody’s delivered the highest proportion of 4 and above CCR points 
(40%).  
Additionally, the sample is partitioned into the pre-regulatory period (Sept 2007-April 2012) 
and post-regulatory period (May 2012-Sept 2014). From the total 556 events, 297(259) actions 
occur in the pre-event (post-event) periods. Positive (negative) actions in the first period 
constitute 53% (47%) of events whereas they amount to 50% (50%) in the second period. 
Interestingly, the average rating is higher in the pre-event period and drops in the post-event 
phase. 
Table 6.4 illustrates basic statistical properties of three event samples. For instance, the pooled 
sample for S&P (Moody’s), including cumulative two-day [0,+1] yield spread is represented 
by a mean of -0.6% (0.34%) and a standard deviation of 18.85% (12.38%). For Fitch, the 
former amounts to -0.15% with standard deviation of 12.49%. The mean term to maturity is 
the highest for Moody’s sub-sample (8.1 years with s.d. of 5.65) followed by S&P (7.66 years 
with s.d. 5.16) and Fitch (7.62 with s.d. 4.2). Further statistics representing the variables used 
in the multivariate analysis can also be found in Table 6.4. 
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6.5 Multivariate analysis 
6.5.1 Measures of quality  
Following the empirical literature (see section 6.3), the quality of ratings is captured by the 
information content of ratings (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Becker and Milbourn, 2011). The 
quality is examined by testing whether the market is more aligned with ratings through bond 
yields after the certification period. Because bond prices change far more frequently than 
ratings, the change in informativeness (accuracy) levels is assessed rather than any absolute 
match to market measures. Kliger and Sarig (2000) suggest using rating changes, rather than 
actual rating levels, because in this setting each firm controls for itself meaning that all price 
relevant elements are included. Specifically, it is tested whether rating changes are able to 
explain bond yield changes (decreases or increases in bond spreads). This capability 
differentiates ratings into less or more informative. To do this, the correlations between the 
credit ratings changes and the bond yields changes are compared prior and post the regulatory 
event date. High quality ratings are expected to explain bond values by correlating strongly 
with the bond yields. Low quality ratings, on the other hand, reveal factors other than the 
expected repayment (pay-off), and thus correlate less with the yields on bonds. The second 
proposition ultimately tests whether ratings encompass information regarding bond values, 
other than the easily detected properties including bond contracts and issuers’ fixed effects.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are estimated, where the changes in bond yield 
spread are regressed on change in credit ratings, an indicator variable depicting regulation 
which is defined in two ways (Eq. (6.1a) & Eq. (6.1b)), a vector of global risk characteristics, 
ratings on the 58 CCR scale followed by bond characteristics and year and/or country fixed 
effects. Outliers in sub-samples are identified using Yohai’s (1987) MM-robust regression 
method, similar to Kurov (2010). The observations with extreme standardized residual values, 
which lie outside of the ‘normal range’, are outliers and hence are eliminated from the sample 
before estimating Eq. (6.1a) & Eq. (6.1b). There is no rule of thumb, which would suggest the 
range in which the observations (as well as their robust distance) need to lie as it depends on 
the properties of each particular sample.220 
                                                 
220. The rule applied here is that the robust standardized residuals (vertical dimension outlier) which lie outside the range   [-
20, +20] and [0, 40] of the robust distance of the distribution (horizontal dimension outlier) are excluded from the analysis. 
This method discards 8 events for S&P (1 for positive events and 7 for negative). For Moody’s 14 events are eliminated      (7 
each for positive and negative events). Lastly, 7 outliers for Fitch are dropped (4 for positive and 2 for negative events). 
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Similar to Livingston et al. (2010), separate sets of regressions for rating upgrades and 
downgrades are used. Unlike their paper each of the three CRAs are tested separately. The 
rationale for benchmark regressions is to observe whether the rating actions result in substantial 
information content for the sovereigns bonds and whether bonds react differently to the actions 
issued by each CRA.  
In the first specification, the effect of disclosure rules by ESMA is measured by using a 
Regulation dummy as well as its interaction with the (change in) sovereign bond ratings 
(Eq.(6.1a)).  
𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔58𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑋𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ℷ1𝐶𝐹 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                             𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1)                                                            (6.1a)                                                             
Where 𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the change in the sovereign’s yield spread to the closest maturity minus the 
treasury bond for country-i, day-t in the time window [0, +1] expressed in basis points.221 
Δ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 is the change in sovereign issuer CCR by one of the three CRAs coded as absolute 
ordinal values 0, 1, 2, 3 for ease of interpretation222 (in separate upgrade and downgrade 
specifications). The coefficient β1 captures the marginal effect of yield spreads as a result of a 
unit change in the CCR scale (on the event date and zero on the non-event date). For negative 
events (downgrade in CCR sovereign rating) coded as absolute values, a positive sign is 
expected as the yields spreads increase to reflect the underlying risk on the bonds. On the other 
hand, the positive events (upgrades in CCR) lead to decreased risk for investors (i.e. spreads 
are narrowing) hence negative sign is expected. 
The Regulation indicator variable equals 1 for dates after the endorsement rules introduced by 
ESMA took effect on April 30 2012, 0 otherwise. The β2 coefficient captures whether the 
regulatory intervention had a positive or negative effect on the bond yields. An insignificant 
sign would indicate about no discernible effect of regulation. 
ΔRating*Regulation, the key variable in this model, measures the linkage between quality of 
ratings and ESMA’s requirement for identifiers by observing correlations between ratings and 
yields in the post-intervention period. In the case of positive rating changes, if the sign is 
                                                 
221. Similarly to Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) this window is used to minimise the impact of 
clusters of credit events that could possibly affect the results.   
222. This refers to rating change (upgrade or downgrade) by 0, 1, 2 or 3 CCR points.   
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negative (corresponding to the expected sign on the ΔRating variable) and significant, the effect 
of rating changes on bond yields is stronger in the post regulatory period. This corresponds to 
a higher quality of ratings. On the other hand, if the interaction produces a positive significant 
coefficient, the effect is weaker and implies that ratings are of lower quality. Similarly, in the 
case of negative events, if the interaction has a positive significant coefficient stronger links 
are detected between rating changes and spreads after the regulation took place, indicating 
higher quality of ratings. Conversely, if the sign is negative there is a weaker effect suggesting 
lower quality of ratings.  
Rating58 represents the sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58 and represents a proxy for the 
macroeconomic conditions of the sovereigns considered in the sample. 
Xi,t is a set of global risk factors which are common to all countries. As suggested by Broto 
and Molina (2014), these variables control for the diversity among the panel data. Following 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Favero et al. (2010), Oliveira et al. (2012) and Eichler (2014), 
one of three risk factors are included on the right hand side. These include CBOE VIX volatility 
index, Treasury rate (5 and 10 years maturity), and interest rate swap spreads (5 and 10 years 
maturity). All data is accessed from Bloomberg. The factors (index or rates) are in the form of 
the logarithmic changes in the window [0, +1] around the event. Since the bond spreads are 
calculated using the US benchmark US based measures of international risk are used due to 
exogeneity to the rest of the data sample. 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡yi,t is the bond’s time to maturity and deals with possible heterogeneity among spread 
changes which derive due to differences in the remaining years to maturity of bonds. The 
natural logarithm of the remaining years to maturity of the bond i on the event date t is obtained.   
CF and TF are country (year) fixed effects respectively. They control for geographic and time 
specific effects (trends). 
The second specification uses most of the previous variables. However, instead of using the 
Regulation indicator variable it defines the regulation using the EE and EU dummies, together 
with their interactions with the change in sovereign ratings (𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔). 
 
𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐸𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝛥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐸𝑈)𝑖,𝑡 
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔58𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑋𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ℷ1𝐶𝐹 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                                𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 1)                                                      (6.1b) 
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EE (EU) specifies whether the rating is EU endorsed (EU originated) in the post-regulatory 
period (after 30 April 2012) by taking the value of 1, 0 otherwise. 𝛽2 and 𝛽3captures the 
whether having a rating issued by an analyst who is located outside or within Europe, after the 
regulation was passed on, has any effect on bond yields.  
ΔRating*EE/EU measures whether any change in rating quality depends on the identifiers and 
hence the location of the analyst. It is tested whether ratings originated outside the EU induce 
more (less) reaction in yield spreads than the ratings issued in the EU. For instance, if the 
interaction ΔRating*EE, tested on the positive events sample, produces a negative significant 
coefficient, this implies a stronger link between bond yields and ratings in the post-regulation 
period when the rating is endorsed (rather than originated in the EU). If the sign is positive and 
significant, the effect between yields and ratings decreased, implying a lower quality of ratings 
in the post-regulation period when the ratings are assigned the EE identifier. The reverse logic 
applies to negative events, i.e. when the coefficient on the interaction is positive and significant 
it means that the sovereign rating assigned by the analyst outside the EU in the post-event 
period is of better quality. Finally, when the sign is negative there is a weaker link between the 
spreads and ratings in the post-regulation period for ratings issued in a jurisdiction outside the 
EU. A similar logic applies to 𝛽5 and comparisons can be made. 
Following Ferreira and Gama (2007), a sample of non-events is compiled where each bond on 
the rating event date is randomly assigned a non-event date. This randomisation was performed 
using the random number generator in STATA. The reasoning behind using non-events 
together with the events data lies in the fact if the model was estimated using only the latter 
one would be measuring the incremental effect of a rating action exceeding one CCR point (on 
the 58-point scale) in the yield spreads (Gande and Parsley, 2005).  
The non-event sample is compiled in the same time frame as the event sample whereas it 
includes only clean observations. A clean observation is defined as: 
a) no credit event for that sovereign issued by any of the three CRAs in a time window of 30 
days before and after the non-event date. 
b) no credit event regarding the US sovereign issued by any of the three CRAs in the window 
of 30 days prior and post the non-event date. 
c) not within proximity of the date of the regulatory change regarding disclosure (30 April 
2012), specifically within a window of 30 days prior and post that event.  
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Additionally, when the non-event date is being matched to the event date recorded in the pre-
regulatory period (September 2007-April 2012), only the clean observations from this period 
are available for random selection. Equivalently, when the non-event is matched to an event 
date which took place after the regulation cut-off date (May 2012-September 2014), only clean 
non-event observations in that pool are selected.     
The non-event sample for each CRA equals the same number of observations as the event 
sample (556 total, 238 S&P, 166 Moody’s, 152 Fitch) which results in a total sample of 1112 
observations with 476 for S&P, 332 for Moody’s and for 304 Fitch sub-samples respectively. 
6.5.1.1 Likelihood ratio (LR) test 
Specifications (a) and (b), estimating Eq.(6.1a) and Eq.(6.1b) respectively for all models and 
CRAs, were tested using the likelihood-ratio (LR) test (see Tables 6.5-6.19). The LR test is 
calculated using the formula: (-2ln (LO/L1): where L1 is the value of the likelihood function 
for the un-nested full model that includes all the variables with unconstrained coefficients and 
L0 is the value of the likelihood function for the nested model in which coefficients on 
variable(s) are restricted to zero. The LR statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of constraints imposed (see Greene, 2012).  
The LR test, with two degrees of freedom, was performed in STATA by estimating two models 
(constrained versus unconstrained) and comparing their fit against each other using the log 
likelihood information. To choose the preferred model, the procedure is to test the statistical 
significance of the difference between the two models. If the difference between the models is 
significant the less restrictive model (with more variables: unconstrained) is preferred as it 
better fits the data.  
In all tests, specification (a) was identified as a constrained model while specification (b) as an 
unconstrained model. The difference between the two models was statistically insignificant in 
all cases suggesting that the two models do not differ in terms of fitting the data. The only 
exception were the robustness tests (see section 6.7) using sub-sample of European data pooled 
from three CRAs (see Table 6.10) and the negative events sample for Fitch using the 20-notch 
scale (see Table 6.19). In these two cases, the LR ratio suggests that the less restrictive model 
(unconstrained: specification (b)) is preferred.  
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The model selection indices such as Akaike criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) also suggested that both models fit the data very similarly in all tested examples.223  
6.6 Empirical results 
Specifications (a) and (b) in Tables 6.5-6.7 present the results of Eq. (6.1a) and Eq. (6.1b) for 
the three CRAs by separating positive (Panel I) and negative events (Panel II). The coefficient 
on ∆Rating has the expected sign for all CRAs in the majority of specifications. However, only 
positive events by S&P and negative events by Fitch have significant coefficients for the effect 
on bond yields. The second specification (b) minimally improves explanatory power of the 
model for all sub-samples for the three CRAs.      
The inverse relationship between S&P rating upgrades and yields is significant (at 1%) and 
economically relevant (see Panel I Table 6.5). The estimates remain robust to the inclusion of 
country224 and/or year fixed effects, which control for unobserved differences across the time 
or country spectrum. The coefficient in specification (b-IV) suggests that bond spreads narrow 
by 9.57 (3.19*3) basis points after S&P issues an upgrade by one notch (three CCR points). 
This suggests a strong link between ratings and bond spreads. Negative events of S&P do not 
demonstrate a strong link with the spreads. The presented results for S&P do not find evidence 
of the impact of regulation on rating quality neither via the interaction (ΔRating*Regulation) 
in specification (a) nor via the use of identifiers (ΔRating*EE/EU) in specification (b).225  
The coefficients for market reactions to Moody’s rating changes have the expected sign for 
both positive and negative events, however these are insignificant. The 58 CCR scale rating 
(Rating58) in Panel I is negative and significant across specifications implying the higher the 
rating by Moody’s the lower the yield on the sovereign. No evidence is found that the effect is 
stronger or weaker for sovereigns with ratings issued either in the EU or outside. 
Fitch negative events yield significant and economically relevant results for bond spreads. The 
coefficient in specification (b-IV) implies that on average bond spreads increase by up to 11.37 
(3.79*3) basis points when Fitch issues a one notch downgrade. Only specification b (I and II), 
                                                 
223. These results are not reported in the interest of brevity but are available on request. 
224. Additionally, the same exercise was performed using regional instead of country dummies, for all CRAs, but the results 
were similar. 
225. However, when a different measure of global risk is applied (VIX index) it is found that in specification (a) the interaction 
between Δ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 yields positive significant results at 10% or 5% for models (I), (II) and (IV). Continuation: 
The positive sign on the coefficient indicates about decreased effect on yields and hence lower quality of ratings after the 
regulation took effect. These results are reported in Appendix 6.A.3. 
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shows modest effects of regulation on the quality of ratings (although only significant at 10%). 
Coefficient on ΔRating*EE suggests that the effect on yields of sovereign bonds originated 
outside EU in the post-event period is weaker at the same time implying a lower quality of 
these ratings.  
Inclusion of the global risk factor in the model considerably strengthens the explanatory power, 
especially in the negative events samples for S&P and Moody’s. In addition to using country 
and/or year fixed effects, it protects from the omitted variable bias. The importance of including 
international exposure to common risks when predicting sovereign spreads has been stressed 
in the literature (Favero et al., 2010). Among the three global risk factors suggested in section 
6.5.1, in Tables 6.5-6.7 only the interest rate swap spreads are presented as they bring the most 
explanatory benefits. The yield spreads are found to positively correlate with the swap 
spreads.226  
6.7 Robustness tests 
6.7.1 Pooled CRAs sample 
To eliminate the risk that estimates are driven by the characteristics of a particular CRA the 
sample of positive (negative) events are merged for the three CRAs and Eq. (6.1a) and (6.1b) 
are re-estimated. The positive events sample (depicted in Table 6.8) has the expected sign on 
the Δ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 for both specifications (a) and (b). In contrast with the positive events by three 
CRAs separately, the results are stronger in terms of the size of the coefficients and their sign.  
Although the effect for Δ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 is weaker than for the S&P alone, it provides middle ground 
between the mostly insignificant results (and mixed signs) for Moody’s and Fitch. Regulation 
related variables are not significant in either specification in the pooled sample. This does not 
differ much from the previous results with an exception of Fitch in two rare cases when the 
coefficients on Regulation and EU in specification (a-I) and (b-I) respectively are marginally 
significant. Further, a control variable measuring the time before (since) the regulation took 
place is added, however the results do not change.227 Since the model is run on different CRAs 
their unobservable effects could be driving the results and be of potential endogeneity problem 
                                                 
226. The volatility index (Treasury rate) is inversely (positively) related to the sovereign bond yields. Although results are not 
reported in the interests of brevity they are available on request. 
227. The adjusted R-squared remains the same and in some cases becomes marginally smaller. Results are not reported in the 
interest of brevity but are available on request. 
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via omitted variable bias. When CRA fixed effects are included, the results do not change 
significantly.228, 229  
In the negative events pooled CRAs sub-sample similar results are found (see Table 6.9). The 
sign on Δ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 is as expected and significant at 5% for all model specifications.230 The 
coefficients are consistent in terms of their size and hold the predicted correct sign across 
specifications. They are marginally lower in magnitude to those on Fitch sub-sample alone. 
When the CRAs fixed effects are applied results remain the same similarly when the time 
before (since) the regulation control variable is included. Collectively no effect of the 
regulation on the quality of ratings is recorded either via the Regulation dummy or its 
interaction with ratings in specification (a) or via the use of identifiers in specification (b).231  
6.7.2 Regional differences 
As a further investigation, the regressions (specification (a) and (b)) are estimated using 
regional sub-samples. The sample is split into Europe, Asia and “Other” countries (the latter 
includes Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan 
Africa). The regions are based on the United Nations country classification (2012).232 See 
Appendix 6.A.4 for country classification in the sample. 
The results for positive events in European subsample using specification (a) show influence 
of Regulation on the quality of ratings significant at 10% and 5% whereas the interaction 
∆Rating*Regulation does not yield significant results. The coefficient on the ∆Rating is also 
insignificant and with the wrong sign. In specification (b), the coefficient ΔRating*EE is 
significant at 1% yielding positive result with quite substantial magnitude (see Table 6.10). 
These strong results suggest that the effect between yields and ratings decreased, implying a 
lower quality of ratings in the post-regulation period when the ratings are assigned with the EE 
identifier.233  
                                                 
228. The coefficient on the main variable (Δ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) gains significance with the expected sign after inclusion of the CRA 
fixed effects in both specifications (a) and (b). However, the adjusted R-squared of the model remains the same or marginally 
lower. 
229. Additionally, the positive sample consists of 61 sovereigns. The number of events which are representing EU (EE) issued 
ratings after April 2012 is 132 (126) respectively. The distribution of the identifiers in both positive and negative pooled sub-
samples is depicted in Figure 6.1 and 6.2. Grey (black) colour is assigned to EE (EU) respectively.  
230. With one exception for model (VI) is specification (a) where it is significant at 10%. 
231. The negative pooled sample comprises of 51 sovereigns. The EU (EE) issued rating events after April 2012 amount to 
114 (146) respectively. 
232. The only exception is Turkey, which is classified as Europe in the sample.  
233. After closer investigation the large magnitude of the coefficient ΔRating*EE is explained by small number of observations 
(5), from more than one country, where the interaction is different from zero. 
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One would expect to see the impact of regulation on sovereigns issued with EU identifiers in 
European sub-sample since that is where ESMA regulation was introduced. However, the 
results are somewhat different and do not show any significant effect.   
Asian positive events sub-sample, does not find any evidence of the relationship nor does it 
show significant results for the main variable (∆Rating) coefficient. These results are reported 
in Table 6.11. 
The last group of sovereigns “Other” includes regions of sovereigns outside from Europe and 
Asia (e.g. Africa and America however, non-US since it is used as a benchmark for bond spread 
calculations). It yields correct significant sign on the ∆Rating in all specifications. The 
Regulation dummy and its interaction are insignificant in specification (a) when Swap rate is 
used as a global risk factor (consistent with other reported results; see Table 6.12). Neither 
there is effect of regulation captured in specification (b), via identifiers or their interactions 
with rating changes, with use of this global risk measure. When VIX index or Treasury rate are 
applied instead ∆Rating*Regulation in specification (a) shows significant results at 10% (two 
cases are significant both at 10% and 5% significance level) in majority of cases (see Table 
6.13 which incorporates the Treasury Rate as global risk factor instead of the Swap rate). This 
suggests that the effect on yields has decreased since identifiers were introduced, and therefore 
the quality of ratings has decreased. If specification (b) is considered with VIX or a Treasury 
rate, the interaction ΔRating*EE with differing fixed effects yields positive results significant 
at 10% and/or 5% with the same proportions. This suggests the effect decreased for those 
ratings originated outside the EU.234 
Regarding negative events, the European sub-sample does not suggest any effect of the 
regulation on quality of ratings when varying fixed effects are used. The only coefficient 
marginally significant is the ∆Rating (at 10%). Somewhat stronger correlation with yields has 
the Asian sub-sample. The ∆Rating is significant at 10% and 5%, however there is no effect of 
regulation. The last sub-sample does not show any effect of regulation neither does it show any 
correlation of ratings with yield spread (see Tables 6.14-6.16).  
                                                 
234. For the distribution of identifiers across the sample, see Figure 6.4. 
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6.7.3 20-Notch Scale 
To investigate whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of the outlook and watch status, 
Eq. (6.1a) and Eq. (6.1b) are estimated using the 20-notch scale rating rather than the 58-point 
CCR scale. All variables relating to ratings are re-defined accordingly. Events are rearranged 
so that any non-event in the 20-notch scale, which equals to solely outlook or watch action is 
deleted from the sample along with its corresponding non-event. As before the number of non-
event observations equals to the number of event observations.  
Both positive and negative sub-sample results for S&P do not vary from the earlier tests and 
suggest that regulation does not influence the quality of ratings. Amongst two samples only the 
former reports significant variable. ΔRating with 5% significance level holds correct sign for 
all specifications. These results are reported in Table 6.17.235 The same holds for Moody’s 
positive sample meaning the new scaling does not reveal any regulatory effects on the quality 
of ratings. In the negative sample model (a), the Regulation dummy is significant in two 
specifications at 10% and 5%.236 In specification (b) EE identifier’s coefficients turns 
significant on the same level. None of the interaction terms shows statistical significance using 
20-scale ratings (see Table 6.18). Positive events by Fitch also do not show significant results 
similarly with other CRAs in the sample. Negative events in specification (b) produce 
significant result for EE identifier when country fixed effects are used and significant 
coefficient on ΔRating*EE when year fixed effect is applied (both at 5%) (see Table 6.19). The 
negative sign on the latter suggests the effect between ratings and yields decreased implying 
lower quality of ratings in the post regulatory period and for the ratings, which originate outside 
the EU.237  
 
 
                                                 
235. Since the remaining results do not present any changes to the original estimations, they are excluded from this analysis 
but are available on request. The same applies to other sub-samples which did not produce significant results for any of the 
variables. 
236. High magnitude cannot be explained by the low number of observations as the ratio between Regulation equal to “1” and 
“0” is almost ½ (48 vs. 46 observations).  
237. The magnitude of the coefficient is high mainly because ΔRating*EE has only 10 rating events after April 2012. 
Additionally, the ΔRating*EU identifier yields inflated results which could also be due to low number of observations (10 
rating events were also recorded after April 2012). For distribution of identifiers in this sample, see Figure 6.5.  
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6.8 Conclusion   
Using an extensive sovereign rating sample from Fitch, Moody’s and S&P covering 69 
countries during the period Sept 2007-Sept 2014, the chapter investigates the impact of the 
recent EU CRA regulation with regards to ESMA identifiers. The regulation, which took effect 
in April 2012, obliges CRAs to identify the location of the analyst preparing the rating, which 
can be either the EU or a jurisdiction outside the EU with a comparable regulatory regime to 
that of the EU. It is important to investigate the effect of disclosure rules by ESMA on the 
market because there is a possibility that endorsement rules might add credibility to CRAs and 
consequently make ratings more, rather than less, influential.  
The study is located within a limited related literature measuring the quality of ratings from the 
information content perspective. The quality refers to the ability of ratings to explain bond 
yields. In contrast to the recent literature (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Becker and Milbourn, 
2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012), the study does not measure the effect of a new entrant (i.e. 
competition levels among the CRAs) on the quality of ratings. This study looks directly at the 
information disclosure rules applied to the already existing CRAs. 
The majority of rating changes fall at 1 or 2 CCR points suggesting that all CRAs rely 
considerably on the outlook and watch signals to imply future downgrades and upgrades. 
Similarly to Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010c), this study finds that S&P is the most conservative 
among the three CRAs by issuing the highest proportion of downgrades during the sample 
period. S&P also represents the lowest mean value of ratings in both pre- and post-regulatory 
periods. Interestingly, positive actions by S&P are reported to have a stronger effect on 
sovereign yields than the negative ones. In this setting, high quality ratings are expected to 
explain bond values by correlating strongly with the bond yields, therefore the positive actions 
by S&P are of higher quality. This could imply that S&P dedicates more time to issue ratings 
which are not inflated to avoid penalties from the regulators and to protect their reputation 
(Dimitrov et al., 2015). There is no evidence, however, that the rating quality improved after 
the introduction of identifiers. In other words, the quality of S&P positive actions was high to 
start with and remained at that level throughout the sample, regardless of regulatory 
pressures.238  
                                                 
238. The same logic applies to negative events by S&P. Namely negative ratings were of poorer quality and remained as such 
regardless of the introduced regulation. 
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The opposite is true for Fitch. Although the CRA issues the highest proportion of positive 
actions by more than 4 CCR points, upgrades have a weak connection with bond spreads, thus 
suggesting their lower quality. The negative events by Fitch have the strongest effect on bond 
spreads amongst the three CRAs, yielding statistically significant and economically relevant 
results. Except for two specifications, where there is a minor link between identifiers and rating 
quality, Fitch subsample does not provide evidence on the impact of the ESMA regulation on 
quality of ratings. The results on Moody’s actions also do not yield significant results, therefore 
identifiers do not have any discernible effect on rating quality.  
This study is of interest to policymakers, market participants and academics alike. The quality 
of ratings inspected in the current setting is an underdeveloped area in the empirical literature. 
It is also closely linked to banking regulation and maintaining financial stability. The effects 
of recent European CRA regulation are at a preliminary stage yet much more concrete evidence 
is needed on the effectiveness of the regime. ESMA itself should find this work of relevance 
as at this stage, it is highly questionable whether the adoption of rating identifiers served any 
meaningful purpose or achieved any of the regulator’s aims. Another contributing factor of this 
work lies in addressing the fact that there were no well-defined goals and objectives stated by 
the regulator when the identifiers were first introduced. The objectives remained opaque in the 
regulatory developments in subsequent years. This chapter fills a gap in knowledge by 
demonstrating that the identifiers did not alter the methods or relevance of the CRAs, at least 
in the short term. Nevertheless, future regulatory reforms need to be undertaken with caution 
as they might further aggravate the quality of ratings and thereby influence the stability and 
efficacy of the financial system. The findings are also of importance to market participants. 
There are obvious implications of how sovereign ratings can influence the functioning of 
financial markets. Ratings are known to affect many aspects of capital markets and shape 
access to funding (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2004; Duff and Einig, 2009a; BIS, 2011; Correa et 
al., 2014).  
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Notes: The Table presents summary statistics of rating events for 69 sovereigns encompassed in the credit rating dataset which 
consists of daily pooled observations for Sept 2007-Sept 2014 period. The ratings are expressed on the 58 point scale. % obs. 
defines percentage of all sample observations. S&P up to 12 CCR points for Jamaica 24.02.2010 upgrade to B- Stable since 
the last rating on the 14.01.2010 marked as default (SD=1 CCR point). Down 11 CCR points for Jamaica which on the 
12.02.2013 was issued default rating (SD) whereas the previous issued rating on the 13.08.2012 was B- Neg Outlook. Moody’s 
down 9 CCR points Barbados on the 02.06.2014 B3 Negative Outlook from the earlier rating on the 20.12.2013 with Ba3 
Negative Outlook. Fitch 11 CRR point downgrade for Jamaica on the 12.02.2013 which dropped to C from B- Negative 
Outlook on the 18.01.2013. 13 CCR point downgrade for Argentina on the 27.11.2012 to CC which dropped from B Negative 
Watch on the 30.10.2012. Finally, up to 15 CCR point upgrade for Argentina on the 12.07.2010 to B Stable from CC issued 
on the 01.01.2007. 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 Rating Events on the 58-Point scale 
 S&P         Moody's                      Fitch 
Up +1 61 51.69% 46 53.49% 36 43.90% 
Up +2 26 22.03% 24 27.91% 21 25.61% 
Up +3 22 18.64% 11 12.79% 17 20.73% 
Up +4 4 3.39% 4 4.65% 3 3.66% 
Up +5 1 0.85% 1 1.16% 0 0.00% 
Up +6 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 4 4.88% 
Up +7 1 0.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Up +8 1 0.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Up +9 1 0.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Up+12 1 0.85% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Up +15 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 1.22% 
         
Down -1 57 47.50% 27 33.75% 31 44.29% 
Down-2 24 20.00% 21 26.25% 14 20.00% 
Down -3 26 21.67% 13 16.25% 14 20.00% 
Down-4 2 1.67% 7 8.75% 3 4.29% 
Down-5 5 4.17% 4 5.00% 2 2.86% 
Down-6 5 4.17% 4 5.00% 0 0.00% 
Down-7 0 0.00% 2 2.50% 2 2.86% 
Down-8 0 0.00% 1 1.25% 0 0.00% 
Down-9 0 0.00% 1 1.25% 2 2.86% 
Down-10 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Down-11 1 0.83% 0 0.00% 1 1.43% 
Down-12 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Down-13 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 1.43% 
         
Upgrades 118  86  82   
Downgrades 120  80  70   
         
Total 238  166  152   
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Table 6.2 Rating Events on the 20-Notch scale     
  S&P Moody's Fitch  
1 No. of 1-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 50 40 33  
2 No. of 2-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 3 1 6  
3 No. of 3-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0 0  
4 No. of 4-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0 0  
5 No. of 5-Notch Upgrade Actions (Solo) 0 0 1  
6 Total Upgrade Actions (row 1+2+3+4+5) 55 41 40  
      
7 No. of 1-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 53 34 30  
8 No. of 2-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 8 10 4  
9 No. of 3-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 0 3 2  
10 No. of 4-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 1 0 1  
11 No. of 5-Notch Downgrade Actions (Solo) 0 0 1  
12 Total Downgrade Actions (row 7+8+9+10+11) 62 47 38  
      
21 Total actions 117 88 78  
Notes: This Table presents summary statistics for the credit rating dataset expressed on the 20-notch scale, which includes daily 
pooled sovereign rating observations  by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch originating from 57 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 
2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. 
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Notes: This Table presents summary statistics for the credit rating dataset, which includes daily pooled sovereign rating 
observations  by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch including outlook and watch originating from 69 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 
2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Credit events in pre- and post- regulation periods 
Entire sample S&P Moody's Fitch Total 
Observations 238  166  152   556 
Average numerical rating  26  27  28     
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 61 51.69% 46 53.49% 36 43.90% 143 
Upgrade by > 3 CCR point 31 26.27% 16 18.60% 25 30.49% 72 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 57 47.50% 27 33.75% 31 44.29% 115 
Downgrade by > 3 CCR point 39 32.50% 32 40.00% 25 35.71% 96 
Positive events 118 49.58% 86 51.81% 82 53.95% 286 
Negative events 120 50.42% 80 48.19% 70 46.05% 270 
Total no of events 238 100.00% 166 100.00% 152 100.00% 556 
Pre-regulatory  
 
        
Observations 123 
 
88  86   297 
Average numerical rating  27 
 
28  30     
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 27 45.00% 28 57.14% 20 41.67% 75 
Upgrade by > 3 CCR point 21 35.00% 7 14.29% 15 31.25% 43 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 28 44.44% 13 33.33% 18 47.37% 59 
Downgrade by > 3 CCR point 23 36.51% 17 43.59% 14 36.84% 54 
Positive events 60 48.78% 49 55.68% 48 55.81% 157 
Negative events 63 51.22% 39 44.32% 38 44.19% 140 
Total no of events 123 100.00% 88 100.00% 86 100.00% 297 
Post-regulatory 
  
        
Observations 115 
 
78  66   259 
Average numerical rating  26 
 
26  27     
Upgrade by 1 CCR point 34 58.62% 18 48.65% 16 47.06% 68 
Upgrade by > 3 CCR point 10 17.24% 9 24.32% 10 29.41% 29 
Downgrade by 1 CCR point 29 50.88% 14 34.15% 13 40.63% 56 
Downgrade by > 3 CCR point 16 28.07% 15 36.59% 11 34.38% 42 
Positive events 58 50.43% 37 47.44% 34 51.52% 129 
Negative events 57 49.57% 41 52.56% 32 48.48% 130 
Total no of events 115 100.00% 78 100.00% 66 100.00% 259 
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Notes: This Table presents summary statistics of credit events for each CRA for 69 sovereigns from Sept 2007 to Sept 2014.  
𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the change in yield spread to the closest maturity Treasury Bond i- country, t- day in the time window [0, +1].  
Δ𝐶𝐶𝑅 Positive (Negative) events is the change in sovereign issuer or issue CCR coded as absolute ordinal values 1, 2, 3. 
Rating58 represents sovereign’s CCR taking values 1-58. CBOE VIX volatility index, Treasury rate and interest rates swap 
spreads are three global risk factors. Since the bond spreads are calculated using the US benchmark US measure of international 
risk is used as it is exogenous to the rest of data sample. 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡yi,t is bond’s time to maturity and deals with possible 
heterogeneity among spread changes which derive due to distinctive remaining years to maturity of bonds.  
Table 6.4 Summary statistics for the credit events sample 
Sample S&P Moody's Fitch 
No of countries 64 49 49 
No of sovereign bonds 83 61 59 
No of benchmark bonds 35 34 31 
Mean ∆Yield -0.6 0.34 -0.15 
S.D.  ∆Yield 18.85 12.38 12.49 
Mean ∆CCR Positive events (abs. 1-3) 0.86 0.85 1 
S.D. ∆CCR Positive events (abs. 1-3) 1.05 0.99 1.12 
Mean ∆CCR Negative events (abs. 1-3) 0.93 0.99 0.88 
S.D. ∆CCR Negative events (abs. 1-3) 1.11 1.19 1.13 
Mean Rating58 (1-58) 26.6 27.52 28.48 
S.D. Rating58 (1-58) 11.85 12.06 11.46 
Mean term to maturity  (years) 7.66 8.14 7.62 
S.D. term to maturity (years) 5.16 5.65 4.24 
Mean coupon rate (%) 6.98 6.85 6.61 
S.D. coupon rate (%) 2.19 2.09 1.97 
Mean amount issued (billion USD) 1.27 1.14 1.39 
S.D. amount issued (billion USD) 1.35 1.09 1.28 
Mean CBOE VIX  20.64 20.13 19.85 
S.D. CBOE VIX  9.89 8.93 8.05 
Mean Treasury rate (5 years maturity) 1.53 1.58 1.54 
S.D. Treasury rate (5 years maturity)  0.7 0.67 0.64 
Mean Interest rates swap spreads (5 years 
maturity)  
28.49 26.97 26.35 
S.D. Interest rates swap spreads (5 years 
maturity)  
23.05 20.84 17.68 
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Table 6.5 Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b) S&P  
Panel I  Positive events                Specification (a)                  Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating -2.4159*** -2.7271*** -2.6844*** -3.1171*** -2.4174*** -2.7286*** -2.7973*** -3.1899*** 
 (-2.92) (-3.24) (-3.02) (-3.47) (-2.91) (-3.23) (-3.14) (-3.54) 
Regulation 0.3351 -2.0433 0.4420 -1.1311     
 (0.18) (-0.58) (0.16) (-0.27)     
∆Rating*Regulatio
n 1.7029 1.8290 1.7798 2.0527     
 (1.32) (1.40) (1.30) (1.49)     
Rating58 0.0917 0.0609 0.4729 0.3120 0.0885 0.0579 0.6913** 0.5087 
 (1.54) (1.00) (1.65) (0.99) (1.47) (0.94) (2.14) (1.39) 
Maturity 0.2716 0.5581 0.2607 1.0928 0.2924 0.5657 0.1350 0.5477 
 (0.27) (0.53) (0.12) (0.39) (0.28) (0.54) (0.06) (0.19) 
Global risk 15.3692 19.0476 5.1575 8.6542 15.5881 19.2029 8.4494 10.7810 
 (1.14) (1.40) (0.34) (0.58) (1.15) (1.41) (0.56) (0.71) 
EE     0.0290 -2.2016 -2.7929 -3.4194 
     (0.01) (-0.58) (-0.76) (-0.70) 
EU     0.5029 -1.7757 3.4696 1.1991 
     (0.24) (-0.48) (1.00) (0.25) 
∆Rating*EE    1.4593 1.6334 1.8079 2.0303 
     (0.90) (1.00) (1.07) (1.19) 
∆Rating *EU     2.0622 2.1315 1.9867 2.1943 
     (1.24) (1.28) (1.14) (1.25) 
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 
R-squared 0.067 0.112 0.248 0.298 0.068 0.113 0.257 0.303 
LR 0.35 0.26 0.28 0.15     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. Eq. (6.1a) and (b) is estimated separately for positive 
and negative events as absolute values (Panel I and II) for interpretation reasons. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled sovereign events by S&P in 58 CCR scale originating from 64 
countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. Outliers are excluded using the MM-robust regression method. For every event observation 
there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury 
curve with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) 
compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model 
(specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year (country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
 
Table 6.5 Continued  
PANEL II  Negative events                             Specification (a)                      
  
Specification a 
 
  
                                Specification (b) 
  
  
  
VARIABLES  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating 1.8618 1.8582 1.5068 1.7102 1.8707 1.8667 1.5272 1.7240 
 (1.16) (1.10) (0.83) (0.90) (1.17) (1.11) (0.84) (0.91) 
Regulation 1.3003 -3.0582 -0.4518 -8.3840     
 (0.37) (-0.45) (-0.08) (-1.02)     
∆Rating*Regulation 0.9606 0.6798 1.6601 1.3352     
 (0.40) (0.27) (0.64) (0.49)     
Rating58 0.1258 0.1091 -0.2818 -0.0361 0.1323 0.1178 -0.2577 -0.0092 
 (1.10) (0.93) (-0.55) (-0.06) (1.16) (1.00) (-0.50) (-0.02) 
Maturity 1.0667 1.3676 0.8101 3.6287 1.1139 1.5578 0.6072 3.7190 
 (0.52) (0.63) (0.15) (0.62) (0.53) (0.69) (0.11) (0.62) 
Global risk 35.5444 39.7877 45.3697 58.4469* 35.6377 39.7435 44.1384 56.7282* 
 (1.41) (1.54) (1.51) (1.89) (1.41) (1.53) (1.47) (1.83) 
EE      -3.9593 -8.7151 -5.8765 -12.8557 
      (-0.81) (-1.10) (-0.70) (-1.20) 
EU      4.2083 -0.5227 2.1319 -6.0327 
      (1.05) (-0.08) (0.36) (-0.70) 
∆Rating*EE      5.1612 4.5926 5.7083 4.8820 
      (1.54) (1.31) (1.58) (1.28) 
∆Rating *EU      -1.4662 -1.3836 -0.7330 -0.5704 
      (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.24) (-0.18) 
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
R-squared 0.029 0.045 0.114 0.144 0.044 0.057 0.126 0.152 
LR 3.60 3.03 3.25 2.28     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Table 6.6  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b) Moody’s   
Panel I  Positive events                                      Specification (a)     Specification (b) 
VARIABLES  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating -1.9588 -1.5159 1.8368 1.4272 -1.9517 -1.5107 2.1237 1.8845 
 (-0.98) (-0.73) (0.85) (0.65) (-0.97) (-0.73) (0.97) (0.84) 
Regulation 0.2138 4.8817 4.1878 8.7850     
 (0.06) (0.67) (0.84) (1.20)     
∆Rating*Regulation 1.6517 1.1212 -2.0666 -1.6657     
 (0.72) (0.47) (-0.87) (-0.69)     
Rating58 -0.1388 -0.1130 -0.9329** -1.1081** -0.1409 -0.1096 -0.8989** -1.0416** 
 (-1.60) (-1.26) (-2.15) (-2.41) (-1.53) (-1.15) (-2.06) (-2.26) 
Maturity -0.6530 -0.7600 -6.5717 -5.5737 -0.6853 -0.8707 -7.0942* -5.2372 
 (-0.49) (-0.56) (-1.60) (-0.99) (-0.49) (-0.60) (-1.67) (-0.89) 
Global risk -4.3997 -4.2584 -16.8030 -21.4313 -4.2934 -4.4146 -17.3304 -22.3509 
 (-0.25) (-0.24) (-0.97) (-1.20) (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.99) (-1.25) 
EE     -0.3340 3.7121 4.3664 8.8014 
     (-0.08) (0.50) (0.81) (1.16) 
EU     1.5700 5.7764 0.3429 3.6505 
     (0.33) (0.75) (0.05) (0.38) 
∆Rating*EE     2.3216 1.9590 -1.6585 -1.3662 
     (0.96) (0.79) (-0.66) (-0.53) 
∆Rating *EU     0.0190 -1.0455 -4.2066 -4.2606 
     (0.01) (-0.35) (-1.43) (-1.42) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 
R-squared 0.056 0.092 0.496 0.538 0.063 0.103 0.509 0.553 
LR 0.92 1.55 3.06 4.13     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. Eq. (6.1a) and (b) is estimated separately for positive 
and negative events as absolute values (Panel I and II) for interpretation reasons. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled sovereign events by Moody’s in 58 CCR scale originating from 
49 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. Outliers are excluded using the MM-robust regression method. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads 
towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads 
over US Treasury curve with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-
ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted 
model (specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year (country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, 
* p<10%. 
 
 
Table 6.6 Continued   
Panel II  Negative events                            Specification (a)    Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating 1.0372 0.6940 0.9625 0.6431 1.0364 0.6923 0.9522 0.5335 
 (0.99) (0.60) (0.78) (0.48) (0.98) (0.60) (0.75) (0.39) 
Regulation -2.6955 -2.6579 -4.9165 -2.6500         
 (-1.12) (-0.39) (-1.20) (-0.32)         
∆Rating*Regulation 0.0018 0.3715 0.3211 0.6259         
 (0.00) (0.24) (0.19) (0.35)         
Rating58 0.0695 0.0690 0.0543 -0.0032 0.0709 0.0712 0.0507 -0.0775 
 (1.03) (0.95) (0.17) (-0.01) (1.03) (0.97) (0.16) (-0.20) 
Maturity -2.0707 -2.0611 -5.3948 -8.7568 -2.1052 -2.1210 -5.3855 -9.3757 
 (-1.44) (-1.38) (-0.99) (-1.33) (-1.45) (-1.40) (-0.97) (-1.38) 
Global risk 47.9153*** 48.5420*** 51.0093** 50.2324** 48.1727*** 48.7230*** 51.1394** 49.9505** 
 (2.68) (2.65) (2.50) (2.40) (2.66) (2.63) (2.48) (2.36) 
EE         -2.7260 -2.4839 -4.9426 -1.2758 
         (-1.11) (-0.36) (-1.20) (-0.14) 
EU         -2.1824 -2.5050 -4.5872 -6.5238 
         (-0.29) (-0.25) (-0.33) (-0.44) 
∆Rating*EE         0.0625 0.4373 0.3625 0.7249 
         (0.04) (0.27) (0.21) (0.40) 
∆Rating *EU         -1.0330 -0.7547 -0.2802 0.3981 
         (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.05) (0.07) 
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
R-squared 0.085 0.100 0.179 0.204 0.086 0.101 0.179 0.205 
LR 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.32     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no No yes yes no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. Eq. (6.1a) and (b) is estimated separately for positive 
and negative events as absolute values (Panel I and II) for interpretation reasons. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled sovereign events by Moody’s in 58 CCR scale originating from 
49 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. Outliers are excluded using the MM-robust regression method. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads 
towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t.  
Table 6.7  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b) Fitch   
Panel I  Positive events                                                          Specification a Specification b 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating 1.1533 0.6733 1.1591 0.3483 1.1516 0.6818 1.0597 0.1710 
 (1.26) (0.68) (1.17) (0.31) (1.26) (0.69) (1.07) (0.15) 
Regulation 3.8161* 4.6511 0.5043 5.2495     
 (1.72) (1.18) (0.13) (1.05)     
∆Rating*Regulation -1.3742 -0.6952 -0.7830 0.4353     
 (-0.95) (-0.44) (-0.50) (0.25)     
Rating58 0.0899 0.0747 -0.5545* -0.5485 0.0986 0.0857 -0.4671 -0.4871 
 (1.17) (0.94) (-1.67) (-1.40) (1.27) (1.06) (-1.39) (-1.24) 
Maturity -0.0116 0.1973 -7.4933** -6.4854 -0.0513 0.2722 -7.8665** -6.0301 
 (-0.01) (0.15) (-2.14) (-1.47) (-0.04) (0.21) (-2.25) (-1.36) 
Global risk 11.6406 10.4532 10.3426 7.6761 10.8281 9.4180 6.4473 3.4613 
 (1.06) (0.92) (0.78) (0.56) (0.97) (0.82) (0.48) (0.25) 
EE     2.5789 2.7571 -4.3174 -0.9031 
     (0.83) (0.57) (-0.85) (-0.14) 
EU     4.4681* 5.2968 3.6402 8.5493 
     (1.77) (1.32) (0.77) (1.55) 
∆Rating*EE     0.3409 1.4561 1.3215 2.7920 
     (0.17) (0.67) (0.60) (1.17) 
∆Rating *EU     -2.5299 -1.9259 -2.0022 -0.8700 
     (-1.48) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-0.44) 
Observations 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 
R-squared 0.038 0.065 0.230 0.264 0.049 0.078 0.246 0.284 
LR 1.76 2.32 3.41 4.48     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Continued: The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of 
international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 
2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year 
(country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
Table 6.7 Continued  
Panel II  Negative events                                                      Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating 2.4566* 2.6749* 3.3409** 3.7713** 2.4894* 2.7130* 3.3591** 3.7930** 
 (1.71) (1.79) (2.10) (2.31) (1.74) (1.82) (2.11) (2.30) 
Regulation 1.3867 0.9573 1.2062 5.8843     
 (0.41) (0.14) (0.20) (0.65)     
∆Rating*Regulation -2.3262 -3.0001 -2.5671 -3.7173     
 (-1.10) (-1.38) (-1.13) (-1.59)     
Rating58 0.0167 0.0735 0.5336 0.5948 0.0241 0.0781 0.5455 0.5941 
 (0.16) (0.67) (1.28) (1.27) (0.23) (0.71) (1.29) (1.24) 
Maturity 1.0418 0.2939 -0.4736 0.9891 1.3806 0.6712 -0.4189 0.9031 
 (0.44) (0.12) (-0.09) (0.18) (0.58) (0.27) (-0.08) (0.16) 
Global risk 28.7587 33.2585 25.3548 29.5135 31.3169 35.8860 27.0467 30.9904 
 (1.27) (1.43) (0.94) (1.06) (1.39) (1.54) (0.99) (1.10) 
EE     0.9922 -0.2131 1.6123 6.8306 
     (0.24) (-0.03) (0.20) (0.62) 
EU     1.6271 1.7265 0.0960 4.6076 
     (0.41) (0.25) (0.01) (0.46) 
∆Rating*EE    -4.4287* -4.4826* -4.4716 -4.7979 
     (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.57) (-1.66) 
∆Rating *EU    -0.1628 -1.2167 -0.7630 -2.5561 
     (-0.06) (-0.45) (-0.27) (-0.86) 
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.034 0.101 0.201 0.276 0.059 0.123 0.211 0.279 
LR 3.85 3.36 1.76 0.62     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
positive sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale originating from 69 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares 
model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) 
does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
Table 6.8  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs positive events 
 Specification (a) Specification (b) 
 VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating -1.0273* -1.1669** -0.6043 -0.8323 -1.0355* -1.1953** -1.0276* -1.1669** -0.6371 -0.8625 -1.0378* -1.2004** 
 (-1.79) (-2.00) (-1.03) (-1.38) (-1.79) (-2.02) (-1.79) (-2.00) (-1.08) (-1.43) (-1.79) (-2.03) 
Regulation 1.6663 1.8738 1.1862 2.1315 1.5846 1.6267       
 (1.32) (0.80) (0.70) (0.86) (1.24) (0.69)       
∆Rating*Regulation 0.5878 0.5501 0.3648 0.4672 0.6136 0.5971       
 (0.70) (0.64) (0.43) (0.53) (0.72) (0.69)       
Rating58 0.0391 0.0301 -0.3223** -0.4267** 0.0402 0.0308 0.0404 0.0316 -0.2925* -0.4003** 0.0411 0.0314 
 (0.95) (0.72) (-1.98) (-2.43) (0.98) (0.74) (0.97) (0.74) (-1.76) (-2.25) (0.98) (0.74) 
Maturity -0.0755 0.1003 -2.3482 -1.6868 -0.0527 0.1348 -0.0875 0.1011 -2.3599 -1.5928 -0.0607 0.1457 
 (-0.11) (0.15) (-1.58) (-0.93) (-0.08) (0.20) (-0.13) (0.15) (-1.58) (-0.88) (-0.09) (0.21) 
Global risk 9.3737 10.3138 8.8015 9.2245 8.9676 9.7993 9.1645 10.0968 8.3369 8.7887 8.7443 9.5302 
 (1.22) (1.34) (1.10) (1.15) (1.16) (1.27) (1.19) (1.31) (1.04) (1.09) (1.13) (1.23) 
EE       1.2153 1.2109 0.0304 0.8478 1.1040 0.8715 
       (0.80) (0.48) (0.02) (0.31) (0.71) (0.34) 
EU       2.1010 2.2657 2.6794 3.4811 2.0435 2.0853 
       (1.39) (0.92) (1.20) (1.22) (1.35) (0.85) 
∆Rating*EE      1.1145 1.1478 0.9546 1.0850 1.1355 1.2027 
       (1.09) (1.11) (0.93) (1.04) (1.10) (1.15) 
∆Rating *EU      -0.0223 -0.1487 -0.2826 -0.2192 0.0163 -0.0919 
       (-0.02) (-0.14) (-0.26) (-0.20) (0.02) (-0.08) 
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 522 
R-squared 0.026 0.043 0.156 0.173 0.028 0.045 0.027 0.045 0.158 0.176 0.029 0.047 
LR 0.85 1.10 1.80 1.89 0.82 1.11       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
negative sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale originating from 69 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results 
suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels 
such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
Table 6.9  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs negative events 
 Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating 1.8395** 1.9147** 2.0064** 2.0869** 1.8348** 1.9071** 1.8514** 1.9274** 2.0082** 2.0885** 1.8327** 1.8966** 
 (2.16) (2.14) (2.20) (2.21) (2.15) (2.13) (2.17) (2.16) (2.20) (2.21) (2.15) (2.12) 
Regulation 0.2711 -0.7980 0.0803 -2.7031 0.2542 -0.8418       
 (0.14) (-0.20) (0.03) (-0.59) (0.13) (-0.21)       
∆Rating*Regulation -0.4045 -0.6051 -0.2333 -0.4609 -0.4027 -0.5958       
 (-0.32) (-0.47) (-0.18) (-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.46)       
Rating58 0.0806 0.0898 0.1137 0.1393 0.0806 0.0910 0.0803 0.0889 0.1173 0.1443 0.0784 0.0886 
 (1.38) (1.50) (0.55) (0.62) (1.37) (1.51) (1.38) (1.48) (0.57) (0.64) (1.33) (1.47) 
Maturity -0.0366 -0.1297 -0.0811 1.0516 -0.0523 -0.1508 0.2263 0.2077 -0.1414 1.1208 0.2299 0.2098 
 (-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.03) (0.35) (-0.04) (-0.12) (0.19) (0.17) (-0.05) (0.36) (0.19) (0.17) 
Global risk 36.5730*** 37.3887*** 38.3870*** 41.2342*** 36.4718*** 37.3246*** 38.3954*** 39.4069*** 38.2703*** 41.2108*** 38.3084*** 39.3377*** 
 (2.68) (2.73) (2.64) (2.82) (2.67) (2.71) (2.80) (2.85) (2.62) (2.81) (2.79) (2.84) 
EE       -1.2536 -3.0051 -0.3798 -3.4503 -1.5649 -3.5244 
       (-0.56) (-0.70) (-0.12) (-0.70) (-0.68) (-0.81) 
EU       2.2817 0.8561 0.6350 -1.8895 2.5387 0.9255 
       (0.92) (0.20) (0.18) (-0.38) (1.01) (0.22) 
∆Rating*EE       0.0107 -0.1439 0.1295 -0.0715 0.0172 -0.1196 
       (0.01) (-0.10) (0.09) (-0.05) (0.01) (-0.08) 
∆Rating *EU       -0.9153 -1.1379 -0.7763 -1.0324 -0.9021 -1.1088 
       (-0.55) (-0.67) (-0.44) (-0.58) (-0.54) (-0.65) 
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
R-squared 0.028 0.042 0.086 0.104 0.028 0.042 0.032 0.045 0.087 0.105 0.032 0.046 
LR 1.87 2.20 0.24 0.32 2.30 2.67       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. 6.1(a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
positive sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares 
model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Significant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) 
has statistically significantly better fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10.  
 
 
Table 6.10  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs positive events (Europe)  
  Specification (a)  Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating 0.4428 -0.0184 0.4040 0.2178 0.3901 0.0313 0.4818 0.0160 0.4178 0.1954 0.5150 0.1265 
 (0.32) (-0.01) (0.28) (0.14) (0.28) (0.02) (0.36) (0.01) (0.31) (0.13) (0.38) (0.09) 
Regulation 4.9951** 6.9254* 5.2493* 7.5644* 4.5961** 7.0670*       
 (2.22) (1.87) (1.81) (1.86) (2.03) (1.89)       
∆Rating*Regulation -0.9994 -0.9680 -0.7931 -0.8724 -0.8570 -0.9014       
 (-0.59) (-0.55) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.51)       
Rating58 -0.0166 -0.0290 -0.3353 -0.5379 -0.0108 -0.0239 0.0125 -0.0045 -0.2069 -0.3804 0.0186 0.0022 
 (-0.23) (-0.39) (-1.07) (-1.58) (-0.15) (-0.32) (0.18) (-0.06) (-0.68) (-1.14) (0.26) (0.03) 
Maturity 0.4743 0.4357 -1.4427 -2.8101 0.5104 0.4910 0.3851 0.4312 -1.8983 -4.1218 0.3686 0.4026 
 (0.39) (0.34) (-0.43) (-0.57) (0.42) (0.38) (0.33) (0.34) (-0.59) (-0.87) (0.31) (0.32) 
Global risk -5.3038 -1.8594 -3.5090 -0.9584 -6.4892 -3.0693 -1.1479 1.3493 0.9684 3.2800 -2.0098 0.6165 
 (-0.38) (-0.14) (-0.24) (-0.07) (-0.47) (-0.22) (-0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.23) (-0.15) (0.05) 
EE       -1.9991 0.5242 -3.7398 0.0991 -2.2837 1.4363 
       (-0.44) (0.10) (-0.72) (0.02) (-0.47) (0.25) 
EU       5.0241** 7.4999** 5.1784* 8.3424** 4.7914** 7.8751** 
       (2.28) (2.09) (1.82) (2.11) (2.17) (2.18) 
∆Rating*EE       16.8290*** 16.0047*** 16.6277*** 15.8259*** 16.7993*** 16.0608*** 
       (3.45) (3.25) (3.35) (3.16) (3.44) (3.26) 
∆Rating *EU       -1.6530 -1.4843 -1.6118 -1.5117 -1.5978 -1.4630 
       (-1.01) (-0.86) (-0.95) (-0.86) (-0.98) (-0.85) 
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.038 0.099 0.129 0.192 0.054 0.110 0.122 0.171 0.203 0.258 0.136 0.183 
LR 16.50*** 15.4*** 16.08*** 15.31*** 16.25*** 15.48***       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
negative sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares 
model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) 
does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.11  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs positive events (Asia) 
 Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating 0.3665 0.2000 0.7130 0.4001 0.3442 0.1375 0.3662 0.1999 0.7865 0.4920 0.3374 0.3374 
 (0.40) (0.21) (0.76) (0.41) (0.37) (0.14) (0.40) (0.21) (0.83) (0.49) (0.36) (0.36) 
Regulation 3.3056 4.3248 1.4079 2.9407 3.1805 4.2232       
 (1.08) (0.84) (0.35) (0.54) (1.02) (0.81)       
∆Rating*Regulation 0.1161 0.2307 0.2985 0.4557 0.0844 0.2193       
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.16) (0.24) (0.05) (0.12)       
Rating58 0.0142 -0.0321 -0.7537** -0.9416** 0.0121 -0.0358 0.0151 -0.0322 -0.9437** -1.1524** 0.0154 0.0154 
 (0.17) (-0.35) (-2.02) (-2.35) (0.14) (-0.38) (0.18) (-0.34) (-2.24) (-2.54) (0.18) (0.18) 
Maturity -0.8182 -0.0404 -4.5430 0.6762 -0.9278 -0.1517 -0.8467 -0.0235 -5.6355 -0.1980 -0.9885 -0.9885 
 (-0.37) (-0.02) (-1.08) (0.08) (-0.42) (-0.06) (-0.38) (-0.01) (-1.29) (-0.02) (-0.44) (-0.44) 
Global risk 26.8785 25.7849 25.5488 19.9238 25.5990 24.3187 26.5034 25.6205 26.6444 20.9316 25.0546 25.0546 
 (1.59) (1.49) (1.46) (1.09) (1.50) (1.39) (1.55) (1.46) (1.50) (1.13) (1.44) (1.44) 
EE       3.1495 4.2098 2.9339 4.2118 2.8124 2.8124 
       (0.94) (0.78) (0.66) (0.72) (0.82) (0.82) 
EU       4.0584 4.5826 -1.9490 -0.8081 4.3778 4.3778 
       (0.78) (0.69) (-0.30) (-0.11) (0.84) (0.84) 
∆Rating*EE       0.2025 0.2745 0.2535 0.4052 0.2194 0.2194 
       (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) 
∆Rating *EU       -1.0995 -0.4476 -1.2296 -1.3639 -1.1511 -1.1511 
       (-0.16) (-0.06) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
R-squared 0.056 0.091 0.164 0.197 0.060 0.098 0.056 0.091 0.173 0.207 0.061 0.061 
LR 0.04 0.01 1.20 1.38 0.09 0.07       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
positive sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. The group labelled  
“Other” includes regions such as Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event 
observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the 
event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures 
of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 
2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. 
Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
Table 6.12  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs positive events (“Other” sub-sample I) 
 Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES   (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating -2.5161*** -2.8145*** -1.9817** -2.2311** -2.4105*** -2.7164*** -2.5056*** -2.8023*** -1.9997** -2.2676** -2.4319*** -2.7308*** 
 (-2.94) (-3.12) (-2.27) (-2.40) (-2.75) (-2.95) (-2.92) (-3.10) (-2.27) (-2.42) (-2.77) (-2.95) 
Regulation -1.2378 -3.0572 -2.7807 -3.2157 -0.9727 -2.7104       
 (-0.64) (-0.79) (-1.08) (-0.79) (-0.48) (-0.68)       
∆Rating*Regulation 1.8386 2.1458 1.6158 1.8662 1.7563 2.0821       
 (1.42) (1.58) (1.24) (1.35) (1.34) (1.52)       
Rating58 0.1282* 0.1047 -0.1322 -0.1860 0.1280* 0.1056 0.1410* 0.1160 -0.1157 -0.1699 0.1390* 0.1154 
 (1.72) (1.35) (-0.56) (-0.71) (1.71) (1.35) (1.86) (1.47) (-0.48) (-0.64) (1.82) (1.45) 
Maturity -0.8075 -0.4942 -2.9615 -2.4042 -0.7201 -0.4265 -0.8023 -0.4975 -2.6368 -1.8386 -0.7329 -0.4435 
 (-0.79) (-0.47) (-1.57) (-1.12) (-0.70) (-0.40) (-0.78) (-0.47) (-1.29) (-0.78) (-0.70) (-0.41) 
Global risk 13.3923 11.4751 9.6242 8.8419 13.4214 11.5086 13.1497 11.2017 9.3863 8.4279 13.1103 11.2338 
 (1.17) (0.97) (0.83) (0.73) (1.16) (0.96) (1.14) (0.94) (0.80) (0.69) (1.13) (0.94) 
EE       -1.7015 -3.1986 -2.6402 -3.1928 -1.4695 -2.9300 
       (-0.83) (-0.82) (-1.01) (-0.78) (-0.68) (-0.73) 
EU       0.4136 -1.3845 -1.0558 -0.7241 0.3822 -1.3775 
       (0.12) (-0.28) (-0.16) (-0.10) (0.11) (-0.28) 
∆Rating*EE       1.8484 2.1427 1.5353 1.8095 1.7824 2.0860 
       (1.37) (1.53) (1.14) (1.28) (1.31) (1.48) 
∆Rating *EU       2.5813 2.8585 2.2884 2.6736 2.5154 2.8259 
       (0.83) (0.89) (0.74) (0.82) (0.81) (0.88) 
Observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.065 0.082 0.214 0.221 0.067 0.084 0.069 0.086 0.214 0.222 0.071 0.086 
LR 1.04 0.81 0.25 0.45 0.81 0.64       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled positive 
sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. The group labelled “Other” 
includes regions such as Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The 
dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The 
independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. The Treasury Rate represents the global risk factor. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 
compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. 
Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
Table 6.13  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs positive events (“Other” sub-sample II) 
  Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating -2.8547*** -3.1874*** -2.3087*** -2.6405*** -2.7934*** -3.1717*** -2.8451*** -3.1772*** -2.3260*** -2.6738*** -2.8056*** -3.1803*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.93) (-2.87) (-3.11) (-3.50) (-3.82) (-3.63) (-3.90) (-2.88) (-3.13) (-3.51) (-3.82) 
Regulation -1.6112 -2.0066 -2.5084 -1.8061 -1.3562 -1.3044       
 (-0.91) (-0.58) (-1.06) (-0.49) (-0.74) (-0.36)       
∆Rating*Regulation 2.3272* 2.6035** 1.9484 2.2010* 2.2742* 2.5967**       
 (1.96) (2.13) (1.63) (1.75) (1.90) (2.11)       
Rating58 0.0945 0.0683 -0.0246 -0.1073 0.0982 0.0733 0.1038 0.0762 -0.0057 -0.0893 0.1061 0.0800 
 (1.39) (0.97) (-0.11) (-0.45) (1.43) (1.03) (1.49) (1.06) (-0.03) (-0.37) (1.51) (1.11) 
Maturity -0.3630 -0.0335 -1.7217 -1.0968 -0.3652 -0.0660 -0.3783 -0.0603 -1.3678 -0.5195 -0.3913 -0.1013 
 (-0.39) (-0.04) (-0.98) (-0.56) (-0.38) (-0.07) (-0.40) (-0.06) (-0.72) (-0.24) (-0.41) (-0.10) 
Treasury Rate -102.38*** -109.96*** -93.93*** -100.22*** -103.22*** -111.45*** -101.87*** -109.67*** -94.06*** -100.40*** -102.81*** -111.26*** 
 (-6.57) (-6.92) (-5.77) (-5.99) (-6.54) (-6.93) (-6.49) (-6.86) (-5.74) (-5.96) (-6.47) (-6.87) 
EE       -2.0316 -2.2142 -2.4642 -1.9055 -1.7894 -1.5661 
       (-1.08) (-0.63) (-1.02) (-0.51) (-0.91) (-0.43) 
EU       0.0660 -0.2859 0.2510 1.7732 0.0786 0.1666 
       (0.02) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.27) (0.03) (0.04) 
∆Rating*EE       2.4262* 2.7008** 1.9710 2.2479* 2.3820* 2.6983** 
       (1.97) (2.14) (1.59) (1.74) (1.91) (2.12) 
∆Rating *EU       2.0517 2.1383 1.7264 1.9554 2.0144 2.1576 
       (0.72) (0.74) (0.60) (0.66) (0.70) (0.74) 
Observations 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.214 0.248 0.328 0.345 0.216 0.251 0.216 0.249 0.328 0.347 0.218 0.252 
LR 0.60 0.46 0.31 0.58 0.44 0.35       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes No no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
negative sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares 
model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) 
does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.14  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs negative events (Europe) 
  Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating 2.6102* 2.6650* 2.7398* 2.9049** 2.4932* 2.4618* 2.6387* 2.6887* 2.7751* 2.9047** 2.4829* 2.4474* 
 (1.90) (1.87) (1.91) (1.97) (1.80) (1.72) (1.92) (1.89) (1.93) (1.97) (1.80) (1.71) 
Regulation 3.4888 3.3975 3.9467 2.1392 3.6848 3.1708       
 (1.01) (0.54) (0.84) (0.30) (1.06) (0.50)       
∆Rating*Regulation -0.5549 -0.5620 -0.1746 -0.0420 -0.5619 -0.4985       
 (-0.24) (-0.24) (-0.07) (-0.02) (-0.25) (-0.21)       
Rating58 0.1543 0.1583 0.0726 0.2389 0.1492 0.1547 0.1557 0.1622 0.1053 0.2857 0.1384 0.1450 
 (1.45) (1.42) (0.23) (0.66) (1.40) (1.39) (1.45) (1.44) (0.33) (0.78) (1.28) (1.28) 
Maturity 1.4126 0.7491 4.0988 2.7757 1.4387 0.7789 1.4359 0.7018 3.7616 1.5373 1.5403 0.8323 
 (0.65) (0.32) (0.92) (0.57) (0.66) (0.34) (0.66) (0.30) (0.82) (0.30) (0.71) (0.36) 
Global risk 59.3552** 57.8705** 55.5444** 58.9375** 58.1409** 55.7014** 62.7974** 60.4894** 57.9817** 60.4547** 62.8431** 59.9238** 
 (2.29) (2.16) (2.02) (2.09) (2.24) (2.07) (2.40) (2.23) (2.11) (2.14) (2.40) (2.21) 
EE       -1.9162 -1.1095 -0.2573 -0.0203 -4.0501 -4.1920 
       (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.04) (-0.00) (-0.64) (-0.51) 
EU       5.2102 5.3080 5.2623 3.0431 6.0237 5.6828 
       (1.40) (0.82) (1.00) (0.41) (1.59) (0.88) 
∆Rating*EE       3.3993 3.4735 3.8099 4.1322 3.3548 3.4654 
       (0.93) (0.93) (1.02) (1.08) (0.92) (0.93) 
∆Rating *EU       -2.1066 -2.1627 -1.7905 -1.6692 -2.0015 -1.9664 
       (-0.82) (-0.83) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.78) (-0.76) 
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 
R-squared 0.044 0.065 0.105 0.136 0.049 0.074 0.053 0.073 0.114 0.146 0.060 0.085 
LR 2.05 2.08 2.08 2.53 2.64 2.66       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
negative sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. For every event 
observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares 
model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) 
does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
 
 
Table 6.15  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs negative events (Asia)  
  Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating 2.5905* 2.0367 3.3145** 3.4142** 2.6037* 2.0919 2.6147* 2.0630 3.3996** 3.4654** 2.6330* 2.1361 
 (1.87) (1.32) (2.18) (1.99) (1.87) (1.35) (1.87) (1.32) (2.21) (2.00) (1.88) (1.37) 
Regulation -3.9171 -0.5958 -5.2347 2.1037 -3.4304 1.4146       
 (-1.06) (-0.06) (-1.02) (0.15) (-0.91) (0.15)       
∆Rating*Regulation -0.5529 -0.0017 -0.9273 -0.4947 -0.6092 -0.1249       
 (-0.24) (-0.00) (-0.39) (-0.19) (-0.27) (-0.05)       
Rating58 -0.0740 -0.1697 0.4072 0.7744 -0.0394 -0.1278 -0.0652 -0.1607 0.4490 0.7902 -0.0279 -0.1091 
 (-0.60) (-1.05) (0.81) (1.31) (-0.31) (-0.76) (-0.52) (-0.98) (0.88) (1.32) (-0.21) (-0.64) 
Maturity -2.2145 -1.0601 -5.7325 -0.3951 -1.9153 -1.0429 -2.5884 -1.6357 -6.5428 -1.7659 -2.3646 -1.8843 
 (-0.74) (-0.29) (-1.06) (-0.05) (-0.63) (-0.28) (-0.85) (-0.43) (-1.19) (-0.20) (-0.76) (-0.48) 
Global risk 36.0148* 38.1417* 32.7899 32.4679 31.3376 33.9118 35.6071* 37.5286* 32.0836 32.1935 30.4676 33.1301 
 (1.75) (1.77) (1.52) (1.44) (1.44) (1.49) (1.71) (1.71) (1.47) (1.41) (1.40) (1.45) 
EE       -4.7126 -0.3888 -5.9479 0.8971 -4.0514 2.9296 
       (-1.20) (-0.04) (-1.08) (0.06) (-0.99) (0.27) 
EU       -2.7730 -0.7257 -5.2233 -0.7797 -2.9870 1.0672 
       (-0.45) (-0.07) (-0.70) (-0.05) (-0.49) (0.11) 
∆Rating*EE       0.4112 0.5752 0.1926 -0.0221 0.5360 0.5928 
       (0.16) (0.21) (0.07) (-0.01) (0.21) (0.21) 
∆Rating *EU       -2.7490 -1.4401 -3.5024 -1.8957 -3.1132 -1.8383 
       (-0.76) (-0.35) (-0.95) (-0.45) (-0.86) (-0.45) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.119 0.150 0.176 0.229 0.136 0.165 0.126 0.155 0.187 0.235 0.146 0.175 
LR 0.75 0.52 1.29 0.67 1.18 1.12       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no no yes yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no no yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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   Notes: This Table presents estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled 
negative sovereign events by 3 CRAs in 58 CCR scale divided between regions for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. The group labelled 
“Other” includes regions such as Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event 
observation. The dependent variable ∆Yield measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds for sovereign bond i on the 
event day t. The independent variables are explained in section 6.5.1. Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures 
of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in 
column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) does not have statistically significantly better 
fit. Year/country/CRA fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10. 
Table 6.16  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Pooled CRAs negative events (“Other” sub-sample) 
  Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
∆Rating 0.6767 -0.1054 0.2810 -0.4423 0.6959 -0.1477 0.7021 -0.0153 0.2873 -0.4367 0.7123 -0.0903 
 (0.45) (-0.06) (0.17) (-0.21) (0.46) (-0.08) (0.46) (-0.01) (0.17) (-0.21) (0.47) (-0.05) 
Regulation -0.7276 -3.4714 -3.7738 -4.9240 -0.6023 -2.8896       
 (-0.23) (-0.51) (-0.81) (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.42)       
∆Rating*Regulation 0.4382 1.1360 1.0522 1.6430 0.3926 1.1924       
 (0.23) (0.51) (0.52) (0.69) (0.20) (0.53)       
Rating58 0.0531 0.0415 -0.0312 0.0093 0.0487 0.0401 0.0590 0.0525 -0.0293 0.0111 0.0533 0.0490 
 (0.50) (0.40) (-0.09) (0.02) (0.45) (0.38) (0.55) (0.50) (-0.08) (0.03) (0.49) (0.46) 
Maturity 0.4469 0.4458 -3.7778 0.3435 0.7599 0.7849 0.7573 0.9592 -4.0301 0.8331 0.9387 1.0778 
 (0.22) (0.22) (-0.84) (0.07) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.46) (-0.87) (0.16) (0.44) (0.50) 
Global risk 23.0529 13.0519 26.0348 16.6290 22.0277 12.6668 24.4063 14.3621 26.7251 17.4712 23.3733 14.0797 
 (1.11) (0.64) (1.16) (0.75) (1.06) (0.62) (1.17) (0.70) (1.19) (0.78) (1.11) (0.68) 
EE       -0.8169 -4.4822 -3.0642 -5.4229 -0.6745 -3.7363 
       (-0.25) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.20) (-0.53) 
EU       -0.0162 -2.3684 -5.8595 -4.9299 -0.2858 -2.3602 
       (-0.00) (-0.32) (-0.89) (-0.58) (-0.06) (-0.32) 
∆Rating*EE       0.1047 0.8265 0.7007 1.3856 0.0661 0.9006 
       (0.05) (0.36) (0.32) (0.56) (0.03) (0.39) 
∆Rating *EU       1.5388 2.0499 2.1964 2.5061 1.4867 2.1302 
       (0.53) (0.67) (0.72) (0.77) (0.51) (0.69) 
Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 
R-squared 0.013 0.099 0.061 0.143 0.016 0.104 0.016 0.104 0.062 0.144 0.018 0.107 
LR 0.71 1.28 0.34 0.30 0.52 0.79       
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no no no yes yes no no 
CRA fe no no no no yes yes no no no no yes yes 
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Notes:  This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and 
(b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled negative sovereign events originated from 30 sovereigns by S&P 
in 20-notch scale for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. Outliers are 
excluded using the MM-robust regression method. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. 
The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads 
towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables follow those 
explained in section 6.5.1 and where rating is involved the 20-notch scale rating is applied. ∆Rating is identified as change by 1 
(1-notch) and 2 (>1-notch). Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve with 5 years maturity. The 
choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds 
yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, 
column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) does not have statistically 
significantly better fit. Year (country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, 
** p<5%, * p<10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.17 Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Positive events S&P (20-Notch scale) 
           Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating -6.1085** -6.8104** -6.2077** -7.3966** -6.1162** -6.8158** -6.2959** -7.3472** 
 (-2.35) (-2.59) (-2.12) (-2.37) (-2.33) (-2.57) (-2.16) (-2.35) 
Regulation 0.3211 -2.8373 2.6946 1.7771     
 (0.09) (-0.40) (0.38) (0.18)     
∆Rating*Regulation 3.7109 3.0371 3.8327 3.6669     
 (0.96) (0.76) (0.89) (0.80)     
Rating20 0.1029 -0.0228 1.5768 2.0769 0.0825 -0.0513 1.7191 2.0491 
 (0.28) (-0.06) (0.81) (0.81) (0.22) (-0.13) (0.89) (0.79) 
Maturity 0.5683 0.7127 2.9208 3.3552 0.4854 0.6595 1.0944 1.9645 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.66) (0.66) (0.24) (0.31) (0.24) (0.38) 
Global risk 11.6971 16.7417 2.4621 10.4468 11.7688 16.9577 15.0231 17.7100 
 (0.52) (0.71) (0.09) (0.35) (0.51) (0.71) (0.53) (0.58) 
EE     -0.2726 -3.0011 -2.2800 -2.1314 
     (-0.07) (-0.40) (-0.29) (-0.20) 
EU     1.2709 -2.4349 23.9946 18.7499 
     (0.26) (-0.31) (1.66) (1.13) 
∆Rating*EE     3.5817 2.2359 3.8728 3.3850 
     (0.81) (0.48) (0.80) (0.65) 
∆Rating *EU     3.9984 4.4966 4.5800 5.2519 
     (0.69) (0.79) (0.72) (0.80) 
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
R-squared 0.075 0.167 0.235 0.287 0.077 0.170 0.265 0.307 
LR 0.26 0.53 4.41 3.15     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Notes:  This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) 
and (b) using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled negative sovereign events originated from 21 sovereigns 
by Moody’s in 20-notch scale for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. 
Outliers are excluded using the MM-robust regression method. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-
event observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] 
sovereign yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent 
variables follow those explained in section 6.5.1 and where rating is involved the 20-notch scale rating is applied. ∆Rating is 
identified as change by 1 (1-notch) and 2 (>1-notch). Global risk includes interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve 
with 5 years maturity. The choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is 
benchmarked against US bonds yields. Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 
2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) with (b, column 6). Insignificant results suggest that the unrestricted model 
(specification b) does not have statistically significantly better fit. Year (country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not 
included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.18  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Negative events Moody’s (20-Notch 
scale) 
 Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating -0.0296 -1.5398 -0.7821 -2.2719 -0.0466 -1.5977 -0.8457 -2.5284 
 (-0.01) (-0.59) (-0.30) (-0.77) (-0.02) (-0.61) (-0.32) (-0.82) 
Regulation -5.5949* -6.5881 -11.8209** -11.8859     
 (-1.72) (-0.81) (-2.12) (-1.16)     
∆Rating*Regulation 1.6992 3.4407 2.1763 3.5645     
 (0.54) (1.01) (0.66) (0.97)     
Rating20 -0.0888 -0.0362 -0.5038 -0.4510 -0.0748 -0.0120 -0.5284 -0.7903 
 (-0.31) (-0.12) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-0.04) (-0.42) (-0.41) 
Maturity -2.9045 -2.8018 -11.5051 -8.7334 -3.0170 -3.0456 -11.5771 -9.7681 
 (-1.45) (-1.32) (-1.51) (-0.88) (-1.43) (-1.35) (-1.49) (-0.93) 
Global risk 24.5517 24.0089 9.0345 5.1554 25.1674 24.8266 9.0848 5.0501 
 (1.00) (0.96) (0.31) (0.17) (1.01) (0.98) (0.31) (0.16) 
EE     -5.6406* -6.0619 -11.7579** -9.6277 
     (-1.70) (-0.72) (-2.07) (-0.79) 
EU     -5.2932 -7.1124 -13.0670 
-
14.7364 
     (-0.43) (-0.50) (-0.83) (-0.87) 
∆Rating*EE    1.9091 3.7635 2.2949 3.7489 
     (0.59) (1.07) (0.67) (0.98) 
∆Rating *EU    -0.3515 1.2096 1.6057 3.2018 
         (-0.04) (0.13) (0.17) (0.33) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.069 0.101 0.214 0.239 0.069 0.104 0.214 0.240 
LR 0.21 0.35 0.10 0.19     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
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Table 6.19 Estimation of Equation 6.1(a) and (b): Negative events Fitch (20-Notch scale) 
 Specification (a) Specification (b) 
VARIABLES (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
∆Rating 2.6075 4.9484 3.7839 5.3414 2.6214 4.9402 4.0190 5.1340 
 (0.77) (1.48) (1.02) (1.42) (0.79) (1.50) (1.13) (1.39) 
Regulation -0.5287 -5.1275 -12.0497 -10.8463     
 (-0.11) (-0.53) (-1.43) (-0.74)     
∆Rating*Regulation -4.6575 -6.8504 -3.2165 -6.0834     
 (-0.94) (-1.44) (-0.63) (-1.20)     
Rating20 -0.2247 0.0308 1.0487 0.0837 -0.2487 -0.0591 1.5332 0.9045 
 (-0.58) (0.08) (0.71) (0.05) (-0.65) (-0.15) (1.06) (0.50) 
Maturity 1.8552 0.7104 -5.1757 -2.6830 1.9846 0.6094 -4.7268 -1.7161 
 (0.63) (0.25) (-0.89) (-0.47) (0.68) (0.22) (-0.85) (-0.30) 
Global risk 18.7573 27.3838 7.0007 9.5467 23.9406 34.3487 13.8367 17.4385 
 (0.62) (0.93) (0.19) (0.26) (0.80) (1.17) (0.40) (0.48) 
EE     -1.2014 -4.6847 -23.9042** -31.7579 
     (-0.22) (-0.48) (-2.28) (-1.65) 
EU     -2.7884 -8.0277 -4.6659 -7.8566 
     (-0.47) (-0.77) (-0.45) (-0.53) 
∆Rating*EE     -8.5935 -10.5046** -6.1111 -7.1818 
     (-1.58) (-2.02) (-1.12) (-1.29) 
∆Rating *EU     5.0432 3.0139 4.3293 -0.3112 
         (0.70) (0.42) (0.60) (-0.04) 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.035 0.220 0.286 0.410 0.099 0.265 0.367 0.460 
LR 5.21* 4.49 9.46*** 6.70**     
year fe no yes no yes no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes no no yes yes 
Notes:  This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) and (b) 
using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled negative sovereign events originated from 40 sovereigns by Fitch s in 
20-notch scale for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. Outliers are excluded 
using the MM-robust regression method. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event observation. The 
dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign yield spreads towards the 
benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables follow those explained in section 
6.5.1 and where rating is involved the 20-notch scale rating is applied. ∆Rating is identified as change by 1 (1-notch) and 2 (>1-notch). 
Global risk includes one of the three risk measures i.e. interest rates swap spreads over US Treasury curve with 5 years maturity. The 
choice of US measures of international risk is determined by the fact that the spread variable is benchmarked against US bonds yields. 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) compares model specifications for best fit. Here, LR in column 2 compares model I specification (a, column 2) 
with (b, column 6). Significant results suggest that the unrestricted model (specification b) has statistically significantly better fit. Year 
(country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”).  Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
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Figure 6.1 This graph presents the distribution of identifiers amongst three CRAs in the positive events pooled sample which consists of 61 sovereigns out of which 7 cases 
have split identifiers and 38 share common identifiers (out of which 17 are EE and 21 EU). 16 sovereigns were dropped (from the graph) since their EE and EU identifier 
variables were equal to “0”.239 Split identifiers amount to 7.36% of the observations/rating actions (upgrades) in the pooled sample. The values in the brackets indicate number 
of rating events per country in the sample. 
 
                                                 
239. Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Ghana, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Qatar,  South Africa, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. 
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Figure 6.2 This graph presents the distribution of identifiers amongst three CRAs in the negative events pooled sample which consists of 51 sovereigns out of which 6 have 
split identifiers and 37 share common identifiers (out of which 22 are EE and 15 EU). 8 sovereigns were dropped from the graph since their EE and EU identifiers were equal 
to “0”.240 The values in the brackets indicate number of rating events per country in the sample.
                                                 
240. Austria, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Namibia, South Korea and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Figure 6.3 This graph presents the distribution of identifiers amongst three CRAs in the positive events pooled sample for Europe. From the 20 sovereigns in the regional sub-
sample one country was dropped (Bulgaria) due to identifier equal to “0”. The sovereigns with split identifiers amount to 20 observations out of 192 which comprises 10.4% 
of the data sample. The values in the brackets indicate number of rating events per country in the sample. 
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Figure 6.4 This graph presents the distribution of identifiers amongst three CRAs in the positive events pooled sample for regional sub-sample “Other”. The sub-group comprises 
countries from areas/regions such as: Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa. Nine sovereigns yielding “0” in both their identifiers 
are excluded from this graph. 241 The values in the brackets indicate number of rating events in the sample. 
                                                 
241. Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Bermuda, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, South Africa and Venezuela. 
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Figure 6.5 This graph presents the distribution of identifiers for Fitch in the negative events sample using 20-notch scale. Six sovereigns were dropped since their identifiers 
were equal to “0” 242 amounting to 31.57% of the sample observations/rating actions. The values in the brackets indicate number of rating events in the sample. 
                                                 
242. Bahrain, Belgium, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal and Vietnam. 
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Appendix 6.A Sample considerations  
Table 6.A.1 Market share of CRAs 
CRA Market share Rates corporates Rates sovereigns 
AM Best  0.72% yes no 
CERVED Group 2.19% yes no 
Creditreform Rating 0.53% yes no 
DBRS 1.27% yes yes 
Economist Intelligence 0.83% no yes 
Feri  EuroRating 0.67% no yes 
Fitch 16.22% yes yes 
ICAP 0.75% yes no 
Moody’s 34.53% yes yes 
S&P 39.69% yes yes 
Notes: This Table presents market share of major CRAs (exceeding 0.5%) in the EU (based on 2013 turnover generated by 
the CRAs registered in the EU) along with types of rated assets (as of December 2014) (ESMA, 2014c). 
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Table 6.A.2 Sample of included sovereigns 
 S&P Moody's Fitch 
 Initial 
sample 
Final 
sample 
Initial 
sample 
Final 
sample 
Initial 
sample 
Final 
sample 
ARGENTINA v v v v v v 
ARMENIA x x v x v x 
ARUBA v v x x v v 
AUSTRALIA v x v x v v 
AUSTRIA v v v v v x 
AZERBAIJAN v x v x v x 
BAHAMAS v v v v x x 
BAHRAIN v v v v v v 
BARBADOS v v v v x x 
BELARUS v v v v x x 
BELGIUM v v v v v v 
BERMUDA v v v v v v 
BOLIVIA v v v x v v 
BRAZIL v v v v v v 
BULGARIA v v v v v v 
CANADA v x v x v x 
CHILE v v v x v v 
CHINA v v v v v v 
COLOMBIA v v v v v x 
COSTA RICA v v v v v x 
CROATIA v v v v v v 
DENMARK v x v x v x 
DOMINICAN REPB. v x v x v x 
ECUADOR v v v v v v 
EGYPT v v v v v v 
EL SALVADOR v v v v v x 
FIJI v v v v x x 
FINLAND v v v x v x 
GABON v v x x v v 
GEORGIA v v v v v v 
GHANA v v x x v v 
GUATEMALA v v x x v v 
HONDURAS v x v v x x 
HUNGARY v v v v v v 
ICELAND v v v v v v 
INDONESIA v v v v v v 
ISRAEL v v v x v v 
ITALY v v v v v v 
JAMAICA v v v v v v 
JORDAN v v v v x x 
KAZAKHSTAN v x v x v x 
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Notes: This Table presents the initial number of sovereigns for which rating information was available before the sample was 
merged with bond data versus the final dataset. 
 
KENYA v x x x v x 
LATVIA v v v v v v 
LEBANON v v v v v v 
LITHUANIA v v v v v v 
MEXICO v v v v v v 
MONGOLIA v v v v v v 
MOROCCO v v v v v x 
NAMIBIA x x v x v v 
NETHERLANDS v x v x v x 
NIGERIA v v x x v v 
PAKISTAN v v v v x x 
PANAMA v v v v v v 
PARAGUAY v v v v v v 
PERU v v v v v v 
PHILIPPINES v v v v v v 
POLAND v x v x v v 
PORTUGAL v v v v v v 
QATAR v v v x x x 
ROMANIA v v v v v v 
RUSSIA v v v v v v 
RWANDA v v x x v x 
SENEGAL v v v x x x 
SLOVAKIA v v v v v x 
SLOVENIA v v x x v v 
SOUTH AFRICA v v x x v x 
SOUTH KOREA x x v v v v 
SPAIN v v v v v v 
SRI LANKA v v v v v x 
SWEDEN v x v x v x 
SERBIA v v x x v v 
TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
v v v x x x 
TURKEY v v v v v v 
TURKS & CAICOS v x x x x x 
UKRAINE v v v v v v 
UAE x x v x x x 
URUGUAY v v v v v v 
VENEZUELA v v v v v v 
VIETNAM v v v v v v 
ZAMBIA v v x x v v 
  76 64 68 49 68 49 
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Notes: This Table presents the estimated coefficients and robust z-statistics in parentheses from specifications of Eq. (6.1a) 
using OLS. The credit rating dataset consists of daily pooled positive sovereign events by S&P in 58 CCR scale originating 
from 64 countries for pre-regulatory (Sept 2007-April 2012) and post-regulatory (May 2012-Sept 2014) periods. Outliers are 
excluded using the MM-robust regression method. For every event observation there is a randomly selected non-event 
observation. The dependent variable is ∆Yield which measures, in basis points, the changes in the window [0, +1] sovereign 
yield spreads towards the benchmark US bonds on a particular sovereign bond i on the event day t. The independent variables 
are explained in section 6.5.1. The global risk includes one of the three risk measures i.e. CBOE VIX volatility index. Year 
(country) fixed effects are included (“yes”), not included (“no”). Significant levels such that: *** p<1%, ** p<5%, * p<10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.A.3  Estimation of Equation 6.1(a)- Positive events S&P 
VARIABLES (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  
∆Rating -3.0003*** -3.4972*** -3.0704*** -3.7116*** 
 (-3.63) (-4.17) (-3.38) (-4.03) 
Regulation 0.2914 -3.3187 0.9494 -1.1007 
 (0.16) (-0.95) (0.35) (-0.26) 
∆Rating*Regulation 2.2175* 2.5259** 2.0162 2.4944* 
 (1.74) (1.97) (1.47) (1.80) 
Rating58 0.0793 0.0519 0.5142* 0.4118 
 (1.34) (0.86) (1.79) (1.32) 
Maturity 0.9961 1.1963 1.1300 2.0182 
 (0.98) (1.16) (0.50) (0.73) 
CBOE VIX  30.5308*** 28.2885*** 25.0130** 23.0378* 
 (2.92) (2.69) (2.12) (1.93) 
Observations 229 229 229 229 
R-squared 0.116 0.170 0.268 0.325 
year fe no yes no yes 
country fe no no yes yes 
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Table 6.A.4 Country classification for regional regressions  
 Country Region  Country Region 
1 ARGENTINA Other 36 LATVIA Europe 
2 ARUBA Other 37 LEBANON Asia 
3 AUSTRALIA Other 38 LITHUANIA Europe 
4 AUSTRIA Europe 39 MEXICO Other 
5 BAHAMAS Other 40 MONGOLIA Asia 
6 BAHRAIN Asia 41 MOROCCO Other 
7 BARBADOS Other 42 NAMIBIA Other 
8 BELARUS Europe 43 NIGERIA Other 
9 BELGIUM Europe 44 PAKISTAN Asia 
10 BERMUDA Other 45 PANAMA Other 
11 BOLIVIA Other 46 PARAGUAY Other 
12 BRAZIL Other 47 PERU Other 
13 BULGARIA Europe 48 PHILIPPINES Asia 
14 CHILE Other 49 POLAND Europe 
15 CHINA Asia 50 PORTUGAL Europe 
16 COLOMBIA Other 51 QATAR Asia 
17 COSTA RICA Other 52 ROMANIA Europe 
18 CROATIA Europe 53 RUSSIA Europe 
19 ECUADOR Other 54 RWANDA Other 
20 EGYPT Other 55 SENEGAL Other 
21 EL SALVADOR Other 56 SERBIA Europe 
22 FIJI Other 57 SLOVAKIA Europe 
23 FINLAND Europe 58 SLOVENIA Europe 
24 GABON Other 59 SOUTH AFRICA Other 
25 GEORGIA Asia 60 SOUTH KOREA Asia 
26 GHANA Other 61 SPAIN Europe 
27 GUATEMALA Other 62 SRI LANKA Asia 
28 HONDURAS Other 63 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Other 
29 HUNGARY Europe 64 TURKEY Europe 
30 ICELAND Europe 65 UKRAINE Europe 
31 INDONESIA Asia 66 URUGUAY Other 
32 ISRAEL Asia 67 VENEZUELA Other 
33 ITALY Europe 68 VIETNAM Asia 
34 JAMAICA Other 69 ZAMBIA Other 
35 JORDAN Asia    
Notes: This Table presents the regional classification of sovereigns used in the Pooled regional regressions (section 6.7.2). The 
three groups are in line with the UN classification except Europe where Turkey is included. The sub-group “Other” comprises 
countries from areas/regions such as: Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, North America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Chapter 7: Thesis conclusions 
The research presented here investigates the recent regulatory reform of the CRA industry, with 
a particular focus on Europe. The main chapters involve empirical examination of sovereign 
and bank ratings employing extensive datasets covering a wide cross-section of economies. 
Overall the Thesis utilises rating events, outlooks and watch status for up to 69 sovereigns and 
147 banks covering period from 2006-2014. Inclusion of several CRAs enables a 
comprehensive analysis of the market and its reactions to the rules imposed since 2009 when 
the first formal CRA regulation was enacted in the EU.  
Chapters 2 and 3 introduce the main principles of the CRA industry, explain the recent changes 
in the regulatory framework for CRAs in Europe and discuss the related empirical and 
theoretical literature concerning ratings. The unique contribution of this Thesis derives from 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 which empirically test aspects of the recent regulatory interventions in the 
CRA market. The aim of these chapters is to seek answers to the question: “Do the new 
regulations achieve their purpose or do they lead to unintended consequences?” Additionally, 
each empirical topic examines more specific questions relating to particular aspects of 
legislation. Chapter 4 inquires whether “the profitability and competitiveness of CRAs has been 
harmed by the increased transparency and disclosure requirements”. Chapter 5 questions 
whether the “conversion to sovereign unsolicited rating status (due to new disclosure rules) 
resulted in lower bank ratings”. Chapter 6 investigates whether the “introduction of ESMA 
identifiers changed the quality of ratings assigned by CRAs”.  
By answering these questions, the Thesis makes significant contributions to the literature on 
regulation and on credit ratings. For example, Chapter 4 presents a critical assessment of the 
legislation’s aim of reducing mechanistic reliance on ratings. No published research exists on 
this aspect. The study also provides a complete comparison of CRAs in two major jurisdictions: 
the US and Europe. Chapter 5 is the first study to expose the dynamics and stress the importance 
of sovereign solicitation status. Further, the chapter synthesises three themes in the literature 
(unsolicited ratings, sovereign-bank ceiling and regulation) which meaningfully overlap and 
have not been investigated together before. Chapter 6 adds a new angle to the literature on 
regulating CRAs and the quality of ratings. Significant novelty stems from the investigation of 
ESMA identifiers which have not received any attention whatsoever in the prior literature.  
The first empirical topic (Chapter 4) adds to the debate on the formal regulation aspect of CRAs 
in Europe since 2010. The chapter contributes to knowledge in several ways. Firstly, it offers 
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a critical appraisal of the recent regulatory efforts aimed at reducing reliance on ratings realised 
through increased transparency requirements which did not receive much attention in the 
empirical literature (except Alsakka et al., 2015). Secondly, novelty derives from linking 
human capital and analyst coverage literature to explain the externalities of regulation. The 
chapter stresses the importance of rating analysts and shows that transparency requirements 
might lead to pressures on CRAs with regards to staffing. This has cost implications and might 
lead to reduced profitability in the long run. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the rating 
process might improve as a result of employing an increased number of analysts. Further, the 
chapter complements studies investigating regulations in the US and compares the US 
regulatory efforts to those of the European authorities. Additionally, the study covers a large 
set of CRAs operating in both jurisdictions. Finally, the chapter offers a critical discussion of 
the measures introduced and suggests some reconsideration of policy. 
Although the concentration index (HHI) does not change dramatically, it shows a negative shift 
after 2011 when regulation in Europe was in its ‘Implementation Phase’ (for the chronology of 
events, see Chapter 2).  In terms of profitability measures, the results are mixed. S&P recorded 
the biggest drop in profitability since the regulation was in place. This is partly due to the 
regulatory penalties and restructuring costs this CRA faced in 2013-2014. Fitch demonstrates 
most volatility with respect to the Ratings to Analysts (R/A) ratio defined in this chapter. The 
ratio compares the number of analysts with the issuance of ratings across years. The measure 
tests whether the costs of the CRA increased as a result of staffing needs arising due to growing 
number of ratings243 or increased due to regulatory pressures (i.e. need to employ more analysts 
for transparency purposes).  
Further, the chapter offers a discussion of the recent regulatory actions in terms of their 
objectivity, practicality and reliability. For example, it finds that some of the assumptions and 
perceived flaws of the CRA system were based on subjective opinions and lacked underlying 
evidence. Many inconsistencies in the reporting styles across CRAs were also found. This lack 
of standardisation made it very difficult to compare the findings and restricts the scope for 
recommendations. Specifically, some CRAs have been reporting amounts of outstanding issuer 
ratings whereas other CRAs recorded issue ratings when submitting to the SEC annual reports. 
This sheds light on the lack of robust and explicit requirements in the regulation, which then 
gives scope for interpretation on the side of CRAs. Compliance by CRAs has also raised doubts 
                                                 
243. The number of ratings depends on (a) issuers’ demand (i.e. debt issuance) and (b) unsolicited ratings. 
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in a couple of instances (i.e. solicitation status disclosures, identifiers). Another aspect under 
review is the suggestion of commentators to introduce the investor-pays model as an ultimate 
solution to conflict of interest problems. The chapter sheds light on the recent scandal relating 
to the only CRA working under this paradigm (EJR); while identifying possible drawbacks of 
the model and suggesting reconsideration of this option. Fines and penalties also attract some 
attention as the only CRA from the big three which has been penalised (with respect to 
structured finance products) is S&P. Nevertheless, it is known that all three big CRAs 
contributed towards deteriorating economic conditions by failing to adequately evaluate the 
creditworthiness of structured finance instruments. For this reason it would be interesting to 
follow the actions of the regulators in the coming years to see if similar penalties will be 
imposed on the other two CRAs (Fitch and Moody’s). The length of these processes leads to 
another question about the effectiveness of regulatory oversight and enforcement. 
This chapter has strong economic significance because it draws policy implications from the 
empirical evidence. The presented issues contribute on different levels and have strong 
potential to inform future policy and are additionally of importance to market practitioners and 
academics. 
Chapter 5 presents unique evidence on the impact of the solicitation status of sovereigns on 
bank ratings, with the effect being transmitted via the rating channel. The study generates a 
synergy across three streams of literature which have not been studied together in prior 
literature. Firstly, the chapter reveals the importance of the solicitation status of sovereigns. 
The literature suggests that ratings of banks and corporations which are based on an unsolicited 
basis are considerably lower than those requested and paid for by the issuer (solicited) (e.g. 
Poon et al., 2009; Bannier et al., 2010; Van Roy, 2013), but there is no literature examining 
this phenomenon for sovereigns. The latter ratings are important for governments and 
economies because they influence the cost of funding for non-sovereigns. The second literature 
stream suggests that sovereign risks spill over to financial institutions through numerous 
channels (BIS, 2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Correa et al., 2014). In line with Alsakka et 
al. (2014) and Huang and Shen (2015), it is hypothesised that the risk transfers onto banks via 
the rating channel. Therefore it is important to investigate whether the solicitation status 
increases that risk. Lastly, the chapter brings together the impact of the EU regulation in terms 
of disclosures by CRAs. There is no published work except Alsakka et al. (2015) which 
considers the effects of disclosure rules imposed by ESMA. There is no other prior empirical 
paper investigating regulatory actions on CRAs in Europe. 
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The chapter uses 147 banks originating from 42 countries for the period between 2006-2013. 
The methodology includes ordered probit modelling, with numerous robustness checks applied 
such as placebo tests, matching on covariate level and use of the propensity score matching 
(PSM). Strenuous attempts are made to ensure that endogeneity does not drive the results and 
to rule out the possibility that other events caused the given effects on bank ratings. In addition, 
the reverse regressions are estimated. 
The results suggest that the application of the unsolicited status to sovereigns adversely affects 
bank ratings operating in those countries via the rating channel. Specifically, banks in 
sovereigns which converted their status face a higher likelihood of downgrades and a lower 
likelihood of upgrades in comparison to banks in countries which did not undergo the switch 
of solicitation status and remained solicited at all times. Among the theories explaining the 
deflated unsolicited ratings, strategic conservatism is the most likely to be reconciled with these 
findings. The CRA might prefer to rate too low rather than too high as it receives less 
information about the issuer after the solicitation switch.   
The marginal effects (MEs) imply that banks in the first group are 1.73%, 0.74% and 0.47% 
more likely to receive downgrades by 1, 2 and 3 or more CCR points respectively. The strength 
of the relationship is especially highlighted when the significance of MEs is considered against 
the total number of sovereign and bank rating downgrades (i.e. 2.73% and 3.28% respectively). 
The chapter proposes strong implications for future policies and regulations and stresses the 
importance of unsolicited sovereign ratings. The economic significance is relevant to market 
participants since the regulation might induce additional costs to banks and other firms in 
obtaining capital. Such unintended effects of disclosure need greater attention in the future. 
Also the issue of unsolicited sovereign ratings needs to be revisited by policymakers as their 
implications are discernible.  
Chapter 6 examines whether the ESMA requirement for rating identifiers to be introduced in 
April 2012 affected the quality of ratings reported by CRAs. By investigating the influence of 
the location of the analyst on the quality of ratings, the chapter contributes towards the stream 
of literature measuring the impact of CRA regulation (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Becker and 
Milbourn, 2011; Bongaerts et al., 2012). This chapter is different from those studies because it 
does not consider the effect of regulation on the competitiveness of CRAs. Additionally, this 
is the first study investigating disclosure rules via the channel of identifiers. The regulation 
requires that CRAs report which ratings are issued by analysts/offices located in the EU and 
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which are issued outside the EU (which can be either ‘endorsed’ or ‘not endorsed’ dependent 
on the EU deeming the CRA regulation in that jurisdiction to be sufficiently rigorous). It is 
important to measure the effect of identifiers as it is perceived that endorsement rules can add 
credibility to the CRAs’ opinions and thus result in an increase rather than decrease in their 
market influence. Studying the sovereign ratings also has an impact for the future policies and 
market participants alike since it affects the sources of funding for nations and therefore the 
economies as a whole. For this reason ensuring that ratings are of the highest possible quality 
is of importance to all market participants. 
By including the regulation aspect in the discussion, the chapter complements earlier studies 
on the information content of ratings which pursue different angles (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; 
Bongaerts et al., 2012). This chapter utilises a more recent sample period (Sept 2007- Sept 
2014) than other papers. In comparison, Bongaerts et al. (2012) is based on data between 2002-
2008 while Kisgen and Strahan (2010) between 2001-2005. The chapter also contributes by 
implementing analysis of the sovereign ratings issued by the big three CRAs for 69 countries. 
The applied methodology, which uses the intensification of the treatment, is also unique as it 
has not been used in this setting before. Finally, the chapter reveals some important issues 
which add to the discussion of the effectiveness of the EU CRA regulation. This policy aspect 
is of importance to regulators (ESMA in particular), market participants and academics because 
it aims at improving the functioning of the CRA market, protecting investors and contributing 
to overall financial stability. 
The results suggest that rating events mainly concentrate at 1 and 2 CCR points which indicate 
the importance of outlook and watch announcements. The chapter confirms earlier studies 
finding S&P to be the most conservative amongst the three CRAs for sovereign ratings (e.g. 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010c). The upgrades by S&P are found to have a stronger effect on 
sovereign yields than negative events. Since higher quality ratings explain the bond values 
better by correlating more closely, it is inferred that positive actions by S&P are of higher 
quality than the negative actions. This could be explained by the fact that CRAs aim to avoid 
inflated ratings in order to protect their reputation (Dimitrov et al., 2015). The results do not 
find any discernible effect of the ESMA identifiers on the quality of released ratings. The same 
applies to Moody’s which yields insignificant results for all its coefficients except one control 
variable. In the Fitch subsample, a strong correlation between negative events and bond yields 
is found, which indicates a high quality of these ratings. This effect is not induced by regulation 
since only two specifications record significant results (at the 10% level) for the interaction 
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between identifiers and the rating change. Except for these cases, Fitch actions do not suggest 
any link between the identifiers and rating quality.  
To ensure the results are robust, a number of tests follow the estimation. The sample is split 
into regions and pooled regressions of three CRAs are performed. Also, a different scale for 
rating events is introduced to examine whether the results are sensitive to the watch and outlook 
status announcements. 
The research direction in this Thesis is new and original. It therefore deserves more attention 
from academics. It is also of relevance to regulators, market participants and CRAs themselves. 
Although the empirical work uses various methods and was supplemented by robustness tests, 
there are some limitations to this research. For example, in Chapter 4 there is no global data on 
the number of analysts and outstanding ratings available for 2014 and 2015 from the SEC 
reports. Also, the reporting style of CRAs is not standardised (issuer vs issue ratings) and 
impedes intra-CRA comparisons. The ESMA transparency reports also suffer from 
standardisation issues while their time series is relatively short to conduct any type of more 
detailed analysis. Chapter 5 is restricted to analysis solely on S&P ratings which results from 
a failure in the new disclosure rules. Namely, solicitation status data was not available for other 
CRAs at the time when the study was conducted. Also, S&P is the only CRA to have publicly 
announced changes in the solicitation status induced by regulation. The limitation of Chapter 
6 is the fact that the time-series is only able to cover 2 years after the identifiers regulation was 
introduced.  
Since this is a ground-breaking research in the area of ratings and regulation, future research 
on the current efforts of ESMA’s CRA supervision is an interesting direction for investigation. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate what determines the fact that the sovereign 
rating is solicited or not, in the context of Chapter 5. What is the role of governments in that 
process in terms of selecting to have solicited ratings? Utilising a theoretical model similar to 
the one suggested by Opp et al. (2013) would be a valuable future extension to the ideas in 
Chapter 6. 
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